Connect with us

Features

Attempted Coup d’etat 1962

Published

on

by A. Patabendige

This year is the 60th anniversary of the notorious attempted coup d’etat in SL. Jayantha Somasunderam and DBS Jeyraj have attempted to revive media interest in it for whatever reason. It would otherwise have been forgotten. Some facts however appear to be distorted even now.

Their combined efforts refer to it as a gentlemen’s attempted coup by a few army and police officers and some cunning civilians, all who were apparently from ‘elitist’ back grounds. If ‘elite’ means the best of society or best people probably only Col FC de Saram would qualify. Most of the others, if not all, were from fairly ordinary middle class background. Most of them were getting a measly Government salary. An army captain then would have got Rs 525.00 monthly, hardly an elitist income. This would be probably more than that of an ASP in the police.

Those involved, less three, were non Buddhists which was not mentioned by the above two writers. That the plotters were representative of religious and racial minorities that were about 15 % of the population may have been the glue that bonded them to fiddle with treason.

The overt reasons for the attempt coup has been given as dissatisfaction with the government due to widespread strikes and protests, ill discipline and general deterioration of the administration of the country. However the emphasis of the government on the inexorable rise of the Sinhala language and increasing influence of Buddhist clergy must have been the real tipping point. The plotters may have felt that their pre-eminence in government service was threatened. The state takeover of Christian schools also added fuel to the rising resentment.

A myth about the intentions of the plotters needs to be quashed. There was never going to be a gentlemen’s coup. Those government ministers and the like to be arrested were not going to be treated well. The so called plans for PM Mrs. Bandaranaike and her children to be sent to live in exile in England at Government expense were as ridiculous as the reasons for the attempted coup. This was the PM of Ceylon. Would the British have agreed to be an accessory to a coup in a democratic dominion? The three Service commanders were to be kept under house arrest before being deposed! Col de Saram was to be Army Commander. There was going to be first ‘a military dictatorship’ followed by ‘indirect democracy with a governing council ’to eventually have’ general elections’. A lot of whisky fueled baloney supported by intoxicated but dangerous middle class dreamers.

In fact most of the arrested members of the government were to be incarcerated in the underground Army ammo dump at Army HQ. It had no ventilation. It recalled shades of the Black Hole of Calcutta (1756) where of a total of about a hundred imprisoned by the Indian ruler only 23 Brits and supporters survived overnight. No mention is made of how military officers who opposed the coup would be treated. Kid gloves were not going to be used surely?

Thus the remark supposed to have been made by DIG CC Dissanayake to an ASP to remove his side arm after being inveigled to obeying superior orders, illegal as they manifestly were, that this was going to be a gentlemen’s coup’! This was like the Police in the East who were ordered to surrender to the LTTE by the then IGP 27 years later; only to be massacred. Clearly a rouge element of the gazetted ranks of the Police believed committing treason was a piece of cake. DIG Sidney de Zoysa for example had a reputation for using deadly force that was enhanced after his stay in Jaffna. He was in it but not for a lark.

Arrangements too were to be made according to Somasunderam to deploy “the sabre’ troop” of the First (armoured) Reconnaissance Regiment. Actually there was more than one troop. They form part of a Sabre Squadron. Normally four Ferret Scout cars alone or two with two Daimler Armoured cars could make a troop. There were 12 scout cars and two Daimlers in the regiment at that time. Apparently they were to be used to prevent intervention by non Colombo based troops crossing into Colombo at Kirilipone, Dehiwala and Kelaniya bridges.

The scout cars would have at least machine gun ammo to carry out their task while the Daimler Armoured car had a two pounder gun that fired high explosive. It made a mockery of CC Dissanayake’s reported fairy tale instructions to that ASP about this act of treason being one carried out without any use of violence and by ‘gentlemen’.

The absolutely irrelevant and silly example cited of Gen Ayub Khan’s takeover of Pakistan was given as one the local plotters wished to emulate. Ayub was the Chief Martial Law Administrator (appointed by President Iskander (from the Greek Alexander) Mirza, himself a General, and former army commander) at the time and Army Commander. Ayub was not a Colonel who was looking to keep the three Service commanders under house arrest. He just deposed the very man who appointed him.

The three service commanders included a loan service RAF officer Air Vice Marshal JL Barker OBE DFC RAF who was commander of the RCyAF. What the plotters were going to tell the Queen of England about this the next morning would have driven her bonkers.

Was the 3rd Field Regiment Artillery going to keep its 4.2 ins mortars only to fire a ceremonial salute after the coup succeeded or use them to fire on First Battalion Ceylon Light Infantry (CLI) troops that could be expected to come from Panagoda with the formidable Lt Col Richard Udugama? Interestingly the plotters had not given any details of their arrangements to deal with Lt Col Udugama of the CLI, if and when he was arrested. One can only speculate grimly. Maybe Sidney de Zoysa and CC Dissanayake had plans.

One thing is sure if ever there was a confrontation between the Artillery and the CLI, it would have led to civil war and an unprecedented blood bath, the likes of which the country would not have recovered from for decades. The ‘gentlemen’ plotters had arranged for ‘’fully armed dispatch riders of the Signals” to help take over Radio Ceylon. That these men were reservists and not commandos appears to have been given a miss but arming them meant they had weapon work to do. This made the alleged disarming of an ASP by CC Dissanayake look stupid.

According to Somasunderam, and this was news unknown to most even in 2022, Major W Rajapakse the second in command of the First Reconnaissance Regiment with a ‘sabre’ troop was to be at Kiralapone bridge to prevent access to Colombo by troops from the cantonment in Panagoda. He was a Buddhist.

At that time the regiment had 12 unturreted scout cars each with a machine gun and two Daimler armoured fighting vehicles with a two pounder gun that fired high explosive rounds. A ‘sabre’ troop mix would normally have been of two scout cars and two Daimler armoured reconnaissance vehicles. When the coup was uncovered, Major Rajapakse was sent on compulsory leave. He however pleaded he had gone along with the plan with the sole intention of being a whistle blower at the opportune time. He was later reinstated as second in command and even commanded the regiment from March 1964 to April 1965 and again from June 1970 to October 1970!

Another Major Wilton White from the same regiment too was indicted. The history of the regiment however is completely blank about its activities in the year 1962. It was under its founder (1955) commander Lt Col DS Attygalle who later went on to become the Army Commander 10 long years (1967 to 1977) or forever and ever as once feared. Only in SL.

The third Buddhist officer involved was Artillery Capt H Wanasinghe, putting paid to an insinuation that the plotters were all from Royal, Trinity and S. Thomas’ Colleges. There was no officer from Trinity College involved while one from the 26 arrested was from S. Thomas’ College. Wanasinghe from Ananda College first agreed to be a crown witness and was released. When the government changed in 1965 he ceased to be a crown witness. He later became Army Commander (1987-89). Only in SL.

In 1966 when Minister of State JR Jayewardene announced that an attempted coup by the Army had been discovered two Trinitians (including Lieutenant Kobbekaduwa) and two Thomians, among many others, were sent on compulsory leave while the Army Commander Gen Udugama, a Trinitian, was arrested as the leader. All the accused, officers and soldiers, were Buddhists. General Udugama was the first Buddhist to command the Army. In 1977 PM Jayewardene appointed Gen Udugama as Ambassador to Iraq! Only in SL.

That Coup case was farcical. It was thrown out after the prosecution closed but not before two suspects one a warrant officer of the Light Infantry and one a businessman (Dodampe mudalali) had been murdered by being thrown out of the fourth floor of the CID after being tortured. An inspector with an evil reputation was brought into the CID to do just that. Major Labrooy at Army HQ asked General Udugama in writing to forgive him for giving false evidence against him. He said he was threatened to do so. Nothing is more telling than that about how, even why, the government and its then Minister of State, JR Jayewardene were determined to convict Gen Udugama.

An interesting connected incident needs to be included. Capt David Rasiah of the Medical Corps had Capt LL (Lucky) Vitharne of the Sinha Regiment (and also Sandhurst and Trinity) as his bestman for his wedding that year. After the church ceremony and before the reception, Capt Vitharne still dressed in his blue ceremonial (No 4 dress) uniform, decided to pay a visit to Col de Saram in the remand prison. He had served under the Colonel in Jaffna in 1961 and held him in tremendous high regard as did most army officers. Having been saluted by the army guards, he had gone in, saluted the Colonel and wished him well, Capt Vitharne then left the magazine prison for the wedding reception.

Unfortunately this act was considered a breach of army discipline and regulations. Vitharne was court martialled. Major TSB Sally, also of Vitharne’s regiment, prosecuted. No evidence of breaking any army rules or regulations was found. Vitharne was discharged only to fall foul of Defence and External Affairs Secretary NQ Dias later, leading to his discharge from the Army.

Accused Douglas Liyanage who had been GA Mannar before 1962 was well known to army officers on Task Force Illicit Immigration (TaFII) duties. He frequented the Mannar (Thallady) Officers’ mess and sounded and attempted to suborn their minds. He probably misled the plotters by exaggerating his military officer contacts assumed dissatisfaction with the Government.

Major Loyola, of the 3rd Field Artillery who was an accused had his brother Lt Ivor Novello and cousin Lt Rex Fernando in the Artillery too.

There was not a single Muslim among the plotters.

PM Dudley Senanayake and former PM Sir John Kotelawela long after their deaths were also alleged by historian KM de Silva to have been involved as allegedly confided in him by Sir John Kotelawela . The Governor General Sir Oliver Goonetilleke was also implicated to no one’s surprise. He was removed with the Queen’s consent and William Gopallawa replaced him

When the case was first taken up, Justice TS Fernando presiding, accepted the defence plea that the court was not legally constituted and dissolved the court. In Parliament Minister Philip Gunewardene stated that ‘It was a ‘fishy business. One fisher appointed three fishers. So the fishing business was caused’. This was a regressive and extremely distasteful reference to caste. The Minister of Justice SPC Fernando and the three Supreme Court judges, TS Fernando, LB de Silva and Sri Skanda Raja were of the Karawa (fishing) caste.

The subsequent second court was also dissolved as one of the judges had as Acting Attorney General been a part of the investigations to the case. A third court deliberated under Justice HNG Fernando for over 300 days and found 11 accused guilty while 15 had been acquitted during different stages of the trial.

An appeal to the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in London was made. The Privy Council deliberated and on December 2, 1965 humbly reported its finding to the Queen that ‘the appeal is allowed and the convictions be quashed’. Most of the freed accused were soon given good jobs by the new UNP government in 1965, starting a trend that became another bad precedent.

Normally at that time in Third World countries coup suspects would be shot at dawn the next day. The judgment of the first court was held by many international judicial bodies like the International Commission of Jurists as a shining example of a ‘bold, fearless and independent judiciary’. That was Sri Lanka then.



Continue Reading
Advertisement
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Features

Coercive laws recipe for future misrule

Published

on

by Jehan Perera

The NPP government is going after powerful figures from the past and present who have engaged in corruption, fraud and criminal activity in a way that no previous government in Sri Lanka has done. Former ministers, politicians and senior state officials are among those facing investigations and legal proceedings. The government has placed before Parliament a document listing 50 cases involving corruption, fraud and other crimes. These include not only financial offences but also cases relating to the Easter Sunday attacks, the killings of Lasantha Wickrematunge and Wasim Thajudeen, the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda and attacks on journalists Keith Noyahr and Upali Tennakoon.

The significance of this effort is that it can demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of political connections or social standing, which will help restore public confidence in institutions that have long been distrusted. It could also recover public resources, improve the investment climate and strengthen the foundations for a more prosperous and just Sri Lanka. When criticised for focusing on the past and not the present, the government position is that these investigations were initiated under earlier governments, particularly between 2015 and 2019, and that it is now allowing investigators to proceed to deal with the backlog without political interference.

But there is an aspect of the government’s approach that is less justifiable. While pursuing past wrongdoing by powerful individuals, it is also advancing a triumvirate of draft laws that could give the state sweeping powers over citizens, organisations and dissent in the present and future. The draft Prevention of Terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill raise serious questions about the over-centralisation of power. Each of these laws strengthens the powers of the state while weakening the rights and safeguards that protect people from their misuse and thus questions the basic rights of people in democracy where ‘the power of the people is vested in the government’. This is a recipe for future misrule rather than the rule of law. As the well-known saying goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Proposed Laws

The real test of system change, for which the government obtained an overwhelming mandate, requires not only a government willing to hold others accountable, but one prepared to subject itself to the same principles of legality, transparency and restraint. The three proposed laws that are particularly important in this regard are the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill. Each of these draft laws has been presented as serving a legitimate purpose. Preventing terrorism, combating organised crime and ensuring that NGOs do not facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing are proper responsibilities of the state. Sri Lanka has international obligations in these areas, and no responsible government can disregard them. However, the existence of a legitimate objective does not justify every means adopted to achieve it.

The proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill illustrates the problem. Although its definition of terrorism draws on a model developed by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has warned that the definition of terrorism extends beyond the model and could bring legitimate political protest, trade union action and civil disobedience within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Its concerns also include prolonged detention, inadequate judicial oversight and restrictions on access to legal counsel. These are objections that go to the heart of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The government cannot credibly promise to protect democratic freedoms while creating powers that could be used to restrict them. It is necessary for the government to reassess the draft through transparent consultation and revise provisions that could criminalise legitimate dissent.

The Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill raises similar concerns. It is presented as giving effect to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which Sri Lanka ratified in 2006. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has argued that the convention does not require many of the bill’s provisions. The proposed law extends to a broad range of offences, permits detention orders lasting up to a year, makes confessions to police admissible for purposes of legal evidence, and introduces extensive surveillance powers. A law intended to dismantle criminal networks should not create a parallel system of exceptional powers that could be applied far beyond organised crime. Nor should safeguards developed through years of experience with abuses under the Prevention of Terrorism Act be weakened through legislation bearing a different name. The government should review whether or not existing laws could be used effectively to control these crimes or whether each exceptional power is necessary.

Civil Society

The proposed NGO Registration and Supervision Bill presents another test of the government’s intentions. The government may reasonably seek transparency in the finances of organisations receiving public or foreign funds, including measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to justify its overreach on the grounds of meeting the internationally mandated requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the Asia-Pacific region. But these objectives do not justify placing civil society and NGOs under excessive administrative control when even the FATF ranks them as low to medium risks. The draft bill would require registration and renewal, impose extensive obligations on organisations and empower authorities to suspend or deregister them on broadly framed grounds. It is important to redraft provisions that confer excessive discretion over registration, renewal, suspension and deregistration of NGOs.

Among the concerns raised by United Nations human rights special rapporteurs with regard to the draft NGO law are provisions requiring organisations to align with government policies and restrictions that could affect advocacy, dissent and freedom of association. The implications extend well beyond organisations that engage directly with the government. Community groups, human rights organisations, independent researchers and organisations working on reconciliation or accountability could find their activities constrained by uncertainty over how these provisions might be interpreted. Organisations that criticise government policies are not thereby working against the country. Their freedom to do so is part of what distinguishes a democracy from a system in which the government determines which opinions and activities are acceptable.

The government has generated considerable public goodwill through its pursuit of corruption and criminality. It should not assume that this goodwill gives it an unlimited mandate to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The NPP knows from its own history that governments can treat dissent as a threat and use the machinery of the state against their opponents. There is still time to correct the drafts through transparent public consultation, narrow definitions of offences, meaningful judicial control over detention and surveillance, and effective remedies against arbitrary decisions. A government that pursues corruption while weakening safeguards against state abuse risks undermining its own achievements. Besides bringing to light the abuse of power by previous governments, the NPP government needs to build a system in which no future government can abuse power in the belief they can get away with it.

Continue Reading

Features

Quality assurance without quality enhancement: The irony of university QA

Published

on

By Ramya Kumar

According to the Quality Assurance Council (QAC) of the University Grants Commission (UGC), quality assurance (QA) refers to “the means (i.e. the policies, attitudes, actions, procedures, etc.), by which an institution can guarantee with confidence and certainty, that the standards and quality of its educational provision are being maintained and enhanced”.

An expansive structure has been in place since 2005 to govern and implement QA processes within the state university system. The QAC is the focal point at the UGC that implements external reviews of state universities and institutes. Each university has its own Centre for Quality Assurance (CQA) tasked with performing QA in line with QAC directives. Faculties, in turn, have Internal Quality Assurance Cells (IQAC) performing their own QA; they are answerable to the CQA.

The big question is whether this all-encompassing top-down QA system, that in many ways undermines the internal dynamics of university governance, actually supports universities to enhance the quality of education. This article highlights some concerns.

Top-down check-box activities

The QAC conducts external reviews of universities and degree programmes. A review team appointed by the UGC (who may or may not have experience in the institution/programme in question) examines the self-evaluation report submitted by the said institution/programme. The team then conducts a site visit to verify the claims made in the university’s self-evaluation report, clarify issues identified during the desk review, and examine how QA procedures operate in practice. The team holds meetings with the university administration, members of the Council and Senate, Deans, Heads of Departments, academic and non-academic staff, students, and others. Following the visit, a draft report is submitted to the relevant institution/programme for comment before final publication. The reviewed institution/programme then prepares and publishes an action plan addressing the recommendations, with subsequent monitoring of progress.

There are some worthy QA initiatives under implementation, such as improving facilities for students with disabilities and strengthening mechanisms to address sexual- and gender-based violence. However, for the most part, QA activities have little to do with improving the quality of education. They are mostly preoccupied with monitoring faculty and department websites, digital transformation, student feedback, subject evaluation, course evaluation, peer evaluation, and, more recently, staff appraisal. These activities, which consume an inordinate amount of time—so precious at understaffed universities—have become check-box activities completed to generate evidence for the next review. Below is an excerpt of a conversation between two academics (1 and 2) that conveys how QA plays out at universities (reproduced with permission).

1: … .it’s like social media you know, like posting things on Facebook or twitter or Instagram. When people do a lot of social media, everything they do, they do thinking, “okay I’m going to post it in this way… this I have to put on my Instagram.” QA is a little like that… everything is considered in light of, “ah we can use this for the review, as evidence… for example very recently we were encouraged to have all the things that we do in our department in the faculty newsletter so then they can put in the review. Every little thing has to be noted down….

2: And with pictures and all…

1: At the very least it has to be written so that you have written evidence .. you can’t be doing something for the sake of doing something or because it is good for the department … and sometimes people tell me “oh yea that’s a good idea we can fit that under this x, y section of the review..”

2: Yea, and nobody really thinks about the actual outcome… whether it’s actually helping anyone..

1: I also find that a lot of the words that we used in different ways have now been co-opted to the QA discourse ..including quality.. I can’t actually say what I want as an “outcome”, for example, that the outcome of this workshop is that my students “think about” … then I am told “ah but no that’s not one of the Bloom’s taxonomy words, “think about”.…

2: And the worst part is these medical and agriculture people, these types of people go around spreading it like some kind of gospel!

1: Yea, this cookie cutter way of doing things, they think is the height of innovativeness or creativity, when actually it is so mundane … for me the most awful thing about it is like some fungus of mundanity has taken over through QA reviews.

2: yea, when you say QA, my mind closes off immediately and I stop listening…

Auditing everything but power

QA leaves out crucial aspects of university governance. For instance, there is no review or assessment of the “quality” of university administrations under Criterion 1 or the integrity of procedures governing the promotion of academic staff under Criterion 6 of the institutional reviews.

The majority in the Council—the university’s executive and governing body, which is responsible for selecting the Vice-Chancellor (VC)—are appointed in ad hoc fashion. Apart from the Ex-Officio members in the Council (VC, Deans, etc.), and the two members elected by the Senate, the remainder are appointed by the UGC with no formal consultation or vetting procedure. The VC appointment process described in UGC Circular No. 03/2023 exemplifies how an ostensibly technical process can become entangled in political sycophancy. The Registrar invites applications for the position of VC through advertisement. Applicants must submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of vision for the university and supporting documents. The University Council appoints a three-member Search Committee of senior academics to encourage “eminent persons” to apply, while the UGC appoints a former VC from another university to “observe” the selection process.

A Special Meeting of the University Council is convened. Candidates are interviewed and must make a presentation to the Council Members, followed by questions. Each Council member “gives marks” for seven prescribed criteria: strategic focus (20%), effective leadership (20%), holistic thinking/conceptual skills (10%), academic and research excellence (15%), personal integrity (10%), professional communication (10%) and managerial competence (15%). Marks are averaged, and the Council recommends three candidates to the UGC in rank order. The UGC-appointed observer separately submits a confidential report on the selection process.

This procedure is expected to guarantee quality, but does it? Applications are submitted to the Council Members, who have been appointed on questionable bases, and who are expected to review the applications and give scores, based on objective assessments. But, in reality, most Council Members are manipulated by VC candidates, who often have personal ties with them. The UGC-appointed observer usually has no genuine interest in the outcome. And there is no way for anyone to actually question the Council’s decision once it is made. Although the highest-ranked candidate may ultimately be appointed, the selection remains a political decision made by the President, who retains the discretion to appoint any one of the three.

External reviews also do not look into the promotions of academic staff, except to scrutinise whether there are policies and procedures in place to govern promotion. Academic staff may apply for promotion to Professor once they satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements, which typically include the period of service, academic qualifications, research and publication achievements, teaching experience, and contributions to the university and wider community. Applications are evaluated against specified criteria, with research output and academic contributions assessed through documentary evidence and expert evaluation. Under the UGC’s scheme for Professors, two experts from outside the applicant’s institution assess specified aspects of research and knowledge dissemination. Again, beneath this technical process, which is externally evaluated, lies a problematic points-based scheme that can be manipulated and abused with impunity.

Rethinking university QA

Like the VC election process and the schemes of promotion for academic staff, QA reviews are open to manipulation. Before a review, there is a chaotic rush to complete evidence gathering and reporting. Academics leave all other work aside, including at times their teaching, to focus on completing documentation and preparing reports. The standardised criteria in the review manuals and scoring sheets often do not reflect differences in disciplines and institutional contexts. But this does not really matter because any serious problems experienced by institutions or programmes are hastily brushed under the carpet to conceal any evidence that could taint the review. The goal is to obtain an A or at least a B grade at whatever cost.

QA may result in positive change if it moves beyond top-down check-box activities towards internally designed and owned processes encompassing all aspects of university governance, led by departments and faculties, and supported by adequate resources. The current QA system needs to be dismantled and replaced by procedures that are accountable, not to the UGC, but to our students and the communities we serve.

(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna)

. Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

Continue Reading

Features

Down Memory Lane — the Grand 20th Edition!

Published

on

Down Memory Lane: Ready to sing again

Yes, Down Memory Lane, the beloved Sing-Along concert series that first struck a chord, way back in 1997, returns for its landmark 20th edition this Saturday, 17th October, at the beautiful Bolgoda Grand Resort, Moratuwa town centre.

Having celebrated its glorious 25th anniversary with the show in 2023, this milestone 20th concert promises to be even more special.

The organisers, the ever-popular Moratuwa Arts Forum, are pulling out all the stops to present yet another unforgettable evening, brimming with camaraderie, fellowship, and pure nostalgia.

Get ready for two-and-a-half hours of non-stop singing as veteran vocalists, from the Moratuwa Arts Forum, will take the stage to lead and inspire the happy audience to sing, sing and sing to their hearts’ content.

The repertoire? Absolutely magical, according to the organisers.

Veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike: Will handle the evening’s proceedings / Priya Peiris: Event Conceptor

Around 40 golden oldies — from timeless English vintage evergreens and hits from the 50s to the 90s, to toe-tapping calypsos, soulful American plantation melodies, rousing cowboy and Dixieland favourites, aa well as cherished Sinhala standards. All to be sung with much gusto!

This year’s dedicated organising committee comprises Brian Coorey (Chairman), Priya Peiris (Event Conceptor), Hiran Fernando, Suranga Fernando, Viranjan Perera, Hemka Fernando and Neelesh Silva. Guidance and support comes from Moratuwa Arts Forum President Sarana Guneratne and Secretary Chandani Silva.

Adding his signature charm to the evening, as Master of Ceremonies, will be the veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike.

Don’t miss this landmark celebration of music and memories!

For further details, contact Hiran Fernando on 0772636446 or WhatsApp 0783636446.

Continue Reading

Trending