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Water spillage from reservoirs: Is CEB to blame?

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Let us examine the facts

By Chris Ratnayake

‘The pen is mightier than the sword’ is an old adage. However, it has gained new currency in today’s world where mass communication, in the form of press and other media, greatly influences public opinion. Consequently, this valuable tool can become lethal in the hands of some who lack professional competence to understand what they write about, are unable to comprehend the relevant issues or analyse relevant data of a complex technical problem. Such an issue has arisen with respect to the water spillage that occurred last month in our hydroelectric reservoirs.

I refer to three articles in The Island recently by Dr. Vidhura Ralapanawe, G. A. D. Sirimal, and Ifham Nizam, alleging mismanagement and even corruption simply because water was spilling, and thermal plants were operating simultaneously. No additional data or analysis was presented. As a professional engineer, with 23 years of experience at the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), focusing on power system planning, and some 30 years’ experience as a Senior Power Engineer at the World Bank, reviewing power sector operations in about 17 developing countries, I could well see the fallacy of these accusations. However, I soon realised that the general public appears to accept the validity of these accusations at face value. Public officials are fair game, any article alleging inefficiency or dishonesty is readily believed without any examination of the merits of these articles. I therefore decided to research the relevant facts and submit the findings in the hope of correcting the grave misinformation propagated.

Facts

Any professionally competent article, addressing the subject, to determine whether there was any inefficiency or miscarriage of duty should have considered the following:

1. Responsibility for water level management:

The articles place the sole blame for spillage on the CEB’s system control centre (SCC) engineers. They seem to be unaware that water level management of the main reservoirs (namely the Mahaweli complex) is the responsibility of the Water Management Secretariat (WMS), not the CEB. WMS has representation from the CEB, Water Board, Irrigation, Mahaweli, and more. The release policy, every week from every reservoir, is issued by the WMS and the CEB cannot store or release water through a unilateral decision. So, the accusation on the CEB is misplaced!

2. Drawdown curves:

These are optimum water level charts, developed based on years of past experience and specialised computer programmes designed to optimise the often-competing demands of agriculture and power, which guide system operators in the management of reservoir water levels. To determine any possible mismanagement, one has to prove that, for sustained periods, the drawdown did not correspond to these curves, subject, of course, to the current rainfall expectations and plant capacities available for dispatch. This is a complex exercise that the writers of these articles appear to be ignorant of.

3. Optimal dam design envisages some spilling:

Occasional spillage in a few years is no indication of mismanagement. Reservoirs are designed and constructed to optimise the competing demands of costs and benefits. In fact, if water never spills, it is a sure indication of bad design and excessive investment on taller dams, inundating larger areas of land than necessary! The articles never examined whether such spillage was a regular occurrence or a one-off after many years.

4. Reservoir heights deviated from optimum:

It may be noted that in some instances the reservoir heights were reduced due to complaints of inundation of affectees, making spillage unavoidable. Clear examples are Kukule (2002) and Upper Kotmale (2012), pruned down to mere ‘ponds’ and not storage reservoirs owing to public protests. Expert hydrologists and the CEB engineers said, at that time, that if Kukule was allowed to be built as a full capacity reservoir, frequent flooding of Kalawana and Baduraliya, sometimes with severe loss of life, would have been avoided. Raising the Kotmale dam for greater storage has been suspended due to protests. We can’t have it both ways: Avoid spillage but refuse to allow the required dam height!

5. Difference between operational ponds and storage reservoirs:

Cascading hydropower systems have both storage reservoirs and operational ponds. The latter are built to enable a power plant to operate with some water storage for a short time period and function by the discharges from upstream plants, secondary inflows in the locality or releases from the main storage reservoirs. The levels of these small capacity reservoirs are not readily controllable and often spillage cannot be avoided.

6. Historical performance:

To do justice to the issue, I obtained historical data of reservoir performance from 2011 to 2020 which the CEB publishes with respect to each reservoir, and computed the extent of spillage as a percentage of annual inflows. It is observed that the spillage that has occurred is extremely minimal and as expected. The results of the 10-year study are as follows:

Laxapana complex:

0.044% in 2013, 0.029% in 2014, 0.002% in 2015, 2.741% in 2018, 0.327% in 2019. All other years zero spill.

Mahaweli complex: Spilling occurred only in 2016: 0.663% and 2018: 5.807%

Samanalawewa: Spilling occurred only in 2019: 3.333%

7. Maximum hydro capability vs system demand:

The mere fact that private thermal power plants operate during spillage, the sole basis of these articles, is absolutely no indication of mismanagement. Our maximum hydroelectricity capability is 1450 MW vs a peak power demand of about 2700 MW. The balance must necessarily come from other sources, mainly thermal power. Consequently, thermal power may be used even when spillage is occurring.

8. Contractual issues with respect to private (thermal) power:

The private power contracts are made with capacity charges payable, irrespective of output, when they are contracted (periods of 10 or 20 years are typical). Once contracted, the capacity charge must be paid, whether it is ordered to operate or not. Private power plants with active agreements and the CEB power plants are scheduled or ‘committed’, generally on the basis of monthly or weekly dispatch plans. The principal in scheduling is to achieve the lowest operating cost of the generating system as a whole, subject to meeting (i) water release schedules (ii) reliability of the transmission network, (iii) purchasing all electricity from renewable energy, whatever the price. Once ordered to operate, additional (variable) charges payable to private oil power plants are based on actual energy discharged and these are determined on the basis of agreed plant efficiencies (specified in the contracts) and CPC-announced current fuel prices. Hence situations may arise where it may even be more profitable to dispatch private power in preference to CEB’s own plants, as the efficiencies of some private thermal plants may be superior to the CEB’s own plants.

9. Contractual issues with respect to private renewable energy:

Since 1996, lucrative contracts were provided to private renewable energy on must-take contracts. Consequently, many situations may arise when private renewable energy power plants, including rooftop solar power, are dispatched and paid for while water is overflowing at the reservoirs. None of the renewable energy plants have any long-term storage capacities and must be discharged when available. The average rates for renewable energy plants for 2020 were: Rs 15.47 (mini-hydro), 16.79 (wind), 22.36 (solar), 22.39 (biomass), and 36.20 (Waste to energy) while the variable cost of the CEB’s own plants vary from Rs 6.78 for coal and 17.26 for diesel plants (Ref: ‘dispatch and fuel cost data’ published by the CEB). During the whole of October-November, one generator at Norochcholai was shut down due to very good rainfall. Financially, the implication is to stop producing at Rs 6.78 from coal (2021 prices are a bit higher) and purchase from private mini-hydros and other such sources at Rs 15.47 or more. So, the CEB reports losses; private mini-hydros report profits! While this may be acceptable due to environmental considerations, the financial impacts may be noted.

10. Exigency situations: The sudden rains last November in Sri Lanka was quite unprecedented.

Many areas, not adversely affected under normal circumstances, were flooded or subject to landslides. Tens of thousands were affected and many lost their lives. We know that such catastrophic weather patterns have occurred recently and are still happening in many countries around the world as a result of global warming. In all such instances the usual operating patterns have been disrupted. Even these considerations have escaped the imagination of the writers of these articles.

Have any of the above issues been analysed in these articles? The answer is a clear ‘no’ and clearly displays the absurdity of the accusations.

Responsible journalism

In the international press we often see articles written by journalists on highly technical subjects. This is acceptable to create a platform for healthy public opinion. However, such reputed journalists carry out extensive research and consult experts as well as the hands-on operators or practitioners. These are usually cited in the articles and give credibility to their contents. However, this is unfortunately not the case in Sri Lanka. Many journalists rush to print sensational stories without even bothering to corroborate basic information, as the above analysis clearly shows. None of the key pertinent facts have been checked or verified. To add insult to injury they also impute fraud and corruption! They also add catchy journalistic innuendos, leading the public completely astray. One article refers to ‘opening a pandora box’, an innuendo that lets the reader imagine massive corruption occurring within the CEB. Instead of imagining a ‘pandora’s box’ he should have studied the generation and water inflow/releases published in the CEB website and done the required analysis. Is this responsible journalism?

I may also add that it is not only such journalists who lose their way handling a complex engineering problem. Sometime ago The Island carried an article by an experienced engineer, who specialises in another field, unrelated to electrical engineering, who recommended pumped storage plants using water released for agriculture in the Mahaweli complex. In reality, this is an impossibility as (a) all pumped storage plants need to collect the water discharged in a storage pond immediately at the outlet and (b) water released for agriculture is widely spread out and can never be collected and pumped back to the head pond. This example further illustrates that complex engineering problems are best left to subject specialists and any laymen’s attempt to address such issues would require understanding and analysis of data and extensive consultation with experts, not simply a reflex action to what appears on the surface.

To right the grave misinformation propagated, I have placed the pertinent facts related to the issue for public scrutiny. It is left for the reader to judge: Is there any evidence that the CEB acted inefficiently or fraudulently, or are the accusations due to the lack of understanding in the subject, not attempting any analysis of the wealth of information available publicly in the CEB’s website, and the need for sensationalism?



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From the missing to the missing truth and beyond

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A file photo of Foreign Minister Vijitha Heath addressing the UNHRC.

by Jehan Perera

The government is preparing to meet the challenge of the UN Human Rights Council next month. A Sri Lankan delegation led by Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath is expected to attend the 63rd session of the UNHRC in Geneva, where the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights will present a written update on Sri Lanka. The government has already submitted its response to the advance version of the report prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Foreign Minister, accompanied by officials from Colombo and Sri Lanka’s Permanent Mission in Geneva, is expected to explain the progress made on reconciliation, accountability and human rights. This is therefore an important moment for the government. It is an opportunity not merely to defend its record but to make new commitments.

The government has been criticised, as were its predecessors, for the manner in which it has dealt with past human rights violations, especially those connected with the thirty year war. The vexed issue of thousands of missing persons remains at the centre of this criticism. The government has sought to strengthen the Office on Missing Persons by providing it with additional staff and resources. It has also given support to the excavations at the Chemmani mass grave. Justice and National Integration Minister Harshana Nanayakkara has told Parliament that the government has allocated Rs. 57 million for the excavations and related legal work, though that figure has not been set against the cost of comparable forensic operations elsewhere.

The government also took the significant step of holding a national event in Jaffna to mark the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. Minister Harshana Nanayakkara attended the event together with the Chairman of the Office on Missing Persons (OMP), Mahesh Katulanda, and other senior officials and political representatives. Their presence was meant to demonstrate the government’s commitment to addressing the issue. But on the victims’ side there is continuing dissatisfaction. The commemoration in Jaffna was met by a protest outside the District Secretariat, organised by families of the disappeared, who demanded to know what happened to relatives who, according to their accounts, surrendered to or were taken away by the military and were never heard from again.

Jaffna Protests

The protests in Jaffna are a reminder of the gap that remains between what the government is trying to do and what the victims expect. For these families, compensation and death certificates are not substitutes for knowing what actually happened to those they lost. The protests, and the police action taken against some of those who demonstrated, were reported by the international and Tamil media and by international human rights organisations, and overshadowed much of what the government had hoped to showcase at the Jaffna event. The OMP’s mandate is to establish the fate and whereabouts of missing persons, clarify the circumstances in which they went missing, and provide redress and assistance to their families. Accordingly, it has sought to verify complaints, remove duplicate entries, encourage people who have not yet made complaints to come forward, and facilitate compensation and other forms of assistance. The families of victims expect the OMP to do more to clarify the circumstances in which their loved ones went missing. An example would be the disappearance of 158 displaced Tamil persons from the Eastern University campus in Vantharumoolai, Batticaloa District, who were rounded up and forcibly removed in front of thousands of other similarly displaced persons, including the officer in charge Prof T Jayasingam.

The government has also increased the support available to families of the missing, and says it is accelerating the OMP’s investigations. But the scale of what remains undone is stark. There are around 11,000 complaints remaining to be investigated, according to the Justice Minister, while the OMP has reported that final information has been established in only 31 cases, communicated privately to the families concerned. On the government’s own figures, that puts the clearance rate for establishing fate and whereabouts at well under one percent of the outstanding caseload. There is a limit to what the OMP can do even with more resources and time. Its mandate is primarily to establish the fate and whereabouts of individual missing persons. It was not intended to produce the comprehensive, public account of the past that victims and the country as a whole require.

In 2015, the government headed by President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe committed itself to establishing such a commission as part of a comprehensive approach to dealing with Sri Lanka’s past. Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1, which the government co-sponsored, specifically welcomed the proposed establishment of a “commission for truth, justice, reconciliation and non-recurrence”, together with an Office on Missing Persons and an Office for Reparations. However, the commitment to a truth-seeking mechanism was never fulfilled. The government should consider setting one up now. There is a growing feeling among Tamil people in the North and East that the government is failing to deliver on promises that are important to them. On issues important to them, they feel this is once again a Sinhala-dominated government like all the ones that came before.

Establish Truth

For the past two years the government has been concentrating on problems that it deems are important to the country as a whole such as the economy, development, poverty alleviation and corruption and criminality. However, the government needs to demonstrate that national unity means addressing the concerns of all communities, including those whose wounds from the war remain unhealed. Some of its own institutions have begun to act on this. The Office for National Unity and Reconciliation recently staged a drama entitled From Yakaweva to Nandikadal, depicting relationships between people that transcend the destruction caused by war. The drama portrayed the sufferings as well as the prejudices on both sides of the divide, from the Kebithigollewa bus bombing to the final days of the war around the Nandikadal lagoon. Its central message is that without forgiveness there cannot be reconciliation.

Particularly moving was the fact that the actors themselves came from families touched by the violence on both sides. The son of an LTTE Black Tiger leader and the daughter of an Army officer were among those who performed, alongside others who had experienced and survived some of the sites of carnage. The fact that a state institution is taking this message of reconciliation forward is itself a testament to the government’s openness to dealing with the past. A government institution can reach a population far larger than any civil society campaign could reach on its own, simply because the machinery of the state is so much more extensive. It is in this context that the government needs to give serious thought to setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the next step in the truth-seeking process. Special care will need to be taken to ensure that those who are appointed are not only politically non-partisan, but are acceptable to all the communities.

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission cannot by itself resolve all the wounds of the past. Nor can it replace criminal investigations or judicial proceedings where these are necessary. But it can provide something that existing institutions cannot provide on their own. This would be a comprehensive national process through which victims can be heard and the truth can be established. The general population needs to understand what happened, so that the country can begin to acknowledge its past without passing it on indefinitely to future generations. The government has already taken several steps. It is supporting the search for the truth at Chemmani. It has begun reaching out to families of the disappeared. Its own institutions are producing messages of reconciliation. But these are still not delivering the results that the victims and their families want. The next step should be to bring these efforts together to begin the journey from the missing to the missing truth, and from there to comprehensive justice.

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The long road to educating Sri Lanka’s Bhikkhunis

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Bhikkunis: Image courtesy Buddhist Society of South Asia

A robe without recognition:

 

by Anushka Kahandagamage

Education is the right of every child. Yet somewhere between childhood and the robe, that right becomes precarious for many Buddhist women in Sri Lanka, threatening not only their social standing, but their fundamental access to learning and the institutional discrimination they face. This piece is not about Buddhist disciplinary rules, which discriminates women, rather about how the state’s refusal to fully recognise bhikkhunis as bhikkhunis quietly determines what they are, and are not, permitted to learn.

Unlike dasasil mathas, who occupy a distinct and unofficial category within Buddhist renunciation, bhikkhunis belong to a formally ordained order recognised within Buddhist monastic tradition itself. Dasa sil mata means ‘ten-precept mother.’ They are women who observe the ten precepts (rather than the fuller Vinaya) and live a renunciant, celibate life, often in robes, but formal ordination has not translated into formal recognition by the state. Even after a Supreme Court ruling affirmed their right to be identified as bhikkhunis on their National Identity Cards, many still do not hold one. This stems from the hesitation of the male-dominated Buddhist hierarchy to recognise these women as part of the Theravada tradition, specifically refusing to validate their higher ordination. The identity card lists her title as Dasa Sil Mata. The ruling exists on paper, but they are still waiting for their identity cards. This is not a small bureaucratic oversight. It is the first link in a longer chain, one that reaches, eventually, into the classroom.

A Name Withheld

In Sri Lanka, there are 827 pirivenas, traditional monastic colleges that have, for centuries, served as the primary institutions of Buddhist education. Of these, only 12 are dedicated to female renunciants at all, and of those 12, just five serve fully ordained nuns specifically. The imbalance is stark on its face: 827 institutions for monks, five for fully ordained nuns. But the discrimination here is not only a matter of numbers, but it is also written into the very language used to name these institutions. Monks’ schools are called pirivena, a term carrying centuries of institutional weight, historical continuity, and state recognition under Sri Lanka’s education laws. Bhikkhunis’ schools, by contrast, are not called pirivenas at all. They are designated Buddha Sravika Meheni Adhyapana Ayathanaya (Institute for the Education of Buddha’s Female Disciples), a separate, parallel term that, however similar in function, withholds from bhikkhuni institutions the same legal and institutional status that the word ‘pirivena’ confers. Since there are ten-precept mothers, the institutes have not given the same name as the pirivena and lack the official as well as social recognition they deserve.

A Pattern a Century in the Making

Following the decline of the Buddhist nun (bhikkhuni) order after the Polonnaruwa period, the first woman to be robed again was ordained in 1905 as a dasasil matha. Although dasasil mathas have long served important religious and societal roles, they have historically lacked access to formal education. Unfortunately, today also, this pattern continuous to exist. Education, in this context, is never just about literacy or dhamma study. It is the currency of religious authority. A bhikkhuni denied equivalent education or educated in an institution the state refuses to name a pirivena, is denied that religious authority. She may know the Tipitaka as well as any monk yet will lack the institutional stamp that would make a lay community trust her reading of it. It was not indifference from the public; it was the accumulated effect of a system that has spent centuries teaching devotees, implicitly, that a woman’s robe does not carry the same weight as a man.

The female renunciants, both dasasil mathas and bhikkunis, although they wear robes, have not been regarded as individuals capable of comprehending or preaching dhamma, simply because they are women. This is most visible in education, the pirivena system, developed historically to train bhikkhus, offered dasasil mathas and bhikkunis no equivalent institutional pathway, no comparable curriculum, certification, or state recognition. This exclusion is notable because it runs counter to Sri Lanka’s broader educational trends, where women have historically outnumbered men in general university enrolment, the gap here is specific to monastic/religious education rather than a reflection of wider societal restrictions on women’s schooling. The country’s National Education Commission Policy has a section on Pirivena education. However, it does not address the education of Buddhist nuns, nor does it mention nuns within the policy. I recently learned that the policy was being reviewed, with a committee appointed by the Ministry of Education, scheduled to begin the review on the 1st of September. This presents an important opportunity to raise the issue of nuns’ education and advocate for its inclusion in the revised policy.

The monks and nuns’ education institutes are funded by the government, which allocates only 5,000–6,000 LKR per student for the entire year. This sum is grossly inadequate to cover even basic institutional needs, accommodation, food, learning materials, and the maintenance of the physical premises, let alone to support any meaningful expansion of the curriculum. With this level of funding, these education institutes are struggling to sustain themselves, and many are forced to rely almost entirely on external support simply to remain operational. This is where the disparity becomes most visible. As female renunciants have historically not been taken seriously, regarded neither as authoritative teachers of dhamma nor as figures worthy of the same reverence extended to their male counterparts, their education centres receive far fewer lay offerings than those for male renunciants. The result is a widening resource gap that mirrors and reinforces the very discrimination that caused it. Underfunded institutions produce fewer well-trained female scholars, which in turn reinforces the perception that female renunciants are less capable, a perception that then justifies continued underinvestment. Without deliberate intervention, either through equitable government allocation or targeted lay support, this cycle is likely to persist rather than resolve on its own.

Sitting Alone at the Bo Tree

I was at Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi in Anuradhapura, where a few monks sat preaching in the shade of the Bo Tree, each surrounded by small clusters of lay devotees. Nearby, I noticed a few female Buddhist renunciants, though I could not immediately tell whether they were bhikkhunîs or dasasil mathas, since visually, in their robes and demeanour, they appeared indistinguishable to an outside observer. Most of them sat alone, without the small crowds of devotees gathered around the monks nearby. This, too, is not incidental. Because women cannot enter the sâsana through the same pathway to ordination, available to men, many Buddhist female renunciants remain dasasil mathas, a status that carries the appearance of monastic life without its legitamised spiritual standing. They observe the 10 precepts, wear robes, and live in renunciation, yet occupy a lower, unofficial rung in the religious hierarchy, one that grants them neither the ordination lineage nor the institutional recognition given to monks. However, in June last year, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka delivered a landmark majority ruling in SC/FR/218/2013, affirming that fully ordained Buddhist nuns have the fundamental right to use the title ‘Bhikkhuni’ on their National Identity Cards, legally recognising the de facto existence of the Bhikkhuni Sanga.

A Closed Loop

Social discrimination and educational discrimination feed each other in a closed loop. Because bhikkhunis have fewer, less recognised institutions, fewer are formally trained to a standard the public recognises. Because fewer are recognised as authoritative teachers, fewer devotees seek them out or support them. Because they attract fewer devotees, the education institutions of female renunciants remain under-resourced and easy to overlook in state budgets and in popular imagination alike. A dasasil matha or bhikkhuni without an active following also lacks the economic support that following brings, since in Sri Lanka’s monastic economy, devotees are patrons as much as students. The precarity is not only spiritual or bureaucratic; it is material, and it compounds across a lifetime spent in robes.

Until bhikkhunis’ education is named, funded, and recognised on the same terms as that of bhikkhus, this will remain a story not only about missing ID cards or under-resourced schools, but about an education system that continues to decide, quietly and continuously, which students are worth investing in. Education was supposed to be the one place where the women can speak for themselves, instead, for these women, it has become just another place where women have to ask permission to be heard.

(Anushka is a Sociologist who is working on contemporary Buddhist movements. She was formerly attached to the University of Colombo)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

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‘Memories of Milton – Live in Concert’ to enchant Dubai

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Seven Notes: Doing it in Dubai

Sri Lankan music knows no borders. Wherever our people go, our melodies follow — and our musicians make sure of it.

From Qatar’s Exit, to Melbourne’s EBONY, to Toronto’s Ceymphony, and Dubai’s Seven Notes, Sri Lankan bands abroad continue to keep the community connected to home, through song.

In July, Rajiv Sebastian set the Dubai stage alight with the band Seven Notes, creating an unforgettable night for Sri Lankans in the UAE. And the live-wire behind that magic? Niluk Uswaththa of Seven Notes.

Well, Niluk says he isn’t stopping there.

Now, Dubai is preparing for something truly special — ‘Memories of Milton – Live in Concert’, a grand musical tribute to one of Sri Lanka’s most beloved voices: Milton Mallawarachchi.

For more than a decade, Milton Mallawarachchi was a trending force in Sri Lankan music. With nearly 850 songs and over 35 albums to his name, he gave us melodies that became the soundtrack to our lives — songs of love, longing, and life itself.

On Saturday, 26th September 2026, from 8:00 PM to 3:00 AM, the Mercure Hotel, Al Barsha Heights, Dubai, will transform into a space of nostalgia.

Ranil Mallawarachchi; Carrying forward his father’s legacy / Yenuli Neriah

With the spotlight on Ranil Mallawarachchi — Milton’s eldest son, carrying forward his father’s legacy — along with Yenuli Neriah and Tharaka, the evening will certainly bring Milton’s timeless classics back to life … on one stage.

Seven Notes will do the needful, providing the live music that made Dubai dance before.

According to Niluk, this isn’t just a concert.

“It’s designed as a nostalgic musical journey — to bring cherished memories and beloved songs back to life,” he says.

And he promises: 26th September will be a night to remember.

In fact, Niluk Uswaththa has become a driving force for Sri Lankan entertainment in Dubai.

Through Seven Notes, he ensures the community always has something special to look forward to — especially when it comes to music that feels like home.

The success of these overseas shows naturally raises one big question back in Sri Lanka.

Yes, music lovers, in Sri Lanka, are keen to know whether the Seven Notes band will pop up in Colombo, sometime soon, for a live performance?

Music lovers, island-wide, will be watching … and waiting!

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