Opinion

Corruption: A concept to be understood properly

Published

2 months ago

2026/06/10

Many of us know that post-independence Sri Lanka is nearly eight decades old, yet the country has not achieved the level of growth and development necessary to ensure a high quality of life for its citizens. Most people point fingers at the politicians who governed the country and criticize their economic policies. One of the most recent accusations against political leaders is corruption. This concern becomes evident when analysing measures such as the Corruption Perceptions Index and examining recent incidents such as the Central Bank bond scam. Ultimately, the country had to face severe economic downturns and a declining standard of living. Consequently, Sri Lanka was compelled to reform its legal framework by introducing new laws for the implementation of monetary policy and the control of corruption, while also seeking assistance from international organisations. It is true that the effective enforcement of the law can reduce corruption. However, achieving meaningful results requires a broader understanding of corruption, along with improvements in legal mechanisms and more effective methods of enforcement. This short write-up aims to familiarise citizens with a broader definition of corruption, its various forms, and several measures that can be adopted to combat corruption effectively and efficiently.

Corruption undermines democracy

As stated by the United Nations, corruption undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organised crime, terrorism, and other threats to human security to flourish. It is also a key factor contributing to economic underperformance and a major obstacle to poverty alleviation and sustainable development. Furthermore, corruption represents a failure of governance, as it distorts the allocation of resources and weakens government performance. The World Bank defines corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain.” In this context, public power is abused by elected politicians or appointed public officials for personal benefit. In the modern global economy, no country can be considered completely free from corruption; therefore, corruption remains a global issue.

Academic literature provides numerous definitions of corruption, and many researchers have proposed various theories to explain it. The relationships between corruption and other socio-economic variables have been widely analysed, while both its causes and effects have been extensively discussed. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, introduced in 2004, proposed several measures to combat corruption. Nevertheless, corruption continues to remain high in many developing countries and is also evident, to some extent, in developed economies. Sri Lanka is no exception. Authorities responsible for controlling corruption in Sri Lanka have acknowledged that investigations and prosecutions alone are insufficient to effectively combat corruption. Therefore, expanding the frontiers of knowledge on corruption, particularly in the Sri Lankan context, is of timely and national importance.

Although the literature provides and explains many definitions of corruption, there is no single universally accepted definition. In efforts to combat corruption effectively, definitions must encompass a broader range of ideas, and people should properly understand the various forms and dimensions of corruption.

Certain improper activities carried out by public sector officials are difficult to categorise strictly as the “abuse of public property for private gain.” For example, in the public sector, failure to properly perform assigned duties, leaving official work unfinished despite being entrusted with responsibilities, taking unnecessarily long periods to complete official tasks, using excessive public resources, and deliberately delaying public services can all be considered forms of corruption or administrative misconduct. Furthermore, in some instances, officials and institutional heads intentionally remain silent about the corrupt activities of others, assist corrupt individuals in concealing evidence, or show reluctance, lethargy, or unwillingness to take legal action against corrupt public officers. Although Sri Lanka’s Anti-Corruption Act No. 9 of 2023 defines corruption, it does not explicitly incorporate all of these dimensions.

Moreover, legalised corruption is another issue that deserves attention. This relates to weaknesses or manipulations in the process of framing laws and regulations. Certain actions may not directly fall under the definition of the “use of public property for private gain,” yet they may still represent indirect or extended forms of corruption. Therefore, for the successful control and prevention of corruption, broader and more comprehensive definitions are required.

Forms of Corruption

Corruption may appear in various forms. If the economy is broadly divided into the public and private sectors, corruption can be analysed under two major categories: public sector–specific corruption and public–private sector corruption. The first category refers to corruption that occurs solely within the public sector, while the second involves the abuse of public resources in transactions or interactions between the public and private sectors.

Within the first category, corruption may occur not only at the individual level but also collectively. Individual corruption takes place when a single public officer abuses public resources or authority for personal gain. However, collective corruption involves coordinated behavior among groups of public officials. This collective behavior may occur within a particular institutional hierarchy or among several related institutions and hierarchies. For example, within a single hierarchy, when a citizen visits a public office to obtain a service, a particular officer may be responsible for handling the relevant task. If the officer is corrupt, he or she may deliberately avoid performing the required duty by raising irrelevant objections or refusing to provide the service efficiently. In some cases, the officer may intentionally insert doubtful or questionable remarks into official documents and forward them to a superior officer in order to obstruct the successful completion of the request.

At times, superior officers themselves may instruct subordinate officers on the type of comments or procedural objections that can be used to justify rejecting a request when no personal benefit or reward is received. Conversely, when a material reward or bribe is offered, all officials involved may cooperate and share the benefit among themselves. This represents a collective form of corruption confined within a particular hierarchy in the public sector, without any direct involvement from the private sector.

Collective corruption may also occur across two or more institutions or hierarchies that are required to work together. Such situations are often observed in the process of taking legal action against criminal offences. If the relevant institutions fail to perform their duties honestly and effectively, the legal process may collapse. Where officials within these institutions act corruptly or engage in favoritism, they may collectively benefit from rewards or unlawful advantages received in exchange for their cooperation or inaction. This is another form of collective corruption that exists entirely within the public sector.

In such circumstances, the rule of law becomes ineffective. Therefore, there is a strong need to recognise and incorporate these collective patterns of corrupt behavior into broader definitions and theories of corruption. This may also provide a foundation for the development of new theoretical approaches to understanding corruption in the public sector.

For the second category, namely public–private sector corruption, many examples can be identified. Tender procedures and procurement activities conducted by state institutions are common practices in every country. When private sector actors attempt to influence public officials through rewards, bribes, or other benefits in order to secure favorable decisions, such actions fall within this category of corruption.

In some instances, private individuals who work in association with public institutions may collaborate to generate undue benefits for themselves. For example, within the court system, lawyers are paid by plaintiffs and defendants for legal representation. Certain lawyers may intentionally delay court proceedings for personal financial gain. In some cases, lawyers representing opposing parties — such as plaintiffs and defendants or co-owners in partition cases — may unofficially cooperate to prolong legal procedures, including the delayed submission of documents or repeated postponements of hearings. By extending the duration of cases, they may maximize the payments received for their court appearances and related services. Such practices can also be regarded as a form of corruption linked to the interaction between public institutions and private actors.

Moreover, within public institutions, when one official engages in corrupt activities, superior officers or fellow officials may intentionally remain silent without reporting the misconduct or taking disciplinary action against the corrupt individual. In Sri Lanka, different political parties have governed the country from time to time; however, corruption has remained widespread under many administrations. Prior to elections, political leaders frequently promise to eliminate corruption and publicly declare that legal action will be taken against corrupt individuals once they are elected. Nevertheless, after assuming power, many fail to fulfill these promises and often avoid taking legal action against corrupt individuals connected either to previous governments or to their own administrations.

Even when certain public officials initiate legal action against corrupt individuals, procedural loopholes or omissions may intentionally be allowed to weaken the effectiveness of such actions. If a superior officer or relevant authority deliberately ignores corruption or fails to take proper legal measures, such behavior may itself be regarded as a secondary form of corruption, which can be described as “corruption on corruption.” Therefore, officials who knowingly tolerate, conceal, or fail to act against corruption should also be considered corrupt.

Preventive Measures

Law serves as the strongest safeguard and a key preventive measure against corruption. However, when the legal framework governing corruption is expanded, the size of government may also increase, and as a result, tax burdens may rise. On the other hand, an excessively enlarged government may itself create additional opportunities for corruption. Therefore, policymakers must exercise caution when designing preventive measures.

It is true that law enforcement institutions take action and punish corrupt individuals with the aim of combating corruption. However, even when legal provisions are adequately established, enforcement is often weak or inconsistent in some countries. In certain cases, legal actions are not taken at all, or they are not implemented effectively against corrupt individuals. At times, officials may deliberately allow omissions or procedural weaknesses within legal processes. In other situations, the legal framework itself may be inadequate, containing loopholes that hinder effective enforcement. In such circumstances, the law must be reformed and made more efficient. Policymakers therefore need to explore new approaches to strengthening anti-corruption legislation. For instance, if legislation clearly states that every employee within a public institution is accountable for corrupt activities occurring within that institution, it may enhance collective responsibility and help prevent collective forms of corruption. Furthermore, when corruption occurs within an institution, heads of institutions or relevant legal authorities may sometimes remain silent. Such silence can enable the continuation and spread of corruption, a situation that may be described as “corruption on corruption.” To address this, legal provisions could be extended to define the deliberate silence or inaction of institutional leaders in the face of known corruption as a punishable offence. Thus, continuous efforts are needed to explore and strengthen legal mechanisms in order to make anti-corruption laws more effective and comprehensive.

Conclusion

Corruption may appear in various forms, and everyone needs to remain vigilant about it. Those who engage in corruption, as well as those who remain silent and fail to take adequate measures to control it, are equally responsible for the persistence of corruption. If the law can be effectively enforced without unnecessarily expanding the size of government, it would be more beneficial for social welfare. Therefore, a broader and more inclusive definition of corruption is required for its successful control. Certain activities may not strictly fall within the internationally recognized definition of corruption as the “use of public property for private gain.” Although Sri Lanka’s Anti-Corruption Act No. 9 of 2023 provides a relatively broader definition, it still does not fully capture all such practices. Moreover, legalised corruption is another important issue that requires further discussion, particularly in relation to the processes of law-making and law enforcement. This includes situations where legal frameworks themselves may be designed or applied in ways that indirectly enable corrupt practices.

by Dr. Tikiri Nimal Herath
Emeritus Professor
tikiriherath@gmail.com

All News Advertisement

Opinion

Dengue: Who will guard the state?

Published

7 hours ago

2026/07/27

Thilina Walpola

I am writing to draw public attention to a serious health hazard regarding a property located at elvitigala mawatha, belonging to the national housing development authority (NHDA)

As seen in the attached photographs, the site is filled with waste that traps water and provides shelter for mosquitoes. Despite repeated complaints, no action has been taken to clean the premises.

This is extremely concerning given the current dengue situation. As of July 18, the National Dengue Control Unit reported over 73,500 dengue cases and 50 deaths nationwide this year, with Colombo being one of the worst affected districts. Residents, including children and the elderly living nearby, are now at direct risk.

PHIs have previously noted that legal action against government premises for dengue breeding is often blocked. If this continues, we are essentially allowing a government property to endanger public health.

I therefore urge the Colombo Municipal Council, the Ministry of Health, and the National Dengue Operations Centre to intervene immediately, clean this property, and hold the authorities concerned accountable before it leads to more dengue cases in our community.

Concerned Citizen

Opinion

Lucille Amarasuriya

Published

1 day ago

2026/07/26

Thilina Walpola

Lucille Amarasuriya

(Written by the late Lakshmi Nimalasuriya in July 1986 and published to mark Lucille’s 40th death anniversary)

She was a special friend. We first met when she was president and I was honorary secretary of a voluntary organization. We worked together in great harmony. She was a person of outstanding merit and enmeshed in dreams and goals which she pursued with unflagging zeal.

Her wealth and position made no impact of exclusiveness, nor the advantages she had as a politician’s wife make her dominating.

She was intelligent, receptive and warm hearted and an indispensable member of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Women’s Association and the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress. She had the ability to respond to any situation and act with confidence – the criterion of leadership.

She was invited to serve on national councils sponsored by the government and was successful in redistributing the allocation of grants which had continued to be unequal and favoured. She was an active member of the Inner Wheel Club adept at fund-raising and was in great demand. She worked long hours in preparation and enlisted all she knew to make the Flag Days successful. She wooed the wives of diplomats for charity performances and the press for publicity. By her tireless efforts she enriched the ever-depleting coffers of these voluntary organizations.

The spiritual growth of young people was a subject close to her heart. She initiated the Youth Forum of the ACBC. She was indeed a happy mother at the time of her death as all her children had grown up to become good citizens.

She was a gifted and versatile person who could sing, write, draw, paint, design, sew and make lovely handicrafts with effortless ease. So, be it an important occasion like her children’s weddings, or mundane functions, fetes, annual general meetings, or at a simple pinkama in the temple or nunnery, or on a sacred day, her lovely creations which she spent hours in making in silent enjoyment would add that splash of gaiety and festivity which delighted us. She told me she learnt this love of decoration from her father who was an eminent Buddhist worker. Underlying all her work was her dedication to the Buddha Sasana.

The death of her teenage daughter early in life, and the death of her husband, who pre-deceased her by a few years, left her inconsolable and she with great difficulty reconciled herself to their loss.

She relives again in memory – Here she comes, a winsome smile on her lovely face, of graceful stature, her wavy hair drawn back, her favourite throatlet around her neck; with friendly charm, her hand out-stretched to help and bound to a generous heart, so she rightly claimed her name of endearment – she was to all Lucilla akka, sister Lucille.

May she soon attain her goal – the end of suffering – Nibbana.

Opinion

Ukraine’s power struggle spills on to the streets

Published

3 days ago

2026/07/24

Thilina Walpola

Zelensky

A leadership crisis that exposes the strategic fault lines of Ukraine’s war effort—and the competing imperatives of domestic command, Western pressure, and battlefield reality.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s abrupt dismissal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and his broader cabinet reshuffle have exposed a deep fracture within Ukraine’s wartime power structure. This extends far beyond personalities and into the strategic orientation of the state itself. What is unfolding is not merely a bureaucratic dispute but a crisis of command in a country prosecuting a high intensity, NATO-supported war against Russia.

On 16 July, protests broke out in Kyiv demanding the removal of Commander in Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi and the reinstatement of Fedorov. Smaller demonstrations occurred in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Lutsk, Dnipro, and other cities. These protests, which have continued for a week, signal a rupture within the prowar bloc that has sustained the Zelensky administration since 2022.

Antiwar sentiment did not drive the demonstrations, in which the “usual suspects” of US-backed “Colour Revolutions” took part. In this case, veterans, territorial defence networks, and upper middleclass “civil society” actors, who remain committed to the war’s continuation. Their demand for Fedorov’s reinstatement reflects a belief that Zelensky has lost operational coherence and strategic clarity. Placards bearing Fedorov’s name were, in effect, endorsements of escalating long range warfare against Russia, despite the catastrophic human toll already borne by both sides.

The political shock waves have reverberated through Ukraine’s Western patrons. The Mayor of Kyiv, Vitaly Klitschko, a major player in the 2014 “Maidan Coup” who is aligned with German strategic interests, condemned the firing publicly as a “big mistake,” while major Western media outlets described the move as “destabilising.” Behind the scenes, officials in Washington and Brussels viewed the sudden change with alarm. Such reactions reveal the degree to which Fedorov had become embedded in Western military technical planning, particularly in the domain of drone warfare, where Ukraine’s operations increasingly intersect with NATO intelligence and logistical support.

This conflict has emerged precisely as Ukraine intensifies drone strikes deep inside Russian territory and escalates operations against Crimea. Fedorov, appointed only six months ago, became the face of this strategy, celebrated by Western media as a “drone warfare mastermind” and criticised domestically for sidelining artillery procurement. His approach aligned closely with NATO’s interest in testing and refining asymmetric strike capabilities against Russia.

Zelensky’s subsequent hints that he may reconsider the decision underscore the precariousness of his position. His authority now rests on a fragile balance between Western expectations, domestic military factions, and a society exhausted by mobilisation. His consultations with both Syrskyi and Fedorov suggest an attempt to reassert control over a command structure that is no longer unified.

Fedorov’s postdismissal revelations sharpen the picture. His claim that Syrskyi and Chief of the General Staff Andrii Hnatov blocked reform initiatives systematically, and that Syrskyi enabled corruption, points to a structural clash between two models of warfare. The Western media has analysed the row as one in which Fedorov represents a Westernaligned, technologydriven paradigm emphasising drones, automation, and longrange strikes. It portrays Syrskyi as embodying an entrenched Sovietera command culture, reliant on artillery, mass mobilisation, and hierarchical control. Zelensky’s decision to side with Syrskyi is presented as a political calculation, preserving the loyalty of the traditional military establishment at the expense of the “reformist” faction.

However, Fedorov’s political alliances complicate this narrative. His cultivation of farright networks, including neo Nazi blogger Serhii Sternenko, reveals the darker undercurrents of Ukraine’s wartime coalition. Sternenko’s role in the 2014 Odessa massacre underscores how extremist actors continue to intersect with state structures, especially in moments of institutional fragmentation.

In actual fact, the power struggle reflects a contradiction between two elite strategies for managing subordination. Ukraine is a subaltern national state embedded in a wider hierarchy of imperialist power. Fedorov is tied to global centi-billionaires and Western technology platforms. His camp can look “more Western” because it is more integrated into transnational circuits of capital and war-tech. The apparent modernity of that model still carries dependency: it improves efficiency while deepening reliance on external monopolies. The war state becomes dependent on foreign-owned infrastructure, satellite systems, software, and elite relationships, which gives external capital leverage over military coordination and political priorities.

Syrskyi, by contrast, is closer to an older form of domestic elite power: the military-bureaucratic order linked to native oligarchic interests, procurement channels, and patronage. This is a more nationally rooted fraction of the bourgeois bloc, but not necessarily a more independent one, because Ukrainian oligarchic power has long been intertwined with Western finance, arms flows, and state restructuring.

The struggle between Syrskyi and Fedorov therefore reflects competing modes of dependency, and (although clearly the Western establishment favours the latter) not a clean split between “national” and “Western” camps. One route passes through transnational tech capital and managerial reform; the other through entrenched oligarchic-military command and domestic networks of influence. The clash is therefore not an isolated dispute but a symptom of an intra-elite struggle over how Ukraine should be governed as a dependent war economy. Neither side points beyond bourgeois rule; they are different management styles of the same subordinated state form.

Taken together, the crisis reflects a deeper geopolitical reality: Ukraine’s war effort is no longer anchored by a unified elite consensus. Instead, it is being pulled apart by competing military doctrines, Western strategic pressures, corruption scandals, and the exhaustion of a society asked to sustain indefinite mobilisation.

Vinod Moonesinghe, formerly chair of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute and of the National Institute for Language Education and Training, serves as Convenor of the Asia Progress Forum.

By Vinod Moonesinghe ✍️