Midweek Review

Are we now moving towards a new Sri Lankan political culture?

Published

6 years ago

2020/08/12

Rev. Fr. Vimal Tirimanna, CSsR

The general election of 2020 has become historical for many reasons. The Sri Lankan voters have overwhelmingly voted for the SLPP for the second time in just nine months, knowing well that in the process, they were freely approving the holding of the two most important public offices in Sri Lanka – the posts of President and Prime Minister – by two Rajapaksa brothers. Not only have they given an unprecedented mandate to them, but they have also decisively voted to send the oldest active political party in Sri Lanka – the UNP – into political oblivion. This particular election has many other salient features. To begin with, it is the election that was declared in April and took some four months before it could be really held. This was partly due to the Covid-19 threat and partly due to the alleged Constitutional blocks to holding an election (propelled by the understandable election phobia of most of the Opposition political parties). It’s also reported to be the most expensive Sri Lankan election thus far. It also will go down in history as the one that had so much of medical precautions surrounding the process of voting and counting the votes in view of the Covid-19 threat at a time when thousands of people are killed daily all over the world by the deadly virus. But one also needs to note that this was the election with least amount of violence in recent history in our country, a fact which is corroborated by all the election monitoring groups. As a matter of fact, no killing linked to elections was reported which is surely a major positive development. By conducting a peaceful general election under very strict health precautions (even though this cost so much of money) Sri Lanka has become a model to the entire world under the present trying conditions of health and economy all over the world. To those pessimist Sri Lankans (both within the country and outside of it) who always tend to see only what is negative in Sri Lankan ethos, the 2020 General Election is a clear indication that even with regard to local politics, there are quite a number of positive points that should never be ignored. As a matter of fact, this election could well be the moment of transition which marks the beginning of a new political culture in the country.

The massive mandate

No reasonable political pundit could ever imagine the ultimate result of this election, especially the margin of victory with which the SLPP won. Ever since J. R. Jayewardene master-minded the present proportionate system of electing members to parliament, and that too, under the preferential system of voting, at every General Election (except in 2010 when Mahinda Rajapaksa’s UPFA won immediately after the historical military defeat of the LTTE) it was hard for a single political party to muster even a workable majority to rule the country. Consequently, after each General Election, the winning political parties had to dilute their own manifestos and agendas to please those of the other parties with whom they were forced to form coalition governments. The fact that it was within such a crippling system of elections (which rarely reflected the overall will of the voters) that the SLPP won not just a simple majority but a nearly two-thirds majority, is surely a record. Only a massive wave of popularity could do this. Of course, during the election campaign, the SLPP clearly appealed to the voters to grant them a two-thirds mandate to right the wrongs and to untie the legal knots of the haphazardly formulated 19th amendment by the previous “Yahapalana” government. However, one wonders whether even the SLPP itself ever dreamt of coming closer to that target, realistically speaking. The fact that a vast majority of the voters as one block (so to say) have responded collectively to this call single-mindedly is itself a sign that they themselves freely chose to give a workable mandate to realize the agenda which the SLPP placed before them. This overwhelming voter response is also a flat refutation of the fears and phobias expressed continuously in the media and the Opposition political stages that granting such a two thirds majority would be unhealthy to democracy. It appears as if, a vast majority of voters en bloc had instead concluded that they rather need to give such a majority to the SLPP to correct those constitutional clauses of the 19th amendment which held the country at ransom during the last couple of years. As a matter of fact, the Sri Lankan masses were first hand witnesses to the glaring reality as to how the hands of the Executive President they elected with such a thumping majority hardly nine months ago were tied, thanks to the notorious 19th amendment. In short, this massive mandate is not only the Sri Lankan polity’s reaffirmation of the benevolent, well-intentioned policies of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa but it is also their clearing all potential obstacles for him to realize his dreams for the country. Now the President and his SLPP government will surely have no excuses not to realize the agenda they themselves had put before the voters.

The high voter turnout

True to its firm belief in democracy, the Sri Lankan citizenry also kept to its usual high percentage of voter-turn-out, thanks this time to the Election Commission and the Health authorities who defied all prophets of doom with regard to the threat of Covid-19, and assured the voters of their safety and that of the others. Sure, as usual in Sri Lanka, at this general election too, there has been a noticeable drop in the percentage of voters using their right to vote, compared to the Presidential elections (except the one in 1988 under the JVP insurrection when it dropped to less than 30%). Yet a 71% of overall voter-turn-out at this election is something very commendable, especially when one considers the trying conditions under which the recent election was held. Not even in those so-called “Western democracies” (some of whom habitually try to give lectures on democracy to nations such as Sri Lanka) does one notice such a high percentage of voting even under normal conditions. Thus, in the USA, the voter turn-out at Presidential Elections remains around 60% while in Britain it has been less than 68% at all the recent General Elections. Perhaps, this high voter turn-out in Sri Lanka could be attributed to the important value our voters assign to elections based on the long tradition of exercising the franchise in Sri Lanka which goes back to 1930’s. However, as already mentioned, since 1978 Sri Lanka has had one of the complicated voting systems in the world. Yet thanks to the high literacy rate, as well as the experience in democratic traditions, the vast majority of voters seem to have not got lost in the polling booth in choosing their candidates so far.

The massive mandate given at this election has demonstrated once again that a winning political party need not always depend on minority political parties even when it means sabotaging their own agenda for the country for which the people had voted them. The unjustified clout which the minority political parties in our country (most of which are based on ethnic or religious foundations) had been enjoying since 1994 (a clout that usually held at ransom the will of the majority of voters in the last parliaments for nearly 26 years), had been neutralized by the voters at this election just as they did in the November Presidential elections. The winning party now need not depend on the minority parties and dance according to their tunes. While there is no denying that keeping to the best of democratic traditions the voices of both majorities and minorities ought to be represented and heard in parliament, in no way should this mean that using the political clout (in the form of the number of seats they have in parliament) the minority parties should dictate terms to the whole country as it has often happened in Sri Lanka during the last few decades. Lest this writer be misunderstood or misinterpreted, it needs to be repeated that minority representation in parliament and their involvement in the country’s decision-making are non-negotiable but in no way should it mean that they can suffocate the legitimate collective aspirations of the Sri Lankan voters as expressed at an election.

Unrealistic election promises

Promises by political parties during election campaigning is normal in any democracy. As a matter of fact, the voters need to know what the respective political parties would do if they were to be elected. A positive point of the recent General Election that should not escape the attention of any political analyst is the way the ordinary Sri Lankan voter (however poor and miserable his/her socio-economic condition may had been) has flatly refused to be hoodwinked by the unrealistic election promises of various political parties. Gone are the days when they would vote for two measures of rice or eight kilos of grain, as promised by political leaders of the caliber of the late Sirimavo Bandaranaika and the late J.R. Jayawardena, respectively. Just as at the last Presidential elections, at this election too, the voters have refused to be taken for rides by such cheap promises. If not, they ought to have elected with a thumping majority the newly formed SJB of Sajith Premadasa who continued to make bizarre election promises which could not be realistically maintained with our weak economy. The promise to give each person 20,000 rupees is an example in this regard. There were also others who were trying to keep pace with him but to a lesser degree. The promise of the UNP leader, Ranil Wickremasinghe to give “money in the hand” of every citizen, was one such example. The very high cost of living and the dwindling of job opportunities due mainly to the Covid-19 epidemic did not tempt the voters (especially those in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder who form the bulk of the voters in Sri Lanka) to be hoodwinked by such enticing promises. Rather, they seemed to have been more interested in long-term, realistic programs aimed at promoting the common good of the country, first of all, by eliminating corruption and poverty. This surely is a mature sign of a nation in transition towards a new political culture.

New faces in Parliament

In spite of the great trust the Sri Lankan citizens have consistently placed in democracy, especially in elections (of which the Opposition parties had a phobia), they have been continuously disappointed by the type of persons they themselves had elected. Not only did those members of parliament fail to keep what they had promised, but more so, their uncivilized, arrogant behaviour and highly corrupt practices in enriching themselves (such as the robbing of the Central Bank in broad day-light), and their other glaring abuses of power (such as letting free the real culprits of the Easter bomb attacks) had been disgusting to the majority of Sri Lankans, so much so that quite a number of them even opting never to vote again! Things in this regard had deteriorated so much that many citizens have come to believe

that the easiest way to enjoy power and status, and at the same time mint money at one’s will (and that too, often, without any professional qualification or hard work) is to become a member of parliament. In short, people had come to perceive that to be elected to parliament was the easiest way for ‘nobodies’ to become ‘somebodies’. It is in this sense that a vast number of Sri Lankans, both rural and urban, had been longing to see a new political culture, especially among their elected representatives. As is well-known, there has been a clamour in the country for some time now for new faces in our parliament, replacing the hackneyed corrupt and unruly political lot, and thank God, at this election a good number of new faces have been elected who hopefully will not disappoint their electors. At the same time, more than 70 members of the last parliament have been defeated. Another gratifying aspect is the amount of professionals that have been elected. Although the mere fact of being a new face or a professional is no guarantee of decent and ethically respectful politics, at least the voters have placed their trust in the new faces and professionals they had elected, hoping that they would not rob our national assets in aggrandizing themselves as it had been happening in recent decades, thanks to some hooligans and uneducated riff raff entering parliament. The new faces and the professionals, together with two newly formed political parties, the SLPP and the SJB as the main political parties (though both of them still have some corrupt and useless members of the bygone years) in this new parliament, we Sri Lankans now have a good opportunity to re-kindle our hopes for a new political culture in Sri Lanka.

A Mandate to change the 19th Amendment/ the Constitution

One of the main mandates asked by the winning SLPP from their General Election platforms had been the request to grant them a two-thirds mandate to change the Constitution, especially to change the disastrous 19th amendment which was hurriedly enacted immediately after the general election in 2015, mainly to keep Mahinda Rajapaksa from coming to office again.

It was so haphazardly drafted with this single intention that even the noble democratic elements that were used to camouflage it (such as the establishment of Independent Commissions) paled into an insignificant horizon. Moreover, the 19th amendment crippled the functioning of that very “yahaplana government” itself, especially in the latter part of that government. The many unprecedented legal knots and riddles with regard to the constitutional matters during the past few years sprang forth mainly from that notorious 19th amendment. Now that the people have given a resounding mandate to change it, the new government should not hesitate to do so as early as possible, but at the same time taking precautions to safeguard those positive aspects of it, such as the establishment of Independent Commissions, and making sure that under the new Constitution, the members appointed to those Commissions be really “independent”.

One of the main factors that paved the way towards the deterioration of the well-establisehd democratic political culture in our country was the introduction of the proportionate system of voting and electing members to parliament in 1978. The preferential system of voting which came along with it had been mainly responsible for the in-fighting even within the same political party, thus, paving the way to a violent political culture in our country since then. It is high time to put an end to this root cause of political violence at elections, which the country had suffered for more than four decades. Also it would be imperative for any new Constitution first of all to respect the will of the voters that is normally expressed through their franchise. As such, the recent phenomenon of MP’s getting elected from one political party and then crossing over to another after the elections should be stopped at any cost because this is a brutal betrayal of the voters, especially under the present system of elections. If this is not checked through some provisions to the Constitution, it could lead to a serious erosion of people’s confidence in democracy and in elections.

Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, a fact which no Constitution can afford to ignore. Fair representation for the ethnic and religious minorities in the country’s decision-making is a must. It is in this sense that the new Constitution should assure that those ethnic and religious minorities be given seats in parliament through what is now known as “the National List” or some other list similar to it, so that those minority ethnic and religious groups (who cannot get their representatives elected at the elections) would have their representation in parliament. Under the first Constitution of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) there was a list of reserved seats for this purpose under the title “Appointed MP’s”. The 1972 and the 1978 Constitutions also wished to continue this practice through what came to be known as the “National List”. But unfortunately, for the past four decades or so, instead of giving representation to those minorities of our country through that list, what we have witnessed is the shameless practice of filling this list with the cronies who are supporters of the respective political parties, or still worse, with those defeated candidates. We witnessed this shameless act at the last parliament, when the ruling UPFA appointed six of its defeated candidates to fill their National list, while the UNP and the JVP, too, did the same. This is nothing but a thundering slap on the face of the Sri Lankan voters (and eventually on democracy) – namely, to bring in the very persons whom they had rejected at elections! The new Constitution ought to prevent such shameless, undemocratic practices.

The Need for a Benevolent “Dictator”

To get out of the messy political culture we had been in, we, the Sri Lankan citizens need a political leadership with a firm and resolute will. This is what most of the citizens in ordinary parlance intend when they say “We need a benevolent dictator”. Of course, we need a “dictator” in Sri Lanka, but not a dictator with the true literal sense of the word, but someone who acts like a dictator using his/her legitimate authority but always well within the Constitution. Such qualifications may sound as a tautology, but what is meant is that we need someone who can take decisions for the common good of the country, with firm and resolute will, ignoring all political party affiliations and favouritisms. He/she ought to be someone who upholds law and order, irrespective of the status or political affiliations of persons. Ever since his election in November 2019, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has shown many signs of such resolute and impartial leadership for the good of the country. His commendable way of coordinating the available persons and resources in our country in the fight against the world-wide threat of Covid-19 is a case in point. The unprecedented mandate given to him at this General election is a clear endorsement of the style of leadership he has been exercising during the past nine months. Now that he is given what he wanted, namely – a parliament that would cooperate with him in implementing his programs for the common good – one hopes that he would continue this style in exercising his role as President of our country (as the head of State) in the coming years too so that at last we as a nation could now begin our journey realistically towards a new political culture in our beloved motherland. We as a nation that believes in democracy and elections cannot afford to be disappointed again!

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Midweek Review

22A: Competing Opposition parties in dilemma

Published

6 days ago

2026/09/2

Sahan Weerasooriya

Ranil Wickremesinghe arrives at the Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa's Office on 23 July, 2026. Talks centred on ways and means to oppose the 22nd Amendment

Silent petty backbiting among Opposition may result in it grabbing defeat from victory over NPP

There is no likelihood of the SJB and the UNP reaching consensus on a tangible arrangement in the near future though some asserted that they may agree on a united front against the ruling National People’s Power (NPP). Referring to

former President and UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’s visit to Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa’s Office on 23 July, a source familiar with the developments said that in spite of such gestures, underlying problems remain. Another source explained that a combined front may be useful in a campaign against a particular issue but the two parties needed a genuine arrangement ahead of the next countrywide election.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

United Republican Front (URF) leader Patali Champika Ranawaka recently thanked Health and Media Minister Dr. Nalinda Jayathissa for recognising the Janathawadi Joint Opposition as a real challenge to the National People’s Power (NPP) government. The NPP enjoys an unassailable 159 parliamentary seats.

The former Minister noted that Dr. Jayathissa, who is also the Cabinet spokesman, realised the political threat posed by them, though the main parliamentary Opposition party Samagi Jana Balawegaya consisted of 40 lawmakers.

Ranawaka refrained from naming the SJB as the main Opposition party he was referring to.

Addressing the media at the Flower Road Office of UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ranawaka pointed out that the ruling party felt their challenge, though there were a plethora of Opposition parties in the Parliament.

Referring to Dr. Jayathissa’s recent accusation that they conspired at the Kirula Place, Colombo 5, residence of former External Affairs Minister Prof. G. L Peiris, Ranawaka appreciated the Minister’s declaration made at the expense of the SJB.

While the 40-member SJB group is the second largest group in Parliament, the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) holds third position with eight seats whereas New Democratic Front (NDF) consists of five MPs. The NDF, that received the backing of Wickremesinghe at the 2024 parliamentary polls, is in fourth position, whereas the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) parliamentary group consists of just three members. The SLPP suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the NPP at the last parliamentary polls, held in November 2024. An angry electorate at the first parliamentary polls after the 2022 regime change project reduced the SLPP, from a commanding 145-seat group, to just three MPs. Defeated 2024 presidential election candidate Namal Rajapaksa was so fearful of the impending rout at the November 2024 polls, he took refuge in the SLPP National List.

The political grouping, based at the Flower Road office of Wickremesinghe, has gradually broadened its operation. The stepping up of the Flower Road operation must be examined taking into consideration the NPP targeting Wickremesinghe over his 2023 September visit to the UK. The NPP has alleged that Wickremesinghe squandered public funds at a time the country was undergoing extreme economic difficulties. The crux of the matter is whether Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as the President, spent Rs 16.2 man on a private visit.

In spite of the Flower Road project receiving the NPP’s attention, Wickremesinghe does not really command the NDF that contested under the ‘Gas Cylinder’ symbol. The NDF group in Parliament consists of former Badulla District SLPP lawmaker Chamara Sampath Dassanayake, former Kalutara District SLPP MP Rohitha Abeygunawardena, ex-SLPP Kandy District MP Andrada Jayaratne, ex-UNP Minister Ravi Karunanayake (National List) and former SLFP Minister Fizer Mustapha (National List).

It would be pertinent to mention that a major problem erupted within the NDF at the time of filling the two National List slots. Wickremesinghe is the undisputed leader of the NDF, though he lacked any formal recognition as such, fielded candidates for selected electoral districts outside the Northern and Eastern regions at the 2024 November polls. The NDL comprised the UNP, the SLFP and the SLPP breakaway faction ‘Podujana Eksath Nidahas Peramuna (PENP).’ All three elected members Dissanayake, Abeygunawardena and Jayaratne represented the PENP.

The SLFP received one National List slot whereas the General Secretary of the NDF, Sharmila Perera, regardless of strong objections by Wickremesinghe, accommodated Karunanayake as the other NDF National List nominee. Perera informed the Election Commission, in writing, while the coalition debated Karunanayake’s appointment. An influential section of the coalition favoured the appointment of Kanchana Wijesekera, of the PENP, as the other National List member.

Perera, in her capacity as the NDF’s General Secretary, chose Karunanayake whose involvement with the NDF is in the public domain. The Election Commission gazetted a notification on 18 November, 2024, naming Karunanayake to Parliament. Will discuss the NDF’s emergence as a significant political factor in the wake of the 2010 presidential election, the first national poll after the eradication of the separatist Tamil terrorist movement.

SJB strategy

Whether the SJB likes it or not, former Yahapalana Minister Ranawaka’s reaction to Dr. Jayathissa’s conspiracy claim highlighted the ongoing controversy surrounding the main Opposition party’s overall response to the NPP’s pet project, the enactment of the 22nd Amendment.

Some political commentators have harshly criticised SJB Chief, who is also the Opposition Leader, Sajith Premadasa, for failing to mount a large-scale counter offensive. Some of them have taken offence that Premadasa sort of played it safe in spite of the NPP seeking to bulldoze the Opposition, both in and outside Parliament. Various interested parties have asserted that Premadasa’s inaction has been influenced by his fear of the government hounding him with corruption investigations, targeting him and his wife Jalani.

In spite of much publicised gathering of recognised Opposition parties/groups at the Opposition Leader’s Office at No 30, Sir Marcus Fernando Mawatha, Colombo 07, on 23 July, 2026, also attended by Wickremesinghe, the SJB appeared to have failed to take the lead in the overall campaign against the 22nd Amendment. Had the government managed to neutralise the determined efforts of the Sri Lanka Bar Association (BASL) and the unexpected United Nations intervention, the Opposition campaign may have collapsed already.

The undeniable truth is the SJB never succeeded in taking command of the overall political strategy. Dr. Jayathissa’s claim and Ranawaka’s reaction clearly suggested the deterioration of the SJB’s status. But those who approve of the SJB’s handling of political developments seem confident the party is on the right track. They feel criticism directed at the SJB and Sajith Premadasa, in particular, unfair and utterly politically motivated. Social media criticism appeared to have troubled the SJB. Recently, the SJB contradicted and challenged the opinion expressed by Priyanjith Vitharana who posted political commentaries under the pseudonym ‘Rate Rala.’ The former General Secretary of the breakaway JVP group, the National Freedom Front (NFF), has emerged as one of the strongest critics of Premadasa’s style of Opposition politics. ‘Rate Rala’ relentlessly attacked the SJB leader and vigorously questioned what he called the Opposition Leader’s lukewarm reaction to the NPP’s challenge.

The SJB and the Wickremesinghe-led political grouping cannot turn a blind eye to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s impending high profile political campaign, countrywide. The NPP has declared that the campaign would be launched on 5 September. The NPP enjoys absolute political power to move large groups of people for their intended meetings as previous ruling parties did. But, in the absence of a cohesive political strategy, those in the Opposition are still unable to work out a strategy to counter the NPP campaign. The Cabinet spokesman has dared Wickremesinghe’s group to bring in people onto the streets instead of having clandestine meetings at the residence of Prof. Peiris, the convenor of the Janathawadi Joint Opposition.

Wickremesinghe’s five-member NDF group in Parliament is obviously divided over political strategy. It seems the members of the group are pulling in different directions. The SLFP’s Faizer Mustapha is somewhat silent on the 22nd Amendment and the remaining members haven’t been seen playing a role against the 22nd Amendment worth mentioning. Cobbling up alliances to overcome short-term political challenges is the bane of the Sri Lankan political setup. The NDF is no exception. Having suffered an expected defeat at the 2024 September presidential poll, Wickremesinghe utilised the NDF to bring together those at the mercy of the NPP. Wickremesinghe’s move dealt a devastating blow to the SLPP, struggling to cope up with the developing situation. The consequences of Wickremesinghe post-presidential actions caused irreparable damage. The fielding of SLPP candidates on the NDF ticket and also accommodating them on its National List, at the expense of the SLPP, undermined that party. Among those who betrayed the SLPP were former Prime Minister Dinesh Gunawardena and ex-Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena. But, Wickremesinghe didn’t care. By then, the SLPP had forgotten how in its capacity as the ruling party it elected Wickremesinghe as Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s successor at the expense of their own Dullas Alahapperuma who teamed up with the SJB to fight it out in Parliament.

The SLPP fell out with Wickremesinghe when the latter sought the ruling party’s backing at the 2024 presidential polls, the first post-Aragalaya (read regime change project) national election. At the end, Sajith Premadasa, Ranil Wickremesinghe and Namal Rajapaksa contested at the expense of a unified front. That enabled Anura Kumara Dissanayake to secure victory at the 2024 presidential race.

Unrealistic SJB-UNP partnership

In the run-up to the 2024 parliamentary polls, the writer, at a Flower Road Office briefing by UNP Deputy Leader Ruwan Wijewardena, raised the failure on the part of the UNP and the SJB to reach a consensus after Dissanayake won the presidency due to their dithering.

The former Deputy Defence Minister, struggled to explain the status on the SJB-UNP talks when the writer pointed out that Dissanayake polled 5,634,915 votes whereas Sajith Premadasa (4,363,035 votes) and Ranil Wickremesinghe (2,299,767) together polled 6,662,802- a staggering 1,027,887 votes more than the winner. Unfortunately, both camps remained adamant regarding the modalities of consensus/unification. Had the two parties realised the gravity of the situation and the extraordinary challenge the NPP posed, they could have shed whatever their differences to contest under one symbol. But the petty-minded SJB and UNP leaders squandered an opportunity that resulted in the NPP securing an unbeatable 159 seats at the presidential election.

The SJB and the UNP continue to move in different directions. Those who remain with the UNP appeared to be more comfortable having Dissanayake as the President than Premadasa. Wickremesinghe’s visit to the Opposition Leader’s Office seemed to have failed to achieve a genuine reconciliation between the two leaders. Soon after the 2019 presidential election that brought newcomer Gotabaya Rajapaksa to power, the internal crisis, within the UNP, intensified.

Defeated UNP contestant Deputy Leader Sajith Premadasa quit the party in early February 2020, to form the SJB. The SJB-led alliance was officially launched in March 2020 ahead of the parliamentary polls in August 2020. The UNP split in the aftermath of the 2019 presidential poll created an extremely unfavourable environment for Wickremesinghe who suffered a crushing defeat at the August parliamentary polls. The UNP was reduced to one National List slot whereas the SJB secured 54 seats, including seven National List slots. Wickremesinghe failed to retain his Colombo District parliamentary seat.

Wickremesinghe refrained from filling that solitary National List slot till June 2021. By then, the economic crisis had set in. Wickremesinghe entered Parliament on 23 June, 2021. Rapid economic deterioration led to sovereign default the following year. Political stability created an environment for Wickremnesinghe to exploit. Wickremesinghe didn’t hesitate to accept the premiership on 12 May, 2022, soon after SJB leader Sajith Premadasa turned down President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s invitation. The beleaguered UNPer couldn’t have asked for more. The SLPP ended up electing Wickremesinghe as Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s successor 10 weeks later, a decision that the party now rued. In hindsight, the consensus between the Rajapaksas and Wickremesinghe, in the short term, benefited both parties but undermined efforts to iron out differences between the SJB and the UNP.

The UNP felt that it should have the final say in the issue at hand. However, the SJB quite rightly asserted that securing 54 seats at the 2020 parliamentary election should be taken into consideration. The UNP was down to one National List slot and in the wake of the SLPP accommodating Wickremesinghe in the Executive Office, Wajira Abeywardena filled that vacancy.

In fact, the UNP never relished consensus with the SJB. Instead, Wickremesinghe felt that it could extend his partnership with the SLPP, to his advantage, by securing its approval as the party’s 2024 presidential poll. Had that happened, the SLPP would have further deteriorated though Wickremesinghe could have polled a far larger share of votes at the presidential poll. Contesting as an independent, Wickremesinghe polled over 2.2 million votes at the presidential election. That defeat compelled Wickremesinghe, who turned 75 in the run-up to the presidential poll, not to join the parliamentary polls fray.

Wickremesinghe knew the signs. He knew the game was over and the UNP no longer appealed, even to die-hard supporters. The UNP leader quietly brought together the remnants of the UNP with the SLFP and SLPP and fielded them under the NDF’s symbol. As mentioned at the onset of this piece, the NDF, under Wickremesinghe’s leadership, obtained five seats. But, he never managed to retain control of the parliamentary group. Against the backdrop of an unprecedented deterioration of the UNP, the 22nd Amendment, in a way, has helped Wickremesinghe to work out a strategy to somewhat consolidate his position. The Flower Road operation has given Wickremesinghe some leverage as the NPP battled the high profile Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL)-led campaign against the 22nd Amendment.

NPP strategy

The NPP seems confident that the SJB and the UNP, under any circumstances, will not amalgamate or contest under one symbol. The NPP’s political strategy is based on the presumption that the two parties lacked the will to do so, though they realised their costly failure to reach consensus at the last presidential and parliamentary polls in 2024. Both parties suffered at the 2025 May Local Government polls as well. In a last-ditch attempt UNP leader Wickremesinghe proposed that the UNP and SJB contest the Colombo Municipal Council under one symbol. That proposal never materialised.

As a result, the UNP lost the CMC after more than 50 years. The UNP won the CMC in 2011 when the rival UPFA, led by the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa, won all other local government bodies outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces, two years after the eradication of the LTTE.

Opposition sources acknowledged that nothing short of an arrangement to contest the next election, under one symbol, wouldn’t help them. “We are unable to fully exploit the deterioration of public confidence in the NPP due to the appalling failure to bring talks between the two parties to a successful conclusion,” a source familiar with the developments said.

The 22nd Amendment gave an opportunity for the SJB, with 40 MPs in Parliament, and the UNP, sans any parliamentary representation, to finalise an arrangement. Unfortunately, they failed to do so, thereby allowed the government to proceed with the strategy. A major campaign, led by President Dissanayake himself, scheduled to be launched on 5 September, underscored their strategy, whereas the Opposition remained still unsure of its own counter-strategy. Had they at least managed to organise a few mega rallies with the participation of the entire Opposition, the NPP may have come under real pressure. Unfortunately, even after the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) and Tamil Progressive Front (TPA) representing upcountry political parties declared strong opposition to 22nd Amendment, the SJB couldn’t take the lead in organising a large-scale counter campaign. Instead, the Janathawadi Joint Opposition, operating out of the Flower Road Office, has exploited the situation to its advantage.

Despite both the SJB and the UNP (Janathawadi Joint Opposition) moving the Supreme Court against the 22nd Amendment, they conveniently failed to appear together at regular media briefings, held at Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office, where Prof. Peiris, in his capacity as the convenor of the grouping, meticulously dealt with the developing story.

Regardless of the failure on the part of the SJB and the UNP to finalise an arrangement with eyes on the next election, the BASL-led campaign against the 22nd Amendment caused significant damage to the NPP’s reputation. The BASL’s shocking revelation that two deserving justices, namely senior justice of the Court of Appeal, Dhammika Ganepola, and senior-most justice of the Court of Appeal, justice R. Gurusinghe, were deprived of promotion to the Supreme Court by the incumbent administration, was received by the public with disappointment. The BASL released 17 August, 2026, dated, hitherto unpublished letter, addressed to President Dissanayake, that dealt with unfilled vacancies in the superior courts, while the government preached the public of its determination to deal with a mountain of case backlog.

Unfortunately, the Opposition campaign lacked direction though some former and present lawmakers targeted the 22nd Amendment. With almost all who moved the Supreme Court against the 22nd Amendment seeking all remaining judges of the Supreme Court to hear the petitions with the BASL suggesting that Chief Justice recuse himself of hearing the cases over conflict of interests and all agreeing on a referendum to approve of the controversial constitutional amendment, the apex court constitutionally is authorised to take three weeks to decide on the issue at hand.

The decision is expected to be communicated to Speaker Dr. Jagath Wickremaratne around the time President Dissanayake completed his second turbulent year in Office on 21 September.

Midweek Review

The local and global dynamics of Sri Lanka’s 22nd Amendment

Published

6 days ago

2026/09/2

Sahan Weerasooriya

Beyond noise and acrimony:

by Sasanka Perera
(The writer is on X as @sasmester)
Background

The Sri Lankan government has proposed to introduce the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution focused on increasing the retirement age for Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judges. Coupled with parallel legislative adjustments to the Judicature Act of 1978 governing the functioning of lower-tier courts, the initiative has drawn sharp criticism from domestic legal bodies, opposition political parties, human rights activists and scrutiny from international organisations, most notably the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers.

Locally however, much of the debate is lost in the noise of acrimony, name-calling and what can only be called ‘social media violence’ rather than becoming a sensible discourse of rational and courteous debate. A week ago, a simple tweet from me on my wariness over getting the UN involved in this matter and the UN’s general bias towards countries like ours literally went viral, castigating me as a supporter of the government. My public writing in support and often in opposition to government positions — as demanded by different cases and situations — had no impact whatsoever. This virulent noise has no place in democratic practice, which all these noisemakers nevertheless claim to protect. This essay, however, finds its genesis in that noise as a means of making sense of the politics of the 22nd Amendment for myself and for any sensible people who might want to ponder over its implications.

As far as my understanding goes as a citizen without a legal background, the present controversy touches on the core tension amongst practical administrative necessity as seen by the government, constitutional integrity as argued by many in the legal profession, human rights advocates and opposition politicians and the geopolitics of international human rights oversight exercised by entities such as the UN.

Under Article 107 of Sri Lanka’s 1978 Constitution, the mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court judges is 65 years, while Court of Appeal judges must retire at 63 years. The proposed 22nd constitutional amendment seeks to raise these limits by two years. That is, extending Supreme Court tenure to 67 years and Court of Appeal tenure to 65 years. It also proposes that the number of judges in the Court of Appeal be increased from 19 to 24. Further, in the case of the Chief Justice, it is specified that the retirement date would be 67 years or after completing six years in office, subject to whichever comes first. In parallel, the government has also proposed to amend the Judicature Act of 1978 with the aim of raising the retirement age of High Court judges to 63 years and for District Court judges and Magistrates to 62 years. In other words, the overall proposal is to increase the retirement age of judges throughout the judicial hierarchy by two years.

Government’s Rationale

The government’s justifications for the proposed amendment rests on two general parameters. One is efficiency in judicial administration. The other is the retention of experienced judges for an additional period of two years. In this context, the government and its supporters in civil society do not perceive the proposal as a political maneouvre, but rather as an urgent administrative intervention that is essential to clear the backlog of cases throughout the judicial system. There is no doubt that the system is clearly overworked, understaffed and inefficient, and as a result, burdened with a serious backlog of cases.

Sri Lankan courts face an acute backlog exceeding 1.1 million pending cases according to some estimates. In this context, the government’s argument is that retaining seasoned judges is vital to maintain case disposal rates and prevent systemic paralysis. Extending judicial service is presented as a pragmatic mechanism to preserve institutional memory and combat capacity shortages.

Objections and Opposition

Despite official justifications, most of which seem legitimate based on actual experience and existing data, some legal analysts, opposition figures, and civil society groups suspect unstated political objectives behind the timing and structure of the reform. For them, a primary concern is that the amendment is structured to apply retroactively or immediately to sitting judges rather than prospective future appointees. Critics suggest this directly benefits specific high-ranking figures ranging from the incumbent Chief Justice to senior appellate judges, who are nearing the mandatory retirement age while overseeing politically sensitive cases. On the other hand, one can argue it is precisely because some of them are presiding over politically sensitive cases, that they need to complete the relevant cases for which experience, familiarity as well as institutional memory are essential.

However, there is no doubt that extending the tenure during an active term creates the impression of a government benefit granted to sitting judges. Whether this is the intention or whether it becomes reality, appearances do matter. The main point opponents bring out is, this specific intervention risks compromising the perception of judicial neutrality in a situation where sitting judges might be perceived as indebted to political authority for extending their service. While this is indeed a possibility, it is nevertheless not a necessary outcome.

Formal and vocal opposition at the moment is led by the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, local political parties, and some constitutional experts. But this has not become a bread-and-butter issue yet in the country. That is, there is no way this issue will capture the public imagination in the manner more pressing bread and butter issues did in the aragalaya of 2022. Also, Sri Lanka’s fractured and delegitimised opposition sharing the same argumentative plain with an entity like the Bar Association of Sri Lanka does not help the latter when it comes to generating public sympathy for its cause however legitimate it might be.

To my understanding and reading between the lines amidst the deafening noise in the vocal opposition, the above concerns are based on several core arguments.

One has to do with the perceived erosion of the separation of powers. That is, changing the retirement age of sitting judges mid-tenure can compromise constitutional predictability and impartiality. Theoretically, fixed retirement ages exist in judicial systems globally to specifically protect judges from executive interference or influence. The second concern I can see but not clearly articulated by sceptics has to do with the possibilities of career stagnation. In other words, delaying emergent vacancies at the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal will create a bottleneck across the entire judicial hierarchy for some time, potentially demoralising junior judges in the High Courts and District Courts awaiting elevation. Finally, there is a concern over the long-term government failure to effectively utilise cadre expansion that has already been made possible which precedes the present government’s access to office. Prior constitutional changes (such as the 20th Amendment) already had expanded the numerical capacity of the superior courts. In this context, the argument is that the government should focus on filling existing vacancies with new appointees rather than altering the tenure of current judges. Purely as matters of principle, theory and potential impact on democratic governance, none of these concerns are spurious.

The UN Special Rapporteur’s Intervention

The 22nd Amendment is no longer merely a local political issue. On 7 August 2026, Margaret Satterthwaite, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, addressed a five-page official communication to the Sri Lankan government based on ‘information’ her office had received and issued 7 requests for further information. Internationalisation of the politics surrounding the 22nd Amendment is also an integral part of Sri Lanka’s oppositional politics. While acknowledging that raising retirement ages can preserve expertise, her mandate emphasised that alterations to judicial tenure must adhere strictly to international standards. The Special Rapporteur highlights a number of primary concerns, which include the following: 1) She is concerned with the application of the proposed changes to sitting judges. That is, extending terms for sitting judges without clear, objective, and transparent transitional safeguards creates the risk or perception of political favor. 2) Second, she has raised concerns over the lack of broad consultations in introducing the proposal. In other words, the rapid introduction of the amendment without inclusive public and professional stakeholder consultation can threaten public trust in the rule of law. 3) Finally, she has also referred to a potential conflict of interest. That is sitting judges benefiting from the extension could face a structural conflict of interest if called upon to adjudicate constitutional challenges against the very amendment that extended their careers.

In a sense, these concerns are very similar to the concerns raised by the local opposition. But in real terms, is the 22nd Amendment unusual or inherently anti-democratic that it warrants a UN body to be this concerned when in general it is often not concerned beyond rhetoric in far worse situations? Increasing judicial retirement ages is a common trend globally, driven by demographic shifts and longer life expectancy. However, the mechanisms and contexts of various cases differ considerably. Through the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Act 2022, the United Kingdom raised the mandatory retirement age for judicial office holders from 70 to 75. This included judges, magistrates, and coroners. The rationale for this provided by the UK government at the time cited improvements in life expectancy, the need to address post-pandemic court backlogs, and recruitment gaps across courts. Crucially, the change followed a comprehensive public consultation involving over 1,000 responses from legal professionals, the magistracy, and civic bodies.

An Australian state and a self-governing territory, namely, New South Wales and Northern Territory offer other recent examples. Australia does not have a single uniform retirement age for all state and federal judges. Under Section 72 of the Australian Constitution, federal judges have a fixed retirement age of 70. However, individual states have raised state-level judicial retirement ages at different times. In 2018, New South Wales enacted the Justice Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2) 2018, raising the mandatory retirement age for state judges and magistrates from 72 to 75. Similarly, in 2019, the Northern Territory also raised the retirement age for Supreme Court judges from 70 to 72 years under the Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2019.

But the UN Special Rapporteur did not issue formal communications or allegations to either the United Kingdom or the Australian state and territory regarding these specific tenure increases — with reason. For one thing, both the UK and Australian state and territorial governments conducted long-term, transparent public consultations with legal professional bodies prior to enacting legislation. That is, there was an appearance of reasonability. On the other hand, in these cases, the reforms were introduced as broad, systemic statutory updates rather than ad-hoc constitutional amendments enacted amid heightened domestic political tension or ongoing sensitive litigation involving sitting judges as is the case in Sri Lanka. Finally, in these cases, the policy changes were implemented via general legislative consensus rather than executive-driven constitutional maneuvers that directly benefited individual judges in real-time in the short term.

Further, in these cases, as far as I can see, there were no formal complaints to the UN from any entity in these countries given that there were adequate consultations. On the other hand, unlike the UK or Australia, bodies like the UN generally assume countries like Sri Lanka are inherently anti-democratic and therefore need oversight. It is in such a context that the UN Special Rapporteurs have routinely issued communications to other countries that have altered judicial terms. For example, Poland, Hungary, and Bolivia have received such communications when changes to judicial retirement ages or tenure were perceived as attempts by the governments concerned to alter the composition of courts or erode judicial independence. The Sri Lankan case too must be understood in such a situation. The government, on its part, has submitted a six-page response accompanied by two annexures to the Special Rapporteur’s communication on 21 August 2026. It responds fully to the queries raised by the Special Rapporteur rationally. However, if it closes the matter remains to be seen.

The problem in this context is that Sri Lanka has the added complication of having a resolution on its human rights situation in the United Nations Human Rights Council since 2012. The next formal update on this resolution is scheduled for the 63rd session of the UN Human Rights Council taking place from 7 September to 9 October 2026. My concern in internationalising a domestic issue such as the opposition to the 22nd Amendment is that it could feed into the longstanding resolution giving further ammunition to Sri Lanka sceptics and detractors both in and outside the country. This is an unnecessary burden for a country like Sri Lanka lacking the power wielded by mass human rights violators such as Israel and its sponsor the United States. It is also a needless distraction for a country that is trying to reinvent itself. In such a situation, dealing with the sins of the predecessors does not help, more so, when UN impartiality is known to be selective.

The Future of the 22nd

Amendment

The controversy surrounding Sri Lanka’s proposed 22nd Amendment illustrates the delicate equilibrium required in constitutional governance and democratic practice. On a practical level, the government’s argument addresses an undeniable operational crisis. That is, as a means to deal with an overburdened legal system requiring the retention of experienced judicial personnel to deliver timely justice. Yet, on a principled level, constitutional safeguards exist precisely to ensure that procedural mechanisms are insulated from perceived political manipulation. In my mind, the government’s cardinal mistake was not to have wide-ranging consultations and information sharing programmes before the proposal became a contentious issue. This is simply good PR and common sense. Consultations and information sharing do not mean wholesale adherence to opposition positions. It simply means transparency, accepting what is reasonable, not accepting what makes no sense and offering at least a semblance of fair play. This would have also ensured that the government did not need to be overly defensive as it is now. In any case, given its overwhelming majority in parliament, the government does not need any support from the opposition to pass legislation. But it can certainly afford to be politically intelligent, sophisticated and mature in its public demeanor.

When a government alters the terms of service for sitting judges, the primary challenge is rarely the increased age limit. Rather, it is the need to preserve public trust in judicial neutrality. As comparative examples demonstrate, nations can adjust judicial tenure legally and successfully when changes are accompanied by broad professional consensus, prospective application, and transparent legislative processes.

Sri Lanka’s challenge lies in balancing the immediate demands of judicial efficiency against the enduring requirement that constitutional reforms must satisfy both domestic legitimacy and established international standards of judicial independence, particularly in a situation the latter is inherently oppositional to nations who do not have a veto or global political wherewithal to withstand pressure.