Features
Attempted Coup d’etat 1962

by A. Patabendige
This year is the 60th anniversary of the notorious attempted coup d’etat in SL. Jayantha Somasunderam and DBS Jeyraj have attempted to revive media interest in it for whatever reason. It would otherwise have been forgotten. Some facts however appear to be distorted even now.
Their combined efforts refer to it as a gentlemen’s attempted coup by a few army and police officers and some cunning civilians, all who were apparently from ‘elitist’ back grounds. If ‘elite’ means the best of society or best people probably only Col FC de Saram would qualify. Most of the others, if not all, were from fairly ordinary middle class background. Most of them were getting a measly Government salary. An army captain then would have got Rs 525.00 monthly, hardly an elitist income. This would be probably more than that of an ASP in the police.
Those involved, less three, were non Buddhists which was not mentioned by the above two writers. That the plotters were representative of religious and racial minorities that were about 15 % of the population may have been the glue that bonded them to fiddle with treason.
The overt reasons for the attempt coup has been given as dissatisfaction with the government due to widespread strikes and protests, ill discipline and general deterioration of the administration of the country. However the emphasis of the government on the inexorable rise of the Sinhala language and increasing influence of Buddhist clergy must have been the real tipping point. The plotters may have felt that their pre-eminence in government service was threatened. The state takeover of Christian schools also added fuel to the rising resentment.
A myth about the intentions of the plotters needs to be quashed. There was never going to be a gentlemen’s coup. Those government ministers and the like to be arrested were not going to be treated well. The so called plans for PM Mrs. Bandaranaike and her children to be sent to live in exile in England at Government expense were as ridiculous as the reasons for the attempted coup. This was the PM of Ceylon. Would the British have agreed to be an accessory to a coup in a democratic dominion? The three Service commanders were to be kept under house arrest before being deposed! Col de Saram was to be Army Commander. There was going to be first ‘a military dictatorship’ followed by ‘indirect democracy with a governing council ’to eventually have’ general elections’. A lot of whisky fueled baloney supported by intoxicated but dangerous middle class dreamers.
In fact most of the arrested members of the government were to be incarcerated in the underground Army ammo dump at Army HQ. It had no ventilation. It recalled shades of the Black Hole of Calcutta (1756) where of a total of about a hundred imprisoned by the Indian ruler only 23 Brits and supporters survived overnight. No mention is made of how military officers who opposed the coup would be treated. Kid gloves were not going to be used surely?
Thus the remark supposed to have been made by DIG CC Dissanayake to an ASP to remove his side arm after being inveigled to obeying superior orders, illegal as they manifestly were, that this was going to be a gentlemen’s coup’! This was like the Police in the East who were ordered to surrender to the LTTE by the then IGP 27 years later; only to be massacred. Clearly a rouge element of the gazetted ranks of the Police believed committing treason was a piece of cake. DIG Sidney de Zoysa for example had a reputation for using deadly force that was enhanced after his stay in Jaffna. He was in it but not for a lark.
Arrangements too were to be made according to Somasunderam to deploy “the sabre’ troop” of the First (armoured) Reconnaissance Regiment. Actually there was more than one troop. They form part of a Sabre Squadron. Normally four Ferret Scout cars alone or two with two Daimler Armoured cars could make a troop. There were 12 scout cars and two Daimlers in the regiment at that time. Apparently they were to be used to prevent intervention by non Colombo based troops crossing into Colombo at Kirilipone, Dehiwala and Kelaniya bridges.
The scout cars would have at least machine gun ammo to carry out their task while the Daimler Armoured car had a two pounder gun that fired high explosive. It made a mockery of CC Dissanayake’s reported fairy tale instructions to that ASP about this act of treason being one carried out without any use of violence and by ‘gentlemen’.
The absolutely irrelevant and silly example cited of Gen Ayub Khan’s takeover of Pakistan was given as one the local plotters wished to emulate. Ayub was the Chief Martial Law Administrator (appointed by President Iskander (from the Greek Alexander) Mirza, himself a General, and former army commander) at the time and Army Commander. Ayub was not a Colonel who was looking to keep the three Service commanders under house arrest. He just deposed the very man who appointed him.
The three service commanders included a loan service RAF officer Air Vice Marshal JL Barker OBE DFC RAF who was commander of the RCyAF. What the plotters were going to tell the Queen of England about this the next morning would have driven her bonkers.
Was the 3rd Field Regiment Artillery going to keep its 4.2 ins mortars only to fire a ceremonial salute after the coup succeeded or use them to fire on First Battalion Ceylon Light Infantry (CLI) troops that could be expected to come from Panagoda with the formidable Lt Col Richard Udugama? Interestingly the plotters had not given any details of their arrangements to deal with Lt Col Udugama of the CLI, if and when he was arrested. One can only speculate grimly. Maybe Sidney de Zoysa and CC Dissanayake had plans.
One thing is sure if ever there was a confrontation between the Artillery and the CLI, it would have led to civil war and an unprecedented blood bath, the likes of which the country would not have recovered from for decades. The ‘gentlemen’ plotters had arranged for ‘’fully armed dispatch riders of the Signals” to help take over Radio Ceylon. That these men were reservists and not commandos appears to have been given a miss but arming them meant they had weapon work to do. This made the alleged disarming of an ASP by CC Dissanayake look stupid.
According to Somasunderam, and this was news unknown to most even in 2022, Major W Rajapakse the second in command of the First Reconnaissance Regiment with a ‘sabre’ troop was to be at Kiralapone bridge to prevent access to Colombo by troops from the cantonment in Panagoda. He was a Buddhist.
At that time the regiment had 12 unturreted scout cars each with a machine gun and two Daimler armoured fighting vehicles with a two pounder gun that fired high explosive rounds. A ‘sabre’ troop mix would normally have been of two scout cars and two Daimler armoured reconnaissance vehicles. When the coup was uncovered, Major Rajapakse was sent on compulsory leave. He however pleaded he had gone along with the plan with the sole intention of being a whistle blower at the opportune time. He was later reinstated as second in command and even commanded the regiment from March 1964 to April 1965 and again from June 1970 to October 1970!
Another Major Wilton White from the same regiment too was indicted. The history of the regiment however is completely blank about its activities in the year 1962. It was under its founder (1955) commander Lt Col DS Attygalle who later went on to become the Army Commander 10 long years (1967 to 1977) or forever and ever as once feared. Only in SL.
The third Buddhist officer involved was Artillery Capt H Wanasinghe, putting paid to an insinuation that the plotters were all from Royal, Trinity and S. Thomas’ Colleges. There was no officer from Trinity College involved while one from the 26 arrested was from S. Thomas’ College. Wanasinghe from Ananda College first agreed to be a crown witness and was released. When the government changed in 1965 he ceased to be a crown witness. He later became Army Commander (1987-89). Only in SL.
In 1966 when Minister of State JR Jayewardene announced that an attempted coup by the Army had been discovered two Trinitians (including Lieutenant Kobbekaduwa) and two Thomians, among many others, were sent on compulsory leave while the Army Commander Gen Udugama, a Trinitian, was arrested as the leader. All the accused, officers and soldiers, were Buddhists. General Udugama was the first Buddhist to command the Army. In 1977 PM Jayewardene appointed Gen Udugama as Ambassador to Iraq! Only in SL.
That Coup case was farcical. It was thrown out after the prosecution closed but not before two suspects one a warrant officer of the Light Infantry and one a businessman (Dodampe mudalali) had been murdered by being thrown out of the fourth floor of the CID after being tortured. An inspector with an evil reputation was brought into the CID to do just that. Major Labrooy at Army HQ asked General Udugama in writing to forgive him for giving false evidence against him. He said he was threatened to do so. Nothing is more telling than that about how, even why, the government and its then Minister of State, JR Jayewardene were determined to convict Gen Udugama.
An interesting connected incident needs to be included. Capt David Rasiah of the Medical Corps had Capt LL (Lucky) Vitharne of the Sinha Regiment (and also Sandhurst and Trinity) as his bestman for his wedding that year. After the church ceremony and before the reception, Capt Vitharne still dressed in his blue ceremonial (No 4 dress) uniform, decided to pay a visit to Col de Saram in the remand prison. He had served under the Colonel in Jaffna in 1961 and held him in tremendous high regard as did most army officers. Having been saluted by the army guards, he had gone in, saluted the Colonel and wished him well, Capt Vitharne then left the magazine prison for the wedding reception.
Unfortunately this act was considered a breach of army discipline and regulations. Vitharne was court martialled. Major TSB Sally, also of Vitharne’s regiment, prosecuted. No evidence of breaking any army rules or regulations was found. Vitharne was discharged only to fall foul of Defence and External Affairs Secretary NQ Dias later, leading to his discharge from the Army.
Accused Douglas Liyanage who had been GA Mannar before 1962 was well known to army officers on Task Force Illicit Immigration (TaFII) duties. He frequented the Mannar (Thallady) Officers’ mess and sounded and attempted to suborn their minds. He probably misled the plotters by exaggerating his military officer contacts assumed dissatisfaction with the Government.
Major Loyola, of the 3rd Field Artillery who was an accused had his brother Lt Ivor Novello and cousin Lt Rex Fernando in the Artillery too.
There was not a single Muslim among the plotters.
PM Dudley Senanayake and former PM Sir John Kotelawela long after their deaths were also alleged by historian KM de Silva to have been involved as allegedly confided in him by Sir John Kotelawela . The Governor General Sir Oliver Goonetilleke was also implicated to no one’s surprise. He was removed with the Queen’s consent and William Gopallawa replaced him
When the case was first taken up, Justice TS Fernando presiding, accepted the defence plea that the court was not legally constituted and dissolved the court. In Parliament Minister Philip Gunewardene stated that ‘It was a ‘fishy business. One fisher appointed three fishers. So the fishing business was caused’. This was a regressive and extremely distasteful reference to caste. The Minister of Justice SPC Fernando and the three Supreme Court judges, TS Fernando, LB de Silva and Sri Skanda Raja were of the Karawa (fishing) caste.
The subsequent second court was also dissolved as one of the judges had as Acting Attorney General been a part of the investigations to the case. A third court deliberated under Justice HNG Fernando for over 300 days and found 11 accused guilty while 15 had been acquitted during different stages of the trial.
An appeal to the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in London was made. The Privy Council deliberated and on December 2, 1965 humbly reported its finding to the Queen that ‘the appeal is allowed and the convictions be quashed’. Most of the freed accused were soon given good jobs by the new UNP government in 1965, starting a trend that became another bad precedent.
Normally at that time in Third World countries coup suspects would be shot at dawn the next day. The judgment of the first court was held by many international judicial bodies like the International Commission of Jurists as a shining example of a ‘bold, fearless and independent judiciary’. That was Sri Lanka then.
Features
RIDDHI-MA:

A new Era of Dance in Sri Lanka
Kapila Palihawadana, an internationally renowned dancer and choreographer staged his new dance production, Riddhi-Ma, on 28 March 2025 at the Elphinstone theatre, which was filled with Sri Lankan theatregoers, foreign diplomats and students of dance. Kapila appeared on stage with his charismatic persona signifying the performance to be unravelled on stage. I was anxiously waiting to see nATANDA dancers. He briefly introduced the narrative and the thematic background to the production to be witnessed. According to him, Kapila has been inspired by the Sri Lankan southern traditional dance (Low Country) and the mythologies related to Riddhi Yâgaya (Riddi Ritual) and the black magic to produce a ‘contemporary ballet’.
Riddhi Yâgaya also known as Rata Yakuma is one of the elaborative exorcism rituals performed in the southern dance tradition in Sri Lanka. It is particularly performed in Matara and Bentara areas where this ritual is performed in order to curb the barrenness and the expectation of fertility for young women (Fargnoli & Seneviratne 2021). Kapila’s contemporary ballet production had intermingled both character, Riddi Bisaw (Princes Riddhi) and the story of Kalu Kumaraya (Black Prince), who possesses young women and caught in the evil gaze (yaksa disti) while cursing upon them to be ill (De Munck, 1990).
Kapila weaves a tapestry of ritual dance elements with the ballet movements to create visually stunning images on stage. Over one and a half hours of duration, Kapila’s dancers mesmerized the audience through their virtuosic bodily competencies in Western ballet, Sri Lankan dance, especially the symbolic elements of low country dance and the spontaneity of movements. It is human bodily virtuosity and the rhythmic structures, which galvanised our senses throughout the performance. From very low phases of bodily movements to high speed acceleration, Kapila managed to visualise the human body as an elevated sublimity.
Contemporary Ballet

Figure 2 – (L) Umesha Kapilarathna performs en pointe, and (R) Narmada Nekethani performs with Jeewaka Randeepa, Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, Maradana, 28th March 2025. Source:
Malshan Witharana
The dance production Riddhi-Ma was choreographed in several segments accompanied by a flow of various music arrangements and sound elements within which the dance narrative was laid through. In other words, Kapila as a choreographer, overcomes the modernist deadlock in his contemporary dance work that the majority of Sri Lankan dance choreographers have very often succumbed to. These images of bodies of female dancers commensurate the narrative of women’s fate and her vulnerability in being possessed by the Black Demon and how she overcomes and emancipates from the oppression. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have showcased their ability to use the bodies not much as an object which is trained to perform a particular tradition but to present bodily fluidity which can be transformed into any form. Kapila’s performers possess formlessness, fluid fragility through which they break and overcome their bodily regimentations.
It was such a highly sophisticated ‘contemporary ballet’ performed at a Sri Lankan theatre with utmost rigour and precision. Bodies of all male and female dancers were highly trained and refined through classical ballet and contemporary dance. In addition, they demonstrated their abilities in performing other forms of dance. Their bodies were trained to achieve skilful execution of complex ballet movements, especially key elements of traditional ballet namely, improvisation, partnering, interpretation and off-balance and the local dance repertoires. Yet, these key ballet elements are not necessarily a part of contemporary ballet training (Marttinen, 2016). However, it is important for the dance students to learn these key elements of traditional ballet and use them in the contemporary dance settings. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have achieved such vigour and somatic precision through assiduous practice of the body to create the magic on stage.
Pas de deux
Among others, a particular dance sequence attracted my attention the most. In the traditional ballet lexicon, it is a ‘pas de deux’ which is performed by the ‘same race male and female dancers,’ which can be called ‘a duet’. As Lutts argues, ‘Many contemporary choreographers are challenging social structures and norms within ballet by messing with the structure of the pas de deux (Lutts, 2019). Pas de Deux is a dance typically done by male and female dancers. In this case, Kapila has selected a male and a female dancer whose gender hierarchies appeared to be diminished through the choreographic work. In the traditional pas de deux, the male appears as the backdrop of the female dancer or the main anchorage of the female body, where the female body is presented with the support of the male body. Kapila has consciously been able to change this hierarchical division between the traditional ballet and the contemporary dance by presenting the female dominance in the act of dance.
The sequence was choreographed around a powerful depiction of the possession of the Gara Yakâ over a young woman, whose vulnerability and the powerful resurrection from the possession was performed by two young dancers. The female dancer, a ballerina, was in a leotard and a tight while wearing a pair of pointe shoes (toe shoes). Pointe shoes help the dancers to swirl on one spot (fouettés), on the pointed toes of one leg, which is the indication of the ballet dancer’s ability to perform en pointe (The Kennedy Centre 2020).
The stunning imagery was created throughout this sequence by the female and the male dancers intertwining their flexible bodies upon each other, throwing their bodies vertically and horizontally while maintaining balance and imbalance together. The ballerina’s right leg is bent and her toes are directed towards the floor while performing the en pointe with her ankle. Throughout the sequence she holds the Gara Yakâ mask while performing with the partner.
The male dancer behind the ballerina maintains a posture while depicting low country hand gestures combining and blurring the boundaries between Sri Lankan dance and the Western ballet (see figure 3). In this sequence, the male dancer maintains the balance of the body while lifting the female dancer’s body in the air signifying some classical elements of ballet.
Haptic sense

Figure 3: Narmada Nekathani performs with the Gara Yaka mask while indicating her right leg as en pointe. Male dancer, Jeewaka Randeepa’s hand gestures signify the low country pose. Riddhi-Ma, Dance Theatre at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025. Source: Malshan Witharana.
One significant element of this contemporary ballet production is the costume design. The selection of colour palette, containing black, red and while combining with other corresponding colours and also the costumes which break the traditional rules and norms are compelling. I have discussed in a recent publication how clothes connect with the performer’s body and operate as an embodied haptic perception to connect with the spectators (Liyanage, 2025). In this production, the costumes operate in two different ways: First it signifies sculpted bodies creating an embodied, empathic experience.
Secondly, designs of costumes work as a mode of three dimensional haptic sense. Kapila gives his dancers fully covered clothing, while they generate classical ballet and Sinhalese ritual dance movements. The covered bodies create another dimension to clothing over bodies. In doing so, Kapila attempts to create sculpted bodies on stage by blurring the boundaries of gender oriented clothing and its usage in Sri Lankan dance.
Sri Lankan female body on stage, particularly in dance has been presented as an object of male desire. I have elsewhere cited that the lâsya or the feminine gestures of the dance repertoire has been the marker of the quality of dance against the tândava tradition (Liyanage, 2025). The theatregoers visit the theatre to appreciate the lâsya bodies of female dancers and if the dancer meets this threshold, then she becomes the versatile dancer. Kandyan dancers such as Vajira and Chithrasena’s dance works are explored and analysed with this lâsya and tândava criteria. Vajira for instance becomes the icon of the lâsya in the Kandyan tradition. It is not my intention here to further discuss the discourse of lâsya and tândava here.
But Kapila’s contemporary ballet overcomes this duality of male-female aesthetic categorization of lâsya and tândava which has been a historical categorization of dance bodies in Sri Lanka (Sanjeewa 2021).

Figure 4: Riddhi-Ma’s costumes creates sculpted bodies combining the performer and the audience through empathic projection. Dancers, Sithija Sithimina and Senuri Nimsara appear in Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025, Source, Malshan Witharana.
Conclusion
Dance imagination in the Sri Lankan creative industry exploits the female body as an object. The colonial mind set of the dance body as a histrionic, gendered, exotic and aesthetic object is still embedded in the majority of dance productions produced in the current cultural industry. Moreover, dance is still understood as a ‘language’ similar to music where the narratives are shared in symbolic movements. Yet, Kapila has shown us that dance exists beyond language or lingual structures where it creates humans to experience alternative existence and expression. In this sense, dance is intrinsically a mode of ‘being’, a kinaesthetic connection where its phenomenality operates beyond the rationality of our daily life.
At this juncture, Kapila and his dance ensemble have marked a significant milestone by eradicating the archetypical and stereotypes in Sri Lankan dance. Kapila’s intervention with Riddi Ma is way ahead of our contemporary reality of Sri Lankan dance which will undoubtedly lead to a new era of dance theatre in Sri Lanka.
References
De Munck, V. C. (1990). Choosing metaphor. A case study of Sri Lankan exorcism. Anthropos, 317-328. Fargnoli, A., & Seneviratne, D. (2021). Exploring Rata Yakuma: Weaving dance/movement therapy and a
Sri Lankan healing ritual. Creative Arts in Education and Therapy (CAET), 230-244.
Liyanage, S. 2025. “Arts and Culture in the Post-War Sri Lanka: Body as Protest in Post-Political Aragalaya (Porattam).” In Reflections on the Continuing Crises of Post-War Sri Lanka, edited by Gamini Keerawella and Amal Jayawardane, 245–78. Colombo: Institute for International Studies (IIS) Sri Lanka.
Lutts, A. (2019). Storytelling in Contemporary Ballet.
Samarasinghe, S. G. (1977). A Methodology for the Collection of the Sinhala Ritual. Asian Folklore Studies, 105-130.
Sanjeewa, W. (2021). Historical Perspective of Gender Typed Participation in the Performing Arts in Sri Lanka During the Pre-Colonial, The Colonial Era, and the Post-Colonial Eras. International Journal of Social Science And Human Research, 4(5), 989-997.
The Kennedy Centre. 2020. “Pointe Shoes Dancing on the Tips of the Toes.” Kennedy-Center.org. 2020 https://www.kennedy-center.org/education/resources-for-educators/classroom-resources/media- and-interactives/media/dance/pointe-shoes/..
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Himansi Dehigama for proofreading this article.
About the author:
Saumya Liyanage (PhD) is a film and theatre actor and professor in drama and theatre, currently working at the Department of Theatre Ballet and Modern Dance, Faculty of Dance and Drama, University of the Visual and Performing Arts (UVPA), Colombo. He is the former Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and is currently holding the director position of the Social Reconciliation Centre, UVPA Colombo.
Features
Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part II

Chinese Naval Entry and End of Post-War Unipolarity
The ascendancy of China as an emerging superpower is one of the most striking shifts in the global distribution of economic and political power in the 21st century. With its strategic rise, China has assumed a more proactive diplomatic and economic role in the Indian Ocean, signalling its emergence as a global superpower. This new leadership role is exemplified by initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The Economist noted that “China’s decision to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform” (The Economist, 11 November 2014). Thus far, China’s ascent to global superpower status has been largely peaceful.
In 2025, in terms of Navy fleet strength, China became the world’s largest Navy, with a fleet of 754 ships, thanks to its ambitious naval modernisation programme. In May 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) further strengthened its capabilities by commissioning the Fujian, its latest aircraft carrier. Equipped with an advanced electromagnetic catapult system, the Fujian can launch larger and heavier aircraft, marking a significant upgrade over its predecessors.
Driven by export-led growth, China sought to reinvest its trade surplus, redefining the Indian Ocean region not just as a market but as a key hub for infrastructure investment. Notably, over 80 percent of China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf transit to the Straits of Malacca before reaching its industrial centres. These factors underscore the Indian Ocean’s critical role in China’s economic and naval strategic trajectories.
China’s port construction projects along the Indian Ocean littoral, often associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), exemplify its deepening geopolitical and economic engagement in the region. These initiatives encompass multipurpose berth development, deep-sea port construction, and supporting infrastructure projects aimed at enhancing maritime connectivity and trade. Key projects include the development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan, a strategic asset for China’s access to the Arabian Sea; Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, which became a focal point of debt diplomacy concerns; the Payra deep-sea port in Bangladesh; as well as port and road infrastructure development in Myanmar’s Yunnan and Kyaukphyu regions and Cambodia’s Koh Kong.
While these projects were promoted as avenues for economic growth and regional connectivity, they also triggered geopolitical tensions and domestic opposition in several host countries. Concerns over excessive debt burdens, lack of transparency, and potential dual-use (civilian and military) implications of port facilities led to scrutiny from both local and external stakeholders, including India and Western powers. As a result, some projects faced significant pushback, delays, and, in certain cases, suspension or cancellation. This opposition underscores the complex interplay between economic cooperation, strategic interests, and sovereignty concerns in China’s Indian Ocean engagements.
China’s expanding economic, diplomatic, and naval footprint in the Indian Ocean has fundamentally altered the region’s strategic landscape, signalling the end of early post-Cold War unipolarity. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiatives, China has entrenched itself economically, financing. Diplomatically, Beijing has deepened its engagement with littoral states through bilateral agreements, security partnerships, and regional forums, challenging traditional Western and Indian influence.
China’s expanding naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, including its military base in Djibouti, and growing security cooperation with regional states, mark the end of unchallenged US dominance in the region. The Indian Ocean is now a contested space, where China’s presence compels strategic recalibrations by India, the United States, and other regional actors. The evolving security landscape in the Indian Ocean—marked by intensifying competition, shifting alliances, and the rise of a multipolar order—has significant implications for Sri Lanka’s geopolitical future.
India views China’s growing economic, political, and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region as a key strategic challenge. In response, India has pursued a range of strategic, political, and economic measures to counterbalance Chinese influence, particularly in countries like Sri Lanka through infrastructure investment, defense partnerships, and diplomatic engagements.
Other Extra-Regional powers
Japan and Australia have emerged as significant players in the post-Cold War strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean. During the early phases of the Cold War, Australia played a crucial role in Western ‘Collective Security Alliances’ (ANZUS and (SEATO). However, its direct engagement in Indian Ocean security remained limited, primarily supporting the British Royal Navy under Commonwealth obligations. Japan, meanwhile, refrained from deploying naval forces in the region after World War II, adhering to its pacifist constitution and post-war security policies. In recent decades, shifting strategic conditions have prompted both Japan and Australia to reassess their roles in the Indian Ocean, leading to greater defence cooperation and a more proactive regional presence.
In the post-Cold War era, Australia has progressively expanded its naval engagements in the Indian Ocean, driven by concerns over maritime security, protection of trade routes, and China’s growing influence. Through initiatives, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and deeper defence partnerships with India and the United States, Australia has bolstered its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region.
Recalibration of Japan’s approach
Japan, too, has recalibrated its approach to Indian Ocean security in response to geopolitical shifts. Recognising the Indian Ocean’s critical importance for its energy security and trade, Japan has strengthened its naval presence through port visits, joint exercises, and maritime security cooperation. The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) has taken on a more active role in anti-piracy operations, freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and strategic partnerships with Indian Ocean littoral states. This shift aligns with Japan’s broader strategy of contributing to regional stability while balancing its constitutional constraints on military force projection.
Japan’s proactive role in the Indian Ocean region is evident in its diplomatic and defence engagements. In January 2019, Japan sent its Foreign Minister, Taro Kono, and Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Katsutoshi Kawano, to the Raisina Dialogue, a high-profile geopolitical conference in India. Japan’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, identifies China’s growing assertiveness as its greatest strategic challenge and underscores the need to deepen bilateral ties and multilateral defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean. It also emphasises the importance of securing stable access to sea-lanes, through which more than 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass. In recent years, Japan has expanded its port investment portfolio across the Indian Ocean, with major projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. In 2021, Japan participated for the first time in CARAT-Sri Lanka (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), a bilateral naval exercise. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force returned for the exercise in January 2023, held at Trincomalee Port and Mullikulam Base.
Japan’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean have been most evident in its involvement in port infrastructure development projects. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are key countries where early Chinese-led port construction faced setbacks. Unlike India, which carries historical and political complexities in its relations with these countries, Japan is better positioned to compete with China. In December 2021, a Japanese company established a ship repair and rebuilding facility in Trincomalee, complementing the already well-established Tokyo Cement factory. When the Sri Lanka Ports Authority announced plans in mid-2022 to develop Trincomalee as an industrial port—inviting expressions of interest from investors to utilise port facilities and up to 2,400 hectares of surrounding land—Trincomalee regained strategic attention.
The Colombo Dockyard, in collaboration with Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard, has established a rapid response afloat service in Trincomalee, marking a significant development in Japan’s engagement with Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure. This initiative aligns with Japan’s broader strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal, a region of critical economic and security importance. A key Japanese concern appears to be limiting China’s ability to establish a permanent presence in Trincomalee. This initiative underscores the broader strategic competition in the Indian Ocean. Trincomalee, with its deep-water harbour, has long been regarded as a critical maritime asset. Japan’s involvement reflects its efforts to deepen economic and strategic engagement with Sri Lanka amid growing regional competition. The challenge before Sri Lanka is how to navigate this strategic contest while maximising its national interests.
Other Regional Powers
In analyzing the evolving naval security architecture of the post-Cold War Indian Ocean, particular attention should be given to the naval developments of regional powers such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In 2012, Pakistan established the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) to strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). The creation of the NSFC suggests a shift toward sea-based deterrence, complementing Pakistan’s broader military strategy. In December 2012, Pakistan conducted a series of cruise missile tests from naval platforms in the Arabian Sea. Given India’s expanding maritime capabilities, which Pakistan views as a significant threat, the Pakistan Navy may consider deploying tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships as part of its evolving deterrence strategy. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy cannot overlook this development.
Indonesia also emerged as a significant player in the evolving naval security landscape of the Indian Ocean. In 2010, it launched a military modernisation programme aimed at achieving a ‘Minimum Essential Force’ (MEF) by 2024. As part of this initiative, Indonesia sought to build a modern Navy with 247 surface vessels and 12 submarines. One of the primary challenges faced by the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is piracy. To enhance maritime security, Indonesia and Singapore signed the SURPIC Cooperation Arrangement in Bantam in May 2005, enabling real-time sea surveillance in the Singapore Strait for more effective naval patrols. In 2017, Indonesia introduced the Indonesian Ocean Policy (IOP) and subsequently incorporated blue economy strategies into its national development agenda, reinforcing its maritime vision. According to projections from the Global Firepower Index, published in 2025, the Indonesian Navy is ranked fourth in global ranking and second in Asia in terms of Navy fleet strength (Global Firepower, 2025).
In October 2012, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) announced plans to build a second Scorpène simulator training facility at its base in Kota Kinabalu, in addition to submarine base in Sepanggar, Sabah, constructed in 2002. To enhance its naval capabilities, the RMN planned to procure 18 Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) for maritime surveillance and six Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) between 2019 and 2023. Malaysia and China finalised their first major defence deal during Prime Minister Najib Razak’s visit to Beijing in November 2016. During this visit, Malaysia’s Defence Ministry signed a contract to procure LMS from China, as reported by The Guardian. Despite this agreement, Malaysia continues to maintain amicable relations with both China and India, as does Indonesia.
The increasing presence of major naval powers, the rise of regional stakeholders, and the growing significance of trade routes and maritime security have transformed the Indian Ocean into a central pivot of both regional and global politics, with Sri Lanka positioned at its heart. (To be Continued)
by Gamini Keerawella
Features
More excitement for Andrea Marr…

Sri Lankan Andrea Marr, now based in Australia, is in the spotlight again. She says she has teamed up with a fantastic bunch of Sri Lankan musicians, in Melbourne, and the band is called IntoGroove.
“The band has been going strong for many years and I have been a fan of this outfit for quite a few years; just love these guys, authentic R&B and funk.”
Although Andrea has her original blues band, The McNaMarr Project, and they do have a busy schedule, she went on to say that “when the opportunity came up to join these guys, I simply couldn’t refuse … they are too good.”
IntoGroove is Jude Nicholas (lead vocals), Peter Menezes (bass), Keith Pereira (drums), Blaise De Silva (keyboards) and and Steve Wright (guitar).

Andrea Marr: Powerhouse of the blues
“These guys are a fantastic band and I really want everyone to hear them.”
Andrea is a very talented artiste with many achievements to her credit, and a vocal coach, as well.
In fact, she did her second vocal coaching session at Australian Songwriters Conference early this year.
Her first student showcase for this year took place last Sunday, in Melbourne, and it brought into the spotlight the wonderful acts she has moulded, as teacher and mentor.
What makes Andrea extra special is that she has years of teaching experience and is able to do group vocal coaching for all styles, levels and genres.
In January, this year, she performed at the exclusive ‘Women In Blues’ showcase at Alfred’s On Beale Street (rock venue with live entertainment), in Memphis, in the USA, during the International Blues Challenge when bands from all over the world converge on Memphis for the ‘Olympics of the Blues.’

The McNaMarr Project with Andrea and Lindsay Marr in the
vocal spotlight
This was her fourth performance in the home of the blues; she has represented Australian Blues three times and, on this occasion, she went as ambassador for Blues Music Victoria, and The Melbourne Blues Appreciation Society’s ‘Women In Blues’ Coordinator.
Andrea was inducted into the Blues Music Victoria Hall of Fame in 2022 and released her 10th album which hit #1 on the Australian Blues Charts.
Known as ‘the pint-sized powerhouse of the blues’ for her high energy, soulful, original music, Andrea is also a huge fan of the late Elvis Presley and has checked out Graceland, in Memphis, Tennessee, USA, many times.
In Melbourne, the singer also plays a major role in helping Animal Rescue organisations find homes for abandoned cats.
Andrea Marr’s wish, at the moment, is that the Lankan audience, in Melbourne, would get behind this band, IntoGroove. They are world class, she added.
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