One of the well-known benefits of reading is that you can get enormous fun from what you read. Many great writers have written funny or entertaining or even stimulating pieces of great literature. But you will have to be introduced to famous works as, although you are students of English, no-one will trouble themselves to explain, show or bring these works to your attention. So read on…

Charles Dickens lived in Victorian London. He has written many amusing pieces in his “Pickwick Papers.” He describes the adventures of Mr Pickwick, and describes Mr Pecksniff and even the snuff and drinking habits of dear old Sairy Gamp who attends to the recently dead and prepares them for sending to the mortuary. These are just two of the many characters found in “Pickwick Papers” (The amazing adventures of the Pickwick Club.) These Pickwick Papers were very popular only a generation or two ago. His colourful descriptions allow our imaginations to conjure up vivid Victorian London scenes. Life in the villages of England was very difficult and everyone thought London was a paradise for work, food and good beer! Everyone eagerly bought Pickwick Papers to learn more of the Pickwick Club and events in London, that dream destination for all English villagers.

No-one will introduce you to Longfellow’s “The Pied Piper of Hamelin.” This poem is based on an old legend. It was said that a plague of rats was running wild in a small town in Germany about 800 years ago. The Pied Piper came and rid the town of rats. He did this for a fee, a good reward, but then was denied payment by the Mayor who had commissioned him to remove the rats. The revenge of the Pied Piper on the town is quite shocking. Longfellow’s powerful descriptions on the several scenes of dramatic action make this poem a charming piece of English literature.

William Wordsworth’s “Daffodils” is a most powerfully evocative poem with words carefully chosen to describe what he saw. The writing is when he viewed thousands of bright yellow daffodils dancing in the breeze (gentle wind) creating a great vista for his viewing, which remained with him and brought pleasure to him in quiet moments. This is the English language waiting for all students to explore.

There are plenty of dismal, turgid writings about historical injustice and brutality by colonisers to countless oppressed people around the world – such writers have a valid message but here we want to introduce a pleasant reading matter that elevates the reader to gain pleasant satisfaction and new good ideas from what he reads. There are many wonderful stories and great writers waiting for the reader to discover many beautiful writings that will make him or her happy.

William Henry Davis, a Welshman and vagrant wanderer, wrote a most charming, beautiful poem: “What is this Life if Full of Care?” He writes about how he regrets that we humans are always in a hurry, too busy to notice or see the delights of nature, and scenes of natural beauty, e.g., a young woman’s smile as she passes by; we have no time to make friends and even kiss her. Regrets!

This is the real English to be tasted and then swigged at lustily in pleasure and satisfaction, not some writing airing historical grievances for children to study!

Priyantha Hettige

(Continued from yesterday)

Wharton Budget Model Analysis

The Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM), a nonpartisan research initiative that analyses the economic impact of public policies, has conducted a detailed assessment of Trump’s tariff plan. Their findings paint an even more concerning picture of the long-term economic consequences.

According to PWBM’s analysis, Trump’s tariffs (as of April 8, 2025) are projected to reduce long-run GDP by approximately 6% and wages by 5%. For perspective, this represents a more severe economic impact than would result from raising the corporate income tax from 21% to 36%, a change that would be considered highly distortionary by most economists. For a middle-income household, these tariffs translate to an estimated $22,000 lifetime loss in economic welfare.

The PWBM analysis highlights that many existing trade and macroeconomic models fail to capture the full harm caused by tariffs. Beyond their direct effects on prices and trade volumes, larger tariffs reduce the openness of the economy, including international capital flows. This is particularly problematic in the context of the United States’ current debt trajectory, which is increasing faster than GDP. As foreign purchases of U.S. government debt decline due to reduced trade, American households must absorb more of this debt, diverting savings away from productive capital investment.

While the Trump administration has emphasised the revenue-generating potential of these tariffs, projected at $5.2 trillion over ten years on a conventional basis, the PWBM notes that this revenue comes at an extraordinarily high cost in terms of economic efficiency. The tariffs effectively function as a highly distortionary tax that reduces economic activity far more than alternative revenue-raising measures would.

Disruption of Global Supply Chains

Beyond these macroeconomic projections lies the complex reality of global supply chains that have been optimised over decades of increasing trade integration. Modern manufacturing rarely occurs entirely within a single country; instead, components and intermediate goods often cross borders multiple times before a final product is assembled. The sudden imposition of high tariffs disrupts these carefully calibrated production networks, forcing companies to make costly adjustments or pass increased costs on to consumers.

Industries particularly vulnerable to these disruptions include electronics, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and textiles sectors, where production is highly fragmented across countries. For example, a smartphone might include components from dozens of countries, each potentially subject to different tariff rates under Trump’s country-specific approach. This complexity makes it extremely difficult for businesses to quickly adapt to the new tariff landscape, leading to production inefficiencies, higher costs, and potential shortages of certain goods.

Retaliatory Measures and Trade Policy Uncertainty

The impact of Trump’s tariffs is further magnified by retaliatory measures from affected countries. China has already responded by imposing a minimum 125% tariff on U.S. goods and restricting exports of rare earth elements critical to high-tech industries. The European Union, Canada, Mexico, and other major trading partners have also announced or are considering countermeasures.

These retaliatory tariffs create a negative feedback loop that further reduces global trade and economic activity. They also contribute to what economists call “trade policy uncertainty”, a measurable phenomenon that has been shown to depress investment, hiring, and consumption as businesses and households delay economic decisions in the face of unpredictable policy changes.

By the end of March 2025, the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index had reached its highest point since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, doubling in value from the start of January. Research suggests that this level of uncertainty alone could reduce business investment by approximately 4.4% in 2025, even before accounting for the direct effects of the tariffs themselves.

Disproportionate Impact on Developing Economies

While the economic costs of Trump’s tariffs will be felt globally, they will not be distributed equally. Developing economies, particularly those that have built their development strategies around export-oriented manufacturing, face disproportionate risks.

Unlike wealthy nations with diverse economies and substantial domestic markets, many developing countries rely heavily on exports to generate foreign exchange, create jobs, and drive economic growth. The sudden imposition of high tariffs on their exports to the world’s largest consumer market represents an existential threat to this development model.

Moreover, developing countries typically have fewer resources to cushion the economic shock of reduced exports. Limited fiscal space, higher borrowing costs, and often fragile social safety nets mean that job losses in export sectors can quickly translate into broader economic hardship and potential social instability.

For countries already facing debt sustainability challenges, like Sri Lanka, the reduction in export earnings can directly threaten their ability to service external debt obligations, potentially triggering new sovereign debt crises. This risk is particularly acute given the current global environment of higher interest rates and tightening financial conditions.

The global economic impact of Trump’s tariffs thus represents not merely a temporary disruption to trade flows but potentially a fundamental challenge to the export-led development model that has helped lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty over recent decades. As we will explore in subsequent sections, Sri Lanka’s experience offers a particularly illuminating case study of these broader dynamics.

SRI LANKA’S ECONOMY AND TRADE PROFILE

Sri Lanka, an island nation of 22 million people in South Asia, presents a compelling case study of how President Trump’s tariff policies can impact vulnerable developing economies. To understand the full implications of the 44% tariff imposed on Sri Lankan goods, it is essential to first examine the country’s economic situation, its trade relationship with the United States, and the particular significance of its textile industry.

Overview of Sri Lanka’s Economic Situation

Sri Lanka has experienced a tumultuous economic journey in recent years. In April 2022, the country became the first in the Asia-Pacific region to default on its external debt since 1999, marking the culmination of a severe economic crisis that had been building for several years. This crisis was precipitated by a perfect storm of factors, the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on tourism revenues and remittances, rising global commodity prices following supply chain disruptions and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and questionable economic policies, including significant tax cuts that depleted government revenues.

The economic implosion led to extreme shortages of essential goods, rolling blackouts that sometimes lasted 13 hours, and long queues for fuel and cooking gas. Inflation soared to over 70% at its peak, eroding purchasing power and pushing many Sri Lankans into poverty. The crisis triggered mass protests that ultimately led to the resignation of then-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in July 2022.

Since then, Sri Lanka has embarked on a painful process of economic stabilization under its 17th program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The $2.9 billion Extended Fund Facility approved in March 2023 came with stringent conditions, including significant tax increases, reductions in energy subsidies, and other austerity measures designed to reduce the fiscal deficit. The country has also undergone a complex debt restructuring process, reaching agreements with official creditors through the Paris Club and with bondholders who own a significant portion of Sri Lanka’s external debt.

By December 2024, Sri Lanka officially exited sovereign default status after completing its debt restructuring. However, the country’s economic recovery remains fragile. While inflation has moderated and foreign exchange reserves have improved from their crisis lows, GDP growth remains subdued, and the social costs of adjustment have been severe. Poverty rates have increased substantially, and many Sri Lankans continue to struggle with the high cost of living and limited economic opportunities.

Against this backdrop of recent crisis and tentative recovery, the sudden imposition of President Trump’s 44% tariff represents a significant new threat to Sri Lanka’s economic stability and growth prospects.

Sri Lanka-US Trade Relations

The United States has historically been Sri Lanka’s largest export market, accounting for approximately 23% of the country’s total exports. This makes Sri Lanka particularly vulnerable to changes in U.S. trade policy, as nearly a quarter of its foreign exchange earnings through exports depend on continued access to the American market.

The composition of Sri Lanka’s exports to the United States is heavily concentrated in a few key sectors, with textiles and apparel dominating the trade relationship.

Other significant export categories include rubber products, tea, spices, and increasingly, information technology services—though the latter are not directly affected by the tariffs on physical goods.

Sri Lanka has benefited from preferential access to the U.S. market through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which provides duty-free treatment for thousands of products from designated developing countries. However, this program has been subject to periodic reviews based on criteria including labor rights, intellectual property protection, and market access for U.S. goods. Sri Lanka’s GSP benefits were temporarily suspended between 2010 and 2017 due to concerns about labour rights, highlighting the country’s vulnerability to changes in U.S. trade policy even before the current tariff shock.

The trade relationship between the two countries is highly asymmetrical. While the United States is Sri Lanka’s largest export market, Sri Lanka ranks only around 114th among U.S. trading partners. This power imbalance means that Sri Lanka has very limited leverage in bilateral trade negotiations and is largely a price-taker in the relationship.

(To be continued)

(The writer served as the Minister of Justice, Finance and Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka)

Disclaimer:

This article contains projections and scenario-based analysis based on current economic trends, policy statements, and historical behaviour patterns. While every effort has been made to ensure factual accuracy using publicly available data and established economic models, certain details, particularly regarding future policy decisions and their impacts, remain hypothetical. These projections are intended to inform discussion and analysis, not to predict outcomes with certainty.

by M. U. M. Ali Sabry
President’s Counsel

I. Imminent Danger

While the economy of Sri Lanka has achieved some degree of stabilisation after the most dire crisis in history, progress along a growth trajectory remains a clear imperative. Fragility of the current situation has been massively increased by the devastating tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration, making our country’s exports to the United States – especially apparel and rubber products – starkly vulnerable.

Against this backdrop the GSP+ facility, affording preferential access to the vast markets of the European Union, becomes a lifeline for our exports. Exemption from import duty for a wide array of products involves an advantage of immense value.

This is, however,neither a right nor an entitlement, and its availability is by no means assured in perpetuity. Its continued enjoyment is conditional upon compliance with provisions contained in 27 treaties, principally the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. Aspects of this have been incorporated into the domestic legal system of Sri Lanka, by legislation in the drafting of which,as Minister of Export Development and International Trade, I played a key role in 2007.

GSP+ privileges for Sri Lanka are now coming up for review, with a delegation from Brussels expected to arrive very shortly.

One of Sri Lanka’s abiding commitments is a fundamental modification of the Online Safety Act, No. 9 of 2024, an unforgiving onslaught on media freedom, which was vehemently opposed by political parties across the spectrum, and representatives of the media and civil society. Despite the outrageous contents of the Act, no action whatever has been taken up to now, to amend this legislation. There is no doubt that this situation, if it is allowed to continue, will gravely impede vital interests in respect of our international trade. Certainly, the government’s professed intention of enhancing the value of exports to the European Union to the threshold of 3.6 billion dollars in the short term, will be reduced to a fanciful expectation.It is, therefore, a matter of urgent practical importance to identify the most obnoxious features of the law and to set in motion the legislative procedures necessary to effect their repeal or radical reform.

II. Overbroad Definition of Offences

A defect going to the very root of the legislation is a definition which is strikingly vague and overbroad: “Any person, whether in or outside Sri Lanka, who poses a threat to national security, public health or public order or promotes feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of people, by communicating a false statement, commits an offence” (Section 12).

The central criterion itself is an attack on basic democratic values. There has been judicial recognition of the reality that “Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” (New York Times vs. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 at p. 270 – 1 (1964). The solution, in a democratic culture, is not suppression but refutation of falsehood through enhanced engagement and challenge.

The central objection is to the use of subjective language like “ill-will” and “hostility” as elements of the definition of a penal offence carrying condign penalties, including long periods of rigorous imprisonment. Inherent vagueness leads to unpredictability of consequences.

Equally compelling considerations apply to the use of “national security” as a lever for restraint on expression and publication. Public policy, as set out in the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (Preamble to UN Document E/CN 4/1996/39), adopted on 1 October 1995, emphasises the need “to discourage governments from using the pretext of national security to place unjustified restrictions on the exercise of freedom of speech and expression”.

It is the absence of necessary qualification that violates the basic ethos of a democratic society.A “threat” to national security, public health or public order as the basis of restriction on free speech and communication is unacceptable without essential limitation.The internationally accepted test of “clear and present danger”(Schenk vs. U.S. 249 U.S. 247 at p.52 (1919)) is in no way reflected as a qualifying element in the Sri Lankan legislation.

III. Overarching Authority of the Commission

The crux of the pivotal offence is a “false statement”. The truth or falsity of the statement complained of, is a matter to be determined at the untrammelled discretion of the Online Safety Commission, the central authority created by the law. It is composed of 5 members appointed by the President,with the concurrence of the Constitutional Council.

A vital circumstance is that members of the Online Safety Commission, unlike the membership of other independent Commissions established under the Constitution, are not recommended for appointment by the Constitutional Council. The initiative is that of the President, not the Constitutional Council, the function of the latter being confined to “approval” (Section 5 (1)). This is a marked, and in principle unacceptable, departure from the pattern of constitutional provisions governing the appointment of independent Commissions.

This difference of approach undeniably impacts public perceptions regarding performance of the Commission’s functions in a spirit of total independence – a result much to be regretted, in view of the awesome sweep of powers conferred on the Commission. These include the prohibition, by mere fiat of the Commission,of statements pertaining to a diversity of matters such as physical security,ethnic and religious harmony,disaffection to the State, personal wellbeing and privacy, and interference with the right of association.

In any event, given the invasion of seminal rights and freedoms as the direct consequence of exercise of the Commission’s powers, it is reasonable to assume the desirability of a process of consultation which would include, among others, internet service providers, internet intermediaries, and representatives of media organisations, as well as the professional, business and academic communities.

Incompatibility of scope and objectives of this Act with the irreducible norms of a functioning democracy is clear from judicial pronouncements of impeccable authority: “The freedom of speech and expression is one which cannot be denied without violating those principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions” (Mark Fernando J. in Amaratunga v. Sirimal, The Jana Ghose Case, S.C. Application No. 468/92).

The reality of this danger is reinforced by implications of the definition of a “false statement”, the anchor of criminal liability in terms of the Act: “A ‘false statement’ means a statement that is known or believed by the maker to be incorrect or untrue and is made especially with the intent to deceive or mislead but does not include a caution, an opinion or imputation made in good faith” (section 52). The manner of formulation suggests that the concluding phrase is in the nature of an exception from criminal liability, the burden of proof in this regard falling on the shoulders of the accused. In practice, this is an intolerably onerous burden.

In sum, the behemoth of the Commission is destructive of the foundations of civil liberty.

IV. Remoteness of Causal Nexus

One of the reasons why the law is indefensibly wide in its operation is the imposition of criminal liability for consequences which are not proximately linked to the conduct of the accused.It is declared to be an offence to communicate “a false statement which gives provocation to any person or incites any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation or incitement will cause the offence of rioting to be committed” (section 14).

In the envisaged situation, rioting is committed by a third party. Criminal liability on the part of the person communicating through an online account or online location, is grounded solely in assumed knowledge of likely behaviour of the third party. Indeed, criminal liability of the communicator is established, even when the consequence of rioting does not take place at all, the only difference being reduction of sentence (section 14 (f)). Similarly, the communicator of the statement is held criminally responsible for disturbance of a religious assembly, with no clear nexus being insisted upon between the act of the accused and the rioting which takes place (section 15)).

The net of criminal liability is cast far too wide by this approach, the lack of a sufficiently clear causal nexus being the underlying defect.

V. Expanding Frontiers of Criminalisation

A prominent feature of the Online Safety Act is the indiscriminate use of criminal sanctions to attain its objectives. A wide range of offences is created by Part III of the legislation. Many of these are of amorphous scope, lacking in precise definition of constituent elements – for example, “wantonly” giving provocation by a false statement to cause riot (section 14), “voluntarily” causing disturbance to a religious assembly (section 15) and “malicious” communication of a false statement to outrage religious feelings (section 16). The ambit of the offence against “public tranquillity” (section 19) is equally unclear. These are all offences which carry deterrent sentences of imprisonment, in one case for up to 3 years and in the other for a maximum of 7 years, in addition to, or as an alternative to, a substantial fine.

The Commission, on satisfaction that an offence has been committed under the Act, is empowered to “take steps to initiate criminal proceedings in terms of s. 136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 15 of 1979” (section 38(2)). Moreover, every offence established by the Act is characterised as a non-cognisable offence within the meaning of the laws governing criminal procedure (section 43(a)).

Penal consequences of daunting severity are visited upon bodies corporate. Every director or other principal officer is held criminally responsible (section 44(a)). If the offender is a firm, criminal liability is imposed on every partner of the firm (section 44(b)) and, in the case of an unincorporated body, “every individual who is a controlling member and every principal officer responsible for management and control” (section 44(c)) is exposed to criminal sanctions. Lack of knowledge or exercise of due diligence is recognised as an exculpatory circumstance but, in keeping with general evidentiary principles, the burden of proof in this regard is borne by the accused.

VI. Chilling Effect of the Law

The core of the statute resides in the powers vested in the Commission, to apply an extensive range of measures to deal with “prohibited statements” (Part II). These include orders “to stop the communication of such statements” (section 11 (b)), “to disable access to an online location” (section 11 (c)) and to direct removal of prohibited statements (section 11 (e)). A worrying factor is the absence of a proper definition of “prohibited statements”, the purported definition consisting merely of a reference to the provisions which use the phrase (section 52).

When the Commission is satisfied that a “prohibited statement” has been made, its coercive powers which come into play, are of a drastic nature. These extend to the authority to issue a notice to the communicator of the statement, ordering the adoption of measures to prevent circulation (section 23 (f)). This renders applicable the draconian provision that the recipient of the notice “shall comply with such notice immediately but not later than 24 hours from such notice” (section 23 (b) and (f)). Failure results in criminal proceedings in a Magistrate’s Court (section 23 (g)).

The Commission has power to name an online location as a “declared online location” if 3 or more prohibited statements have been communicated on that location to end users in Sri Lanka (section 28 (i)). An internet service provider or an internet intermediary, on the making of such a declaration by the Commission, is obliged to cease communication instantly on pain of imprisonment for a term of up to 7 years or a maximum fine of 10 million rupees, the penalty being doubled in the event of a subsequent offence (section 29 (6)).

Especially in light of the broad definition of “inauthentic online account”, “internet service provider”, “internet intermediary” and “internet intermediary service” (section 52), the chilling effect of the law is evident.

It is hardly surprising, then, that prominent internet and technology companies active in Sri Lanka, in their response to the legislation, have sounded a strong note of caution, even indicating the risk of withdrawal from their operations in our country.

The Asian Internet Coalition (AIC) which consists of 13 companies of international stature, commenting on this legislation when it was in Bill form, declared: “Despite our commitment to constructive collaboration, the AIC has not been privy to proposed amendments to the Bill. We unequivocally stand by our position that the Online Safety Bill, in its current form, is unworkable and would undermine potential growth and direct foreign investment into Sri Lanka’s digital economy. We firmly believe that for the Bill to align with global best practices, extensive revisions are imperative” (Emergency Media Statement of 23 January 2024).

This can hardly be disregarded in cavalier fashion.As the government has emphatically acknowledged, digitalization and other technology innovations are central to current plans for economic development and, of equal importance, for ensuring equitable distribution of the benefits of progress. Swift and ready access to market information – be it for farmers, the fishing community, manufacturers of industrial products, providers of services and the small and medium sector in particular – is an indispensable requirement for the success of current strategies. If companies of the calibre of Facebook, Google,X,Apple,Amazon,Cloudflare and Yahoo,contemplate discontinuation of their services because of the oppressive character of the law, economic development, far from being advanced, is certain to be retarded.

VII. The Need for Imperative Change

Parliament debated the Online Safety Bill for 2 full days on 23 and 24 February 2024. Pervasive deficiencies of the law were convincingly identified during this rich and rewarding debate. No one was more forthright than the current Prime Minister, Dr. Harini Amarasuriya, at that time speaking from the ranks of the Opposition, in her unreserved condemnation of the Bill and her strident call for its withdrawal: “The intent of the Government is clear. It is about controlling dissent; it is about taking control of public discourse or public narrative at a crucial time in this country when democracy needs to be protected at all costs. That every instrument is gong to be used to stifle dissent, is very clear” (Hansard of 24 January 2024, Column 224).

The Online Safety Act stands as a monument to illiberalism and as an anchor of State apparatus infringing the substance of civil liberty. Its removal from the statute laws of our country is a dire necessity, no longer to be delayed.

By Professor G. L. Peiris
D. Phil. (Oxford), Ph. D.
(Sri Lanka);
Rhodes Scholar,Quondam Visiting Fellow of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London;
Former Vice-Chancellor and Emeritus Professor of Law of the University of Colombo.