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Crossovers from the SLFP to the UNP during the lead-up to 2021 elections

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On an inpection tour with MP Salinda Dissanayake

I too was at the President’s House when a small group of Cabinet Ministers were invited for dinner by CBK to discuss the changing political scenario in the light of Minister Hakeem’s increasingly erratic behaviour. Among those present were Kadirgamar, Mangala, Maithripala Sirisena and me. We first discussed Hakeem’s possible options. It was clear that he had struck a bargain with his Royal College friend Ranil.

Hakeem had got a scare at the last election [2000] when he nearly lost his seat in the Kandy district. It was no secret that Dr. Mahroof, the SLFP leader of Kandy Muslims, – had worked against him. In fact it was rumoured that Hakeem had lost in the first count and that a last minute appeal to Balapatabendi -CBK’s secretary-had helped him to clear the hurdle by a narrow margin. On the other hand if he was a candidate with the elephant symbol he had a better chance of being returned. [Subsequent results have confirmed this thesis].

Also he was wooed by Milinda Moragoda who had a reputation as a successful interlocutor. Rauf was proud of his Royal College education as a scholarship holder from Galagedera. He shared that pride with Ranil who too had a soft spot for Royalists. There may have been many other perks which were discussed. But we did not know his actual game plan. Should he be sacked from the Cabinet before he makes a grandiose exit or should we play for time in view of our narrow majority in Parliament, was the question.

Lunch at Sugala Devi Weva

Ideas were being tossed to and fro when Kadirgamar suddenly got up and went to the phone to address his high level contact who was the editor of a Sunday newspaper. He was told that Hakeem was about to resign with a publicity splash to embarrass the government. That helped to clear our collective mind and CBK decided to dismiss him forthwith. Her Secretary was asked to draft the necessary papers.

Then we explored the possibility of detaching Ferial Ashraff and a few of her minions from the Muslim Congress group. A problem arose because Ferial was in “purdah” or isolation because of her husband’s death. No male could meet with her. However there was a glimmer of hope as CBK could meet her, woman to woman. I do not know whether CBK did meet her or not but such a meeting became redundant because on the following day the full complement of MC members, including Ferial, visited Ashraff ‘s grave to honour their late leader and presumably get his good wishes from on high for an alliance with the UNP which he had resolutely opposed when he was in the land of the living. [Later Ferial left Hakeem and contested under the SLFP].

Probably according to a preordained plan Ranil then called for a vote of confidence secure in the knowledge that we could not muster a majority. As an alternative it was suggested that we could go for a referendum on the proposed new constitution which had been approved by Ranil. But this was abandoned because we were not sure whether the UNP would honour its agreement to back it.

Since we were now a minority in the House it became imperative that we get the support of the JVP if we were to continue in power. Mangala and Anura who were asked to negotiate did not have a difficult brief After their anti-UNP tirades it was scarcely possible for the JVP to look on while the UNP formed a government. Further they were not ready for another election so soon after 2000 when they had won 16 seats. Their solution was to extend their support to us for one year subject to some conditions, especially that the Cabinet should be restricted to 20 members.

Inspection of Uma Oya

This was agreed to and a new Cabinet was sworn in. Among the 20 members so selected I was assigned the portfolio of Education and Higher Education. I was to take over from Susil Premajayantha who was relegated to Deputy Minister status overnight. Anyway a change was on the cards in the Education Ministry since Susil and the Secretary Tara de Mel, who had CBK’s ear, did not get on. While appointing me to this prestigious post CBK told me that this was the Ministry she would have chosen for herself had she not been the President.

I knew it was a subject close to her heart and felt honoured to be selected when many of the former Ministers were being reduced to Deputy Minister status. But there was not much I could achieve since my tenure as Education Minister lasted only four months [August 2001 to December 2001]. Since Tara de Mel made a distinctive contribution in this field I wrote a very favourable review of her book on education. It contains much that we would have achieved had I remained in that Ministry for a longer time.

A signature initiative of the CBK administration from 1994 to 2005 was the attempt to reform the education system of the country. The free education system was in crisis largely because the demographics of population growth had put a strain on the resources which could be made available to this sector. However because it was a “sacred cow” in our political animal farm, politicians were loath to make the necessary changes demanded by our growing economy and the transformation of concepts of education which were the hallmarks of a modern society and culture.

From the start the President took the bold step of paying special attention to the subject of education. What were the areas that were identified for special attention? They were “education quality improvement, teaching of English, forms of assessment, compulsory education, primary education, reorganization of school management, counseling and career guidance, media and education technology university admissions and education legislation”

It was estimated that during the 1996-1997 period 14 percent of the children in the age five to 14 category did not attend school. The reasons identified were poverty, the need to help their parents, caring for siblings, household work and lack of documentation like birth certificates which were needed for school admission. As a result of Ministry intervention the introduction of the free midday meal and the provision of stationary helped in increasing enrollment. Regarding primary education “It was to be child centered and not teacher centered. Emphasis will be on developing the child’s mind, skills, attitudes and abilities through an activities based programme”.

Another focus of interest was the grade five scholarship examination. Says Tara, “Preparation for sitting the two papers in the exam began as early as when the child was in Grade three since parents were keen to enter good schools in urban settings. Although the competition was not as severe as now and although the tuition industry and tuition lobby was not as strong as today, yet tuition teachers held sway in the run up to the exam”. The apotheosis of ‘tuitiondom’ came when Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed a tuition master as the Minister of Education.

Free education has become a joke today because even the poorest parent has to beg, borrow or steal to pay for tuition. A crucial change was recommended by the education authorities. They recommended that teaching of English from grade three and making English a core subject for GCE “O” level. But this suggestion was shot down by the Cabinet. Says Tara, “After lengthy discussion only a few Cabinet Minister endorsed the proposal. They included ministers Lakshman Kadirgamar, Mangala Samaraweera and Sarath Amunugama.”

What I do remember is that it was a difficult time when we could not even attend a school prize giving without a scare of a terrorist attack. When her old school St Bridget’s invited CBK to be the chief guest at their prize giving Anura and I had to hang around in the hall with the guests for three hours till CBK was given security clearance to attend.

Crossovers

The political atmosphere after the 2000 reshuffle was one of despondency. Many seniors who held cabinet rank had to be satisfied with posts of deputy minister owing to the insistence of the JVP. SB Dissanayake who was a livewire and CBK’s early supporter, fell out with her and was busy canvassing PA members for a crossover to the UNP. As I was informed much later many of the mudalalis who were offended by CBK’s refusal to pander to their requests spent freely to subvert her regime. One such

businessman later told me that to ensure secrecy he bought tickets for representatives of the rebels and the UNP leaders to travel to Singapore for their discussions. [This became a habit among parliamentary conspirators later on.]

On hearing of these conspiracies CBK removed SB from the post of Secretary of the SLFP – a post she had canvassed for him earlier, breaking all rules – and appointed Maithripala Sirisena instead. She publicly apologised to Maitri for opposing him earlier. It was a motley crew that left the Government which included SB, GL Peiris, Bandula Gunawardena, Mahinda Wijesekera, Ediriweera Premaratne, Wijekoon, Ananda Munasinghe and surprisingly Wijepala Mendis who was angry that he was not given a portfolio. However with this move the government again lost its majority and CBK dissolved Parliament and called for elections to be held on December 5, 2001.

2001 Elections

With the crossover of 13 members of the SLFP, including several Ministers, the CBK administration lost its majority in Parliament. Several solutions were considered including the luring of members of the Opposition by engineering a countervailing crossover to the government ranks by offering them “plums” of office. This was rejected by CBK. Another option was to call on Ranil to take over as PM. This was considered seriously by CBK but finally she decided to dissolve Parliament and go for another election because she was persuaded by party bigwigs that we could be returned with a bigger majority.

About this time I met her as Education Minister to discuss our calender of public examinations. Many of them were scheduled to be held in December. CBK listened patiently to my submissions and laughingly replied that examinations will have to be postponed because the general election will be held about that time. That was the first intimation I had that she had made up her mind to go for a fresh election. My view was that Ranil should be asked to form a government because the voting public will punish us for going for another election so soon which will be an admission of our failure to govern.

The constant reversals in the war in the northern theatre, the ailing economy and the undercutting of CBK by her own party leaders were taking their toll. We could not face this election with confidence.

The general election was fixed for December 5, 2001 just 14 months since the previous election. Unlike in the past the momentum was with Ranil and the UNP. I entered the fray again from Kandy district. As Minister of Education I had high visibility and it was not difficult for me to be confident of being returned. A large number of teachers and teachers unions supported me and undertook house to house canvassing on my behalf. But it became apparent that the public service and the police were turning to the UNP thereby joining the gathering storm against us.

In addition to the above mentioned crossovers, several others also chose to contest in 2001 under the UNP banner. Lakshman Kiriella and Sarath Munasinghe who had been considered “true blues” went to the UNP. Thondaman too joined a UNP-led coalition. These shenanigans had their amusing side. Jeyaraj Fernandopulle proclaimed that he too was crossing over. But he discovered that his “bete noir” Wijepala Mendis had also crossed over to the UNP. He created a drama by getting his supporters to climb a roof and “in response to their wishes” came back to the SLFP.

Mahinda Rajapaksa whose sympathies were with the defectors [They all came back when he became leader] declared that he on principle would not leave the SLFP come what may. Anura Bandaranaike, with his early opponents out of the SLFP, decided to come back to the family firm. It was in such a confused state that the public again went to the polls and punished the SLFP for its inability to hold on to its 2000 victory.

The UNP led coalition won the election and Ranil exulted that he had broken the hoodoo of losing elections under his leadership. The national results were as follows;

United National Front

– [45. 6 percent] 96/109 seats. People’s Alliance – [37. 1 percent] 66/77 seats

Ianatha Vimukthi Peramuna

– [9. 1 percent] 13/16 seats Tamil United Front – [3. 8 percent] 14/15 seats. Muslim Congress – [1. 1 percent] 4/5 seats. (The second figure is after adding on National List seats)

It was clear that with the support of the TULF and SLMC the UNP could muster a majority in Parliament. But they did not have a majority of their own which was their Achilles heel.

The results for the PA in Kandy was as follows; Anuruddha Ratwatte – 102,906

Sarath Amunugama

– 78,100

Thilina Tennekone –

51,542

M. Aluthgamage

– 50,618

I had increased my vote substantially [by over 10,000] while all the others had reduced votes when compared to their 2000 performance. This was a reason for some satisfaction as I contemplated a long innings in the Opposition. It did not bother me very much since CBK remained the President and we could rebuild the PA after the people’s verdict. She appointed me a Presidential Advisor on Irrigation and I set about planning to use the President’s discretionary funds for promoting water management. Irrigation Engineers helped me by booking me into their circuit bungalows and the new Minister of Irrigation, Jayawickreme Perera, did not object.

There was a rule that farmers had to pay for their water connections. This was counter productive and I used the President’s Fund to pay for those connections for the poorest farmers. We prioritized Hambantota district and I was able to help Chamal Rajapaksa whose base was among the farmers of the district. Chamal and I are good friends and I urged him to contest the Presidency after Mahinda bowed out. The Rajapaksa family selfishly overlooked his claims and paid the price for it with the Gota debacle.

(Excerpted from Volume 3 of the Sarath Amunugama autobiography) ✍️



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Features

Regime change and the vacuum:Strategic lessons of Iraq and Libya

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Post-Gaddafi Civil war: the rebellion triggered by the arab spring of 2011 soon toppled the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. the power vacuum created by Gaddafi’s ouster has been exploited by local actors, as well as extraneous actors, with the only intention of making libya a war theatre for proxy wars and political disintegration

by Col. (R) Nalin Herath

There is a question that the international community must periodically ask itself: What happens to a State after its regime has been ousted?

The question is particularly relevant when examining Iraq and Libya. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were authoritarian rulers. Their governments were associated with political repression, human-rights violations and the suppression of political opposition. None of this should be ignored or excused. But recognising the failures of authoritarian rule does not prevent us from asking another, equally important strategic question:

Did the removal of these regimes adequately prepare for what came next?

The experience of Iraq and Libya suggests that removing a ruler is considerably easier than replacing the political, administrative and security architecture around that ruler.

Danger of confusing regime change with State reconstruction

A state is more than its leader. It consists of institutions, security forces, civil servants, courts, political structures, infrastructure, economic systems and, perhaps most importantly, an accepted monopoly over the legitimate use of force. When an authoritarian system has concentrated enormous power around one individual, removing that individual can expose weaknesses that were previously hidden. The strategic mistake is to assume that once the dictator has gone, a democratic and stable state will naturally emerge. History does not support such an assumption. The aftermath of Iraq demonstrates this particularly clearly. Following the 2003 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order No. 2, formally dissolving the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi Army, among other security institutions. A US congressional report later documented the enormous consequences of this decision, including the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of military personnel from the institutional framework of the state. Whatever the intentions behind the decision, the strategic consequence was that an established security structure had to be rebuilt while the country was simultaneously experiencing political upheaval and growing violence. That is a dangerous combination.

Iraq: Removing the structure before building the replacement

Saddam Hussein’s government was unquestionably authoritarian. It also reflected a complicated sectarian and political structure in which members of the Sunni minority occupied disproportionate positions of power despite being a demographic minority. But the question for strategic planners should not simply be whether Saddam deserved to remain in power. The question should have been:

What institutional structure would replace the system once he was removed?

An army can be politically controlled without being politically representative. A bureaucracy can serve an authoritarian government while still providing essential state functions. A security institution can be reformed without necessarily being destroyed. The distinction between reforming institutions and eliminating institutions is therefore critical. The post-2003 experience demonstrated the consequences of institutional disruption. Security vacuums contributed to insurgency and instability, while the process of rebuilding Iraq’s security forces took place amid an increasingly deteriorating security environment. The lesson is not that authoritarian institutions should never be reformed. The lesson is that state capacity should not be casually destroyed without a credible replacement.

Libya: prosperity, authoritarianism and institutional fragility

Libya presents an even more complicated case. Gaddafi’s government was authoritarian and deeply personalised. Political freedom was severely restricted, and the security apparatus was deliberately structured around regime survival. Yet Libya, under Gaddafi, also used substantial oil revenues to fund education, healthcare, infrastructure and social services. World Bank data from around the end of the Gaddafi era show life expectancy reaching approximately 75 years by 2011, skilled attendance at birth at 100 percent and measles immunisation at 98 percent. This does not prove that Gaddafi’s system was politically legitimate. It demonstrates something different: economic and social outcomes can coexist with authoritarian political structures.

The Great Man-Made River illustrates the scale of Libya’s investment ambitions. The World Bank described the project as one of the world’s largest engineering schemes, involving thousands of kilometres of planned pipelines to transport water from deep desert aquifers toward the populated coastal belt. The original project was estimated at approximately US$ 25 billion over several phases. Again, this should not become nostalgia for dictatorship. It should become a lesson in state capacity.

What happened after Gaddafi?

The post-2011 experience is perhaps the clearest illustration of the vacuum problem. Libya did not simply move from dictatorship to a consolidated democratic state. Instead, competing armed groups, political factions and institutions emerged. A UN economic and social affairs analysis concluded that the fall of the Gaddafi regime exposed weak state institutions and that the post-Gaddafi period was characterised by the proliferation of armed militias and institutional fragmentation.

The World Bank has similarly described how the security vacuum allowed armed groups to expand, while attempts to integrate them into the formal security apparatus produced a hybrid system in which state institutions and powerful armed groups operated alongside one another. This is the heart of the lesson. The consequences of regime change were also evident in Libya. The 2012 Benghazi attack, later portrayed in 13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi, illustrated the security vacuum that emerged after Gaddafi’s fall. The collapse of central authority allowed militias and competing armed groups to fill the space left by weakened state institutions. The lesson is clear: removing a regime may achieve military victory, but without a credible plan to rebuild the state, victory can quickly become a security vacuum.

When the state withdraws, something else occupies the space. If the replacement is not a legitimate national institution, the vacuum can be filled by militias, tribes, ideological movements, criminal networks or competing political authorities. The vacuum does not remain empty.

Terrorism question

There is another uncomfortable issue. Authoritarian regimes frequently suppress political and armed movements through coercive security systems. When those systems disappear abruptly, previously contained organisations can find new operating space. This does not mean that dictatorship is an appropriate method of counterterrorism. It means that counterterrorism cannot be separated from State capacity. The international community therefore needs to distinguish between defeating a particular terrorist organisation and maintaining the institutional conditions that prevent multiple armed actors from competing for power. The destruction of one regime does not automatically eliminate the forces that created insecurity. Sometimes it creates an environment in which those forces multiply.

Strategic mistake: winning the war but losing the peace

Military intervention can have a clearly defined operational objective. State reconstruction does not. A military campaign may successfully remove a government in weeks or months. Building legitimate institutions can take decades.This creates a fundamental strategic asymmetry. The shorter the planning horizon for intervention, the greater the danger of a long-term vacuum. The international community therefore needs to think beyond the first question: How do we remove the regime?

It must ask: Who governs the country the next morning? Who controls the borders? Who controls the security forces? Who pays government employees? Who maintains electricity, water and hospitals? Who protects critical infrastructure? Who administers justice? Who prevents armed groups from becoming alternative governments? Who provides political legitimacy? And perhaps most importantly: Who possesses the authority to enforce the decisions of the new state? If there are no convincing answers, regime change is only the beginning of the problem.

The lesson should not be that the United States or its allies should never intervene. Nor should it be that Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi should be rehabilitated as models of governance. The lesson is more practical. Regime change must never be confused with state-building.

Before dismantling an established political order, external powers need a credible understanding of the institutions that will replace it. Security-sector reform should normally distinguish between individuals who must be removed and institutions that must be preserved. A national army may need reform. A ministry may need restructuring. A security service may need accountability and civilian oversight. But destroying institutional capacity without having an operational replacement can create consequences far beyond the original objective.

Wider geopolitical lesson

The consequences of Iraq and Libya did not remain within their borders. State fragmentation affects neighbouring countries, migration, organised crime, arms trafficking, terrorism, energy markets and regional power competition. In today’s interconnected world, a failed transition in one country can become a security problem for an entire region. That is why intervention planning should include not only military objectives but also political, economic, humanitarian and security-sector objectives. The most important planning document may therefore not be the operational plan for removing the regime. It may be the plan for Day One after the regime has disappeared.

History should not be written as a simple choice between dictatorship and democracy. The real strategic challenge is more complicated. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were dictators. Their governments committed serious abuses, and their populations had legitimate grievances. But the failures of authoritarian rule do not automatically justify the destruction of state institutions without a credible plan for rebuilding them. The experience of Iraq and Libya demonstrates a fundamental principle of international security: A political vacuum is not neutral space. Someone will fill it. If legitimate national institutions cannot fill that space, armed groups, sectarian interests, extremist organisations or foreign-backed factions may do so. The ultimate lesson for the United States, its allies and the wider international community is therefore straightforward:

Removing a regime may win the immediate battle. Building a legitimate, functioning and secure state determines whether the intervention succeeds in the long term. The world should learn to ask not only “How do we remove the dictator?”. It must also ask:

“What happens to the country when he is gone?”

That may be the most important strategic question of all.

(The writer is the Secretary General of the Ceylon Chamber of Shipping, former Director General of the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), and former Spokesman of the Ministry of Defence. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the London Dialogue. His areas of expertise include international relations, geopolitics, maritime affairs, national security, economic policy, and strategic governance. He is a consultant at JITT Group and a member of World Pace Board.).

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‘Death at the Sign of the Rook’

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Tales of Mystery and Suspense – 23

By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha

As I have noted with regard to the adventures of John Rebus, I am indebted to Dinali Fernando and her husband Steve for whole hosts of thrillers. The latter strongly recommended Kate Atkinson when I borrowed four books. I wondered about this, for I had not been too impressed with her debut novel, Behind the Scenes at the Museum, which was amongst the entries I had to judge for the Eurasian section of the Commonwealth Writing Prize. Two decades later, I had forgotten what it had been about.

But I am glad Steve persuaded me to read her. Kate Atkinson is distinctively British, and Death at the Sign of the Rook is set in a country house and the surrounding village, and seems a modern descendant of the laidback Agatha Christies I so much enjoy.

There are, however, many differences in that we have a policeman who can go rogue, like Rebus, with again a female sidekick who has a mind of her own, again like Rebus. But Jackson Brodie has retired and set up as a private investigator, while Reggie, a young lady, is still in the police.

There is a lesbian couple living in the converted dairy of the manor house, as has occurred in Agatha Christie too, in A Murder is Announced. But they are peripheral to the story, unlike Ben, the brother of one of them who left the army after losing a leg in Afghanistan. When he turns up at the Manor House to shelter from a snowstorm, along with its chatelaine, Lady Milton, he is asked to answer the door as various characters turn up, including Jackson and Reggie, who then starts fantasising about him.

The others who turn up are two couples, one from America, who have paid for a murder weekend at the hotel. The family is impoverished, and has sold lots of pictures to survive, but most recently a Turner had been stolen, almost certainly by Lady Milton’s housekeeper Sophie, who vanished one night along with the picture. Reggie had been involved in that investigation, but there had been no trace of either picture or young lady.

Jackson Brodie suspects a connection between that theft and the one he has been called in to investigate, which has not been reported to the police. The picture hung opposite the bed of an old woman whose carer vanished after she died, along with it. Her children, adopted twins, have asked Jackson to investigate and also try to trace the carer, though he suspects something strange in that they did not go to the police.

Kate Atkinson

Brodie, in studying the stolen art, is also struck by the disappearance of a Rembrandt from a house in Scotland, along with a member of the cleaning staff. He thinks the three women might be the same one.

But Brodie’s assumption that the three women who vanished when valuable pictures did were identical would not have helped except that Beatrice, as she was also called, kept turning up, including to the funeral home where the old lady’s body was kept. And then that picture turned up, in the village church, and was found by the local vicar, Simon Cate, whose life story is also a prominent feature of the novel. He was an aspiring actor but then smitten by faith, and became a priest, but in time he lost his faith. His wife left him after the death of their son, and he is now in this backwater, where he feels he is of no use to anyone. But he has a great feel for living beings, and his most successful service has been one in which he blessed pets. And he was deeply concerned about the bees that Ben looks after for his sister and her wife.

He too staggers into the manor house in the midst of the storm, in which everyone concerned loses their way comprehensively. But amongst those Ben lets in is a man in a tracksuit with cuts and bruises, who then vanishes after he has been led to a bedroom, when Ben went in search of brandy. We soon work out that it is the escaped murderer about whom Reggie has been alerted.

Simon also turns up, through the back door, carrying the picture and also a gun, for he has found the dead body of one of his parishioners when he went to her house in search of his mobile phone. She had been shot and he had picked up the gun he found there. But he could not tell the police, for though he called he had lost his voice, and for the last few days had communicated only through writing.

This chaotic mix of characters at the manor house is further complicated by the group of players putting on the murder mystery play though some members have either cried off or died before reaching the venue. So, there is much doubling up and confusion over who is an actor and who is not.

The grand now largely empty rooms of the manor house, and its various odd passages and multiple doors, make it a splendid set for the lunacy that runs on and on. Reggie finds herself in a pantry Atkinsonwith a dead body, though this turns out to be the nanny who fell down the stairs and was put there by Lady Milton’s younger son. And there is high drama on the roof when the murderer nearly kills Ben, but he is saved by Reggie, and when he tries to kill Brody with an axe, he is shot by Beatrice, who has been the maid who served at the dinner before the murder mystery play, and explains to Brody how she has managed all her thefts.

And then in the melee, she vanishes on a motorbike, along with the daughter of the old lady’s adopted daughter, the only person who seemed to grieve at the funeral, and to whom the old lady had left her house in a codicil to her will, which her children have not known about. She leaves the picture to the carer, but it is brought to Simon Cate as he lies in hospital, recovering from a heart attack which adds confusion to the play.

Wonderfully convoluted, but all very clear, despite the headlong pace of the book and its shifts from one scene to another, from one character to another (or rather combinations of them) and from one-time span to another. A writer and a detective well worth looking out for. e more books by her on Dinali’s shelves.

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Safety, security and teamwork in aviation

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Indian Captain Smit Machchhar injured in the cockpit attack

by Capt. (Ret.).G.A. Fernando, MBA

There are three essential components to a commercial airline operation: safety, security and teamwork.

Aviation and teamwork at the ‘sharp’ end of a commercial aircraft, i.e. the flight deck, is unique. Unlike many other teams, it may be quite literally the first and the last time a particular combination of small teams of two, three, or four individual airmen (or women) will fly together. Sometimes even in the same airline that employs them.

Therefore, to make conditions safe and practical, while understanding and trusting tech other, they have to rely on a series of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and ‘Normal’ and ‘Emergency’ checklists for every conceivable situation. That is, to be able to do the right things, and do things right. In fact, there is a saying in aviation to the effect that ‘if you make a mistake in aviation, be original and make a new one’.

To ensure that safety standards are constantly maintained, airline pilots’ proficiency is tested every six months, in simulators, under the supervision of examiners from the civil aviation regulator. In Sri Lanka that organisaton is the Civil Aviation Authority-Sri Lanka (CAASL). Three simulator checks are conducted every 12 months in keeping with the tenet that ‘practice makes perfect’. A pithy adage not confined to the world of aviation warns that ‘prior preparation prevents piss-poor performance’.

The simulator exercises include rejected takeoffs, including in cross-wind situations, landings, engine fires and/or engine failures from a variety of causes, cabin pressurisation failure, precision and non-precision approaches, and landings in bad visibility – amongst other conditions that could be expected in actual flight.

In addition, a flight in a real airplane, on a regular passenger service under the supervision of an examiner from the airline, is undertaken to ensure that the company’s standard practices and procedures are carried out and maintained as prescribed in the airline’s manuals. These publications are in turn approved by the national regulator.

Crash axe

Finally, flight crew members must take a written test annually, on emergency equipment locations and procedures, with 90% as the pass mark.

Since the mid-1980s it has been mandatory for airline pilots to undertake a Crew Resource Management (CRM) programme once every two years. This training essentially emphasises what to do and what not to do to, in a specific emergency situation, or even during normal operations, to make the team cohesive and effective. During the course, the CRM facilitators discuss recent incidents and accidents that have occurred. Results of those events are recorded and could be retrieved, when necessary, by the official aviation bodies.

Not unexpectedly, it is demanding on a pilot to fulfill these requirements on a regular basis throughout his/her career, along with presenting for a bi-annual medical examination, all with the objective of retaining one’s licence to operate an aircraft. It may not be understood, therefore, by persons outside the aviation industry, or even some working in other aspects of an airline organisation, that it is often the passion for flight that keeps many pilots doing what they do to earn a living.

Security

Another important factor is the challenge of maintaining security in all aspects of airline operations, not least in the cockpit. The challenges are many, with new ones surfacing almost every day. It is therefore essential to be always prepared for the activities and ‘methods’ of perpetrators seeking to wreak evil on an aircraft and its occupants. As it is impossible for any airline or national security organisation to cover all aspects, systematic management of risks to effect a safe outcome becomes imperative.

Flydubai Incident

In the recent Flydubai incident of 30 September, 2026, a first officer (co-pilot) attacked the captain of the flight with a crash axe to accomplish his sinister motives, into which investigations are continuing. For the time being, it prompts the questions: should the crash axe be easily accessible to the flight crew? Or even be there at all? I believe it is a case of assessing the greater risk.

With regard to that event, and the circumstances that led to it, other deterrents could have been applied more thoroughly. For example, more thorough screening of pilots’ and other crewpersons’ backgrounds, with emphasis on their mental health, ideological affiliations and previous employment history. Separately, during a time of conflict in the Middle East, should Flydubai have even been operating between Dubai and Tel Aviv? Notwithstanding that cost-cutting and profit maximisation are key aims of any business, an airline’s apparent failure to conduct adequate psychological profiling of flight crew members, while continuing to operate ‘profitable’ routes, regardless of potential danger, can only be regarded and condemned as greed and disregard for human lives.

( Captain. Fernando, RCyAF, SLAF, Air Ceylon, Air Lanka, Singapore Airlines (SIA), SriLankan Airlines, Former Chief Pilot, Air Lanka Boeing 737, Former Deputy Chief Pilot, Lockheed L 1011, Former Crew Resource Management (CRM) Facilitator, SIA, Former Deputy Director (Air Operations) CAASL, Former President, Aircraft Owners and Operators Association Sri Lanka (AOAOASL), President, The Colombo Flying Club, Representative for Aviation, Organisation of Professional Associations (OPA), Hony, and Member Sri Lanka Society of Transport and Logistics.)

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