Features
Are they two peas in a pod?
Economic policy and foreign policy:
By Neville Ladduwahetty
The general practice of governments of most nation states is to treat Economic policies and Foreign policy as two separate components of their national interest. Consequently, while the field of economics is littered with economic specialists, the field of foreign relations is confined to a relatively few. Perhaps, the tendency to do so is because of the popular understanding that economics is driven by market forces, while foreign policy is driven by a different paradigm, that being how nations conduct their relations with other nation states, even in matters that could include economics. This has resulted in the two subjects being handled by most governments as separate branches.
For instance, the financial crisis that Sri Lanka is currently facing is due to a combination of misguided economic policies, one of which was the lowering of taxes, causing the internal economy to be seriously impacted to a degree that caused budget deficits, and inflation to skyrocket, as a result of printing money, and the other being indulging in indiscriminately excessive dollar borrowings, from readily available sources, to develop infrastructure projects, where the returns were mostly in local Rupees. These lending sources took advantage of their bilateral relations to tempt Sri Lanka, because the significance of the island’s strategic location was critical to further their geopolitical interests. What Sri Lanka is experiencing currently is primarily due to these factors.
BLURRING of ECONOMIC and FOREIGN POLICIES
The nexus between Economic Policies and Foreign Policy is manifesting itself most prominently with neighbouring India. In April 2022, Sri Lanka’s debt to India was USD 1.041 billion. Today, it is nearly USD 5 Billion. While the need for India to engage in Sri Lanka’s internal and external affairs is motivated by self-interest, the fact that it would impact on Sri Lanka’s economic dependence is indisputable. Furthermore, it would also be a fetter to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and independence to further relations with other countries with the view to furthering Sri Lanka’s own interests.
Sri Lanka is currently seriously campaigning for the importance of “economic integration between Sri Lanka and India”. Whether such a policy has been approved by the President and the Cabinet of Ministers, who, incidentally, are Constitutionally “charged with the direction and control of the Government”, is not known. As an extension of this policy, “India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration, since July 2022, has been exploring the possibility of bringing countries that are short of dollars into the Rupee settlement mechanism. Designating the INR as a legal currency in Sri Lanka has provided Sri Lanka much needed liquidity support to tide over its economic crisis amid inadequate availability of US dollars …” (Sunday Observer, May 7, 2023).
While designating the INR as the legal currency in Sri Lanka would be favourable to India, it would amount to Sri Lanka piling up stacks of Indian currency, through trade and tourism, not knowing what to do with it all, because the Indian rupee is not only a non-convertible currency but also because the distortion between exports from India being five times the exports from Sri Lanka to India, as stated herein. would seriously disadvantage Sri Lanka. For instance, “During the last 26 years the exports of India to Sri Lanka have increased at an annualized rate of 10.1%, from $397M, in 1995, to $4.87B, in 2021. In 2021, India did not export any services to Sri Lanka. In 2021, Sri Lanka exported $1B to India (https://oec.world › bilateral-country › ind › partner › lka)
The experience between India and Russia, in respect of oil exports from Russia, was no different. Russia realizing that they would be stuck with Billions of Indian Rupees, for bilateral trade with India, suspended negotiations “after months of negotiations failed to convince Moscow to keep Indian Rupees in its coffers. This will be a major setback for Indian importers of cheap oil and coal from Russia who were awaiting a permanent rupee payment mechanism to help lower currency conversion costs …. Russia is not comfortable holding rupees and wants to be paid in Chinese yuan.” (The Island, May 5, 2023).
“Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 21, last year, India’s imports from Russia have risen to $51.3 billion, until April 5, from $10.6 billion in the same period in the previous year, according to another Indian government official” (Ibid). The fact that Russia is prepared to accept such a large outstanding debt, to be settled in Chinese yuan ,reflects the strength of the bilateral relationship between Russia and China, at the expense of India. This underscores the power of bilateral relationships that could at times influence economic issues and vis-a-versa.
Drawing a lesson from this Russian/Indian experience, Sri Lanka should test the strength of its relationships and explore settling its outstanding debts to China, India and Japan, in their respective currencies, instead of settling them in US Dollars.
THE SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE
Although Sri Lanka, then Ceylon, started out with Foreign affairs being linked with Defence, Foreign relations came under the jurisdiction of an independent Ministry, with the passage of time, thereby causing economic policies and foreign policy to function under two separate Cabinet ministers. However, during the early stages of this separation, bilateral relations had a significant influence on the determination of economic priorities.
For instance, the impetus to manufacturing was initiated with the introduction of the steel and tyre factories, from Russia. The flour mill from Russia contributed to meet the food needs. Another was the textile mill, at Athurugiriya, from The German Democratic Republic (GDR). It was the strength of bilateral relationships that contributed to further the economic development of Sri Lanka. Likewise, the urgent power needs of Sri Lanka, in the late 1970s and 1980s, compelled the then government to initiate the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme. The Implementation of the programme depended on harnessing the needed funds.
To secure the funds, the late Gamini Dissanayake invited all the Ambassadors ,and local heads of aid missions in Colombo, to a detailed discussion because “the raising of foreign funds for the construction of the Projects and the implementation of the downstream development programmes”, presented themselves as the most formidable task. It was the bilateral relations with countries such as “the USA, the UK, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and from international funding agencies, like the World Bank, through outright grants, such as from the UK, and soft loans that became the key for Sri Lanka to find the needed financial resources to implement the Accelerated Mahaweli programme.
These infrastructure projects did not impose financial strains on the economy, not only because the cost of funding was low but also the return on the investment, which was in the form of Dollar savings for power generation, was almost immediate. However, the more recently implemented projects were funded with high cost short term loans, where the return on investment was over too long a period to justify their viability. For instance, there are several grounds on which the network of expressways constructed can be justified, but not the funding through Dollar loans at high interest rates. Instead, they should have been funded through a gasoline tax, as was done in the U.S.A. following WWII, because at the end of the day, it is the user that foots the bill, similar to any Value Added Tax.
What was the motivation for the strategy adopted? Was it corruption, or was Sri Lanka tempted by the creditors into taking advantage of bilateral relations with a view to seeking a foothold in order to exploit its strategic location to pursue their own geopolitical interests? Whatever the reason, or reasons, the fact remains that the current crisis is because Sri Lanka was not astute enough to be aware of “Greeks bearing gifts.”
CONCLUSION
It is evident from the foregoing that Economic Policies and Foreign Policy do not work in isolation of each other. Instead, the material cited above demonstrate that Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy have a significant influence over Economic Policies even to the point of outwitting Economic Policies that have negative consequences. For instance, the offer of three 100 MW Nuclear Reactors, by Russia, is motivated by bilateral relations and certainly not by economic considerations, because it would amount to importing uranium instead of oil. The Light Rail Project, at a reported cost of USD 2.0 Billion from Japan, that has soured Sri Lanka/Japan relations, is similar in vein, because the loan is in Dollars and the benefits are in Rupees.
The clear reason for this is because Sri Lanka does not have an Economic Plan. If it had, Sri Lanka would be in sounder position to politely say NO to bilateral unsolicited offers, without an impact on Foreign Relations.
One guiding principle of such an Economic Plan should be that if the funding for a project is in International convertible currency, the return on the investment should be in the same currency, or, the equivalent reduction in imports should be in a convertible currency.
Not only does Sri Lanka NOT have an Economic Plan, she does not have a clear Foreign Policy either. There is no more talk of being Non-Aligned. There is not much talk of being Neutral, either. This vacuum is tempting all the major powers to seek a foothold in Sri Lanka because of its relevance to Indo-Pacific confrontations; a trend that would make Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity vulnerable. The lack of a clear Foreign Policy gives the opportunity for the Government to respond to each situation and to every offer, individually. Such an individualized approach not only allocates too much power to the President, and a few others close to him, but also could change with a change of Government. This approach is not in the best interests of Sri Lanka, particularly because of global uncertainties in terms of currency related economic issues, as well as the other maneuverings going on around Sri Lanka, arising from Indo-Pacific tensions.
The President has repeatedly commented on these tensions. The most recent being at the BMICH when he stated that Sri Lanka “doesn’t want to get caught between escalating US-China tensions…. We are now being asked to choose sides”. However, he had stated that Sri Lanka would not succumb to the pressures (Daily Mirror, May 11, 2023). If Sri Lanka is not to take sides and/or succumb to pressures, the policy to pursue vigorously the policy of “integrating” with India would be a contradiction.
The President’s recommendation has been to rely on a strengthened ASEAN in the coming decades. Reliance on a future strengthened ASEAN misses the most critical point that the strategic location of Sri Lanka is unique in comparison to that of other ASEAN countries. Consequently, the pressures on them would be significantly less and different to that of Sri Lanka. This fact alone requires Sri Lanka to develop its own policy as to how it handles these escalating tensions.
Therefore, it is imperative that clear bipartisan policies be developed in respect of the link between economic and foreign policy issues. In addition, because of this inevitable interplay between economic policy and foreign policy, the separate institutional arrangements that currently exist should be reformed and reorganized to include an overarching arrangement in order to foster greater integration between economic and foreign policies, when making decisions that impact on both sectors, and eventually, the country.
Features
The NPP Government is more than a JVP offspring:
It is also different from all past governments as it faces new and different challenges
No one knows whether the already broken ceasefire between the US and Iran, with Israel as a reluctant adjunct, will last the full 10 days, or what will come thereafter. The world’s economic woes are not over and the markets are yo-yoing in response to Trump’s twitches and Iran’s gate keeping at the Strait of Hormuz. The gloomy expert foretelling is that full economic normalcy will not return until the year is over even if the war were to end with the ceasefire. That means continuing challenges for Sri Lanka and more of the tough learning in the art of governing for the NPP.
The NPP government has been doing what most governments in Asia have been doing to cope with the current global crisis, which is also an Asian crisis insofar as oil supplies and other supply chains are concerned. What the government can and must do additionally is to be totally candid with the people and keep them informed of everything that it is doing – from monitoring import prices to the timely arranging of supplies, all the details of tender, the tracking of arrivals, and keeping the distribution flow through the market without bottlenecks. That way the government can eliminate upstream tender rackets and downstream hoarding swindles. People do not expect miracles from their government, only honest, sincere and serious effort in difficult circumstances. Backed up by clear communication and constant public engagement.
But nothing is going to stop the flow of criticisms against the NPP government. That is a fact of Sri Lankan politics. Even though the opposition forces are weak and have little traction and even less credibility, there has not been any drought in the criticisms levelled against the still fledgling government. These criticisms can be categorized as ideological, institutional and oppositional criticisms, with each category having its own constituency and/or commentators. The three categories invariably overlap and there are instances of criticisms that excite only the pundits but have no political resonance.
April 5 anniversary nostalgia
There is also a new line of criticism that might be inspired by the April 5 anniversary nostalgia for the 1971 JVP insurrection. This new line traces the NPP government to the distant roots of the JVP – its April 1965 founding “in a working-class home in Akmeemana, Galle” by a 22-year old Rohana Wijeweera and seven others; the short lived 1971 insurrection that was easily defeated; and the much longer and more devastating second (1987 to 1989) insurrection that led to the elimination of the JVP’s frontline leaders including Wijeweera, and brought about a change in the JVP’s political direction with commitment to parliamentary democracy. So far, so good, as history goes.
But where the nostalgic narrative starts to bend is in attempting a straight line connection from the 1965 Akmeemana origins of the JVP to the national electoral victories of the NPP in 2024. And the bend gets broken in trying to bridge the gap between the “founding anti-imperialist economics” of the JVP and the practical imperatives of the NPP government in “governing a debt-laden small open economy.” Yet this line of criticism differs from the other lines of criticism that I have alluded to, but more so for its moral purpose than for its analytical clarity. The search for clarity could begin with question – why is the NPP government more than a JVP offspring? The answer is not so simple, but it is also not too complicated.
For starters, the JVP was a political response to the national and global conditions of the 1960s and 1970s, piggybacking socialism on the bandwagon of ethno-nationalism in a bi-polar world that was ideologically split between status quo capitalism and the alternative of socialism. The NPP government, on the other hand, is not only a response to, but is also a product of the conditions of the 2010s and 2020s. The twain cannot be more different. Nothing is the same between then and now, locally and globally.
A pragmatic way to look at the differences between the origins of the JVP and the circumstances of the NPP government is to look at the very range of criticisms that are levelled against the NPP government. What I categorize as ideological criticisms include criticisms of the government’s pro-IMF and allegedly neo-liberal economic policies, as well as the government’s foreign policy stances – on Israel, on the current US-Israel war against Iran, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, and the apparent closeness to the Modi government in India. These criticisms emanate from the non-JVP left and Sinhala Buddhist nationalists.
Strands of nationalism
To digress briefly, there are several strands in the overall bundle of Sri Lankan nationalism. There is the liberal inclusive strand, the left-progressive strand, the exclusive Sinhala Buddhist Nationalist (SBN) strand, and the defensive strands of minority nationalisms. Given Sri Lanka’s historical political formations and alliances, much overlapping goes on between the different strands. The overlapping gets selective on an issue by issue basis, which in itself is not unwelcome insofar as it promotes plurality in place of exclusivity.
Historically as well, and certainly after 1956, the SBN strand has been the dominant strand of nationalism in Sri Lanka and has had the most influential say in every government until now. Past versions of the JVP frequently straddled the dominant SBN space. Currently, however, the dominant SBN strand is in one of its more dormant phases and the NPP government could be a reason for the current dormancy. This is an obvious difference between the old JVP and the new NPP.
A second set of criticisms, or institutional criticisms, emanate from political liberals and human rights activists and these are about the NPP government’s actions or non-actions in regard to constitutional changes, the future of the elected executive presidency, the status of provincial devolution and the timing of provincial council elections, progress on human rights issues, the resolution of unfinished postwar businesses including the amnesia over mass graves. These criticisms and the issues they represent are also in varying ways the primary concerns of the island’s Tamils, Muslims and the Malaiyaka (planntationn) Tamils. As with the overlapping between the left and the non-minority nationalists, there is also overlapping between the liberal activists and minority representatives.
A third category includes what might be called oppositional criticisms and they counterpose the JVP’s past against the NPP’s present, call into question the JVP’s commitment to multi-party democracy and raise alarms about a creeping constitutional dictatorship. This category also includes criticisms of the NPP government’s lack of governmental experience and competence; alleged instances of abuse of power, mismanagement and even corruption; alleged harassment of past politicians; and the failure to find the alleged mastermind behind the 2019 Easter bombings. At a policy and implementational level, there have been criticisms of the government’s educational reforms and electricity reforms, the responses to cyclone Ditwah, and the current global oil and economic crises. The purveyors of oppositional criticisms are drawn from the general political class which includes political parties, current and past parliamentarians, as well as media pundits.
Criticisms as expectations
What is common to all three categories of criticisms is that they collectively represent what were understood to be promises by the NPP before the elections, and have become expectations of the NPP government after the elections. It is the range and nature of these criticisms and the corresponding expectations that make the NPP government a lot more than a mere JVP offspring, and significantly differentiate it from every previous government.
The deliverables that are expected of the NPP government were never a part of the vocabulary of the original JVP platform and programs. The very mode of parliamentary politics was ideologically anathema to the JVP of Akmeemana. And there was no mention of or concern for minority rights, or constitutional reforms. On foreign policy, it was all India phobia without Anglo mania – a halfway variation of Sri Lanka’s mainstream foreign policy of Anglo mania and India phobia. For a party of the rural proletariat, the JVP was virulently opposed to the plantation proletariat. The JVP’s version of anti-imperialist economics would hardly have excited the Sri Lankan electorate at any time, and certainly not at the present time.
At the same time, the NPP government is also the only government that has genealogical antecedents to a political movement or organization like the JVP. That in itself makes the NPP government unique among Sri Lanka’s other governments. The formation of the NPP is the culmination of the evolution of the JVP that began after the second insurrection with the shedding of political violence, acceptance of political plurality and commitment to electoral democracy.
But the evolution was not entirely a process of internal transformation. It was also a response to a rapidly and radically changing circumstances both within Sri Lanka and beyond. This evolution has not been a rejection of the founding socialist purposes of the JVP in 1968, but their adaptation in the endless political search, under constantly changing conditions, for a non-violent, socialist and democratic framework that would facilitate the full development of the human potential of all Sri Lankans.
The burden of expectations is unmistakable, but what is also remarkable is their comprehensiveness and the NPP’s formal commitment to all of them at the same time. No previous government shouldered such an extensive burden or showed such a willing commitment to each and every one of the expectations. In the brewing global economic crisis, the criticisms, expectations and the priorities of the government will invariably be focussed on keeping the economy alive and alleviating the day-to-day difficulties of millions of Sri Lankan families. While what the NPP government can and must do may not differ much from what other Asian governments – from Pakistan to Vietnam – are doing, it could and should do better than what any and all past Sri Lankan governments did when facing economic challenges.
by Rajan Philips
Features
A Fragile Ceasefire: Pakistan’s Glory and Israel’s Sabotage
After threatening to annihilate one of the planet’s oldest civilizations, TACO* Trump chickened out again by grasping the ceasefire lifeline that Pakistan had assiduously prepared. Trump needed the ceasefire badly to stem the mounting opposition to the war in America. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu wanted the war to continue because he needed it badly for his political survival. So, he contrived a fiction and convinced Trump that Lebanon is not included in the ceasefire. Trump as usual may not have noticed that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Shariff had clearly indicated Lebanon’s inclusion in his announcement of the ceasefire at 7:50 PM, Tuesday, on X. Ten minutes before Donald Trump’s fake deadline.
True to form on Wednesday, Israel unleashed the heaviest assault by far on Lebanon, reportedly killing over 300 people, the highest single-day death toll in the current war. Iran responded by re-closing the Strait of Hormuz and questioning the need for talks in Islamabad over the weekend. There were other incidents as well, with an oil refinery attacked in Iran, and Iranian drones and missiles slamming oil and gas infrastructure in UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.
The US tried to insist that Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire, with the argumentative US Vice President JD Vance, who was in Budapest, Hungary, campaigning for Viktor Orban, calling the whole thing a matter of “bad faith negotiation” as well as “legitimate misunderstanding” on the part of Iran, and warning Iran that “it would be dumb to jeopardise its ceasefire with Washington over Israel’s attacks in Lebanon.”
But as the attack in Lebanon drew international condemnation – from Pope Leo to UN Secretary General António Guterres, and several world leaders, and amidst fears of Lebanon becoming another Gaza with 1,500 people including 130 children killed and more than a million people displaced, Washington got Israel to stop its “lawn mowing” in southern Lebanon.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to “open direct negotiations with Lebanon as soon as possible,”. Lebanese President Joeseph Aoun has also called for “a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, followed by direct negotiations between them.” Israel’s involvement in Lebanon remains a wild card that threatens the ceasefire and could scuttle the talks between the US and Iran scheduled for Saturday in Islamabad.
Losers and Winners
After the ceasefire, both the Trump Administration and Iran have claimed total victories while the Israeli government wants the war to continue. The truth is that after more than a month into nonstop bombing of Iran, America and Israel have won nothing. Only Iran has won something it did not have when Trump and Netanyahu started their war. Iran now has not only a say over but control of the Strait of Hormuz. The ceasefire acknowledges this. Both Trump and Netanyahu are under fire in their respective countries and have no allies in the world except one another.
The real diplomatic winner is Pakistan. Salman Rushdie’s palimpsest-country has emerged as a key player in global politics and an influential mediator in a volatile region. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Defence Field Marshal Asim Munir have both been praised by President Trump and credited for achieving the current ceasefire. The Iranian regime has also been effusive in its praise of Pakistan’s efforts.
It is Pakistan that persisted with the effort after initial attempts at backdoor diplomacy by Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye started floundering. Sharing a 900 km border and deep cultural history with Iran, and having a skirmish of its own on the eastern front with Afghanistan, Pakistan has all the reason to contain and potentially resolve the current conflict in Iran. Although a majority Sunni Muslim country, Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia Muslim population after Iran, and is the easterly terminus of the Shia Arc that stretches from Lebanon. The country also has a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia that includes Pakistan’s nuclear cover for the Kingdom. An open conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia would have put Pakistan in a dangerously awkward position.
It is now known and Trump has acknowledged that China had a hand in helping Iran get to the diplomatic table. Pakistan used its connections well to get Chinese diplomatic reinforcement. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar flew to Beijing to brief his Chinese counterpart and secured China’s public support for the diplomatic efforts. The visit produced a Five-Point Plan that became a sequel to America’s 15-point proposal and the eventual ten-point offer by Iran.
There is no consensus between parties as to which points are where and who is agreeing to what. The chaos is par for the course the way Donald Trumps conducts global affairs. So, all kudos to Pakistan for quietly persisting with old school toing and froing and producing a semblance of an agreement on a tweet without a parchment.
It is also noteworthy that Israel has been excluded from all the diplomatic efforts so far. And it is remarkable, but should not be surprising, the way Trump has sidelined Isreal from the talks. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been enjoying overwhelming support of Israelis for starting the war of his life against Iran and getting the US to spearhead it. But now the country is getting confused and is exposed to Iranian missiles and drones far more than ever before. The Israeli opposition is finally coming alive realizing what little has Netanyahu’s wars have achieved and at what cost. Israel has alienated a majority of Americans and has no ally anywhere else.
It will be a busy Saturday in Islamabad, where the US and Iranian delegations are set to meet. Iran would seem to have insisted and secured the assurance that the US delegation will be led by Vice President Vance, while including Trump’s personal diplomats – Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner. Iran has not announced its team but it is expected to be led, for protocol parity, by Iran’s Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and will likely include its suave Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Vice President Vance’s attendance will be the most senior US engagement with Iran since Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal under President Obama.
The physical arrangements for the talks are still not public although Islamabad has been turned into a security fortress given the stakes and risks involved. The talks are expected to be ‘indirect’, with the two delegations in separate rooms and Pakistani officials shuttling between them. The status of Iran’s enriched uranium and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz will be the major points of contention. After Netanyahu’s overreach on Wednesday, Lebanon is also on the short list
The 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan) took months of negotiations and involved multiple parties besides the US and Iran, including China, France, Germany, UK, Russia and the EU. That served the cause of regional and world peace well until Trump tore up the deal to spite Obama. It would be too much to expect anything similar after a weekend encounter in Islamabad. But if the talks could lead to at least a permanent ceasefire and the return to diplomacy that would be a huge achievement.
(*As of 2025–2026, Donald Trump is nicknamed “TACO Trump” by Wall Street traders and investors as an acronym for “”. This term highlights a perceived pattern of him making strong tariff threats that cause market panic, only to later retreat or weaken them, causing a rebound.)
by Rajan Philips
Features
CIA’s hidden weapon in Iran
We are passing through the ten-day interregnum called a ceasefire over the War on Iran. The world may breathe briefly, but this pause is not reassurance—it is a deliberate interlude, a vacuum in which every actor positions for the next escalation. Iran is far from secure. Behind the veneer of calm, external powers and local forces are preparing, arming, and coordinating. The United States is unlikely to deploy conventional ground troops; the next moves will be executed through proxies whose behaviour will defy expectation. These insurgents are shaped, guided, and amplified by intelligence and technology, capable of moving silently, striking precisely, and vanishing before retaliation. The ceasefire is not peace—it is the prelude to disruption.
The Kurds, historically instruments of Tehran against Baghdad, are now vectors for the next insurgency inside Iran. This movement is neither organic nor local. It is externally orchestrated, with the CIA as the principal architect. History provides the blueprint: under Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi, Kurdish uprisings were manipulated, never supported out of sympathy. They were instruments of leverage against Iraq, a way to weaken a rival while projecting influence beyond Iran’s borders. Colonel Isa Pejman, Iranian military intelligence officer who played a role in Kurdish affairs, recalled proposing support for a military insurgency in Iraq, only for the Shah to respond coldly: “[Mustafa] Barzani killed my Army soldiers… please forget it. The zeitgeist and regional context have been completely transformed.” The Kurds were pawns, but pawns with strategic weight. Pejman later noted: “When the Shah wrote on the back of the letter ‘Accepted’ to General Pakravan, I felt I was the true leader of the Kurdish movement.” The seeds planted then are now being activated under new, technologically empowered auspices.
Iran’s geographic vulnerabilities make this possible. The Shah understood the trap: a vast territory with porous borders, squeezed by Soviet pressure from the north and radical Arab states from the west. “We are in a really terrible situation since Moscow’s twin pincers coming down through Kabul and Baghdad surround us,” he warned Asadollah Alam. From Soviet support for the Mahabad Republic to Barzani’s dream of a unified Kurdistan, Tehran knew an autonomous Kurdish bloc could destabilize both Iraq and Iran. “Since the formation of the Soviet-backed Mahabad Republic, the Shah had been considerably worried about the Kurdish threat,” a US assessment concluded.
Today, the Kurds’ significance is operational, not symbolic. The CIA’s recent rescue of a downed F-15 airman using Ghost Murmur, a quantum magnetometry system, demonstrated the reach of technology in intelligence operations. The airman survived two days on Iranian soil before extraction. This was not a simple rescue; it was proof that highly mobile, technologically augmented operations can penetrate Iranian territory with surgical precision. The same logic applies to insurgency preparation: when individuals can be tracked through electromagnetic signatures, AI-enhanced surveillance, and drones, proxy forces can be armed, guided, and coordinated with unprecedented efficiency. The Kurds are no longer pawns—they are a living network capable of fracturing Iranian cohesion while providing deniability to foreign powers.
Iran’s engagement with Iraqi Kurds was always containment, not empowerment. The Shah’s goal was never Kurdish independence. “We do not approve an independent [Iraqi] Kurdistan,” he stated explicitly. Yet their utility as instruments of regional strategy was undeniable. The CIA’s revival of these networks continues a long-standing pattern: insurgent groups integrated into the wider calculus of international power. Israel, Iran, and the Kurds formed a triangular strategic relationship that terrified Baghdad. “For Baghdad, an Iranian-Israeli-Kurdish triangular alliance was an existential threat,” contemporary reports noted. This is the template for modern manipulation: a networked insurgency, externally supported, capable of destabilizing regimes from within while giving foreign powers plausible deniability.
Iran today faces fragility. Years of sanctions, repression, and targeted strikes have weakened educational and scientific hubs; Sharif University in Tehran, one of the country’s leading scientific centres, was bombed. Leaders, scholars, and innovators have been eliminated. Military readiness is compromised. Generations-long setbacks leave Iran exposed. Against this backdrop, a Kurdish insurgency armed with drones, AI-supported surveillance, and precision munitions could do more than disrupt—it could fracture the state internally. The current ten-day ceasefire is a mirage; the next wave of revolt is already being orchestrated.
CIA involvement is deliberate. Operations are coordinated with allied intelligence agencies, leveraging Kurdish grievances, mobility, and ethnolinguistic networks. The Kurds’ spread across Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria provides operational depth—allowing insurgents to strike, vanish, and regroup with impunity. Barzani understood leverage decades ago: “We could be useful to the United States… Look at our strategic location on the flank of any possible Soviet advance into the Middle East.” Today, the calculation is inverted: Kurds are no longer instruments against Baghdad; they are potential disruptors inside Tehran itself.
Technology is central. Ghost Murmur’s ability to detect a single heartbeat remotely exemplifies how intelligence can underpin insurgent networks. Drones, satellite communications, AI predictive modeling, and battlefield sensors create an infrastructure that can transform a dispersed Kurdish insurgency into a high-precision operation. Iran can no longer rely on fortifications or loyalty alone; the external environment has been recalibrated by technology.
History provides the roadmap. The Shah’s betrayal of Barzani after the 1975 Algiers Agreement demonstrated that external actors can manipulate both Iranian ambitions and Kurdish loyalties. “The Shah sold out the Kurds,” Yitzhak Rabin told Kissinger. “We could not station our troops there and keep fighting forever,” the Shah explained to Alam. The Kurds are a pivot, not a cause. Networks once acting under Tehran’s influence are now being repurposed against it.
The insurgency exploits societal fissures. Kurdish discontent in Iran, suppressed for decades, provides fertile ground. Historical betrayal fuels modern narratives: “Barzani claimed that ‘Isa Pejman sold us out to the Shah and the Shah sold us out to the US.’” Intelligence agencies weaponize these grievances, pairing them with training, technological augmentation, and covert support.
Geopolitically, the stakes are immense. The Shah’s defensive-offensive doctrine projected Iranian influence outward to neutralize threats. Today, the logic is inverted: the same networks used to contain Iraq are being readied to contain Iran. A technologically augmented Kurdish insurgency, covertly backed, could achieve in months what decades of sanctions, diplomacy, or repression have failed to accomplish.
The operation will be asymmetric, high-tech, and dispersed. UAVs, quantum-enhanced surveillance, encrypted communications, and AI-directed logistics will dominate. Conventional Iranian forces are vulnerable to this type of warfare. As Pejman reflected decades ago, “Our Army was fighting there, rather than the Kurds who were harshly defeated… How could we keep such a place?” Today, the challenge is magnified by intelligence superiority on the insurgents’ side.
This is not a temporary flare-up. The CIA and its allies are constructing a generational network of influence. Experience from Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon proves these networks endure once operationalised. The Shah recognized this: “Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign left a lasting legacy for the post-Revolution era.” Today, those instruments are being remade as vectors of foreign influence inside Iran.
The future is stark. Iran faces not simply external threats, but a carefully engineered insurgency exploiting historical grievances, technological superiority, and precise intelligence. The Kurds are central. History, technology, and geopolitical calculation converge to create a transformative threat. Tehran’s miscalculations, betrayals, and suppressed grievances now form the lattice for this insurgency. The Kurds are positioned not just as an ethnic minority, but as a vector of international strategy—Tehran may be powerless to stop it.
Iran’s containment strategies have been weaponized, fused with technology, and inverted against it. The ghosts of Barzani’s Peshmerga, the shadows of Algiers, and the Shah’s strategic vision now converge with Ghost Murmur, drones, and AI. Tehran faces a paradox: the instruments it once controlled are now calibrated to undermine its authority. The next Kurdish revolt will not only fight in the mountains but in the electromagnetic shadows where intelligence operates, consequences are lethal, and visibility is scarce.
by Nilantha Ilangamuwa
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Business5 days agoHayleys Mobility introduces Premium OMODA C9 PHEV
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News7 days agoUN Regional Director launches SL’s first Country Gender Equality Profile during official visit
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News7 days agoDialog Launches ‘GanuDenu QR’, Making Cashless Transfers Free for All with eZ Cash and Dialog Finance
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Business4 days agoHNB Assurance marks 25 years with strategic transformation to ‘HNB Life’
