Opinion
Concerns on import ban on chemical fertilisers and pesticides
The Green Socio-Economic Model for Development:
Letter to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa
Sri Lanka Agricultural Economics Association (SAEA) is the professional body representing the agricultural economists of Sri Lanka. Our membership endorses the government’s decision to adopt a Green Socio-Economic Model for development, as we firmly believe that such a strategy is vital for conserving the environment and improving human health. We agree that green approaches in crop cultivation contribute significantly towards achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, SAEA is of the view that most of the current farming systems in Sri Lanka are unsustainable. Hence, the conversion of them into organic farming systems, in the long run, would help promote health of the people and nurture integrity of the nation’s environment. It is well known that many countries currently take systematic and pragmatic approaches to achieve this long-term objective by first setting targets, standards, and subsequently, investing and promoting farmers to adopt best practices. Therefore, we would like to extend our appreciation to the government for taking such a valuable decision to adopt the green socioeconomic model in Sri Lanka.
SAEA also would like to bring to your attention some concerns on the appropriateness of the newly introduced regulation, to restrict forthwith the importation of chemical fertilizers and pesticides by the Gazette Extraordinary No 2226/48 of May 6, 2021, to achieve the above-mentioned broader development goal.
The SAEA predicts massive economic losses due to potential yield losses, in the absence of proper substitutes for chemical fertilisers and pesticides, with the implementation of the import ban on fertilisers and pesticides. The immediate adverse impacts on food security, farm incomes, foreign exchange earnings and rural poverty can be detrimental to achieving the cherished long term goals. The SAEA’s primary concerns, and the less costly policy alternatives proposed by its members in place of the newly introduced import ban, are given below for your kind perusal and consideration.
A. Appropriateness of using an Import Restriction on Agrochemicals to promote organic farming
The SAEA is of the view that the policy instrument identified by the government to promote organic farming is less appropriate due to potential economic losses and its incompatibility with other policy goals of the government.
1. Economic cost to the society
When converting from conventional agriculture into organic farming, the government should weigh the technological, environmental, and economic costs and benefits. The preliminary findings of the studies conducted by the SAEA on potential economic losses of the import ban and respective estimations are given below for your consideration.
(a) Agronomic studies reveal that the average yields from paddy can drop by 25% if chemical fertilisers are fully replaced by organic fertilisers. This loss in productivity could reduce the profitability of paddy farming by 33%, and rice consumption by 27%, if paddy is cultivated just with organic fertilisers with a complete ban on rice imports. In contrast, applying organic fertilizer with the recommended dosages of chemical fertilisers would improve the profitability of farming by 16%.
(b) Absence of chemical fertiliser would drastically reduce the productivity of the Vegetatively Propagated Tea (VPT). With a 35% pro ductivity drop, the export volume of tea would go down from 279 to 181 million kg, causing an income loss of LKR 84 billion. The estate sector will likely incur significant losses compared to those of tea smallholders. These losses could further be aggravated due to increased cost of labour to apply bulky organic fertilisers.
(c) The coconut yields would go down by 30% if chemical fertilisers and pesticides are not applied. This situation will adversely impact fresh coconuts availability for the production of coconut oil, desiccated coconut and other coconut products. The loss in foreign exchange earnings can be as high as LKR 18 billion, based on the assumption that only 26% of the total coconut extent is fertilized. When the additional cost for the importation of edible oils is considered, the loss of foreign exchange earnings will be even higher.
(d) The above results were derived considering the immediate effects on three agricultural sub-sectors. An analysis performed accommodating adjustments in the economy over the medium to long run reveals that a reduction in average agricultural productivity by 20% could cause a decrease in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 3.05%, suggesting an overall contraction of the economy with the implementation of the import ban.
2. Compatibility with other development policies
The proposed policy instrument is not compatible with the policy objectives stated in ‘Vistas for Prosperity and Splendor’. Given below are a few policy incompatibilities highlighted by the members of SAEA (Relevant statement from Vistas for Prosperity and Splendor shown in parenthesis).
(a) Modernisation of agriculture (International export business through various value-added products backed up by new technologies): The SAEA would like to propose that the government considers Sustainable Intensification of farming systems to feed the growing population with rising incomes, seeking safe and nutritious food which are produced in environmentally sustainable farming systems, rather than converting all systems to fully organic agriculture, as its policy objective.
(b) Food self-sufficiency drive (Make the country self-sufficient in the relevant products): Estimates reported in section A (a) indicate that a food deficit would be created in the country owing to yield losses. However, the current government policy on food self-sufficiency would not allow the policymakers to fill this deficit through imports. Such a situation could give rise to food price inflation, unrest, and starvation.
(c) Freedom (People-Centric Economic Development): The chosen policy instrument does not provide flexibility to farmers to determine their least-cost food production methods, without harming the environment. This situation would violate the ‘people’s freedom’ policy of the government.
(d) Rural-urban migration (Linking the village development together with the regional development): Contraction of the rural economy due to reduced farm profitability will lead to increased migration from rural to urban areas. With limited capacity of the manufacturing sector to absorb migrants, this will result in urban congestion.
(e) Commitments with the WTO and other international relations (Friendly, Non-aligned, Foreign Policy): The policy instrument chosen is not compatible with commitments to the WTO.
B. Alternative Policy Instruments for making Food Systems more Environmentally Sustainable
In light of the above observations, members of SAEA suggest the government use more cost-effective instruments to achieve the stated health and environmental outcomes, in place of the newly introduced import regulation. They note that globally, the approach to environmental protection has been evolving from a regulation-driven approach to a more proactive approach, involving voluntary and market-led initiatives. Accordingly, we wish to propose the following three-point policy package.
1. Incentivize organic cultivation using safe and environmentally friendly organic fertilizers and pesticides:
1. Open up pathways towards encouraging organic fertiliser production, storage, distribution, etc., and promote Public-Private Partnership (PPP) models to achieve those.
2. Develop national standards for organic fertilisers and pesticides to ensure non-importation of substandard products to the country, and domestic production meeting specified quality standards.
3. Improve awareness of various organic farming technologies among farmers through a strengthened extension system.
4. Institutionalize and make Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) a mandatory national standard.
2. Dis-incentivize use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides in an environmentally harmful manner:
1. Revisit national standards for chemical fertilisers and pesticides to ensure non-importation of sub-standard products to the country.
2. Impose environmental taxes on selected inorganic fertilisers and pesticides.
3. Reduce and eventually eliminate the subsidy on chemical fertilizers. In phasing out the fertilizer subsidy, we wish to recommend the following steps.
I. Prioritize subsidies according to characteristics such as fertilizer type, agro-ecological region, season, and crop.
II. For the targeted farmers, establish a voucher system that restricts farmers’ access to a lifeline amount [such as two bags] and require them to purchase the balance at market prices for a limited period.
III. When the subsidy is lowered, introduce an output price support program to support the farm producers partially.
4. Provide and support farmers to adopt site-specific fertilizer recommendations and integrated pesticide recommendations.
5. Reduce and eventually eliminate protection provided to crops that are highly fertilizer intensive and erosive.
6. Strengthen existing measures to improve awareness of the safe use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides.
3. Cross-cutting proposals to safeguard the poor and vulnerable and improve the policy process:
1. Maintain a safety net for the poor recognizing the possible increase in food prices.
2. Identify a harmonized financing mechanism. For example, finances of saved fertilizer subsidy and environmental taxes can be used to subsidize organic fertilizer production and application.
3. In formulating the strategic roadmap, adopt a consultative process involving all stakeholders (policymakers, politicians, agriculturalists, environmentalists, and the private sector) and also consider economy-wide impacts (macro, meso, and micro) and externalities.
Considering the economic loss, policy inconsistency, and counterproductive effects created by the regulation in the manner introduced, and the availability of relatively superior alternative measures, the SAEA humbly requests you to substitute the import ban on chemical fertilizers and pesticides with the set of alternative measures proposed above. We assure SAEA’s professional support to establish a green-economic model for the agriculture sector of Sri Lanka.
Dr. SAMPATH DHARMADASA, President/SAEA
Dr. SHASHIKA RATHNAYAKA, Secretary/SAEA
Opinion
What BNP should keep in mind as it assumes power
BNP rightly deserves our congratulations for winning a decisive victory in the 13th parliamentary election. This outcome reflects an unequivocal mandate that is both politically and historically significant. Coming as it does at a critical point in Bangladesh’s democratic journey, this moment marks more than a change of government; it signals a renewed public resolve to restore democratic norms, accountability, and institutional integrity.
The election came after years of severe distrust in the electoral process, questions over legitimacy, and institutional strain, so the poll’s successful conduct has reinforced trust in the process as well as the principle that governments derive authority from the consent of the governed. For quite some time now, Bangladesh has faced deep polarisation, intolerance, and threats to its democratic foundations. Regressive and anti-democratic tendencies—whether institutional, ideological, or political—risked steering the country away from its foundational goals. BNP’s decisive victory can therefore be interpreted as a call to reverse this trajectory, and a public desire for accountable, forward-looking governance rooted in liberal democratic principles.
However, the road ahead is going to be bumpy, to put it mildly. A broad mandate alone cannot resolve deep-rooted structural problems. The BNP government will likely continue to face economic challenges and institutional constraints for the foreseeable future. This will test its capacity and sincerity not only to govern but also to transform the culture of governance in the country.
Economic reform imperatives
A key challenge will be stabilising the economy, which continues to face mounting pressures: growth has decelerated, inflation has eroded people’s purchasing power, foreign exchange reserves remain low, and public finances are tight. External debt has increased significantly in recent years, while the tax-to-GDP ratio has fallen to historically low levels. State-owned enterprises and the banking sector face persistent structural weaknesses, and confidence among both domestic and international investors remains fragile.
The new government should begin by restoring macroeconomic discipline. Containing inflation will need close coordination across ministries and agencies. Monetary policy must remain cautious and credible, free from political interference, while fiscal policy should prioritise stability rather than expand populist spending.
Tax reform is also unavoidable. The National Board of Revenue requires comprehensive modernisation, digitalisation, and total compliance. Broadening the tax base, especially by bringing all high-income groups and segments of the informal economy into the formal system, is crucial. Over time, reliance on indirect taxes such as value-added tax and import duties should be reduced, paving the way for a more progressive direct tax regime.
Banking sector reform is equally crucial. Proper asset quality reviews and regulatory oversight are necessary to rebuild confidence in the sector. Political patronage within the financial institutions must end. Without a resilient financial system, private investment cannot recover. As regards growth, the government should focus on diversifying exports beyond ready-made garments and deepening integration into regional value chains. Attracting foreign direct investment will depend on regulatory predictability and improvements in logistics and energy reliability. Ambitious growth targets must be matched by realistic implementation capacity.
Political Challenges
Distrust among political actors, partly fuelled by fears of retribution and violence, is a reality that may persist. BNP will face pressure from its supporters to act quickly in addressing perceived injustices, but good governance demands restraint. If the new government resorts to or tolerates exclusion or retaliation, it will risk perpetuating the very cycle it has condemned.
Managing internal party discipline will also be crucial, as a large parliamentary majority can sometimes lead to complacency or factional rivalry. Strong leadership will be required to maintain unity while allowing constructive internal debate. BNP must also rebuild trust with minority communities and vulnerable groups. Elections often heighten anxieties among minorities, so a credible commitment to equal citizenship is crucial. BNP’s political maturity will also be judged by how it treats or engages with its opponents. In this regard, Chairman Tarique Rahman’s visits to the residences of top opposition leaders on Sunday marked a positive gesture, one that many hope will withstand the inevitable pressures or conflicts over governance in the coming days.
Strengthening democratic institutions
A central promise of this election was to restore democracy, which must now translate into concrete institutional reforms. Judicial independence needs constant safeguarding. Which means that appointment, promotion, and case management processes should be insulated from political influence. Parliamentary oversight committees must also function effectively, and the opposition’s voice in parliament must be protected.
Electoral institutions also need reform, particularly along the lines of the July Charter. Continued credibility of the Election Commission will depend on transparency, professional management, and impartiality. Meanwhile, the civil service must be depoliticised. Appointments based on loyalty rather than merit have long undermined governance in the country. So the new administration must work on curtailing the influence of political networks to ensure a professional, impartial civil service. Media reform and digital rights also deserve careful attention. We must remember that democratic consolidation is built through institutional habits, and these habits must be established early.
Beyond winner-takes-all
Bangladesh’s politics has long been characterised by a winner-takes-all mentality. Electoral victories have often resulted in monopolisation of power, marginalising opposition voices and weakening checks and balances. If BNP is serious about democratic renewal, it must consciously break with this tradition. Inclusive policy consultations will be a good starting point. Major economic and constitutional reforms should be based on cross-party dialogue and consensus. Appointments to constitutional bodies should be transparent and consultative, and parliamentary debates should be done with the letter and spirit of the July Charter in mind.
Meeting public expectations
The scale of public expectations now is naturally immense. Citizens want economic relief, employment opportunities, necessary institutional reforms, and improved governance. Managing these expectations will be quite difficult. Many reforms will not yield immediate results, and some may impose short-term costs. So, it is imperative to ensure transparent communication about the associated timelines, trade-offs, and fiscal constraints.
Anti-corruption efforts must be credible and monitored at all times. Measures are needed to strengthen oversight institutions, improve transparency in public procurement, and expand digital service delivery to reduce opportunities for rent-seeking. Governance reform should be systematic, not selective or politically driven. Tangible improvements are urgently needed in public service delivery, particularly in health, education, social protection, and local government.
Finally, a word of caution: BNP’s decisive victory presents both opportunities and risks. It can enable bold reforms but it also carries the danger of overreach. The key deciding factor here is political judgment. The question is, can our leaders deliver based on the mandate voters have given them? (The Daily Star)
Dr Fahmida Khatun is an economist and executive director at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). Views expressed in the article are the author’s own.
Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.
by Fahmida Khatun
Opinion
Why religion should remain separate from state power in Sri Lanka: Lessons from political history
Religion has been an essential part of Sri Lankan society for more than two millennia, shaping culture, moral values, and social traditions. Buddhism in particular has played a foundational role in guiding ethical behaviour, promoting compassion, and encouraging social harmony. Yet Sri Lanka’s modern political history clearly shows that when religion becomes closely entangled with state power, both democracy and religion suffer. The politicisation of religion especially Buddhism has repeatedly contributed to ethnic division, weakened governance, and the erosion of moral authority. For these reasons, the separation of religion and the state is not only desirable but necessary for Sri Lanka’s long-term stability and democratic progress.
Sri Lanka’s post-independence political history provides early evidence of how religion became a political tool. The 1956 election, which brought S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike to power, is often remembered as a turning point where Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism was actively mobilised for political expedience. Buddhist monks played a visible role in political campaigning, framing political change as a religious and cultural revival. While this movement empowered the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, it also laid the foundation for ethnic exclusion, particularly through policies such as the “Sinhala Only Act.” Though framed as protecting national identity, these policies marginalised Tamil-speaking communities and contributed significantly to ethnic tensions that later escalated into civil conflict. This period demonstrates how religious symbolism, when fused with state power, can undermine social cohesion rather than strengthen it.
The increasing political involvement of Buddhist monks in later decades further illustrates the risks of this entanglement. In the early 2000s, the emergence of monk-led political parties such as the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) marked a new phase in Sri Lankan politics. For the first time, monks entered Parliament as elected lawmakers, directly participating in legislation and governance. While their presence was justified as a moral corrective to corrupt politics, in practice it blurred the boundary between spiritual leadership and political power. Once monks became part of parliamentary debates, policy compromises, and political rivalries, they were no longer perceived as neutral moral guides. Instead, they became political actors subject to criticism, controversy, and public mistrust. This shift significantly weakened the traditional reverence associated with the Sangha.
Sri Lankan political history also shows how religion has been repeatedly used by political leaders to legitimise authority during times of crisis. Successive governments have sought the public endorsement of influential monks to strengthen their political image, particularly during elections or moments of instability. During the war, religious rhetoric was often used to frame the conflict in moral or civilisational terms, leaving little room for nuanced political solutions or reconciliation. This approach may have strengthened short-term political support, but it also deepened ethnic polarisation and made post-war reconciliation more difficult. The long-term consequences of this strategy are still visible in unresolved ethnic grievances and fragile national unity.
Another important historical example is the post-war period after 2009. Despite the conclusion of the war, Sri Lanka failed to achieve meaningful reconciliation or strong democratic reform. Instead, religious nationalism gained renewed political influence, often used to silence dissent and justify authoritarian governance. Smaller population groups such as Muslims and Christians in particular experienced growing insecurity as extremist groups operated with perceived political protection. The state’s failure to maintain religious neutrality during this period weakened public trust and damaged Sri Lanka’s international reputation. These developments show that privileging one religion in state power does not lead to stability or moral governance; rather, it creates fear, exclusion, and institutional decay.
The moral authority of religion itself has also suffered as a result of political entanglement. Traditionally, Buddhist monks were respected for their distance from worldly power, allowing them to speak truth to rulers without fear or favour. However, when monks publicly defend controversial political decisions, support corrupt leaders, or engage in aggressive nationalist rhetoric, they risk losing this moral independence. Sri Lankan political history demonstrates that once religious figures are seen as aligned with political power, public criticism of politicians easily extends to religion itself. This has contributed to growing disillusionment among younger generations, many of whom now view religious institutions as extensions of political authority rather than sources of ethical guidance.
The teachings of the Buddha offer a clear contrast to this historical trend. The Buddha advised rulers on ethical governance but never sought political authority or state power. His independence allowed him to critique injustice and moral failure without compromise. Sri Lanka’s political experience shows that abandoning this principle has harmed both religion and governance. When monks act as political agents, they lose the freedom to challenge power, and religion becomes vulnerable to political failure and public resentment.
Sri Lanka’s multi-religious social structure nurtures divisive, if not separatist, sentiments. While Buddhism holds a special historical place, the modern state governs citizens of many faiths. Political history shows that when the state appears aligned with one religion, minority communities feel excluded, regardless of constitutional guarantees. This sense of exclusion has repeatedly weakened national unity and contributed to long-term conflict. A secular state does not reject religion; rather, it protects all religions by maintaining neutrality and ensuring equal citizenship.
Sri Lankan political history clearly demonstrates that the fusion of religion and state power has not produced good governance, social harmony, or moral leadership. Instead, it has intensified ethnic divisions, weakened democratic institutions, and damaged the spiritual credibility of religion itself. Separating religion from the state is not an attack on Buddhism or Sri Lankan tradition. On the contrary, it is a necessary step to preserve the dignity of religion and strengthen democratic governance. By maintaining a clear boundary between spiritual authority and political power, Sri Lanka can move toward a more inclusive, stable, and just society one where religion remains a source of moral wisdom rather than a tool of political control.
In present-day Sri Lanka, the dangers of mixing religion with state power are more visible than ever. Despite decades of experience showing the negative consequences of politicised religion, religious authority continues to be invoked to justify political decisions, silence criticism, and legitimise those in power. During recent economic and political crises, political leaders have frequently appeared alongside prominent religious figures to project moral legitimacy, even when governance failures, corruption, and mismanagement were evident. This pattern reflects a continued reliance on religious symbolism to mask political weakness rather than a genuine commitment to ethical governance.
The 2022 economic collapse offers a powerful contemporary example. As ordinary citizens faced shortages of fuel, food, and medicine, public anger was directed toward political leadership and state institutions. However, instead of allowing religion to act as an independent moral force that could hold power accountable, sections of the religious establishment appeared closely aligned with political elites. This alignment weakened religion’s ability to speak truthfully on behalf of the suffering population. When religion stands too close to power, it loses its capacity to challenge injustice, corruption, and abuse precisely when society needs moral leadership the most.
At the same time, younger generations in Sri Lanka are increasingly questioning both political authority and religious institutions. Many young people perceive religious leaders as participants in political power structures rather than as independent ethical voices. This growing scepticism is not a rejection of spirituality, but a response to the visible politicisation of religion. If this trend continues, Sri Lanka risks long-term damage not only to democratic trust but also to religious life itself.
The present moment therefore demands a critical reassessment. A clear separation between religion and the state would allow religious institutions to reclaim moral independence and restore public confidence. It would also strengthen democracy by ensuring that policy decisions are guided by evidence, accountability, and inclusive dialogue rather than religious pressure or nationalist rhetoric. Sri Lanka’s recent history shows that political legitimacy cannot be built on religious symbolism alone. Only transparent governance, social justice, and equal citizenship can restore stability and public trust.
Ultimately, the future of Sri Lanka depends on learning from both its past and present. Protecting religion from political misuse is not a threat to national identity; it is a necessary condition for ethical leadership, democratic renewal, and social harmony in a deeply diverse society.
by Milinda Mayadunna
Opinion
NPP’s misguided policy
Judging by some recent events, starting with the injudicious pronouncement in Jaffna by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and subsequent statements by some senior ministers, the government tends to appease minorities at the expense of the majority. Ill-treatment of some Buddhist monks by the police continues to arouse controversy, and it looks as if the government used the police to handle matters that are best left to the judiciary. Sangadasa Akurugoda concludes his well-reasoned opinion piece “Appeasement of separatists” (The island, 13 February) as follows:
“It is unfortunate that the President of a country considers ‘national pride and patriotism’, a trait that every citizen should have, as ‘racism’. Although the President is repeating it like a mantra that he will not tolerate ‘racism’ or ‘extremism’ we have never heard him saying that he will not tolerate ‘separatism or terrorism’.”
It is hard to disagree with Akurugoda. Perhaps, the President may be excused for his reluctance to refer to terrorism as he leads a movement that unleashed terror twice, but his reluctance to condemn separatism is puzzling. Although most political commentators consider the President’s comment that ‘Buddhist go to Jaffna to spread hate’ to be callous, the head of an NGO heaped praise on the President for saying so!
As I pointed out in a previous article, puppet-masters outside seem to be pulling the strings (A puppet show? The Island, 23 January) and the President’s reluctance to condemn separatism whilst accusing Buddhists of spreading hatred by going to Jaffna makes one wonder who these puppeteers are.
Another incident that raises serious concern was reported from a Buddhist Temple in Trincomalee. The police removed a Buddha statue and allegedly assaulted Buddhist priests. Mysteriously, the police brought back the statue the following day, giving an absurd excuse; they claimed they had removed it to ensure its safety. No inquiry into police action was instituted but several Bhikkhus and dayakayas were remanded for a long period.
Having seen a front-page banner headline “Sivuru gelawenakam pahara dunna” (“We were beaten till the robes fell”) in the January 13th edition of the Sunday Divaina, I watched on YouTube the press briefing at the headquarters of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Association. I can well imagine the agony those who were remanded went through.
Ven. Balangoda Kassapa’s description of the way he and the others, held on remand, were treated raises many issues. Whether they committed a transgression should be decided by the judiciary. Given the well-known judicial dictum, ‘innocent until proven guilty’, the harassment they faced cannot be justified under any circumstances.
Ven. Kassapa exposed the high-handed actions of the police. This has come as no surprise as it is increasingly becoming apparent as they are no longer ‘Sri Lanka Police’; they have become the ‘NPP police’. This is an issue often editorially highlighted by The Island. How can one expect the police to be impartial when two key posts are held by officers brought out of retirement as a reward for canvassing for the NPP. It was surprising to learn that the suspects could not be granted bail due to objections raised by the police.
Ven. Kassapa said the head of the remand prison where he and others were held had threatened him.
However, there was a ray of hope. Those who cry out for reconciliation fail to recognise that reconciliation is a much-misused term, as some separatists masquerading as peacemakers campaign for reconciliation! They overlook the fact that it is already there as demonstrated by the behaviour of Tamil and Muslim inmates in the remand prison, where Ven. Kassapa and others were kept.
Non-Buddhist prisoners looked after the needs of the Bhikkhus though the prison chief refused even to provide meals according to Vinaya rules! In sharp contrast, during a case against a Sri Lankan Bhikkhu accused of child molestation in the UK, the presiding judge made sure the proceedings were paused for lunch at the proper time.
I have written against Bhikkhus taking to politics, but some of the issues raised by Ven. Kassapa must not be ignored. He alleges that the real reason behind the conflict was that the government was planning to allocate the land belonging to the Vihara to an Indian businessman for the construction of a hotel. This can be easily clarified by the government, provided there is no hidden agenda.
It is no secret that this government is controlled by India. Even ‘Tilvin Ayya’, who studied the module on ‘Indian Expansionism’ under Rohana Wijeweera, has mended fences with India. He led a JVP delegation to India recently. Several MoUs or pacts signed with India are kept under wraps.
Unfortunately, the government’s mishandling of this issue is being exploited by other interested parties, and this may turn out to be a far bigger problem.
It is high time the government stopped harassing the majority in the name of reconciliation, a term exploited by separatists to achieve their goals!
By Dr Upul Wijayawardhana
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