Features

Accountability issues: Some conveniently forgotten facts

Published

8 months ago

2025/10/22

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk at Chemmani, Jaffna, where mass graves were unearthed during his visit last June

Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) recently commemorated the death of Sahayaseeli Pedhuruppillai, alias Maalathy, the first woman cadre killed fighting for the macabre Eelam cause.

Jaffna District parliamentarian and ITAK leader Sivagnanam Shritharan, MP, attended the event, organised by the ITAK Kilinochchi branch. Tamil Guardian (TG) in an online report, headlined ‘ITAK commemorates 2nd Lt. Maalathy in Kilinochchi,’ posted on 13 October, 2025, recounting how Shritharan spoke about Maalathy’s life and the sacrifice she made for the Tamil liberation struggle.

According to that report, there hadn’t been any other parliamentarian, past or present, except for Shritharan, at the event. Shritharan received the ITAK leadership in January 2024 after beating parliamentarian M.A. Sumanthiran, PC. Shritharan succeeded the ageing Mavai Senathiraja, who passed away in January 2025.

Having first entered Parliament, in 2010, on the ITAK ticket (ITAK led the Tamil National Alliance), Shritharan was reelected at the 2015, 2020 and 2024 parliamentary elections.

What really interested me, in that TG report, was the reference to the Indian Army deployment in Sri Lanka in the late ’80s. TG reported: “Maalathy was killed at the age of 20 during a confrontation with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Jaffna. She was shot in the legs by the IPKF and swallowed cyanide to avoid being captured.”

Maalathy committed suicide to avoid falling into the hands of the IPKF on 10 October, 1987, close to Navatkuli-Kopay Road, during a fierce confrontation between the Indians and the LTTE.

TG also reported a commemoration event in Jaffna to mark the Pirambadi massacre in Kokuvil, where over 64 Tamils were massacred by the IPKF, 38 years ago. That massacre happened at the onset of IPKF operation, codenamed ‘Pawan,’ to disarm the belligerent LTTE. Obviously, India had no option but to go on the offensive against those New Delhi clandestinely recruited, trained, and armed with Indian taxpayers’ money. TG posted its online report, headlined ‘Pirambadi massacre by Indian troops remembered in Jaffna’ on 12 October, 2025.

Those who had been loudly demanding accountability, on the part of Sri Lanka during the war/conflict, are conveniently silent about the IPKF deployment in northern and eastern Sri Lanka (29 July, 1987, to 24 March, 1990). Would Shritharan care to explain the ITAK’s stand on accountability at least now? There cannot be any justifiable reason for him to remain silent on the contentious issue against the backdrop of him attending a commemoration event for Maalathy.

The Valvettithurai Citizens’ Committee (VCC) has caught both Sri Lanka and India by surprise. The Committee has sought compensation from the Office for Reparations, for the Valvettithurai massacre, perpetrated by the IPKF in early August 1989. VCC has asked for altogether Rs. 4.3 bn (USD 14.6 mn) and The Sunday Times, last week, quoted the Secretary to VCC, N. Aanatharaj, as having said they asked for compensation from India in 1990 but didn’t receive any response. Nearly 70 perished in the VVT incidents.

The Jaffna Hospital massacre, in October 1987, was another incident directly blamed on the IPKF. Over 60 people died at the Jaffna Hospital. But the thriving Western funded global human rights industry has never taken into consideration such incidents when moving resolutions, targeting Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, too, never mentioned such atrocities at Geneva in order not to antagonise India and thereby has ended up taking the blame for everything that had happened.

The Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) had been always silent on India’s accountability. Successive Sri Lankan governments, too, lacked the courage to set the record straight at the Geneva HRC. The JVP-led National People’s Power government, despite all their previous bravado, especially against India, prior to coming to power, is no exception.

TG reportage is evidence that those who wanted to haul Sri Lanka up before a hybrid court, consisting of local and foreign judges, selectively make reference to alleged atrocities perpetrated by the IPKF. In the absence of cohesive planning on the part of Sri Lanka, the ITAK, LTTE rump and the Tamil Diaspora have been able to advance their strategy meant to isolate the war-winning country. They are careful not to condemn the Indian Army when the Sri Lankan military is targeted at Geneva. The UNHRC seems comfortable with that obvious, but utterly shameful strategy.

True face of the LTTE

The same lot are generally silent about the atrocities committed by the LTTE. Perhaps, they must be reminded of the true face of the LTTE. The LTTE massacred hundreds of Tamils, belonging to rival Tamil groups trained by India, killed quite a number of Tamil civilians, executed members of its own organisation, including its number two Gopalswamy Mahendrarajah, aka Mahattaya, killed Tamil parliamentarians, and blew up Indian Congress Party leader and former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Do not forget that the LTTE assassinated Gandhi over a year after India ended its disastrous military mission in Sri Lanka. India could never explain how it lost nearly 1,500 officers and men and nearly 3,000 wounded, some maimed for life, during less than three years of ‘peace keeping’ here!

The LTTE could have easily reached a consensus with President J.R. Jayewardene’s government on the basis of the July 1987 Indo-Lanka Peace Accord and secured the Lion’s share of the first North-East Provincial Council. But, the LTTE had been too greedy and sought to eradicate all other Tamil groups and the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), predecessor of the TNA.

The LTTE believed in one-party rule and the group also sought to force Muslims and Sinhalese out of the northern and eastern regions. The eviction of Muslims from the Northern Province, in October 90, several months after India ended its military mission here, and the LTTE resuming its cold blooded hostilities with terror attacks, revealed the mindset of the group. The LTTE obviously felt confident that it could overwhelm the Sri Lankan military, after India withdrew its Army.

At one point, the LTTE even toyed with the idea of contesting elections – both parliamentary and Provincial Councils – during Ranasinghe Premadasa’s presidenc, but changed its strategy. On Premadasa’s explicit directive, the then Election Commissioner Chandrananda de Silva recognised the People’s Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT) as a recognised political party, regardless of the group retaining arms, as the government and the LTTE examined how mutual trust could be established.

The LTTE never sought to hide its intentions to do away with other political parties. The group brazenly used direct negotiations with Premadasa (May 1989 to June 1990) to infiltrate Colombo. An LTTE hit squad that arrived in Colombo, courtesy Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), assassinated foremost Tamil politician Appapillai Amirthalingam, along with ex-Jaffna MP Vettivelu Yogeswaran. Ex-Nallur MP Murugesu Sivasithamparam was shot and wounded during the same hit job, but he luckily survived.

The Indian Army was still deployed in the northern and eastern provinces while Premadasa foolishly provided funds and arms to the LTTE, thinking that he was getting on their good books and to get rid of the Indians. On the orders of Premadasa, the Sri Lankan military even facilitated the LTTE operations, aimed at liquidating rival Tamil groups. The LTTE killed hundreds of hastily trained men of rival groups, by Delhi, in a stupid bid to form, what was called, the Tamil National Army (TNA), prior to its departure from here, as demanded by Premadasa. The result was Velupillai Prabhakaran unleashed his forces to wipe them out. The LTTE killed indiscriminately.

Even after the LTTE resumed hostilities, in June 1990, against his own government, Premadasa had been so dumb, he released funds to the Tigers, through the Treasury. By the time R. Paskaralingam, who served as Premadasa’s trusted Treasury Chief, had released as much as Rs 125 mn and the true value of the arms, ammunition and equipment provided during this period of madness is not known. As to how trustworthy is Paskaralingam can be gauged from yet unresolved revelations made by Pandora papers.

Prabhakaran could have easily had his Eelam without waging war. Don’t forget at India’s behest, Sri Lanka merged the Eastern Province with the Northern Province, in September 1988, in terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord. That interim arrangement was to be placed before the people living in the Eastern Province by/before 31 December, 1988, for approval/rejection. But that referendum was never held. The LTTE had an extremely favourable ground situation and could have easily consolidated political power if not for unleashing violence in the wake of a group of its cadres, including Kumarappan and Pulendran, detained at Palalay, taking their own lives in protest.

The Supreme Court declared the North-East merger illegal in October 2006. The province was formally demerged into the Northern and Eastern provinces on 1 January, 2007. The SC gave its historic order on 16 October, 2006, the LTTE mounted devastating suicide attack on the Navy at Digampathana. The blast claimed the lives of 107 Navy personnel and wounded over 150 more. Retired Admiral Ravi Wijegunaratne is on record as having said that attack influenced their campaign against the Sea Tigers. In a series of operations, facilitated by intelligence provided by the Army and the US, the then Navy Chief VA Wasantha Karannagoda’s Navy hunted down floating LTTE arsenals.

The unprecedented success, achieved by the Navy, with stepped up operation, entirely disrupted the Tiger sea supply routes to Northern Sri Lanka. By the time the war ended, in May, 2009, the LTTE had almost run out of ammunition stocks. In the following year, Shritharan’s ITAK, then led by the late R. Sampanthan, betrayed the LTTE by backing retired General Sarath Fonseka at the presidential election. That should be examined against Sampanthan’s declaration, way back in 2001, that the LTTE/Velupillai Prabhakaran is the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people. The Trincomalee district lawmaker obviously and conveniently forgot what the group did to Amirthalingam.

Did the UN fail the Tamil community? Tamil Guardian

Editor Thusiyan Nandakumar dealt with the latest UN resolution in a well-articulated piece, posted on The Diplomat. The 14 October, 2025, datelined article (The UN’s Sri Lanka Failure: Why yet another resolution on accountability is being rejected by victims) bluntly alleged that the UNHRC failed to hold Sri Lanka’s war criminals to account.

The UK-based Nandakumar quoted those whom he identified as observers as having asserted that the latest resolution, adopted without a vote, is the weakest since the introduction of accountability measures in 2012. (https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/the-uns-sri-lanka-failure/)

It would be pertinent to ask whether accountability measures could be implemented without examining the origins of terrorism here. Of course the UN failed Sri Lanka by turning a blind eye to the high profile Indian destabilisation project that caused massive death and destruction. That project was meant to pave the way for the creation of a single administrative unit, comprising the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Had the UN intervened here thousands of lives could have been saved. The UN did nothing. The global body simply watched as India destabilised Sri Lanka, forcing the latter to accept the Indian Army on a peacekeeping role. Not only the Mullivaikkal battle but Nanthikadal could have been avoided if the LTTE accepted peace under Indian terms. Instead, the LTTE was overconfident and believed it had the wherewithal to deceive India, Sri Lanka and achieve Eelam in an all-out war.

Interested parties tend to forget that the Sri Lankan military fought the LTTE, consisted of almost 100 percent Tamils. Often, they portrayed the conflict as war between the military and Tamil civilians. They bring up atrocities perpetrated by the IPKF in isolation to highlight selected cases such as Maalathy taking her life after being shot in both legs and the Pirambadi massacre in Kokuvil, both incidents in October 1987.

There had been instances of excesses by the Sri Lankan military and the IPKF, no doubt, when fighting a ruthless enemy, like the LTTE. There is no point in denying that. But, the LTTE, after having killed as many as 35,000 Sri Lankan armed forces and police and 1,500 Indians cannot continue to portray themselves as the victims. Those who fled Sri Lanka and secured highly sought after citizenship in the affluent West, while their same Western backers shouldn’t be allowed to exploit the situation to the separatists’ advantage. The LTTE fought well and adopted tactics such as suicide attacks on selected individuals and military targets and there cannot be any dispute over their commitment to the Eelam cause. But, foreigners of Sri Lankan origin have become a nuisance with organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) harassing post-war Sri Lanka.

None of those shedding crocodile tears now for war victims did not bother to issue even a simple statement requesting the LTTE not to depend on Tamil civilian human shields to advance their macabre cause. They remained tight-lipped when the retreating LTTE forced Tamil civilians, living in Vanni west, to accompany them. The LTTE’s action resulted in approximately 300,000 people being trapped in the Mullivaikkal area. That was Velupillai Prabhakaran’s intention to have a human shield to protect his surviving band.

The ITAK stayed silent throughout that period (last phase of the war January to May 2009) while the LTTE took cover behind the civilians. If the ITAK made any interventions on behalf of the people and particularly to save children from forced conscription, leader Shritharan should be able to prove their efforts. The Jaffna district politician can do so in Parliament.

In fact, the UN had been aware of the civilians seeking to flee LTTE held areas at the onset of military operations in the Vanni west. The 57 Division – one of the principal offensive divisions conducting operations on the Vanni west, beginning March 2007, prompted those living in the area to seek refuge in the government held area. Fearing large scale departure of civilians, the LTTE took action to halt secret flight of people. When the LTTE realised some UN workers, too, had been involved in secretly moving people across the lines, Velupillai Prabhakaran ordered action. Except for The Island no other media – both print and electronic – reported the detention of UN workers by the increasingly desperate LTTE.

The UN secretly negotiated for the release of two UN workers held by the Tigers in the Vanni. The Colombo-based UN bigwigs kept the incident under wraps believing that the LTTE would eventually free them.

The UN Headquarters claimed that its Colombo office hadn’t alerted New York about the abduction. An influential section of the Colombo-based diplomatic community strived to resolve the dispute without bringing it to the notice of the government though the incident should have been immediately brought to the notice of the government.

The UN is believed to have brought the incident to the notice of the government several weeks after the unexpected development and the LTTE’s refusal to release the UN workers.

So-called human rights champions (they are also called human rights defenders) remained deaf and dumb during the entire period. Those who accuse the government of death and destruction, at the drop of a hat, turned a convenient Nelsonian eye. The detention of two employees of the world body is a case in point. Until the very end, the LTTE tried to retain the civilian shield at any cost by shooting anyone who tried to flee. Instead of demanding the LTTE to give up civilian shields forthwith, the UN sought to evacuate Velupillai Prabhakaran, his family and a selected group of LTTE families, from the Vanni east. The US had been involved in that project and no less than wartime Navy Commander, the then VA Karannagoda, in his memoirs, published in both Sinhala and English, mentioned the US involvement in the effort.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa had the guts to thwart that plan as well as a US backed joint British-French bid meant to force a ceasefire in April 2009 to save the LTTE. If Western powers really wanted to save Velupillai Prabhakaran and his loved ones, they could have arranged for them to leave Puthumathalan, under ICRC protection. That is the truth. The ICRC evacuated thousands of wounded civilians and their relatives from Vanni east to Pulmoddai where an Indian medical team accepted them. Transfer of Prabhakaran and family, too, from Vanni east to Pulmoddai could have been arranged. The writer was among a small group of journalists taken by the Navy to Mullaitivu seas in late April 2009 (three weeks before Prabhakaran’s death) to observe the ICRC operation.

Let me conclude this article by reproducing a note written by the then Norwegian Ambassador in Colombo to Basil Rajapaksa. The following is the text of the missive dated 16 February, 2009: “I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population now trapped in the LTTE controlled area has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far there has been regrettably no response from the LTTE and it does not seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree to this in the near future.”

The ugly truth is civilians/civilian shields have been an integral part of the overall LTTE defence.

By Shamindra Ferdinando ✍️

All News Advertisement

Features

Power crept into the Sangha and is now tearing it apart

Published

17 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

A file photo of Buddhist monks engaged in a protest

For more than a century, Sri Lankan society has lived with a quiet contradiction at the heart of its religious life. On the one hand, the Buddhist monk is revered as the embodiment of moral discipline, selfrestraint, and renunciation. On the other, the modern monk has become a public figure, political actor, administrator, media personality, and in some cases power broker whose influence extends far beyond the temple. This contradiction has been tolerated, even celebrated, for decades. But recent events, most notably a widely publicised case involving a senior monk accused of grave moral misconduct, have forced the country to confront a painful truth: the institutional conditions that make such scandals possible are not new. They are the predictable outcome of a long historical process that H. L. Seneviratne described with remarkable clarity in The Work of Kings. The moral deterioration visible today is not an aberration. It is the culmination of a centurylong transformation in the identity, function, and authority of the Sangha.

To understand how we arrived at this moment, it is necessary to revisit the argument Seneviratne made nearly three decades ago. His thesis was simple but profound: the modern Sri Lankan monkhood has taken on the ‘work of kings.’ By this he meant that monks, instead of confining themselves to the renunciant life prescribed by the Vinaya, have assumed the secular responsibilities once associated with precolonial kingship, such as protecting the religion, organising society, guiding the nation, and enforcing moral order. This shift, he argued, was not a natural evolution of Buddhist tradition but a modern invention shaped by colonialism, nationalism, and the anxieties of a society struggling to redefine itself in the face of foreign domination. The monk became a symbol of national identity, a guardian of cultural authenticity, and a leader in the struggle for political autonomy. In the process, the boundaries that once separated the monastic from the worldly began to dissolve.

Transformation

The consequences of this transformation were not immediately visible. For decades, the activist monk was celebrated as a patriot, a reformer, and a moral guide. His involvement in education, social welfare, and nationalist mobilisation was seen as a necessary response to colonial pressures and missionary competition. But beneath the surface, the foundations of monastic discipline were slowly eroding. The Vinaya, which had served for centuries as a rigorous framework for regulating monastic life, was increasingly overshadowed by the demands of public engagement. The communal structures that once ensured accountability, senior supervision, collective confession, and the daily rhythms of monastic routine, were weakened by the pressures of modernity. Monks who travelled constantly, managed institutions, or lived independently in urban temples found themselves outside the traditional systems of oversight that had long protected the integrity of the Sangha.

Scandal

It is within this historical context that the recent scandal must be understood. The case shocked the nation not only because of the severity of the allegations but because it shattered the public’s assumption that the monkhood remains a bastion of moral purity. Yet the shock itself reveals a collective denial. For years, Sri Lankan society has been aware, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly—of the growing gap between the ideal of the monk and the realities of modern monastic life. Stories of misconduct, financial irregularities, political manipulation, and abuse of authority have circulated with increasing frequency. But each incident has been treated as an isolated failure, a personal weakness, or an unfortunate exception. What has been missing is recognition that these incidents are symptoms of a deeper structural problem.

Seneviratne’s analysis helps illuminate this problem. When monks take on the work of kings, they inevitably enter domains of power that expose them to temptations the Vinaya was designed to avoid. Handling money, managing institutions, cultivating political patrons, and exercising authority over laypeople create opportunities for ego, ambition, and moral compromise. The monk who becomes a public figure is no longer shielded by the anonymity and humility of the renunciant life. Instead, he becomes a celebrity, a leader, and in some cases an object of uncritical devotion. This elevation brings with it a dangerous form of immunity. Laypeople who revere a monk for his public achievements may hesitate to question his behaviour. Politicians who rely on monastic support may protect him from scrutiny. The media, which often treats monks as moral authorities, may be reluctant to investigate allegations that challenge the sanctity of the robe.

The recent scandal illustrates how these dynamics can converge. The monk at the centre of the case was not an obscure figure. He was a respected preacher, charismatic leader, and head of a prominent institution. His public image was built on years of service, teaching, and community engagement. Yet it was precisely this public stature that allowed him to operate without meaningful oversight. The institutional structures around him, administrators, lay supporters, and junior monks, were either unwilling or unable to challenge his authority. The very qualities that made him a respected figure in the eyes of the public also made him untouchable within his own institution. When allegations finally emerged, they revealed not only personal wrongdoing but a systemic failure of accountability.

Failure that is not unique

This failure is not unique to one temple or one monk. It reflects a broader pattern within the modern Sangha. As monastic institutions have grown in size, wealth, and influence, their internal governance has struggled to keep pace. Many temples operate as semiautonomous entities controlled by a single monk or a small group of monks. Financial transparency is limited, administrative oversight is weak, and the mechanisms for addressing misconduct are often informal or ineffective. The traditional structures of monastic discipline, such as the Sangharama procedures for adjudicating offences, are rarely used in modern contexts, partly because they require collective participation and partly because they are illsuited to the complexities of contemporary institutional life. In practice, this means that monks who wield significant authority can act with little fear of internal sanction.

The politicisation of the Sangha has further complicated matters. Since the midtwentieth century, monks have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral politics, nationalist movements, and public policy debates. This involvement has given them access to political networks that can be mobilised to protect their interests. It has also created a culture in which monks are valued not for their adherence to the Vinaya but for their ability to influence public opinion, mobilise voters, or lend moral legitimacy to political causes. In such an environment, the monk who is politically useful may be shielded from criticism, while the monk who adheres strictly to the renunciant ideal may find himself marginalised or ignored.

The result is a profound distortion of monastic identity. The monk who once sought liberation from worldly attachments is now encouraged to cultivate influence, authority, and public recognition. The monk who once lived under the strict supervision of senior elders now operates in a world where independence is celebrated and oversight is minimal. The monk who once relied on laypeople for basic sustenance now controls vast resources, manages institutions, and commands the loyalty of thousands of followers. This inversion of traditional roles has created a fertile ground for moral deterioration.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this deterioration as evidence that the Sangha as a whole is corrupt. Many monks continue to live lives of remarkable discipline, humility, and spiritual dedication. In remote forest monasteries, small village temples, and meditation centres across the country, monks quietly uphold the ancient ideals of the renunciant life. They are not the ones who appear on television, lead political rallies, or manage large institutions. Their work is invisible, their influence subtle, and their commitment unwavering. The crisis facing the Sangha today is not a crisis of individual morality but a crisis of institutional identity. It is the product of a centurylong transformation that has blurred the boundaries between the monastic and the secular, the spiritual and the political, the renunciant and the worldly.

If Sri Lanka is to address this crisis, it must begin by acknowledging the structural nature of the problem. The temptation to treat each scandal as an isolated incident must be resisted. Instead, the country must confront the uncomfortable reality that the modern configuration of monastic life is fundamentally at odds with the principles of the Vinaya. The Sangha cannot simultaneously function as a political force, a social service provider, a media institution, and a spiritual community without compromising its integrity. The more monks are drawn into the world, the more vulnerable they become to the moral dangers that the Buddha warned against.

Reform, therefore, must focus not only on punishing individual offenders but on rethinking the institutional structures that enable misconduct. This includes strengthening internal governance, enhancing financial transparency, restoring the authority of senior elders, and reestablishing the communal practices that once ensured accountability. It also requires a broader cultural shift in how laypeople relate to monks. Blind devotion must give way to informed respect. Reverence must be balanced with responsibility. The robe must be honoured, but it must not be used as a shield against scrutiny.

Seneviratne’s work offers a valuable starting point for this rethinking. His analysis reminds us that the crisis facing the Sangha is not the result of moral decline alone but of historical forces that reshaped the identity of the monkhood. By tracing the evolution of the activist monk, he shows how the Sangha became entangled in the political and social structures of the modern nationstate. This entanglement has brought both benefits and dangers. It has allowed monks to play important roles in education, social welfare, and national development. But it has also exposed them to the corrupting influences of power, wealth, and public acclaim.

The challenge now is to disentangle the Sangha from these influences without undermining its ability to serve society. This will not be easy. The activist monk has become deeply embedded in the cultural and political fabric of the country. Many laypeople expect monks to be leaders, reformers, and guardians of national identity. Politicians rely on monastic support to legitimise their agendas. Media institutions depend on monks for content, commentary, and moral authority. Reversing this trend will require a collective effort from monks, laypeople, and political leaders alike.

Ultimately, the future of the Sangha depends on its ability to reclaim the renunciant ideal that lies at the heart of Buddhist monasticism. This does not mean withdrawing from society entirely, but it does mean reestablishing the boundaries that protect the monk from the dangers of worldly involvement. It means recognising that the true strength of the Sangha lies not in its political influence or institutional power but in its moral authority, its spiritual discipline, and its commitment to the path of liberation. The recent scandal, painful as it is, may serve as a catalyst for this reevaluation. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern monastic system and forced the country to confront the consequences of a centurylong transformation.

To understand how the Vihara Devalegam Act relates to the perceived moral deformation of the clergy, it is necessary to examine how property management, state law, and monastic discipline intersect in the modern era. Historically stemming from the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No. 19 of 1931, this act serves as the primary legal framework governing the ‘temporalities’—meaning the secular wealth, extensive landholdings, and material donations belonging to Buddhist temples and shrines. While ancient kings granted these vast tracts of land to support the monkhood’s spiritual pursuits, the modern codification of this law has inadvertently fostered a system where property rights frequently supersede spiritual accountability.

The core of the crisis lies in the commercialisation of the monastic order that this legal framework enables. By treating temple lands as economic assets and vesting absolute administrative power in individual chief monks or lay trustees, the act has contributed to the rise of what critics term a monastic middle class. Access to vast, unregulated financial resources, rent from lands, and corporate donations has fundamentally shifted the focus of certain segments of the clergy away from the traditional path of worldly renunciation and spiritual guidance. Instead, it has driven a preoccupation with business investments, the accumulation of private capital, and luxury lifestyles, which deeply alienates a public looking to the Sangha for moral leadership.

The institutional flaws embedded in the Vihara Devalegam Act find a stark, real-world manifestation in the recent criminal case involving Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana Thero. As the chief priest of Anuradhapura and the custodian of the Atamasthana—the eight highly venerated Buddhist shrines, including the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi—Hemarathana Thero occupied one of the most powerful and wealthy positions within the Sri Lankan Sangha. His arrest on charges of sexual abuse of a minor girl perfectly illustrates how the structural defects of the Act facilitate not only moral decay but also the systemic obstruction of justice.

The core of this intersection lies in the vast, unaccountable wealth generated by the temporalities of the Anuradhapura shrines. Under the Vihara Devalegam Act, the chief custodian exercises immense, virtually unchecked control over temple revenues, state-backed land management, and millions of rupees in daily donations from millions of global pilgrims. It is precisely this immense financial liquidity that enabled the alleged deployment of vast sums of money to the victim’s family.

Furthermore, the situation underscores the profound policy failures cited regarding the helplessness of the monastic hierarchy and state enforcement. When child protection authorities initially attempted to act, the National Child Protection Authority noted severe delays and institutional resistance, stating they practically had to force the police to execute the arrest. The monk’s immediate retreat to a private hospital in Colombo upon the advancement of the criminal probe, followed by his release on bail, mirrors the exact loop described where wealthy monastics deploy high-priced legal defence teams funded directly or indirectly by their institutional positions. Because the Vihara Devalegam Act does not provide a mechanism for the immediate, unconditional forfeiture of temporal administrative rights upon a criminal indictment, the accused retains his structural power throughout the legal process. The Pallegama Thero scandal stands as definitive proof that without a fundamental overhaul of how temple wealth is legally governed and disciplined, the material benefits guaranteed by ancient temporalities will continue to shield the worst elements of moral deformation from the rule of law.

If Sri Lanka can learn from this moment and if it can recognise the structural roots of the crisis and commit to meaningful reform, then the Sangha may yet emerge stronger, more disciplined, and more faithful to its ancient ideals. But if the country continues to treat each scandal as an isolated failure and if it continues to ignore the deeper institutional problems that Seneviratne identified, then the moral deterioration we see today will only deepen. The work of kings, when performed by monks, carries a heavy price. It is time to decide whether that price is worth paying.

by Professor Amarasiri de Silva

Features

Kondachchi wind farm and battery storage project to boost energy security, says Power Ministry Secretary

Published

17 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

The Power and Energy Ministry’s drive towards energy security and renewable energy expansion received a major boost yesterday with the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement for the development of the 150 MW Kondachchi Wind Power Project and an integrated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Mannar.

The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Power auditorium under the patronage of Power Minister Anura Karunatilaka and Deputy Power Minister Arkam Ilyas.

Speaking at the event, Ministry Secretary G. M. R. D. Aponsu described the project as a transformative investment that would strengthen the country’s electricity network while supporting Sri Lanka’s transition towards cleaner energy sources.

“The Kondachchi Wind Power Project represents a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s renewable energy journey. By combining large-scale wind generation with advanced battery energy storage technology, we are creating a more resilient and reliable power system capable of meeting future energy demands while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Aponsu said.

The project will be developed at Silavathurai in the Kondachchi area of Mannar on lands owned by the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation. It is expected to utilise some 31 modern wind turbines with a total installed capacity of at least 150 MW.

Aponsu said the inclusion of an integrated battery storage facility would help address the variability associated with wind power generation and ensure stable electricity supply to the national grid.

“The battery energy storage component is a key feature of this project. It will enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the grid and enhance overall system stability, which is essential as Sri Lanka increases the share of renewables in its energy mix,” he said.

According to the Ministry, the wind farm is expected to generate nearly 525 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, significantly reducing the country’s expenditure on imported fuel and strengthening national energy security.

The project is also expected to contribute to Sri Lanka’s climate commitments by reducing carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 372,750 tonnes annually.

“This investment delivers both economic and environmental benefits. It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support sustainable development objectives and help Sri Lanka move closer to achieving its renewable energy and climate targets,” Aponsu noted.

The project will be implemented under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement using the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) model. The Asian Development Bank is providing technical and financial advisory support through its Transaction Advisory Services programme.

The signing ceremony was attended by Pradeep Perera, Chairman of the National System Operator (Pvt) Ltd., and Takeyo Koike, Head of Market Development and Public-Private Partnership Division of the ADB, among other distinguished guests.

The Ministry said comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments and avifaunal studies have been undertaken to ensure minimal impacts on bird populations, nearby communities and agricultural lands. A dedicated 220-kilovolt transmission system will also be constructed to connect the project to the national grid.

“The Kondachchi Wind Farm is a strategic national project that will help secure Sri Lanka’s energy future while accelerating the country’s transition towards sustainable and affordable electricity generation,” Aponsu said.

Energy sector experts view the project as one of the most important renewable energy initiatives currently being pursued in Sri Lanka, combining utility-scale wind generation with modern energy storage technology to enhance grid reliability and long-term energy sustainability.

By Ifham Nizam

Features

Saudi Arabia sets new benchmark in Hajj management as 1.7 million pilgrims complete sacred journey

Published

17 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

Ambassador Al-Kahtani

Interview with Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka

Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its unparalleled capacity to manage one of the world’s largest annual religious gatherings, with this year’s Hajj pilgrimage concluding successfully despite extreme temperatures and the immense logistical challenge of accommodating more than 1.7 million pilgrims from around the world.

In an exclusive interview with The Island, Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka, described the 2026 Hajj season as a resounding success, crediting the achievement to the visionary leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the coordinated efforts of multiple government agencies working around the clock to serve pilgrims.

The Ambassador noted that nearly 3,500 Sri Lankan pilgrims participated in this year’s Hajj under the quota allocated to Sri Lanka, benefiting from enhanced healthcare services, sophisticated crowd-management systems, expanded shaded areas and cutting-edge digital solutions introduced by the Kingdom.

With Saudi Arabia continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure, technology and pilgrim services under Vision 2030, Ambassador Al-Kahtani said the Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that pilgrims from around the world perform their religious duties in safety, comfort and tranquility.

The Saudi envoy also highlighted the growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, emphasising expanding cooperation not only in Hajj affairs but also in trade, investment, education, culture and institutional exchanges.

Following are excerpts of the interview:

Q: How do you assess this year’s Hajj season?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: This year’s Hajj season was a resounding success, thanks to the Almighty Allah and the integrated efforts of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. This success was reflected in the efficiency of crowd management, the quality of services provided to the Hajj pilgrims and the effective coordination among the various relevant authorities, which enabled pilgrims to perform their rituals in an atmosphere of security, tranquility and ease.

Q: How many Sri Lankan pilgrims performed Hajj this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The number of Hajj pilgrims from the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka reached approximately 3,500, within the quota allocated to Sri Lanka for this season.

Q: Are there any discussions regarding increasing Sri Lanka’s quota in the future?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:Hajj quotas are determined according to approved regulatory mechanisms that take into account a range of considerations. The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continue to study various aspects related to developing Hajj services and accommodating the allocated numbers for all countries, in coordination with the concerned parties.

Q: What were the most prominent special arrangements implemented this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The operational plans for this season focused on enhancing the safety and comfort of the Hajj pilgrims, especially given the climatic conditions and high temperatures. Measures included expanding shaded areas, increasing water distribution points and enhancing health and ambulance services, in addition to developing the transportation system and traffic management within the holy sites.

Q: What are the most prominent digital systems and smart services that were provided?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:The Kingdom continues to implement its digital transformation objectives for the Hajj and Umrah system. The scope of electronic services offered through the Nusuk platform and application has been expanded, along with the development of digital systems for issuing permits, managing crowds, guidance and health services. This contributes to increasing the efficiency of services and improving the pilgrim’s experience at all stages of their journey.

Q: How were the challenges of overcrowding and heat addressed?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities adopted an integrated crowd-management system based on modern technologies and real-time data analysis. This was coupled with intensified health-awareness campaigns, expanded organised movement routes and increased deployment of field, medical and emergency teams. These measures support the safety of the Hajj pilgrims and reduce the risks associated with crowd density and climatic conditions.

Q: Were there special services for the elderly and sick?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Yes. The Kingdom paid special attention to the elderly and people with special health needs by providing specialized medical services, assistive transportation and facilities equipped to meet their needs, in addition to field teams working to provide humanitarian support and necessary healthcare throughout the Hajj period.

Q: How successful was the Kingdom in combating irregular Hajj permits?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continued to rigorously implement the regulations and instructions governing Hajj, utilising modern technologies and advanced monitoring procedures to reduce violations related to irregular Hajj. These efforts contributed to enhancing the safety of pilgrims, improving crowd-management efficiency and maintaining the smooth flow of movement within the holy sites.

Q: How would you describe Saudi-Sri Lankan cooperation in organising Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka is characterised by continuous and constructive coordination in all matters related to Hajj. The relevant authorities in both countries work jointly to ensure the provision of the best services for Sri Lankan pilgrims and enable them to perform their rituals with ease and peace of mind.

Q: How many Hajj pilgrims were there globally, and what were the main challenges?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: According to official statistics, the number of Hajj pilgrims this year reached 1,707,301 from various countries around the world. The main challenges included managing large crowds, ensuring public safety and providing health, transportation and accommodation services within a specific geographical and temporal scope. These challenges were addressed through advanced and integrated operational plans, which contributed to the smooth and successful completion of the Hajj season.

Q: Are there any future expansion projects?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The Kingdom continues to implement strategic development projects within the framework of Vision 2030, including developing the infrastructure in Makkah and the Holy Sites, and enhancing transportation networks and smart services. This contributes to raising the quality of services provided to pilgrims and Umrah performers and improving their long-term experience.

Q: How are Saudi-Sri Lankan relations strengthened outside the context of Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka are witnessing continuous development in many areas, including political, economic, trade, cultural and educational cooperation, in addition to developing exchanges between institutions and the private sector. This reflects the two countries’ keenness to strengthen the bilateral partnership and achieve common interests.

Q: What message would you like to convey to Sri Lankan Muslims?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: We extend our sincere congratulations to the Hajj pilgrims who have completed their Hajj rituals, and we ask Almighty Allah to accept their pilgrimage. We also assure Muslims in Sri Lanka that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places serving the Two Holy Mosques and the guests of Almighty Allah at the forefront of its priorities and continues to develop the Hajj and Umrah system to achieve the highest standards of quality and safety.

By Ifham Nizam