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Coalescing existing maritime competencies for collective capacity building and capacity enhancement against non-traditional threats

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The world heavily depends on sea-borne trade for its continued existence and allows all countries to participate in the global marketplace in the high seas.Undoubtedly the economic and political affairs of South Asia have been dominated by the sea.The Indian Ocean covers 20 percent of the earth and it is ranked the largest water body in the World. IOR comprises 38 littoral states, 24 Ocean territories and 17 landlocked countries.

Indian Ocean region

Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has emerged as the world’s major energy and trade route.I recollect here what Dr. Ash Carter, US Secretary of Defence, said in 2015 at the Shangri-La Dialogue after visiting the Singapore strait in a P-8 surveillance aircraft with Singaporean Defence Minister Ng. What he said was, “what I saw were fully laden oil tankers, one after another, moving towards the East. And similarly, empty oil tankers moving in other directions.

That day I realized how much China, Japan and South Korea depend on Arabian Gulf oil and it was an eye opener for me. Please remember that 15.2 million barrels of oil are transported daily via this sea route.

Crude oil transported daily in the world

The IOR Littorals are concerned about the vulnerability in the region due to various non- traditional maritime security threats such as piracy, maritime terrorism, climate change, IUU Fishing, illegal immigration and smuggling of arms and drugs.As described by Robert D. Kaplan in his book ‘Monsoon’, in world maps used in America, the Western Hemisphere is at the centre while the Indian Ocean is all but omitted.

Monsoon: IO and the future of American power

This was very much relevant in the 20th Century, but not in the 21st Century as the focus has fundamentally changed. Kaplan has identified a few countries as ‘Monsoon Asia’, which includes India, Pakistan, China, Indonesia, Myanmar, Oman, Bangladesh and Tanzania.He explained how important these countries are to American power and firmly believes that this area will be winning or losing grounds of democracy, energy independence and religious freedom.There are currently two main sources of insecurity in the Indian Ocean. The first is the instability of some of the littoral and hinterland states. To a certain degree both sea-based terrorism and maritime piracy threatens the security of international shipping.Moreover, sea-based terrorism can also be aimed against land target.Out of non-traditional maritime security threats, I am going to focus on drug trafficking.Drug traffickers have extensively used the sea route to take advantage of the incapability of most Navies to allocate 100 percent surveillance. Unless intelligence is very accurate and timely, apprehension of the smuggled drugs will be a tough task.

Heroin smuggling vessel

The Sri Lankan fishing fleet consists of 30,470 motorized boats. Out of this, around 4,000 boats are engaged in deep sea fishing and are capable of remaining more than one month out at sea.

Despite Sri Lanka Navy’s presence and apprehension of very large quantities of drugs, mainly heroin, it continued to come into the island nation through sea routes, now identified as “Southern Route”.Most of the apprehensions by SLN involved ocean-going wooden hull vessels loaded with drugs at Makran coast, smuggled from heroin factories in Afghanistan.These vessels sail southerly from Makran coast, pass south of Maldives territorial waters, reach the equator and remain drifting in high seas. The smugglers are smart enough to always stay in international waters and if any warship approaches them, they will just dump their heroin overboard.It is an extremely difficult task for ship Captains to approach the vessels in darkness and send their VBSS (Vessel Boarding Search and Seizure) teams to board them.On the Northern route, the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) in anti-piracy operations, Headquartered in Bahrain confirmed that more than 22,000 tons of illegal narcotics, much of it destined to fund terrorism, has been seized in the Northern Indian Ocean, but the narcotics were destroyed by throwing overboard and the vessels were allowed to return to home ports.The heroin trade, born in the poppy fields of Afghanistan, is a major source of revenue for extreme groups. With the Taliban becoming rulers of Afghanistan, we cannot expect anything good in terms of drug smuggling.In Sri Lanka, as per estimates of the Dangerous Drugs Prevention Authority, strong heroin addicts consume four to eight milligrams of heroin per day.Sri Lanka has approximately 40,000 heroin addicts. Due to the close-knit family system, if a child is addicted to heroin, he or she will be reported to the authorities for possible rehabilitation. So, the figures are fairly accurate.

So, we know Sri Lanka’s annual consumption of heroin. That is approximately 116.8 kilograms (8mg x 40,000 x 365). As a rule of thumb, it is estimated that law enforcement agencies detect only 10 percent of drugs and contraband passing between borders.What is surprising is that very large quantities on the ‘Southern Route’ were detected by the Sri Lanka Navy and on a few occasions by the Indian Navy and Coast Guard. A total of 1,017 kilograms of heroin, 126 kgs of ICE and 88 kgs of Hashish were confiscated by the SLN this year alone. If the rule of thumb is applied, 10170 kgs of Heroin, 1,260 kgs of ICE and 880 kgs of Hashish may be entering Sri Lanka.You see that this figure far exceeds Sri Lankan consumption. Where is these drugs’ final destination? Surprisingly, we have not detected any sizeable amount of drugs leaving our shores to third party countries. We have to work hard and work together to find answers for this issue.In the meantime, we have to stay one step ahead when working with drug smugglers. They have money, power and the latest technology. Therefore, it is of paramount importance for nations to work together, sharing knowledge, expertise and training. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Sri Lanka Navy jointly conduct periodic training programs on VBSS, evidence collecting and identification of new types of synthetic drugs. Specially smaller Island nations in the Indian Ocean who have only a coast guard are required to improve their VBSS Capabilities.

The coast guard and Marine Police personnel from Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Bangladesh, Seychelles, Madagascar and Comoros were trained on VBSS at the Sri Lanka Navy’s elite Special Boats Squadron (SBS) quarters under the watchful eyes of highly trained and competent SBS instructors.The SLN ship-in-box training facility was developed to offer the real feeling of climbing aboard a ship out at sea, to these foreign trainees.When we talk about enhancing existing maritime competencies, the relationship between the Indian Navy and SLN and also Indian Coast Guard and Sri Lanka Coast Guard (SLCG) is unique. All officers take their Sub Lieutenant courses, specialization courses, staff courses and ultimately NDC at Indian Naval Institutions. This relationship kept our Navy highly professional. If we have done well in eradicating terrorism from Sri Lanka, it is due to the sound knowledge we received in India.On July 9, 2014, the National Security Advisor (NSA) of India, Defence Secretary of Sri Lanka and Defence Minister of Maldives signed a trilateral Maritime Cooperation Agreement in New Delhi, which greatly helped Sri Lanka and Maldives enhance their competencies at sea on handling oil or chemical spills and disaster relief operations.

A Coast Guard exercise titled ‘Exercise Dosti’ was also conducted and today all three countries have compatible oil spill response equipment. With India in the lead, we saw the results of these exercises when the super tanker MT New Diamond, carrying 270,000 tons of crude oil, on its voyage from Kuwait to Vizag, caught fire in the South East of Sri Lanka.The ICG and Indian Navy, with the support of Sri Lanka Navy and an international salvage company, was able to douse the fire and tow the ship to safety avoiding a major oil spill.Now Exercise Dosti is carried out based on a road map to enhance cooperation. Further work is carried out based on table top exercises, including legal and policy issues related to piracy.Even though the agreement, first signed in 2014, went into cold storage for six years due to various reasons, this Maritime Security Dialogue was revived, in August this year, with the meeting of top security leadership of three countries, in Sri Lanka. Now the intention to invite both Mauritius and Seychelles, to join India in support of a Coastal Surveillance Radar System to Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles, is a welcome signal. Similarly, India will support Sri Lanka’s existing Automatic Identification System (AIS).

Currently the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) for Indian Ocean Region, Gurugram fuses the white shipping information collected by the Coastal Surveillance Radar System and AIS and shares this with the other two countries.It is heartening to see that India has signed agreements to share white shipping information with 26 countries.

These facilities, in sharing information, has helped all three countries (India, Maldives and Sri Lanka) to overcome security challenges out at sea including acts of terrorism, piracy, drugs and weapons smuggling, human trafficking, IUU fishing and maritime pollution.

It is therefore very important for India to work with other smaller nations in the Indian Ocean to improve and enhance maritime competencies for collective capacity building.I am failing in my duty if I do not recollect, for the benefit of this august gathering, ‘Operation Rainbow’, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard’s actions to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to Sri Lankans affected by the Tsunami on Boxing Day, December 26, 2004.

Lasting over two and half months, this remains the largest relief operation undertaken by India outside the country.The architect and executor of this operation was Indian Navy’s then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSMis. I salute you Sir for saving thousands of innocent lives in my country.

It reminds me of what late Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadiragamar said of Indian support during a critical hour. “Friend in need, a friend in deed.” I wish Goa Maritime Conclave all the best.



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Regime change and the vacuum:Strategic lessons of Iraq and Libya

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Post-Gaddafi Civil war: the rebellion triggered by the arab spring of 2011 soon toppled the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. the power vacuum created by Gaddafi’s ouster has been exploited by local actors, as well as extraneous actors, with the only intention of making libya a war theatre for proxy wars and political disintegration

by Col. (R) Nalin Herath

There is a question that the international community must periodically ask itself: What happens to a State after its regime has been ousted?

The question is particularly relevant when examining Iraq and Libya. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were authoritarian rulers. Their governments were associated with political repression, human-rights violations and the suppression of political opposition. None of this should be ignored or excused. But recognising the failures of authoritarian rule does not prevent us from asking another, equally important strategic question:

Did the removal of these regimes adequately prepare for what came next?

The experience of Iraq and Libya suggests that removing a ruler is considerably easier than replacing the political, administrative and security architecture around that ruler.

Danger of confusing regime change with State reconstruction

A state is more than its leader. It consists of institutions, security forces, civil servants, courts, political structures, infrastructure, economic systems and, perhaps most importantly, an accepted monopoly over the legitimate use of force. When an authoritarian system has concentrated enormous power around one individual, removing that individual can expose weaknesses that were previously hidden. The strategic mistake is to assume that once the dictator has gone, a democratic and stable state will naturally emerge. History does not support such an assumption. The aftermath of Iraq demonstrates this particularly clearly. Following the 2003 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order No. 2, formally dissolving the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi Army, among other security institutions. A US congressional report later documented the enormous consequences of this decision, including the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of military personnel from the institutional framework of the state. Whatever the intentions behind the decision, the strategic consequence was that an established security structure had to be rebuilt while the country was simultaneously experiencing political upheaval and growing violence. That is a dangerous combination.

Iraq: Removing the structure before building the replacement

Saddam Hussein’s government was unquestionably authoritarian. It also reflected a complicated sectarian and political structure in which members of the Sunni minority occupied disproportionate positions of power despite being a demographic minority. But the question for strategic planners should not simply be whether Saddam deserved to remain in power. The question should have been:

What institutional structure would replace the system once he was removed?

An army can be politically controlled without being politically representative. A bureaucracy can serve an authoritarian government while still providing essential state functions. A security institution can be reformed without necessarily being destroyed. The distinction between reforming institutions and eliminating institutions is therefore critical. The post-2003 experience demonstrated the consequences of institutional disruption. Security vacuums contributed to insurgency and instability, while the process of rebuilding Iraq’s security forces took place amid an increasingly deteriorating security environment. The lesson is not that authoritarian institutions should never be reformed. The lesson is that state capacity should not be casually destroyed without a credible replacement.

Libya: prosperity, authoritarianism and institutional fragility

Libya presents an even more complicated case. Gaddafi’s government was authoritarian and deeply personalised. Political freedom was severely restricted, and the security apparatus was deliberately structured around regime survival. Yet Libya, under Gaddafi, also used substantial oil revenues to fund education, healthcare, infrastructure and social services. World Bank data from around the end of the Gaddafi era show life expectancy reaching approximately 75 years by 2011, skilled attendance at birth at 100 percent and measles immunisation at 98 percent. This does not prove that Gaddafi’s system was politically legitimate. It demonstrates something different: economic and social outcomes can coexist with authoritarian political structures.

The Great Man-Made River illustrates the scale of Libya’s investment ambitions. The World Bank described the project as one of the world’s largest engineering schemes, involving thousands of kilometres of planned pipelines to transport water from deep desert aquifers toward the populated coastal belt. The original project was estimated at approximately US$ 25 billion over several phases. Again, this should not become nostalgia for dictatorship. It should become a lesson in state capacity.

What happened after Gaddafi?

The post-2011 experience is perhaps the clearest illustration of the vacuum problem. Libya did not simply move from dictatorship to a consolidated democratic state. Instead, competing armed groups, political factions and institutions emerged. A UN economic and social affairs analysis concluded that the fall of the Gaddafi regime exposed weak state institutions and that the post-Gaddafi period was characterised by the proliferation of armed militias and institutional fragmentation.

The World Bank has similarly described how the security vacuum allowed armed groups to expand, while attempts to integrate them into the formal security apparatus produced a hybrid system in which state institutions and powerful armed groups operated alongside one another. This is the heart of the lesson. The consequences of regime change were also evident in Libya. The 2012 Benghazi attack, later portrayed in 13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi, illustrated the security vacuum that emerged after Gaddafi’s fall. The collapse of central authority allowed militias and competing armed groups to fill the space left by weakened state institutions. The lesson is clear: removing a regime may achieve military victory, but without a credible plan to rebuild the state, victory can quickly become a security vacuum.

When the state withdraws, something else occupies the space. If the replacement is not a legitimate national institution, the vacuum can be filled by militias, tribes, ideological movements, criminal networks or competing political authorities. The vacuum does not remain empty.

Terrorism question

There is another uncomfortable issue. Authoritarian regimes frequently suppress political and armed movements through coercive security systems. When those systems disappear abruptly, previously contained organisations can find new operating space. This does not mean that dictatorship is an appropriate method of counterterrorism. It means that counterterrorism cannot be separated from State capacity. The international community therefore needs to distinguish between defeating a particular terrorist organisation and maintaining the institutional conditions that prevent multiple armed actors from competing for power. The destruction of one regime does not automatically eliminate the forces that created insecurity. Sometimes it creates an environment in which those forces multiply.

Strategic mistake: winning the war but losing the peace

Military intervention can have a clearly defined operational objective. State reconstruction does not. A military campaign may successfully remove a government in weeks or months. Building legitimate institutions can take decades.This creates a fundamental strategic asymmetry. The shorter the planning horizon for intervention, the greater the danger of a long-term vacuum. The international community therefore needs to think beyond the first question: How do we remove the regime?

It must ask: Who governs the country the next morning? Who controls the borders? Who controls the security forces? Who pays government employees? Who maintains electricity, water and hospitals? Who protects critical infrastructure? Who administers justice? Who prevents armed groups from becoming alternative governments? Who provides political legitimacy? And perhaps most importantly: Who possesses the authority to enforce the decisions of the new state? If there are no convincing answers, regime change is only the beginning of the problem.

The lesson should not be that the United States or its allies should never intervene. Nor should it be that Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi should be rehabilitated as models of governance. The lesson is more practical. Regime change must never be confused with state-building.

Before dismantling an established political order, external powers need a credible understanding of the institutions that will replace it. Security-sector reform should normally distinguish between individuals who must be removed and institutions that must be preserved. A national army may need reform. A ministry may need restructuring. A security service may need accountability and civilian oversight. But destroying institutional capacity without having an operational replacement can create consequences far beyond the original objective.

Wider geopolitical lesson

The consequences of Iraq and Libya did not remain within their borders. State fragmentation affects neighbouring countries, migration, organised crime, arms trafficking, terrorism, energy markets and regional power competition. In today’s interconnected world, a failed transition in one country can become a security problem for an entire region. That is why intervention planning should include not only military objectives but also political, economic, humanitarian and security-sector objectives. The most important planning document may therefore not be the operational plan for removing the regime. It may be the plan for Day One after the regime has disappeared.

History should not be written as a simple choice between dictatorship and democracy. The real strategic challenge is more complicated. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were dictators. Their governments committed serious abuses, and their populations had legitimate grievances. But the failures of authoritarian rule do not automatically justify the destruction of state institutions without a credible plan for rebuilding them. The experience of Iraq and Libya demonstrates a fundamental principle of international security: A political vacuum is not neutral space. Someone will fill it. If legitimate national institutions cannot fill that space, armed groups, sectarian interests, extremist organisations or foreign-backed factions may do so. The ultimate lesson for the United States, its allies and the wider international community is therefore straightforward:

Removing a regime may win the immediate battle. Building a legitimate, functioning and secure state determines whether the intervention succeeds in the long term. The world should learn to ask not only “How do we remove the dictator?”. It must also ask:

“What happens to the country when he is gone?”

That may be the most important strategic question of all.

(The writer is the Secretary General of the Ceylon Chamber of Shipping, former Director General of the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), and former Spokesman of the Ministry of Defence. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the London Dialogue. His areas of expertise include international relations, geopolitics, maritime affairs, national security, economic policy, and strategic governance. He is a consultant at JITT Group and a member of World Pace Board.).

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‘Death at the Sign of the Rook’

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Tales of Mystery and Suspense – 23

By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha

As I have noted with regard to the adventures of John Rebus, I am indebted to Dinali Fernando and her husband Steve for whole hosts of thrillers. The latter strongly recommended Kate Atkinson when I borrowed four books. I wondered about this, for I had not been too impressed with her debut novel, Behind the Scenes at the Museum, which was amongst the entries I had to judge for the Eurasian section of the Commonwealth Writing Prize. Two decades later, I had forgotten what it had been about.

But I am glad Steve persuaded me to read her. Kate Atkinson is distinctively British, and Death at the Sign of the Rook is set in a country house and the surrounding village, and seems a modern descendant of the laidback Agatha Christies I so much enjoy.

There are, however, many differences in that we have a policeman who can go rogue, like Rebus, with again a female sidekick who has a mind of her own, again like Rebus. But Jackson Brodie has retired and set up as a private investigator, while Reggie, a young lady, is still in the police.

There is a lesbian couple living in the converted dairy of the manor house, as has occurred in Agatha Christie too, in A Murder is Announced. But they are peripheral to the story, unlike Ben, the brother of one of them who left the army after losing a leg in Afghanistan. When he turns up at the Manor House to shelter from a snowstorm, along with its chatelaine, Lady Milton, he is asked to answer the door as various characters turn up, including Jackson and Reggie, who then starts fantasising about him.

The others who turn up are two couples, one from America, who have paid for a murder weekend at the hotel. The family is impoverished, and has sold lots of pictures to survive, but most recently a Turner had been stolen, almost certainly by Lady Milton’s housekeeper Sophie, who vanished one night along with the picture. Reggie had been involved in that investigation, but there had been no trace of either picture or young lady.

Jackson Brodie suspects a connection between that theft and the one he has been called in to investigate, which has not been reported to the police. The picture hung opposite the bed of an old woman whose carer vanished after she died, along with it. Her children, adopted twins, have asked Jackson to investigate and also try to trace the carer, though he suspects something strange in that they did not go to the police.

Kate Atkinson

Brodie, in studying the stolen art, is also struck by the disappearance of a Rembrandt from a house in Scotland, along with a member of the cleaning staff. He thinks the three women might be the same one.

But Brodie’s assumption that the three women who vanished when valuable pictures did were identical would not have helped except that Beatrice, as she was also called, kept turning up, including to the funeral home where the old lady’s body was kept. And then that picture turned up, in the village church, and was found by the local vicar, Simon Cate, whose life story is also a prominent feature of the novel. He was an aspiring actor but then smitten by faith, and became a priest, but in time he lost his faith. His wife left him after the death of their son, and he is now in this backwater, where he feels he is of no use to anyone. But he has a great feel for living beings, and his most successful service has been one in which he blessed pets. And he was deeply concerned about the bees that Ben looks after for his sister and her wife.

He too staggers into the manor house in the midst of the storm, in which everyone concerned loses their way comprehensively. But amongst those Ben lets in is a man in a tracksuit with cuts and bruises, who then vanishes after he has been led to a bedroom, when Ben went in search of brandy. We soon work out that it is the escaped murderer about whom Reggie has been alerted.

Simon also turns up, through the back door, carrying the picture and also a gun, for he has found the dead body of one of his parishioners when he went to her house in search of his mobile phone. She had been shot and he had picked up the gun he found there. But he could not tell the police, for though he called he had lost his voice, and for the last few days had communicated only through writing.

This chaotic mix of characters at the manor house is further complicated by the group of players putting on the murder mystery play though some members have either cried off or died before reaching the venue. So, there is much doubling up and confusion over who is an actor and who is not.

The grand now largely empty rooms of the manor house, and its various odd passages and multiple doors, make it a splendid set for the lunacy that runs on and on. Reggie finds herself in a pantry Atkinsonwith a dead body, though this turns out to be the nanny who fell down the stairs and was put there by Lady Milton’s younger son. And there is high drama on the roof when the murderer nearly kills Ben, but he is saved by Reggie, and when he tries to kill Brody with an axe, he is shot by Beatrice, who has been the maid who served at the dinner before the murder mystery play, and explains to Brody how she has managed all her thefts.

And then in the melee, she vanishes on a motorbike, along with the daughter of the old lady’s adopted daughter, the only person who seemed to grieve at the funeral, and to whom the old lady had left her house in a codicil to her will, which her children have not known about. She leaves the picture to the carer, but it is brought to Simon Cate as he lies in hospital, recovering from a heart attack which adds confusion to the play.

Wonderfully convoluted, but all very clear, despite the headlong pace of the book and its shifts from one scene to another, from one character to another (or rather combinations of them) and from one-time span to another. A writer and a detective well worth looking out for. e more books by her on Dinali’s shelves.

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Safety, security and teamwork in aviation

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Indian Captain Smit Machchhar injured in the cockpit attack

by Capt. (Ret.).G.A. Fernando, MBA

There are three essential components to a commercial airline operation: safety, security and teamwork.

Aviation and teamwork at the ‘sharp’ end of a commercial aircraft, i.e. the flight deck, is unique. Unlike many other teams, it may be quite literally the first and the last time a particular combination of small teams of two, three, or four individual airmen (or women) will fly together. Sometimes even in the same airline that employs them.

Therefore, to make conditions safe and practical, while understanding and trusting tech other, they have to rely on a series of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and ‘Normal’ and ‘Emergency’ checklists for every conceivable situation. That is, to be able to do the right things, and do things right. In fact, there is a saying in aviation to the effect that ‘if you make a mistake in aviation, be original and make a new one’.

To ensure that safety standards are constantly maintained, airline pilots’ proficiency is tested every six months, in simulators, under the supervision of examiners from the civil aviation regulator. In Sri Lanka that organisaton is the Civil Aviation Authority-Sri Lanka (CAASL). Three simulator checks are conducted every 12 months in keeping with the tenet that ‘practice makes perfect’. A pithy adage not confined to the world of aviation warns that ‘prior preparation prevents piss-poor performance’.

The simulator exercises include rejected takeoffs, including in cross-wind situations, landings, engine fires and/or engine failures from a variety of causes, cabin pressurisation failure, precision and non-precision approaches, and landings in bad visibility – amongst other conditions that could be expected in actual flight.

In addition, a flight in a real airplane, on a regular passenger service under the supervision of an examiner from the airline, is undertaken to ensure that the company’s standard practices and procedures are carried out and maintained as prescribed in the airline’s manuals. These publications are in turn approved by the national regulator.

Crash axe

Finally, flight crew members must take a written test annually, on emergency equipment locations and procedures, with 90% as the pass mark.

Since the mid-1980s it has been mandatory for airline pilots to undertake a Crew Resource Management (CRM) programme once every two years. This training essentially emphasises what to do and what not to do to, in a specific emergency situation, or even during normal operations, to make the team cohesive and effective. During the course, the CRM facilitators discuss recent incidents and accidents that have occurred. Results of those events are recorded and could be retrieved, when necessary, by the official aviation bodies.

Not unexpectedly, it is demanding on a pilot to fulfill these requirements on a regular basis throughout his/her career, along with presenting for a bi-annual medical examination, all with the objective of retaining one’s licence to operate an aircraft. It may not be understood, therefore, by persons outside the aviation industry, or even some working in other aspects of an airline organisation, that it is often the passion for flight that keeps many pilots doing what they do to earn a living.

Security

Another important factor is the challenge of maintaining security in all aspects of airline operations, not least in the cockpit. The challenges are many, with new ones surfacing almost every day. It is therefore essential to be always prepared for the activities and ‘methods’ of perpetrators seeking to wreak evil on an aircraft and its occupants. As it is impossible for any airline or national security organisation to cover all aspects, systematic management of risks to effect a safe outcome becomes imperative.

Flydubai Incident

In the recent Flydubai incident of 30 September, 2026, a first officer (co-pilot) attacked the captain of the flight with a crash axe to accomplish his sinister motives, into which investigations are continuing. For the time being, it prompts the questions: should the crash axe be easily accessible to the flight crew? Or even be there at all? I believe it is a case of assessing the greater risk.

With regard to that event, and the circumstances that led to it, other deterrents could have been applied more thoroughly. For example, more thorough screening of pilots’ and other crewpersons’ backgrounds, with emphasis on their mental health, ideological affiliations and previous employment history. Separately, during a time of conflict in the Middle East, should Flydubai have even been operating between Dubai and Tel Aviv? Notwithstanding that cost-cutting and profit maximisation are key aims of any business, an airline’s apparent failure to conduct adequate psychological profiling of flight crew members, while continuing to operate ‘profitable’ routes, regardless of potential danger, can only be regarded and condemned as greed and disregard for human lives.

( Captain. Fernando, RCyAF, SLAF, Air Ceylon, Air Lanka, Singapore Airlines (SIA), SriLankan Airlines, Former Chief Pilot, Air Lanka Boeing 737, Former Deputy Chief Pilot, Lockheed L 1011, Former Crew Resource Management (CRM) Facilitator, SIA, Former Deputy Director (Air Operations) CAASL, Former President, Aircraft Owners and Operators Association Sri Lanka (AOAOASL), President, The Colombo Flying Club, Representative for Aviation, Organisation of Professional Associations (OPA), Hony, and Member Sri Lanka Society of Transport and Logistics.)

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