Midweek Review

B’caloa Tigers’ 2004 shock revolt in retrospect

Published

10 months ago

2025/04/23

Pilleyan, a key element in that drama now arrested for political expediency?

The LTTE killed two Karuna loyalists on July 15, 2004 in the Batticaloa Prison. The dead included Satchi Master. The killer was an LTTEer serving a short sentence for jewellery theft and assault. The killings in the Batticaloa Prison caused anxiety among senior government officials. On Aug. 24, 2004, an LTTEer shot dead another Karuna loyalist, P. Jayakumar, in the Akkaraipattu Magistrate’s Court. A jail guard and a court clerk sustained minor injuries. The police arrested Jayakumar, along with another LTTE dissident, Saravanamuthu Shanthakumar, at a road block, at Akkaraipattu, on May 19th, 2004. They were in possession of a pistol, one hand grenade and 15 rounds of ammunition. Shanthakumar was killed on July 15, 2004 at the Batticaloa Prison along with Satchi Master.

Against the backdrop of one-time LTTEer Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pilleyan’s arrest on April 08, 2025 and subsequent detention under Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) over Eastern University Vice Chancellor Prof. S. Raveendranath’s disappearance on Dec. 15, 2006, whose life was actually under threat from the TIGERS several years after Karuna and Pilleyan broke away from it, various interested parties started commenting on the role played/atrocities perpetrated by Pilleyan and Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, aka Karuna Amman, during the conflict, and after.

Both Karuna and Pilleyan entered mainstream politics before the successful conclusion of the war in May 2009. Pilleyan is the current leader of TMVP (Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal).

In a way it is a pity that the police are now trying to pin Pilleyan for the disappearance of Prof Raveendranath, obviously to please the current political masters.

Comments included their role in LTTE terrorism and what they did after switching their allegiance to the government in March 2004. Let me stress that they daringly rebelled against the LTTE during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the Prime Minister. The UNP has repeatedly claimed the credit for the unprecedented schism in what was considered a monolithic terror organisation and some asserted that the LTTE engineered Wickremesinghe’s defeat at the 2005 presidential election to avenge the catastrophic split.

Pilleyan’s arrest caused a political storm with his counsel Udaya Gammanpila alleging that an attempt was being made to compel his client to confess complicity in the 2019 Easter Sunday suicide attacks. Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) leader and former Minister Gammanpila is no stranger to controversy, but he has remained unscathed when it comes to his integrity.

In spite of vindictive attacks on him, Attorney-at-Law Gammanpila declared that nothing could be as ridiculous as accusing Pilleyan, who had been detained at the Batticaloa Prison for a period of five years (Oct. 11, 2015 to Nov. 24, 2020) of arranging National Thowheed Jaamaath (NTJ) to bomb churches and hotels on April 21, 2019. Having granted bail to Pilleyan and four others held in connection with the Christmas Day, 2005, assassination of TNA MP Joseph Pararajasingham on two personal sureties of Rs. 100,000/- each, the Batticaloa High Court acquitted and released them on January 13, 2021.

It would be pertinent to examine the devastating split caused by Karuna in March 2003 and its impact on the Eelam War IV (2006 August to May 2009).

Karuna’s move

Having received information that ‘Colonel’ Karuna decamped, the Kilinochchi-based leadership acted swiftly and decisively to neutralise the impending threat. The LTTE planned to take hold of both Karuna Amman, responsible for Ampara-Batticaloa sector, and his colleague, Sivasubramanium Varadanthan, aka ‘Colonel’ Paduman, in charge of the neighbouring Trincomalee District, to Kilinochchi. The Kilinochchi-based leadership, or Vanni leadership, wanted to ensure that those deployed under the command of Karuna and Paduman remaind loyal to the organisation. Both Karuna and Paduman had held the rank of ‘Colonel’ at that time, though Karuna was in the limelight due to his involvement in negotiations with the UNF government.

The Kilinochchi command cleverly used the Defence Ministry and SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process) officials to arrange for an SLAF chopper to fly Karuna Amman, along with Paduman, to Kilinochchi. SCOPP records prove that on the authorisation of the Defence Ministry, it directed the SLAF to pick Paduman from Trincomalee and then touch down at a pre-arranged location in the Batticaloa District, on March 2, 2004, to take on board Karuna.

Fearing that he would have to face a firing squad in Kilinochchi, Karuna declined to join Paduman. Instead, he set in motion a strategy, which finally debilitated the LTTE’s conventional fighting capability. The writer disclosed the LTTE’s counter-move in a Sunday Island report headlined ‘Prabhakaran plotted Karuna capture’ in its March 28, 2004, edition.

Both Karuna and Paduman, at that time, confirmed the LTTE using SCOPP/ SLAF to arrange their transfer from the East to Kilinochchi.

The UNP and the Norwegians never bothered to raise the issue with the LTTE at that time. The Defence Ministry continued to provide chopper rides to the LTTE and did everything possible to appease the outfit, even at the expense of national security.

Norwegian peace facilitator and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), too, had been aware of the LTTE request for an SLAF chopper ride for top Tigers in the East. Had Karuna got into that chopper and ended up in a secret LTTE detention camp or executed, Eelam War IV would have taken a different course.

The Vanni leadership used Paduman, on several occasions, to counter reports of a debilitating split in the LTTE. The LTTE never allowed Paduman to leave the Vanni throughout Eelam War IV. Paduman surrendered on May 15, 2009, four days before troops killed LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

Karuna caused the split just over a year after the LTTE quit the negotiating table. President CBK, PM Wickremesinghe, and the co-chairs of the peace process, agreed that the LTTE should be allowed to deal with the situation. They allowed the situation to develop into a bloody confrontation. They failed to realise that Karuna’s revolt caused irreparable damage to the organisation by dividing the LTTE’s fighting cadre on regional lines. The crisis denied the LTTE recruitment in the Batticaloa and Ampara sectors, while its operations in the Trincomalee District, too, experienced difficulties due to the detention of ‘Colonel’ Paduman, the senior man in charge of the area. ‘Colonel’ Paduman, too, was perceived as a threat due to his close association with Karuna.

Karuna acted swiftly to ensure his protection and that of the eastern cadres. The well-proven battlefield strategist felt that his security, as well as the safety of the Batticaloa fighting cadre, depended on an understanding with the Sri Lankan military. Karuna pushed for a separate agreement on the lines of the Norwegian arranged CFA between the GoSL and the LTTE in February 2002.

The Island dealt with Karuna’s move in an exclusive headlined ‘Rebel Karuna wants separate deal with government’ in the March 5, 2004 issue, which was based on information provided by Varathan, an aide to Karuna. The then Army Chief, Lieutenant General Lionel Balagalle and DIG Nimal Lewke confirmed what Varathan had to say on behalf of Karuna.

Karuna offered to negotiate a separate ceasefire in the Ampara-Batticaloa sector, though both the Norwegians and the government promptly rejected the move, while reiterating their commitment to the CFA. But, an influential section, within the establishment, supported Karuna’s move. Varathan alleged that a wave of killings in the Eastern Province, in the wake of the CFA, and a demand for 1,000 more cadres from the Batticaloa-Ampara sector for deployment in the Northern Province, too, had contributed to Karuna’s decision to break ranks.

Wobbling goverment

An unprecedented crisis caused by Karuna sent shock waves through the LTTE and its supporters. Among the affected parties were the TNA and the Tamil Diaspora. The LTTE struggled to contain the developing crisis. In spite of specific government orders issued to the Army not to intervene, at certain levels the military cooperated with Karuna.

Karuna wanted the Army to prevent a group of senior cadres, who had been under his overall command, from crossing the entry/exit point at Omanthai, north of Vavuniya, back to the Vanni. The LTTE dissident also urged the Army to facilitate an operation to help his men, deployed in the Northern Province, to return through Army lines on the night of March 3, 2004. The government prohibited the Army from supporting Karuna’s efforts, hence a group of senior cadres, including ‘Colonel” T. Ramesh and their families, crossed the entry/exit point. Immediately after their arrival in Kilinochchi, ‘Colonel’ Ramesh was declared as Karuna’s successor.

Undaunted by the government’s refusal to back his revolt against, what Karuna called, the treacherous Kilinochchi leadership, he ordered public protests in Batticaloa. The first of a series of protests was held at Kiran, Karuna’s home town, where a crowd of over 2,000 people gathered in support of Karuna. Some of them set fire to effigies of Prabhakaran and Ramesh, while Karuna reiterated his demand for a separate CFA with the government. Much to the glee of the LTTE and the Norwegians, the government rejected Karuna’s call for cooperation out of hand. But, the military continued to extend support to Karuna.

In spite of the LTTE’ pull-out from negotiations in April 2003, the government reiterated its commitment to a non-existent peace process thereby bending backwards to please the LTTE and the so-called peace facilitator with its own ultimate agenda coinciding with those of the LTTE.

The LTTE ordered the Tamil media not to provide space for the rebellious group. No one dared challenge the LTTE, though Karuna, too, exerted pressure on the media. Undergraduates from the Northern Province, studying at the Eastern University at Vantharamoolai ,returned to their villages amidst rising tension.

Regardless of the government directive that the military kept its distance from the rebel faction, an influential section of those in the military, who were earlier deployed in clandestine operations behind enemy lines, threw their weight behind the former LTTE field commander.

Batticaloa’s hostility towards the LTTE increased after an LTTE operative shot dead eight Karuna loyalists, including Kuheneshan, widely believed to be a high ranker among the renegade group, at Crystal Terrace housing scheme, Kottawa, on July 25, 2004. They were slain in their sleep

Batticaloa Tamils defied an LTTE directive prohibiting public participation at the funerals of the three Karuna loyalists killed at Kottawa. Several hundred people paid their last respects to Pakyam Amarasevan, alias Tehvan, of Main Street, Kommathurai, Chennkalady, Ponnathurai Thurainadan alias Ruban of the same address, and Kandiah Annandakumar of Kattankudy. The LTTE distributed leaflets warning the public of dire consequences if they attended, what they called, traitors’ funeral. The LTTE made an attempt to prevent public participation, having failed to dissuade families of the victims from bringing the bodies to Batticaloa. Families, living in military held areas, accepted the bodies, whereas those living in the LTTE-controlled region had no option but to accept the directive.

It would be important to examine the circumstances under which the LTTE hunted down those given refuge at the Crystal Terrace housing scheme. They had moved in on July 13, 2004, and were in the process of trying to obtain passports to leave the country. The police quoted a neighbour as having said he heard gunshots around 3.30 a.m. As people used to light crackers to scare monkeys away, he had not taken much notice, he said.

In fact, the first indication of the LTTE operation, the biggest directed against the Karuna faction in Colombo, since the March 2004 split, came to light after the military intercepted a conversation between two LTTE personnel. Although they discussed a successful hit in Colombo, there was no clue as regards the location. The conversation revealed that those involved in the operation had reached Karuna’s successor, ‘Colonel’ Thambirajah Ramesh based in the Batticaloa district. The Colombo police took about four hours to locate the scene of the massacre.

Impact on CFA

The crisis created by Karuna quickly engulfed the entire CFA process. Those trying to save the CFA soon realised that they were fighting a losing battle. They understood Karuna’s action had caused irreparable damage and nothing could resurrect the Norwegian initiative.

The SLMM (Norway led Sri Lanka monitoring mission) suspended the monitoring process in areas under Karuna’s control. Overnight, the Northern and Eastern Provinces were divided into three sectors, under the control of the GoSL, the LTTE and the breakaway LTTE faction. The Norwegians and the SLMM rejected Karuna’s overtures to have a separate CFA negotiated between the breakaway faction and the GoSL. Karuna also emphasised that the LTTE should recognise that the Batticaloa-Ampara sector was outside its purview. UNICEF and the UNHCR, too, pulled out of Karuna’s territory.

Today only a few remember the dicey situation the country experienced at thatime.

The SLMM also turned down an SLA request to arrange for a meeting between the Army and Karuna. In spite of the Army chief, Lt. Gen. Balagalle, who held the post of the Chief of Defence Staff, personally pushing for a meeting, which he felt could help ease tensions, the SLMM refused to comply. The LTTE insisted that there shouldn’t be any interaction whatsoever between the SLMM and the breakaway faction. Erik Solheim ruled out a Norwegian intervention, thereby effectively ending any sort of mediation effort.

In a desperate bid to settle the crisis, the UK stepped in. The UK sent its top diplomat in Colombo, Steven Evans, along with its Defence Attaché, Lt. Col. Mark Weldon, to find a way out.

Efforts to isolate Karuna failed. Premier Wickremesinghe compelled Ali Zarheer Moulana to resign his parliamentary seat after the disclosure of his role in facilitating Karuna to leave the Batticaloa district. Before that, the battlefield tactician quickly won over the confidence of the Tamil-speaking people in the region. He took advantage of the situation by offering to discuss long standing grievances of the public. Then General Officer Commanding (GoC) the Army’s 23 Division, headquartered at Welikanda, Brigadier Vajira Wijegunawardene, recalled how Karuna moved swiftly to consolidate his power in areas under his control. Karuna offered to discuss the forcible takeover of land by the LTTE in the east. Soon, the UNP and the TNA realised that the crisis was having a debilitating impact on their campaign for the April 2, 2004 parliamentary polls. In fact, Premier Wickremesinghe had to avoid Batticaloa during campaigning in the East as the Defence Ministry couldn’t guarantee his security.

Vanni move on East

Under the noses of the Norwegians, the LTTE moved cadres to beef up its strength in the Batticaloa District to take on Karuna. The SLMM and the government facilitated the transfer of LTTE cadres from the North to the East in the run-up to the parliamentary polls. The CFA permitted transfers, though there had been restrictions as regards the number of personnel. The LTTE overcame the problem by sending groups in small batches across Army controlled entry and exit points at Omanthai and Uliyankulam. Although the Army had managed to detect some of those entering the East illegally, it couldn’t thwart the LTTE plans. Then the LTTE humiliated the government by launching a series of sea landings on the night of April 9, 2004 to wipe out the breakaway group. The LTTE operation had got underway a few hours after the service commanders arrived at Trincomalee. In spite of the Defence portfolio being under her control, President Kumaratunga did nothing, while the Prime Minister and the Norwegians looked the other way. A confident LTTE leadership told the government that it intended to use sea routes to mount an operation targeting Karuna. The government was told to keep the Navy out of the LTTE’s way. The government gave in to LTTE demands. Following urgent consultations in Colombo between the military and the President, the top brass summoned a meeting at the Batticaloa Brigade Headquarters, where senior officers, in charge of the region, were told to keep out of the fight.

After Karuna’s decision to give up the fight on April 9, 2004, when the LTTE confronted his cadres on the banks of the Verugal River, many believed that Prabhakaran’s erstwhile friend wouldn’t survive.

Karuna’s decision has been influenced by the realisation that the sea borne assault was led by Batticaloa cadres, the majority of those who had fought under him. Had Karuna engaged them on the banks of the Verugal River, there would have been many casualties. Instead of fighting, Karuna ordered his men to leave the battlefield and return to their villages, while he fled Batticaloa with the help of UNP National List MP Ali Zaheer Moulana. Until Moulana acknowledged his role in Karuna’s escape, the UNP, a section of the medi, and even the Norwegians, blamed the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) for helping Karuna escape. Once the UNP had established Moulana’s involvement, PM Wickremesinghe demanded his resignation. He swiftly complied. Moulana sought protection abroad. After years in the US, he returned to the country to pledge his allegiance to President Rajapaksa.

Karuna loyalists killed five LTTE cadres, including ‘Lt. Colonel’ Neelan, the deputy head of the Batticaloa District Intelligence outfit before fleeing the area. A furious Kilinochchi leadership vowed to hit back wherever Karuna and his top men took refuge.

A spate of killings undermined SLMM efforts to restore normalcy in the Batticaloa-Ampara sector, where unidentified gunmen killed 10 LTTE personnel, in three separate incidents on April 24, May 2 and May 6, 2004. The LTTE accused the DMI of carrying out the killings, a charge vehemently denied by the DMI. The LTTE hit back. An LTTE operative shot dead Lance Corporal Wasantha Liyanage. He was shot through the head inside a private bus approaching Batticaloa town on May 9, 2004. The bus was coming from Chenkaladi.

The LTTE struck again on May 19, 2004, outside the Batticaloa hospital. Reserve police constable, Dassanayake (32658) of police intelligence shot through his head in broad daylight. The gunman walked out of the nearby post office and shot the policeman before walking away.

In spite of a change of government in April, 2004, the UPFA’s response to the LTTE, too, remained the same.

But the military responded to the LTTE threat by stepping up clandestine action, particularly in the East. A growing relationship, mutually beneficial to the military and the breakaway LTTE faction, gradually undermined the LTTE in the Eastern Province. By the time Eelam War IV erupted in Aug 2006, the LTTE had suffered a debilitating setback in the East.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

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Midweek Review

Fonseka clears Rajapaksas of committing war crimes he himself once accused them of

Published

4 days ago

2026/02/25

Sahan Weerasooriya

With Sri Lanka’s 17th annual war victory over separatist Tamil terrorism just months away, warwinning Army Chief, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka (Dec. 06, 2005, to July 15, 2009) has significantly changed his war narrative pertaining to the final phase of the offensive that was brought to an end on May 18, 2009.

The armed forces declared the conclusion of ground operations on that day after the entire northern region was brought back under their control. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, hiding within the secured area, was killed on the following day. His body was recovered from the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

With the war a foregone conclusion, with nothing to save the increasingly hedged in Tigers taking refuge among hapless Tamil civilians, Fonseka left for Beijing on May 11, and returned to Colombo, around midnight, on May 17, 2009. The LTTE, in its last desperate bid to facilitate Prabhakatan’s escape, breached one flank of the 53 Division, around 2.30 am, on May 18. But they failed to bring the assault to a successful conclusion and by noon the following day those fanatical followers of Tiger Supremo, who had been trapped within the territory, under military control, died in confrontations.

During Fonseka’s absence, the celebrated 58 Division (formerly Task Force 1), commanded by the then Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva, advanced 31/2 to 4 kms and was appropriately positioned with Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne’s 53 Division. The LTTE never had an opportunity to save its leader by breaching several lines held by frontline troops on the Vanni east front. There couldn’t have been any other option than surrendering to the Army.

The Sinha Regiment veteran, who had repeatedly accused the Rajapaksas of war crimes, and betraying the war effort by providing USD 2 mn, ahead of the 2005 presidential election, to the LTTE, in return for ordering the polls boycott that enabled Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory, last week made noteworthy changes to his much disputed narrative.

GR’s call to Shavendra What did the former Army Commander say?

* The Rajapaksas wanted to sabotage the war effort, beginning January 2008.

* In January 2008, Mahinda Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Navy Commander VA Wasantha Karannagoda, proposed to the National Security Council that the Army should advance from Vavuniya to Mullithivu, on a straight line, to rapidly bring the war to a successful conclusion. They asserted that Fonseka’s strategy (fighting the enemy on multiple fronts) caused a lot of casualties.

* They tried to discourage the then Lt. Gen. Fonseka

* Fonseka produced purported video evidence to prove decisive intervention made by Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa on the afternoon of May 17. The ex-Army Chief’s assertion was based on a telephone call received by Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva from Gotabaya Rajapaksa. That conversation had been captured on video by Swarnavahini’s Shanaka de Silva who now resides in the US. He had been one of the few persons, from the media, authorised by the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry to be with the Army leadership on the battlefield. Fonseka claimed that the videographer fled the country to escape death in the hands of the Rajapaksas. It was somewhat reminiscent of Maithripala Sirisena’s claim that if Rajapaksas win the 2015 Presidential election against him he would be killed by them.

* Shanaka captured Shavendra Silva disclosing three conditions laid down by the LTTE to surrender namely (a) Their casualties should be evacuated to Colombo by road (b) They were ready to exchange six captured Army personnel with those in military custody and (c) and the rest were ready to surrender.

* Then Fonseka received a call from Gotabaya Rajapaksa, on a CDMA phone. The Defence Secretary issued specific instructions to the effect that if the LTTE was to surrender that should be to the military and definitely not to the ICRC or any other third party. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, one-time Commanding Officer of the 1st battalion of the Gajaba Regiment, ordered that irrespective of any new developments and talks with the international community, offensive action shouldn’t be halted. That declaration directly contradicted Fonseka’s claim that the Rajapaksas conspired to throw a lifeline to the LTTE.

Fonseka declared that the Rajapaksa brothers, in consultation with the ICRC, and Amnesty International, offered an opportunity for the LTTE leadership to surrender, whereas his order was to annihilate the LTTE. The overall plan was to eliminate all, Fonseka declared, alleging that the Rajapaksa initiated talks with the LTTE and other parties to save those who had been trapped by ground forces in a 400 m x 400 m area by the night of May 16, among a Tamil civilian human shield held by force.

If the LTTE had agreed to surrender to the Army, Mahinda Rajapaksa would have saved their lives. If that happened Velupillai Prabhakaran would have ended up as the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, he said. Fonseka shocked everyone when he declared that he never accused the 58 Division of executing prisoners of war (white flag killings) but the issue was created by those media people embedded with the military leadership. Fonseka declared that accusations regarding white flag killings never happened. That story, according to Fonseka, had been developed on the basis of the Rajapaksas’ failed bid to save the lives of the LTTE leaders.

Before we discuss the issues at hand, and various assertions, claims and allegations made by Fonseka, it would be pertinent to remind readers of wartime US Defence Advisor in Colombo Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith’s June 2011 denial of white flag killings. The US State Department promptly declared that the officer hadn’t spoken at the inaugural Colombo seminar on behalf of the US. Smith’s declaration, made two years after the end of the war, and within months after the release of the Darusman report, dealt a massive blow to false war crimes allegations.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in 2010, appointed a three-member Panel of Experts, more like a kangaroo court, consisting of Marzuki Darusman, Yasmin Sooka, and Steven Ratner, to investigate war crimes accusations.

Now Fonseka has confirmed what Smith revealed at the defence seminar in response to a query posed by Maj. General (retd.) Ashok Metha of the IPKF to Shavendra Silva, who had been No 02 in our UN mission, in New York, at that time.

White flag allegations

‘White flag’ allegations cannot be discussed in isolation. Fonseka made that claim as the common presidential candidate backed by the UNP-JVP-TNA combine. The shocking declaration was made in an interview with The Sunday Leader Editor Frederica Jansz published on Dec. 13, 2009 under ‘Gota ordered them to be shot – General Sarath Fonseka.’

The ‘white flag’ story had been sensationally figured in a leaked confidential US Embassy cable, during Patricia Butenis tenure as the US Ambassador here. Butenis had authored that cable at 1.50 pm on Dec. 13, 2009, the day after the now defunct The Sunday Leader exclusive. Butenis had lunch with Fonseka in the company of the then UNP Deputy Leader Karu Jayasuriya, according to the cable. But for the writer the most interesting part had been Butenis declaration that Fonseka’s advisors, namely the late Mangala Samaraweera, Anura Kumara Dissanayake (incumbent President) and Vijitha Herath (current Foreign Minister) wanted him to retract part of the story attributed to him.

Frederica Jansz fiercely stood by her explosive story. She reiterated the accuracy of the story, published on Dec. 13, 2009, during the ‘white flag’ hearing when the writer spoke to her. There is absolutely no reason to suspect Frederica Jansz misinterpreted Fonseka’s response to her queries.

Subsequently, Fonseka repeated the ‘white flag’ allegation at a public rally held in support of his candidature. Many an eyebrow was raised at The Sunday Leader’s almost blind support for Fonseka, against the backdrop of persistent allegations directed at the Army over Lasantha Wickrematunga’s killing. Wickrematunga, an Attorney-at-Law by profession and one-time Private Secretary to Opposition Leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was killed on the Attidiya Road, Ratmalana in early January 2009.

The Darusman report, too, dealt withthe ‘white flag’ killings and were central to unsubstantiated Western accusations directed at the Sri Lankan military. Regardless of the political environment in which the ‘white flag’ accusations were made, the issue received global attention for obvious reasons. The accuser had been the war-winning Army Commander who defeated the LTTE at its own game. But, Fonseka insisted, during his meeting with Butenis, as well as the recent public statement that the Rajapaksas had worked behind his back with some members of the international community.

Fresh inquiry needed

Fonseka’s latest declaration that the Rajapaksas wanted to save the LTTE leadership came close on the heels of Deputy British Prime Minister David Lammy’s whistle-stop visit here. The UK, as the leader of the Core Group on Sri Lanka at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council, spearheads the campaign targeting Sri Lanka.

Lammy was on his way to New Delhi for the AI Impact Summit. The Labour campaigner pushed for action against Sri Lanka during the last UK general election. In fact, taking punitive action against the Sri Lankan military had been a key campaign slogan meant to attract Tamil voters of Sri Lankan origin. His campaign contributed to the declaration of sanctions in March 2025 against Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda, General (retd) Shavendra Silva, General (retd) Jagath Jayasuriya and ex-LTTE commander Karuna, who rebelled against Prabhakaran. Defending Shavendra Silva, Fonseka, about a week after the imposition of the UK sanctions, declared that the British action was unfair.

But Fonseka’s declaration last week had cleared the Rajapaksas of war crimes. Instead, they had been portrayed as traitors. That declaration may undermine the continuous post-war propaganda campaign meant to demonise the Rajapaksas and top ground commanders.

Canada, then a part of the Western clique that blindly towed the US line, declared Sri Lanka perpetrated genocide and also sanctioned ex-Presidents Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Other countries resorted to action, though such measures weren’t formally announced. General (retd) Jagath Dias and Maj. Gen (retd) Chagie Gallage were two of those targeted.

Against the backdrop of Fonseka’s latest claims, in respect of accountability issues, the urgent need to review action taken against Sri Lanka cannot be delayed. Although the US denied visa when Fonseka was to accompany President Maithripala Sirisena to the UN, in Sept. 2016, he hadn’t been formally accused of war crimes by the western powers, obviously because he served their interests.

On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations that hadn’t been subjected to judicial proceedings, Geneva initiated actions. The US, Canada and UK acted on those accusations. The US sanctioned General Shavendra Silva in Feb. 2020 and Admiral Karannagoda in April 2023.

What compelled Fonseka to change his narrative, 18 years after his Army ended the war? Did Fonseka base his latest version solely on Shanaka de Silva video? Fonseka is on record as claiming that he got that video, via a third party, thereby Shanaka de Silva had nothing to do with his actions.

DNA and formation of DP

Having realised that he couldn’t, under any circumstances, reach a consensus with the UNP to pursue a political career with that party, Fonseka teamed up with the JVP, one of the parties in the coalition that backed his presidential bid in 2010. Fonseka’s current efforts to reach an understanding with the JVP/NPP (President Anura Kumara Dissanayake is the leader of both registered political parties) should be examined against the backdrop of their 2010 alliance.

Under Fonseka’s leadership, the JVP, and a couple of other parties/groups, contested, under the symbol of the Democratic National Alliance (DNA) that had been formed on 22 Nov. 2009. but the grouping pathetically failed to live up to their own expectations. The results of the parliamentary polls, conducted in April 2010, had been devastating and utterly demoralising. Fonseka, who polled about 40% of the national vote at the January 2010 presidential election, ended up with just over 5% of the vote, and the DNA only managed to secure seven seats, including two on the National List. The DNA group consisted of Fonseka, ex-national cricket captain Arjuna Ranatunga, businessman Tiran Alles and four JVPers. Anura Kumara Dissanayake was among the four.

Having been arrested on February 8, 2010, soon after the presidential election, Fonseka was in prison. He was court-martialed for committing “military offences”. He was convicted of corrupt military supply deals and sentenced to three years in prison. Fonseka vacated his seat on 7 Oct .2010. Following a failed legal battle to protect his MP status, Fonseka was replaced by DNA member Jayantha Ketagoda on 8 March 2011. But President Mahinda Rajapaksa released Fonseka in May 2012 following heavy US pressure. The US went to the extent of issuing a warning to the then SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena that unless President Rajapaksa freed Fonseka he would have to face the consequences (The then Health Minister Sirisena disclosed the US intervention when the writer met him at the Jealth Ministry, as advised by President Rajapaksa)

By then, Fonseka and the JVP had drifted apart and both parties were irrelevant. Somawansa Amarasinghe had been the leader at the time the party decided to join the UNP-led alliance that included the TNA, and the SLMC. The controversial 2010 project had the backing of the US as disclosed by leaked secret diplomatic cables during Patricia Butenis tenure as the US Ambassador here.

In spite of arranging the JVP-led coalition to bring an end to the Rajapaksa rule, Butenis, in a cable dated 15 January 2010, explained the crisis situation here. Butenis said: “There are no examples we know of a regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes while that regime or government remained in power. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country’s senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka.”

Then Fonseka scored a major victory when Election Commissioner Mahinda Deshapriya on 1 April, 2013, recognised his Democratic Party (DNA was registered as DP) with ‘burning flame’ as its symbol. There hadn’t been a previous instance of any service commander registering a political party. While Fonseka received the leadership, ex-Army officer Senaka de Silva, husband of Diana Gamage ((later SJB MP who lost her National List seat over citizenship issue) functioned as the Deputy Leader.

Having covered Fonseka’s political journey, beginning with the day he handed over command to Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, in July, 2009, at the old Army Headquarters that was later demolished to pave the way for the Shangri-La hotel complex, the writer covered the hastily arranged media briefing at the Solis reception hall, Pitakotte, on 2 April, 2023. Claiming that his DP was the only alternative to what he called corrupt Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government and bankrupt Ranil Wickremesinghe-led Opposition, a jubilant Fonseka declared himself as the only alternative (‘I am the only alternative,’ with strapline ‘SF alleges Opposition is as bad as govt’. The Island, April 3, 2013).

Fonseka had been overconfident to such an extent, he appealed to members of the government parliamentary group, as well as the Opposition (UNP), to switch allegiance to him. As usual Fonseka was cocky and never realised that 40% of the national vote he received, at the presidential election, belonged to the UNP, TNA and the JVP. Fonseka also disregarded the fact that he no longer had the JVP’s support. He was on his own. The DP never bothered to examine the devastating impact his 2010 relationship with the TNA had on the party. The 2015 general election results devastated Fonseka and underscored that there was absolutely no opportunity for a new party. The result also proved that his role in Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE hadn’t been a decisive factor.

RW comes to SF’s rescue

Fonseka’s DP suffered a humiliating defeat at the August 2015 parliamentary polls. The outcome had been so bad that the DP was left without at least a National List slot. Fonseka was back to square one. If not for UNP leader and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, Fonseka could have been left in the cold. Wickremesinghe accommodated Fonseka on their National List, in place of SLFPer M.K.D.S. Gunawardene, who played a critical role in an influential section of the party and the electorate shifting support to Maithripala Sirisena. Gunawardena passed away on 19 January, 2016. Wickremesinghe and Fonseka signed an agreement at Temple Trees on 3 February, 2016. Fonseka received appointment as National List MP on 9 February, 2016, and served as Minister of Regional Development and, thereafter, as Minister of Wildlife and Sustainable Development, till Oct. 2018. Fonseka lost his Ministry when President Sirisena treacherously sacked Wickremesinghe’s government to pave the way for a new partnership with the Rajapaksas. The Supreme Court discarded that arrangement and brought back the Yahapalana administration but Sirisena, who appointed Fonseka to the lifetime rank of Field Marshal, in recognition of his contribution to the defeat of terrorism, refused to accommodate him in Wickremesinghe’s Cabinet. The President also left out Wasantha Karannagoda and Roshan Goonetilleke. Sirisena appointed them Admiral of the Fleet and Marshal of Air Force, respectively, on 19, Sept. 2019, in the wake of him failing to secure the required backing to contest the Nov. 2019 presidential election.

Wickremesinghe’s UNP repeatedly appealed on behalf of Fonseka in vain to Sirisena. At the 2020 general election, Fonseka switched his allegiance to Sajith Premadasa and contested under the SJB’s ‘telephone’ symbol and was elected from the Gampaha district. Later, following a damaging row with Sajith Premadasa, he quit the SJB as its Chairman and, at the last presidential election, joined the fray as an independent candidate. Having secured just 22,407 votes, Fonseka was placed in distant 9th position. Obviously, Fonseka never received any benefits from support extended to the 2022 Aragalaya and his defeat at the last presidential election seems to have placed him in an extremely difficult position, politically.

Let’s end this piece by reminding that Fonseka gave up the party leadership in early 2024 ahead of the presidential election. Senaka de Silva succeeded Fonseka as DP leader, whereas Dr. Asosha Fernando received appointment as its Chairman. The DP has aligned itself with the NPP. The rest is history.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

Strengths and weaknesses of BRICS+: Implications for Global South

Published

4 days ago

2026/02/25

Sahan Weerasooriya

The 16th BRICS Summit, from 22 to 24 October 2024 in Kazan, was attended by 24 heads of state, including the five countries that officially became part of the group on 1 January: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia. Argentina finally withdrew from the forum after Javier Milei’s government took office in 2023.

In the end, it changed its strategy and instead of granting full membership made them associated countries adding a large group of 13 countries: two from Latin America (Bolivia and Cuba), three from Africa (Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda) and eight from Asia (Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Vietnam). This confirms the expansionary intent of the BRICS, initiated last year and driven above all by China, which seeks to turn the group into a relevant multilateral forum, with focus on political than economic interaction, designed to serve its interests in the geopolitical dispute with the United States. This dispute however is not the making of China but has arisen mainly due to the callous bungling of Donald Trump in his second term in office.

China has emerged as the power that could influence the membership within the larger group more than its rival in the region, India. Obviously, the latter is concerned about these developments but seems powerless to stop the trend as more countries realize the need for the development of capacity to resist Western dominance. India in this regard seems to be reluctant possibly due to its defence obligations to the US with Trump declaring war against countries that try to forge partnerships aiming to de-dollarize the global economic system.

The real weakness in BRICS therefore, is the seemingly intractable rivalry between China and India and the impact of this relationship on the other members who are keen to see the organisation grow its capacity to meet its stated goals. China is committed to developing an alternative to the Western dominated world order, particularly the weaponization of the dollar by the US. India does not want to be seen as anti-west and as a result India is often viewed as a reluctant or cautious member of BRICS. This problem seems to be perpetuated due to the ongoing border tensions with China. India therefore has a desire to maintain a level playing field within the group, rather than allowing it to be dominated by Beijing.

Though India seems to be committed to a multipolar world, it prefers focusing on economic cooperation over geopolitical alignment. India thinks the expansion of BRICS initiated by China may dilute its influence within the bloc to the advantage of China. India fears the bloc is shifting toward an anti-Western tilt driven by China and Russia, complicating its own strong ties with the West. India is wary of the new members who are also beneficiaries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While China aims to use BRICS for anti-Western geopolitical agendas, India favors focusing on South-South financial cooperation and reforming international institutions. Yet India seems to be not in favour of creating a new currency to replace the dollar which could obviously strengthen the South-South financial transactions bypassing the dollar.

Moreover, India has explicitly opposed the expansion of the bloc to include certain nations, such as Pakistan, indicating a desire to control the group’s agenda, especially during its presidency.

In this equation an important factor is the role that Russia could play. The opinion expressed by the Russian foreign minister in this regard may be significant. Referring to the new admissions the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said: “The weight, prominence and importance of the candidates and their international standing were the primary factors for us [BRICS members]. It is our shared view that we must recruit like-minded countries into our ranks that believe in a multipolar world order and the need for more democracy and justice in international relations. We need those who champion a bigger role for the Global South in global governance. The six countries whose accession was announced today fully meet these criteria.”

The admission of three major oil producing countries, Saudi Arabia, Iran and UAE is bound to have a significant impact on the future global economic system and consequently may have positive implications for the Global South. These countries would have the ability to decisively help in creating a new international trading system to replace the 5 centuries old system that the West created to transfer wealth from the South to the North. This is so because the petro-dollar is the pillar of the western banking system and is at the very core of the de-dollarizing process that the BRICS is aiming at. This cannot be done without taking on board Saudi Arabia, a staunch ally of the west. BRICS’ expansion, therefore, is its transformation into the most representative community in the world, whose members interact with each other bypassing Western pressure. Saudi Arabia and Iran are actively mending fences, driven by a 2023 China-brokered deal to restore diplomatic ties, reopen embassies, and de-escalate regional tensions. While this detente has brought high-level meetings and a decrease in direct hostility rapprochement is not complete yet and there is hope which also has implications, positive for the South and may not be so for the North.

Though the US may not like what is going on, Europe, which may not endorse all that the former does if one is to go by the speech delivered by the Canadian PM in Brazil recently, may not be displeased about the rapid growth of BRICS. The Guardian UK highlighted expert opinion that BRICS expansion is rather “a symbol of broad support from the global South for the recalibration of the world order.” A top official at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Caroline Kanter has told the daily, “It is obvious that we [Western countries] are no longer able to set our own conditions and standards. Proposals will be expected from us so that in the future we will be perceived as an attractive partner.” At the same time, the bottom line is that BRICS expansion is perceived in the West as a political victory for Russia and China which augurs well for the future of BRICS and the Global South.

Poor countries, relentlessly battered by the neo-liberal global economy, will greatly benefit if BRICS succeeds in forging a new world order and usher in an era of self-sufficiency and economic independence. There is no hope for them in the present system designed to exploit their natural resources and keep them in a perpetual state of dependency and increasing poverty. BRICS is bound to be further strengthened if more countries from the South join it. Poor countries must come together and with the help of BRICS work towards this goal.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga