Anura-Modi Pact: The elephant in the room is the dragon 

In a historic first for Sri Lanka, a “defence pact” was signed last week by President AKD with Prime Minister Modi of India, to the surprise of the people of Sri Lanka who had no inkling that such a thing was on the cards.  It has justifiably given rise to agitated discussion in this country, not only due to the secrecy surrounding the contents of the “pact”, but also due to its sudden emergence. For a seriously consequential decision such as this, there had been zero discussion in the public domain, and the defence pact was practically sprung on the public during the two-day visit of the leader of the neighbouring giant, India.

In 2019, an Australian researcher at the Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka (INSSSL) Ms. Lucy Stronach, urged the use of Defence White Papers for “assessing necessity and analysing structures for Sri Lanka’s next strategic priority”.

Udeshika Jayasekara reports in the INSSL website the researcher’s submission that “The absence of a well-developed defence white paper could hinder Sri Lanka’s strategic response to a changing security environment…She stressed that a Sri Lankan defence white paper should present the Government’s position on defence policy, objectives and strategies, with specific mention to the security environment and threats, future defence directions, and military doctrine.”

Stronach explains that “All strategies that are made must be evidence-based in nature [rather than influenced for political or personal gain], and decisions should be made as cost-effectively as possible whilst adhering to core government objectives and policy.” (https://www.inss.lk/index.php?id=231)

A White Paper is not a secret document, but one that is made available to the public. For instance, the Australian Defence White Papers which consider its defence cooperation with India, are in the public domain. Such a White Paper on Sri Lanka-India Defence cooperation which goes beyond the existing arrangements for the first time in its history, formalising a defence pact, would have reassured the public and other global actors that all relevant issues had been considered before arriving at such a momentous decision with national security implications.

Soon after the Doklam stand-off between India and China in 2017, in a piece that I wrote titled “Between Dragons & Elephants: Sri Lanka’s Dangerous Quest For Cash From China & India”, I quoted the foreign editor of the Hindustan Times, Pramit Paul Chaudri who wrote that after the 2017 Doklam affair which took place outside “Indian soil or Indian claimed territory”, India and China were “more likely to run into each other in third countries”.

A Bhutani journalist reflected after this event with some relief that they have so far avoided  “both the fire from the Dragon on our heads and also the Elephant’s tusks in our soft underbelly”.  (https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/between-dragons-elephants-sri-lankas-dangerous-quest-for-cash-from-china-india/)

Sri Lanka has several think tanks, Diplomatic and Defence institutes including a university (KDU), and a post-graduate institute at the National Defence College, that must surely track current global trends and their implications for Sri Lanka, its national security, economic security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Were there adequate consultations on the most recent, critical step the government has just taken in the domain of defence?

Has Sri Lanka veered away from its traditional foreign policy position of balancing between India and China, successfully practiced by all regimes to-date, and moved under the AKD/NPP administration to throw in our lot with our giant neighbour without any public discussion, despite the complex historical relationship of incursions, wars, and interventions on sensitive ethnic issues?

INDIA-US Defence Cooperation

The India -Sri Lanka defence pact has been signed in the aftermath of greatly enhanced defence cooperation between the United States and India. Unlike the yet to be disclosed ‘pact’ signed by President AKD, the joint statement following the 13th February 2025 meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Trump gave great details on their agreements, within the day.

Released on the same day that the leaders met in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, the joint statement recognizes India as a “Major Defense Partner with Strategic Trade Authorization-1 (STA-1) authorisation and a key Quad partner, the U.S.” (https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/39066/India__US_Joint_Statement_February_13_2025)

The Joint statement states that “The leaders also called for opening negotiations this year for a Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP) agreement to better align their procurement systems and enable the reciprocal supply of defense goods and services. The leaders pledged to accelerate defense technology cooperation across space, air defense, missile, maritime and undersea technologies, with the U.S. announcing a review of its policy on releasing fifth generation fighters and undersea systems to India.”

It also says, “The leaders committed to break new ground to support and sustain the overseas deployments of the U.S. and Indian militaries in the Indo-Pacific, including enhanced logistics and intelligence sharing…with other exchanges and security cooperation engagements.” The increasing defence cooperation between India and the US has inevitably been seen as being part of the on-going attempts to contain China, by Chinese analysts.

Chunhao Lou of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations writes that “Defence cooperation between the US and India has become increasingly focused on targeting China, creating real challenges for China’s national security.” He reveals that their joint military exercises, Yudh-Abyas 21 and 22, held after the Galvan Valley incident, took place not 100 kilometers from China’s Actual Line of Control, “clearly indicating a strategic focus against China”. (http://www.cicir.ac.cn/UpFiles/file/20241114/6386720528685461646420295.pdf, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

He asks if this move away from India’s traditional non-alignments policy means a move towards a US-India Alliance, but concludes that scholars are yet to agree on the “essence of the partnership” and that “sovereignty-transfer issues” involved in formal alliance will prevent India from going that far. However, he says that the agreements show “clear intentions against third parties…” which show “some characteristics of an alliance”, and therefore describes it as “more of a quasi-alliance”.

He discloses that India’s multilateral Malabar exercises have included anti-submarine warfare and that the US sent a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to participate in the 2022 event. He mentions with concern India’s plans to become a hub for the maintenance and repair of “forward-deployed US Navy assets and other aircraft and vessels”. He also mentions the 2023 US proposal to India to be included in a NATO-plus arrangement, which had been publicly rejected by Foreign Minister Jaishankar. The report acknowledges that it is “impossible for India to compromise its sovereignty”.

Who, What, How?

The continuing lack of transparency with regard to the Anura-Modi defence pact are making people nervous about the government’s motivations. At first, it wasn’t clear if the Cabinet had given approval to it, nor who had participated in negotiating its contents.

Several days later following questions from the media as well as parliamentarians, the Secretary of Defence chose to confirm that it had in fact received Cabinet approval, placing accountability for it and its contents on the government. The contents are yet to be revealed to the public, as is the logic that necessitated such a step, moving beyond the defence cooperation arrangements already in place.

The people are justified in feeling a sense of dissonance for several reasons, not least among them the history of uncompromising opposition to any such arrangement with India, by the dominant partner in the governing coalition, the JVP. This fact more than any other, compels the citizens to seek to understand how the anxieties articulated at length and over decades by the JVP and its leader, now the powerful President of the country, has been resolved, and the factors that secured this leap of faith.

India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Mishri explained at the Press Briefing on April 5th 2025 on PM Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka that the defence pact “proceeds from” the conversations between the two leaders starting in December 2024, when President AKD visited Delhi. He said that there was “really close convergence” of the “recognition of the completely interlinked nature of the national security of Sri Lanka and India…This is the background of the signature of the defense MOU between the two countries for the first time, and the MOU is in itself an umbrella framework document that will make existing defense cooperation initiatives more structured.” (https://www.hcicolombo.gov.in/section/speeches-and-interviews/transcript-of-special-briefing-by-mea-on-prime-minister-s-visit-to-sri-lanka-april-05-2025/)

Many in Sri Lanka would want to know contours of the “completely interlinked nature” of Sri Lanka’s national security with India’s, especially given the geopolitics of region, the ethnic dimension of the long war, and the divergent national interests of the two countries over time.

The President’s reading of our national interest led to some concern when he decided against attending the BRICS Plus summit, weeks after being elected to the Presidency, not even sending either his Prime Minister, or the Foreign Minister. The chief bureaucrat of the Foreign Ministry attended the Heads of State summit instead. The members of BRICS have been Sri Lanka’s traditional allies, and it would have been an opportunity for the new government to renew those relationships. The recent tariff shock experienced across the globe reflected negatively in major stock exchanges around the world including ours which stopped trading for 30 minutes, validates the urging of diversifying of our dependency and the balancing of major powers using non-alignment in its former and revised forms that Sri Lanka had privileged, over the last decades.

People have a right to be concerned, when a government makes an about-turn without explanation. They want to know that their interests and that of the country have been considered adequately, as well as the concerns of other global players, who are also big powers such as China, who have stood by them in times of difficulty.

They want to know that this government is capable of playing the role that a small island situated in an important strategic location, is called upon to play at this globally critical time, when the world order is in transition to something which is yet unclear. Analysts suggest that taking the long historical view, transitions invariably involve war, resistance to change, contestation and eventual emergence of a hegemonic power, but not before a period of violent transition. We need to know that our government can navigate this complexity intelligently, not ignorantly, taking the long view, and driven primarily by the national interest of Sri Lanka.

By Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka