Features
Election ’24: Rajapaksa Implosion and Red Sea Meddling
by Rajan Philips
A defining condition of the elections this year (Election ’24), in my view, is the implosion of the Rajapaksas. They have been a fixture and a dominant factor in every election after the 2005 presidential election that Mahinda Rajapaksa managed to win by the narrowest of margins thanks to the election boycott imposed by the LTTE in the northern and eastern provinces. The ‘wheel of time’, as the late TULF leader Amirthalingam (whose own wheel was cut short by the LTTE) was wont to say drawing on the circular concept of time in Indian religions, would seem to have come a full circle for the elections this year.
Ranil Wickremesinghe, who was narrowly defeated in 2005, is all set for his last hurrah in 2024. The Rajapaksas, who have dominated the island’s politics for the first quarter of the 21st century, are all set for their political obituaries. But the ripple effects of their collapse will implicate the contest and the outcome of the presidential election expected in September and the parliamentary election expected to follow not long after.
In the 2019 presidential election, Gotabaya Rajapaksa polled 6.9 million votes against Sajith Premadasa’s 5.6 million votes. Anura Kumara Dissanayake polled 418,550 votes. The Rajapaksa implosion means that the 6.9 million votes that went to Gotabaya Rajapaksa are now up for grabs. Who will be the main beneficiary? That is going to be the campaign question in the months ahead, and which way the erstwhile Rajapaksa votes break will be a significant factor in the final result.
Red Sea Meddling
I do not think ‘foreign involvement’ will be a key factor in the election, especially in influencing the 6.9 million who voted for Rajapaksa last time to make up their mind about whom to vote for this time. Mahinda Rajapaksa never stopped blaming everyone outside the country, especially India, for causing his defeat in the 2015 presidential election, which he should not have contested.
Foreign meddling talk was palpable nonsense. The same nonsense is being parroted by still lingering MR admirers, who see a foreign hand behind the emergence of Aragalaya but who conveniently forget that by the same logic the US could have road-blocked the GR candidacy. And everyone including Gotabaya Rajapaksa would have been spared of the calamity he created as president.
While there might not be a foreign hand in the upcoming election, that is not going to stop Ranil Wickremesinghe from claiming that only he can play his hand outside Sri Lanka on behalf of Sri Lanka unlike any of his rivals. His promoters are already onto it, and Mr. Wickremesinghe himself seems to be wanting to show it off with his frequent flying missions overseas. He has already made two trips in January, first to Switzerland (for Davos) and now to Uganda (for the Non-Aligned summit), adding to the 13 trips prior since becoming interim president. Someone has even started a Wikipedia account on Mr. Wickremesinghe’s presidential travels.
Whether any of this will help getting votes in large numbers is a different question. Among what might be called knowledgeable political circles in Sri Lanka, Mr. Wickremesinghe is likely acknowledged as the Sri Lankan political leader with the most international recognition. But he runs the risk of overdoing it and getting boomeranged for it.
The proposed mission to join the US led naval operations for protecting commercial ships in the Red Sea is a case in point. Rather than getting the country to punch above its weight, Mr. Wickremesinghe would seem to be implicating Sri Lanka in unnecessary foreign meddling, which would only annoy the Arab world and getting nothing in return from anyone else. It would be quite a reversal after years of Rajapaksa grumbling about foreign meddling targeting them.
The Red Sea crisis only illustrates the dangerous impasse that Israel’s intransigence in Gaza has drawn the Middle East. The crisis seems unstoppable from spilling over. Even South Africa’s bold decision to take Israel to the International Court of Justice alleging genocide and asking for provisional measures has not been able to deter the Netanyahu government. On Friday, Mr. Netanyahu publicly rejected even the idea of a Palestinian state that the US has been hoping to create in return for its support of Israel’s unrestricted right of defence.
The US has isolated itself in supporting Israel, and it has few supporters for the Operation Prosperity Guardian it has launched against the Houthis in the Red Sea. Even the US’s NATO allies are keeping away from the US naval operation. The leaking trouble finds Iran and Pakistan raiding each other’s territory to kill one’s terrorist enemies allegedly harboured by the other.
What contribution is Mr. Wickremesinghe trying to make by meddling in these matters? Is he going to solicit support from Non Aligned countries to align with the US? These are questions to President Wickremesinghe and to his campaign organizers even though they would serve no purpose as election questions for Sri Lankan voters.
The Post Rajapaksa Vote
Apart from international recognition, Mr. Wickremesinghe is also being promoted not so much as a UNP candidate, but as the candidate of a yet to be shaped ‘grand alliance.’ The only grandness that one can find until now is the number of SLPP Ministers and MPs in parliament who will rally round the Wickremesinghe candidacy. Even the Rajapaksa family seems to be coming around to sponsoring Ranil Wickremesinghe as ‘their’ candidate. Dhammika Perera might be finally finding out that there are still things in Sri Lanka that money alone cannot buy.
But will all the familial sponsorships and grand alliance gimmicks be enough to translate into a first round victory for Ranil Wickremesinghe? We come to the same question again and will be constrained to keep coming until the elections are over.
Ranil Wickremesinghe has not contested a presidential election after his loss to Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005. How many of the 6.9 million who voted for Gotabaya Rajapaksa (GR) will Mr. Wickremesinghe be able to peel off to his tally, considering that about four million of them may have never voted UNP in the past? The GR vote is not the only one that is going to be divvied up. The 5.6 million votes that Sajith Premadasa polled will also be split between Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe who was upstaged from being a candidate in 2019 by Mr. Premadasa. The two men will also compete for the lion share of the Rajapaksa vote. It might be too late to prevent a contest between, which could only happen by Sajith Premadasa being persuaded to stand down. Unlikely, even with foreign meddling.
The multi-million vote question is of course how Anura Kumara Dissanayake is going to jump from less than half a million votes in 2019 to more than seven million in 2024? Of all the three candidates, Anura Kumara Dissanayake is the only one who appears to be having a somewhat nationwide mass appeal for the election. Is that enough to be cashed into six to seven million plus votes if he is to pass the 50% mark?
The last time a Left Party in Sri Lanka ran a campaign believing that it would win the election to form a new government was in March 1960 for what was then only the parliamentary election. That was the LSSP’s campaign and the belief that NM Perera would get the call from the Governor General to form a new government. Election posters all over the country showed a smiling NM holding the phone to his ear. There was no call from Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, and what came after is now part of history. Now there is no Governor General, only Ranil Wickremesinghe making all the calls.
The JVP was born out of that history of the late 1960s, and tried its own method to capture power through other means, not once but twice, with failures and setbacks both times. It first entered the electoral fray in the first presidential election in 1982, and its leader and candidate Rohana Wijeweera polled a hardly significant tally of 273,428 votes. After 37 years, in the 2019 presidential election Anura Kumara Dissanayake obtained 418,553 votes, an increase of 145,000 votes whereas the number of registered in the country doubled from eight million to 16 million.
The highest number of votes that the JVP has recorded since 1982, is 815,000 and it was in the 2001 parliamentary election. It may have fared better in the 2004 parliamentary election, but then the JVP was part of an SLFP-lead alliance. A seven million leap seems like a bridge too far, even with exciting opinion polling. But nothing is impossible although a great deal of organizational infrastructure will be needed to effect such a massive turnaround.
It is far too early even to speculate how the three candidates will likely fare in the election. As of now none of them is a runaway candidate. It is possible that for the first time in a presidential election there may not be a winner after the first count and additional counts of second/third preference votes may be required to declare the winner. It is also possible that campaign momentum could change and one of the candidates could break free ahead of the other two.
The three-way split of the Rajapaksa vote will likely be influenced by the national momentum of the three campaigns and the regional/districts strengths of the three candidates. Going by past election results, Ranil Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa would likely attempt to consolidate their support in the Western, North-Western, Central, Northern and Eastern provinces. To get as many as seven million votes, Anura Kumara Dissanayake will have to vigorously campaign everywhere and extend the NPP branches nationally from the traditional JVP roots in the Southern, Sabaragamuwa, North-Central and Uva provinces.
The Rajapaksa vote was mostly concentrated among the majority Sinhala Buddhist sections of the population. The three candidates will also be vying, unlike the Rajapaksas, for the non- Sinhala Buddhist voting blocs. Although the supporters of Ranil Wickremesinghe will fancy his chances among the minorities, there is no certainty that he would do well as his supporters expect him to do. The Tamils in the north and east and the Sinhala Catholics will likely be lukewarm at best in their support for him. And he will have competition from the other two candidates for all sections of the minority vote.
Hopefully, at the national level the three campaigns will focus on policy issues and not platitudes. The issues of the economy, political corruption, constitutional changes and power devolution should figure prominently in the campaigns. It would be a challenge for every one of the three candidates to present a platform that clearly differentiates it from the other two. No one seems to have caught the imagination of the voting public in an exciting debate on any or all of the major issues.
The JVP’s popularity in opinion polls would suggest that its campaign is resonating with the people, but as the campaign hits the home stretch there will be expectations for more details and demonstration of competence. Sajith Premadasa will have to find a way to campaign without losing himself in his rhetoric, and Ranil Wickremesinghe should try hard not to come across as the only know it all. As they campaign for the Rajapaksa vote, it will be interesting to see if or how they will critique the recent Rajapaksa past. And if the Rajapaksas were to formally endorse Ranil Wickremesinghe, would they be invited to join him on the campaign trail? Will they turn out to be an electoral asset or albatross?
Features
Coercive laws recipe for future misrule
by Jehan Perera
The NPP government is going after powerful figures from the past and present who have engaged in corruption, fraud and criminal activity in a way that no previous government in Sri Lanka has done. Former ministers, politicians and senior state officials are among those facing investigations and legal proceedings. The government has placed before Parliament a document listing 50 cases involving corruption, fraud and other crimes. These include not only financial offences but also cases relating to the Easter Sunday attacks, the killings of Lasantha Wickrematunge and Wasim Thajudeen, the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda and attacks on journalists Keith Noyahr and Upali Tennakoon.
The significance of this effort is that it can demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of political connections or social standing, which will help restore public confidence in institutions that have long been distrusted. It could also recover public resources, improve the investment climate and strengthen the foundations for a more prosperous and just Sri Lanka. When criticised for focusing on the past and not the present, the government position is that these investigations were initiated under earlier governments, particularly between 2015 and 2019, and that it is now allowing investigators to proceed to deal with the backlog without political interference.
But there is an aspect of the government’s approach that is less justifiable. While pursuing past wrongdoing by powerful individuals, it is also advancing a triumvirate of draft laws that could give the state sweeping powers over citizens, organisations and dissent in the present and future. The draft Prevention of Terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill raise serious questions about the over-centralisation of power. Each of these laws strengthens the powers of the state while weakening the rights and safeguards that protect people from their misuse and thus questions the basic rights of people in democracy where ‘the power of the people is vested in the government’. This is a recipe for future misrule rather than the rule of law. As the well-known saying goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Proposed Laws
The real test of system change, for which the government obtained an overwhelming mandate, requires not only a government willing to hold others accountable, but one prepared to subject itself to the same principles of legality, transparency and restraint. The three proposed laws that are particularly important in this regard are the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill. Each of these draft laws has been presented as serving a legitimate purpose. Preventing terrorism, combating organised crime and ensuring that NGOs do not facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing are proper responsibilities of the state. Sri Lanka has international obligations in these areas, and no responsible government can disregard them. However, the existence of a legitimate objective does not justify every means adopted to achieve it.
The proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill illustrates the problem. Although its definition of terrorism draws on a model developed by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has warned that the definition of terrorism extends beyond the model and could bring legitimate political protest, trade union action and civil disobedience within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Its concerns also include prolonged detention, inadequate judicial oversight and restrictions on access to legal counsel. These are objections that go to the heart of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The government cannot credibly promise to protect democratic freedoms while creating powers that could be used to restrict them. It is necessary for the government to reassess the draft through transparent consultation and revise provisions that could criminalise legitimate dissent.
The Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill raises similar concerns. It is presented as giving effect to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which Sri Lanka ratified in 2006. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has argued that the convention does not require many of the bill’s provisions. The proposed law extends to a broad range of offences, permits detention orders lasting up to a year, makes confessions to police admissible for purposes of legal evidence, and introduces extensive surveillance powers. A law intended to dismantle criminal networks should not create a parallel system of exceptional powers that could be applied far beyond organised crime. Nor should safeguards developed through years of experience with abuses under the Prevention of Terrorism Act be weakened through legislation bearing a different name. The government should review whether or not existing laws could be used effectively to control these crimes or whether each exceptional power is necessary.
Civil Society
The proposed NGO Registration and Supervision Bill presents another test of the government’s intentions. The government may reasonably seek transparency in the finances of organisations receiving public or foreign funds, including measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to justify its overreach on the grounds of meeting the internationally mandated requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the Asia-Pacific region. But these objectives do not justify placing civil society and NGOs under excessive administrative control when even the FATF ranks them as low to medium risks. The draft bill would require registration and renewal, impose extensive obligations on organisations and empower authorities to suspend or deregister them on broadly framed grounds. It is important to redraft provisions that confer excessive discretion over registration, renewal, suspension and deregistration of NGOs.
Among the concerns raised by United Nations human rights special rapporteurs with regard to the draft NGO law are provisions requiring organisations to align with government policies and restrictions that could affect advocacy, dissent and freedom of association. The implications extend well beyond organisations that engage directly with the government. Community groups, human rights organisations, independent researchers and organisations working on reconciliation or accountability could find their activities constrained by uncertainty over how these provisions might be interpreted. Organisations that criticise government policies are not thereby working against the country. Their freedom to do so is part of what distinguishes a democracy from a system in which the government determines which opinions and activities are acceptable.
The government has generated considerable public goodwill through its pursuit of corruption and criminality. It should not assume that this goodwill gives it an unlimited mandate to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The NPP knows from its own history that governments can treat dissent as a threat and use the machinery of the state against their opponents. There is still time to correct the drafts through transparent public consultation, narrow definitions of offences, meaningful judicial control over detention and surveillance, and effective remedies against arbitrary decisions. A government that pursues corruption while weakening safeguards against state abuse risks undermining its own achievements. Besides bringing to light the abuse of power by previous governments, the NPP government needs to build a system in which no future government can abuse power in the belief they can get away with it.
Features
Quality assurance without quality enhancement: The irony of university QA
By Ramya Kumar
According to the Quality Assurance Council (QAC) of the University Grants Commission (UGC), quality assurance (QA) refers to “the means (i.e. the policies, attitudes, actions, procedures, etc.), by which an institution can guarantee with confidence and certainty, that the standards and quality of its educational provision are being maintained and enhanced”.
An expansive structure has been in place since 2005 to govern and implement QA processes within the state university system. The QAC is the focal point at the UGC that implements external reviews of state universities and institutes. Each university has its own Centre for Quality Assurance (CQA) tasked with performing QA in line with QAC directives. Faculties, in turn, have Internal Quality Assurance Cells (IQAC) performing their own QA; they are answerable to the CQA.
The big question is whether this all-encompassing top-down QA system, that in many ways undermines the internal dynamics of university governance, actually supports universities to enhance the quality of education. This article highlights some concerns.
Top-down check-box activities
The QAC conducts external reviews of universities and degree programmes. A review team appointed by the UGC (who may or may not have experience in the institution/programme in question) examines the self-evaluation report submitted by the said institution/programme. The team then conducts a site visit to verify the claims made in the university’s self-evaluation report, clarify issues identified during the desk review, and examine how QA procedures operate in practice. The team holds meetings with the university administration, members of the Council and Senate, Deans, Heads of Departments, academic and non-academic staff, students, and others. Following the visit, a draft report is submitted to the relevant institution/programme for comment before final publication. The reviewed institution/programme then prepares and publishes an action plan addressing the recommendations, with subsequent monitoring of progress.
There are some worthy QA initiatives under implementation, such as improving facilities for students with disabilities and strengthening mechanisms to address sexual- and gender-based violence. However, for the most part, QA activities have little to do with improving the quality of education. They are mostly preoccupied with monitoring faculty and department websites, digital transformation, student feedback, subject evaluation, course evaluation, peer evaluation, and, more recently, staff appraisal. These activities, which consume an inordinate amount of time—so precious at understaffed universities—have become check-box activities completed to generate evidence for the next review. Below is an excerpt of a conversation between two academics (1 and 2) that conveys how QA plays out at universities (reproduced with permission).
1: … .it’s like social media you know, like posting things on Facebook or twitter or Instagram. When people do a lot of social media, everything they do, they do thinking, “okay I’m going to post it in this way… this I have to put on my Instagram.” QA is a little like that… everything is considered in light of, “ah we can use this for the review, as evidence… for example very recently we were encouraged to have all the things that we do in our department in the faculty newsletter so then they can put in the review. Every little thing has to be noted down….
2: And with pictures and all…
1: At the very least it has to be written so that you have written evidence .. you can’t be doing something for the sake of doing something or because it is good for the department … and sometimes people tell me “oh yea that’s a good idea we can fit that under this x, y section of the review..”
2: Yea, and nobody really thinks about the actual outcome… whether it’s actually helping anyone..
1: I also find that a lot of the words that we used in different ways have now been co-opted to the QA discourse ..including quality.. I can’t actually say what I want as an “outcome”, for example, that the outcome of this workshop is that my students “think about” … then I am told “ah but no that’s not one of the Bloom’s taxonomy words, “think about”.…
2: And the worst part is these medical and agriculture people, these types of people go around spreading it like some kind of gospel!
1: Yea, this cookie cutter way of doing things, they think is the height of innovativeness or creativity, when actually it is so mundane … for me the most awful thing about it is like some fungus of mundanity has taken over through QA reviews.
2: yea, when you say QA, my mind closes off immediately and I stop listening…
Auditing everything but power
QA leaves out crucial aspects of university governance. For instance, there is no review or assessment of the “quality” of university administrations under Criterion 1 or the integrity of procedures governing the promotion of academic staff under Criterion 6 of the institutional reviews.
The majority in the Council—the university’s executive and governing body, which is responsible for selecting the Vice-Chancellor (VC)—are appointed in ad hoc fashion. Apart from the Ex-Officio members in the Council (VC, Deans, etc.), and the two members elected by the Senate, the remainder are appointed by the UGC with no formal consultation or vetting procedure. The VC appointment process described in UGC Circular No. 03/2023 exemplifies how an ostensibly technical process can become entangled in political sycophancy. The Registrar invites applications for the position of VC through advertisement. Applicants must submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of vision for the university and supporting documents. The University Council appoints a three-member Search Committee of senior academics to encourage “eminent persons” to apply, while the UGC appoints a former VC from another university to “observe” the selection process.
A Special Meeting of the University Council is convened. Candidates are interviewed and must make a presentation to the Council Members, followed by questions. Each Council member “gives marks” for seven prescribed criteria: strategic focus (20%), effective leadership (20%), holistic thinking/conceptual skills (10%), academic and research excellence (15%), personal integrity (10%), professional communication (10%) and managerial competence (15%). Marks are averaged, and the Council recommends three candidates to the UGC in rank order. The UGC-appointed observer separately submits a confidential report on the selection process.
This procedure is expected to guarantee quality, but does it? Applications are submitted to the Council Members, who have been appointed on questionable bases, and who are expected to review the applications and give scores, based on objective assessments. But, in reality, most Council Members are manipulated by VC candidates, who often have personal ties with them. The UGC-appointed observer usually has no genuine interest in the outcome. And there is no way for anyone to actually question the Council’s decision once it is made. Although the highest-ranked candidate may ultimately be appointed, the selection remains a political decision made by the President, who retains the discretion to appoint any one of the three.
External reviews also do not look into the promotions of academic staff, except to scrutinise whether there are policies and procedures in place to govern promotion. Academic staff may apply for promotion to Professor once they satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements, which typically include the period of service, academic qualifications, research and publication achievements, teaching experience, and contributions to the university and wider community. Applications are evaluated against specified criteria, with research output and academic contributions assessed through documentary evidence and expert evaluation. Under the UGC’s scheme for Professors, two experts from outside the applicant’s institution assess specified aspects of research and knowledge dissemination. Again, beneath this technical process, which is externally evaluated, lies a problematic points-based scheme that can be manipulated and abused with impunity.
Rethinking university QA
Like the VC election process and the schemes of promotion for academic staff, QA reviews are open to manipulation. Before a review, there is a chaotic rush to complete evidence gathering and reporting. Academics leave all other work aside, including at times their teaching, to focus on completing documentation and preparing reports. The standardised criteria in the review manuals and scoring sheets often do not reflect differences in disciplines and institutional contexts. But this does not really matter because any serious problems experienced by institutions or programmes are hastily brushed under the carpet to conceal any evidence that could taint the review. The goal is to obtain an A or at least a B grade at whatever cost.
QA may result in positive change if it moves beyond top-down check-box activities towards internally designed and owned processes encompassing all aspects of university governance, led by departments and faculties, and supported by adequate resources. The current QA system needs to be dismantled and replaced by procedures that are accountable, not to the UGC, but to our students and the communities we serve.
(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna)
. Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Down Memory Lane — the Grand 20th Edition!
Yes, Down Memory Lane, the beloved Sing-Along concert series that first struck a chord, way back in 1997, returns for its landmark 20th edition this Saturday, 17th October, at the beautiful Bolgoda Grand Resort, Moratuwa town centre.
Having celebrated its glorious 25th anniversary with the show in 2023, this milestone 20th concert promises to be even more special.
The organisers, the ever-popular Moratuwa Arts Forum, are pulling out all the stops to present yet another unforgettable evening, brimming with camaraderie, fellowship, and pure nostalgia.
Get ready for two-and-a-half hours of non-stop singing as veteran vocalists, from the Moratuwa Arts Forum, will take the stage to lead and inspire the happy audience to sing, sing and sing to their hearts’ content.
The repertoire? Absolutely magical, according to the organisers.

Veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike: Will handle the evening’s proceedings / Priya Peiris: Event Conceptor
Around 40 golden oldies — from timeless English vintage evergreens and hits from the 50s to the 90s, to toe-tapping calypsos, soulful American plantation melodies, rousing cowboy and Dixieland favourites, aa well as cherished Sinhala standards. All to be sung with much gusto!
This year’s dedicated organising committee comprises Brian Coorey (Chairman), Priya Peiris (Event Conceptor), Hiran Fernando, Suranga Fernando, Viranjan Perera, Hemka Fernando and Neelesh Silva. Guidance and support comes from Moratuwa Arts Forum President Sarana Guneratne and Secretary Chandani Silva.
Adding his signature charm to the evening, as Master of Ceremonies, will be the veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike.
Don’t miss this landmark celebration of music and memories!
For further details, contact Hiran Fernando on 0772636446 or WhatsApp 0783636446.
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