Features
Can Death Penalty be imposed for murder in Sri Lanka
The penalty for the criminal offence of murder is set out in the Penal Code which has been enacted and in operation since 1885. Section 296 of the Penal Code pertains to the death penalty (also known as capital punishment) for murder.
This provision underwent an amendment in 1958 with the enactment of the Suspension of Capital Punishment Act, No. 20 of 1958. Section 2 of this Act which contained the operative provisions and reads as –”During the continuance in force of this Act- (a) Capital punishment shall not be imposed under section 296 of the Penal Code for the commission of murder and under section 299 of the Penal Code for the abetment of suicide, and (b) Section 296 and section 299 of the Penal Code shall have effect as if, for the word “death” occurring in each of those sections, there were substituted the words “rigorous imprisonment for life.”.
As per section 3 of the Act, this Act was to continue in force for three years and then to expire, provided however ‘that if the Senate and the House of Representatives by resolution so declare, this Act shall continue in force for such further period as may be specified in such resolution.’
This Act was enacted during the premiership of Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and after his assassination, the Government of the day moved to repeal this Act in 1959 by enacting the Suspension of Capital Punishment (Repeal) Act, No. 25 of 1959. This three paragraph repealing Act in its operative provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 states as follows-
Section 2 –
‘The Suspension of Capital Punishment Act, No. 20 of 1958, is hereby repealed.’
Section 3 –
‘Notwithstanding anything in any other written law, capital punishment shall be imposed– (a) under section 296 of the Penal Code on every person who, on or after the date of the commencement of this Act, is convicted of the offence of murder committed prior to that date; and (emphasis added)
(b) under section 299 of the Penal Code on every person who, on or after that date, is convicted of the offence of abetment of suicide committed prior to that date.’
In the Case of The Queen v. Mapitigama Buddharakkita Thera and 2 others, the 1st and 2nd Accused (Appellants) succeeded in having the death sentences passed on them by the original Court substituted to sentences of imprisonment for life, in their Appeal to the Supreme Court.
This case came under the ambit of the Section 3 (a) of the Suspension of Capital Punishment (Repeal) Act.
The analysis and the aforesaid laws along with the provisions of the Interpretation
Ordinance is as follows –
“There remains for consideration only the ground that the sentence passed on the 1st and 2nd accused is illegal. On their behalf it was argued that only sentence of imprisonment for life and not sentence of death should have been imposed upon their conviction, on count (1) of the indictment, of the offence of conspiracy to commit or abet the murder of the deceased. Until the enactment of the Suspension of Capital Punishment Act No. 20 of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Suspension Act) which took effect on May 9th 1958, the punishment for the offence of conspiracy to commit or abet murder was undoubtedly the punishment of death; section 113B of the Penal Code provides that the punishment for that offence is the same as the punishment for the abetment of murder, and under section 102 of the Code the punishment for abetment of murder is the punishment provided by section 296 for the offence of murder itself.
Section 2 of the Suspension Act, however, in addition to providing that capital punishment shall not be imposed under section 296 for the commission of murder, also made an alteration in the law affecting the punishment for the offence of abetment of murder and accordingly for the offence of conspiracy to commit or abet murder. While the Suspension Act would be in force section 2 (b) provided that section 296 shall have effect as if for the word “death”; there were substituted the words “rigorous imprisonment for life”. Clearly therefore by virtue of the Suspension Act a person who committed the offence of conspiracy to murder while the Act was in force became liable to the punishment of rigorous imprisonment for life and not to the punishment of death.
The law however was again altered by the Suspension of Capital Punishment (Repeal) Act No. 25 of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as Suspension Repeal Act) which repealed the Suspension Act.
This repeal took effect on December 2nd 1959 some months after the period during which, according to the indictment and verdict in this case, the 1st and 2nd accused committed the offence of conspiracy to commit or abet murder. Taking first the section 2 of the Suspension Repeal Act, which section repealed the Suspension Act, it is pertinent to consider the punishment which on and after 2nd December 1959 the law provided in cases of murder, abetment of murder, and conspiracy to commit or abet the offence of murder, where such offences had been committed at any time during the period 9th May 1958 to 1st December 1959.
Prima facie
it might be thought having regard to the repeal of the Suspension Act, that the punishment for any such offence committed during the period aforesaid would be that of death, being the punishment “revived” for the offence under section 296; for as was the case prior to 9th May 1958, the punishment for the offence under section 296 became once again the punishment of death. This impression is however corrected by section 6 of the Interpretation Ordinance (Cap. 2 Revised Ed. 1956 at page 17). The relevant portion of section 6 (3) of the Interpretation Ordinance reads as follows :-
“Whenever any written law repeals … written law, such repeal shall not, in the absence of any express provision to that effect, affect or be deemed to have affected … any penalty…. incurred under the repealed written law.”
Leaving out of consideration for the moment the words which have been underlined above, the repeal by the Suspension Repeal Act of the Suspension Act, and in particular the re-introduction into section 296 of the Penal Code of the word “death” in replacement of the words “rigorous imprisonment for life” (which latter words had temporarily been substituted into the section in 1958) did not affect the penalty incurred under the repealed law, that is to say under section 296 in the form in which that section stood during the “interval of suspension” and therefore an offence of murder committed during the interval of suspension would have attracted only the punishment of rigorous imprisonment for life notwithstanding that the conviction for that offence may be entered after the Suspension Repeal Act came into force; and it would follow that the same would be the case in the event of a conviction for an offence of abetment or conspiracy committed during the interval of suspension.
Turning now to the words from section 6 (3) of the Interpretation Ordinance underlined, there was undoubtedly in the Suspension Repeal Act some provision of the nature contemplated by the words underlined. The relevant part of that Act is section 3 (a)- “Notwithstanding anything in any other written law, capital punishment shall be imposed-
(a) under section 296 of the Penal Code on every person who, on or after the date of the commencement of this Act, is convicted of the offence of murder committed prior to that date”
The effect of this section, having regard to its express words, is that the Legislature clearly declared its intention that upon every conviction for the offence of murder entered after 1st December 1959 the punishment to be imposed for that offence shall be the punishment of death, notwithstanding anything in any other written law, the written law here in reference being section 6 (3) of the Interpretation Ordinance. Hence for instance, in the case of the 4th accused who has after 1st December 1959 been convicted of the offence of murder committed prior to the coming into force of the Suspension Repeal Act, section 3(a) avoids the effect of section 6 (3) of the Interpretation Ordinance by clearly providing for the death penalty for persons in the position of the 4th accused. There is however nothing more in the Suspension Repeal Act in the nature of any express provision to limit the operation of section 6(3) in its application in a case where a person is convicted after that Act of any other offence which at the time of its commission attracted, by reason of the Suspension Act only the punishment of imprisonment for life, and not the punishment of death.
The only argument adduced by counsel appearing for the Crown was quite unconvincing. It was that, since the relevant sections (113B, 102 and 296) of the Penal Code, as they stood at the time of the convictions in this case, provide for the punishment of death for conspiracy to commit murder, the trial Judge had by law to impose that punishment. This argument completely ignores the existence and effect of section 6(3) of the Interpretation Ordinance.
“We accordingly quash the sentence of death passed on the 1st, 2nd and 4th accused in respect of the first count of conspiracy and substitute therefore a sentence of imprisonment for life.”
This judgment of the Supreme Court, inter alia, acknowledged that, section 296 of the Penal Code, and the impact on it by the Suspension of Capital Punishment Act, No. 20 of 1958 and the Suspension of Capital Punishment (Repeal) Act, No. 25 of 1959 came within the ambit of section 6 of the Interpretation Ordinance.
The Supreme Court in this case was urged to adjudicate on the scope of Section 3 (a) of the Suspension of Capital Punishment (Repeal) Act. This section very clearly limits itself to the convictions of the offence of murder committed prior to the date of enactment the Suspension of Capital Punishment (Repeal) Act, No. 25 of 1959.
Punishment for convictions for the offence of murder after the date of enactment of the said No. 25 of 1959 comes within the sole purview of sections 2, which reads as – ‘The Suspension of Capital Punishment Act, No. 20 of 1958, is hereby repealed’. The capital punishment has not been expressly re-introduced. Nor has another form of punishment been introduced. Hence by extension, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case of The Queen v. Mapitigama Buddharakkita Thera & others, provisions of section 6 of the Interpretation Ordinance ought to be applied to ascertain the law pertaining to punishment for convictions of murder and conspiracy to commit or abet the offence of murder.
(The writer can be contacted at buddhika103@gmail.com)
by Buddhika K. Jayasinghe
Attorney-at-Law
Features
So, who is going to tell the rest of the world?
Series: The greatest digital rethink, Part V of V – Series conclusion
Five instalments. Five levels of education. One recurring pattern: the countries that ran the experiment are retreating, the countries that watched them are still paying the entry price. This final column asks the question the international education community has been carefully avoiding: does anyone actually learn from anyone else, or do we just take turns making the same expensive mistakes?
What five parts told us
Let us briefly take stock. In Part I of this series, we traced the arc of three decades of digital enthusiasm in education, from the early computer labs of the 1990s through the tablet explosion of the 2010s, to the pandemic acceleration and the emerging backlash that defines the present moment. In Part II, we watched Sweden take tablets away from preschoolers who should never have been given them in the first place, and Finland legislate to return the pencil to its rightful place in the primary classroom. In Part III, we confronted the paradox at the heart of secondary school de-digitalisation: governments triumphantly banning the phone in the student’s pocket while quietly expanding the data systems that monitor their every digital interaction. In Part IV, we sat in the university exam hall, a room that had been pronounced redundant 20 years ago, and watched it fill up again with students writing with pens, because the large language models (LLM) like Chat GPT, had made every other form of assessment untrustworthy.
The inconvenient asymmetry
There is a concept in international education research, ‘asymmetric correction’, that describes this phenomenon with academic precision. It means, in plain language, that the systems with enough money, data and institutional capacity to discover that an experiment has gone wrong can afford to correct it. The systems without those resources cannot, and often do not even know the correction is needed until the damage is visible in their own classrooms and their own assessment results.
This is not merely an abstract inequity. It has a specific mechanism. The countries now de-digitalising, Finland, Sweden, Australia, France, the UK, have had 20 or 30 years of experience with school digitalisation. They have run multiple cycles of national assessments. They have PISA data going back decades. They have teacher unions vocal enough to flag classroom deterioration before it becomes a crisis. They have the research infrastructure to connect a policy change to an outcome measure and draw a conclusion. When their scores drop, they investigate. When the investigation points at screens, they act.
The evidence that was always there
One of the more unsettling conclusions of this series is that much of the evidence driving the current de-digitalisation wave was available considerably earlier than the policies it has inspired. The finding that handwritten notes produce better conceptual understanding than typed ones was published in 2014. The OECD’s analysis showing that more computers do not produce better learning outcomes appeared in 2015. UNESCO’s concerns about platform power and datafication in education have been articulated consistently for years. The distraction research, documenting that students with open laptops in lecture halls perform worse, and drag their neighbours down with them, has been accumulating for well over a decade.
None of this stopped the rollout. The tablets arrived in the Swedish preschools. The 1:1 device programmes expanded. The learning management systems embedded themselves. The AI proctoring tools were procured and deployed. Evidence that gave pause was routinely absorbed into a narrative about implementation, the problem was not the technology, it was how it was being used; give us better training, better platforms, better connectivity, and the results will follow. The results, in many cases, did not follow. But by the time that was clear, the infrastructure was in place, the contracts were running, and the political cost of admitting the bet had been wrong was prohibitive.
What changed was not the evidence, it was the political permission to act on it. PISA 2022 delivered declines dramatic enough to be impossible to attribute to anything other than something systemic. UNESCO issued what amounted to an institutional mea culpa. And a sufficient number of teachers, in a sufficient number of countries, were by then willing to say publicly what they had been saying in staffrooms for years: that the screens were not helping, and in many cases were actively in the way.
What a responsible global policy would look like
This series is not a manifesto against technology in education. It has never argued that. Screens are indispensable tools, for accessing information, for enabling collaboration across distance, for serving students whose accessibility needs require digital solutions, for supporting the administrative and logistical complexity of modern educational institutions. The argument is not against technology. It is against the thoughtless, evidence-free, vendor-driven acceleration of technology in contexts where it undermines the very foundations it is supposed to strengthen.
A responsible global education policy would, at minimum, do several things that the current system conspicuously fails to do. It would require that the evidence base for large-scale digital procurement be genuinely independent of the vendors supplying the technology. It would insist that the learning from early-adopter systems, including the learning about what went wrong, be actively communicated to late-adopter systems before, not after, they make the same investments. It would treat the question of appropriate technology use at different ages and in different pedagogical contexts as a matter of ongoing empirical inquiry, not a settled ideological commitment to ‘more is better.’ And it would hold to account the international organisations and development banks that have promoted digital solutions to educational problems without adequate attention to long-term cognitive and social outcomes.
None of this is technically difficult. The knowledge exists. The research is available. The lesson is sitting there in the PISA data, in the Swedish preschool curriculum reversal, in the UK university exam halls filling up with students holding pens. The question is purely one of political will, and of whether the global education community considers it acceptable to keep selling a model it is quietly dismantling at home.
Who decides what technology is for?
Beneath all the policy detail in this series lies a question that is fundamentally political rather than technical: who gets to decide what role technology plays in education, and in whose interest do those decisions get made? The answer, across the period this series has covered, has too often been: vendors, with governments following at a respectful distance and parents and teachers arriving to the conversation after the contract is signed.
De-digitalisation, for all its imperfections, its occasional moral panic, its selective use of evidence and its tendency to become a political signalling exercise, represents something important: a reassertion that educational technology is a means, not an end, and that the people who should determine how much of it to use are educators, researchers and communities, not quarterly earnings reports. The fact that Finland chose to legislate, that Sweden chose to buy books instead of tablets, that Queensland schools now require phones to be away for the day, often collected, or switched off, from the moment students arrive and found their playgrounds transformed, these are acts of pedagogical agency. They are an insistence that schools are for children, not for platforms.
A final word
There is nothing wrong with technology in education. There is something very wrong with the assumption that more technology is always better, and something worse with the global system that allows wealthy nations to learn that lesson expensively, correct it quietly, and then export the uncorrected version to everyone else.
The pencil did not disappear because it failed. It was sidelined because screens arrived with better marketing. It is coming back, in Finnish classrooms, in Swedish preschools, in Australian playgrounds, in university exam halls, not out of nostalgia, but because 30 years of evidence have converged on an uncomfortable truth: some things, it turns out, require your full attention, your physical hand, and the irreplaceable cognitive effort of a human being working without a shortcut.
That is not a retreat. That is a reckoning. And the only question left worth asking is whether the rest of the world will get to benefit from it before they have to discover it for themselves.
SERIES COMPLETE
Part I: From Ed-Tech Enthusiasm to De-Digitalisation | Part II: Phones, Pens & Early Literacy | Part III: Attention, Algorithms & Adolescents | Part IV: Universities, AI & the Handwritten Exam | Part V: Who Is Going to Tell the Rest of the World?
Features
New kid on the block – AI drug prescriber from the US
Artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare has come to stay and is a well-recognised development over the last decade or so. AI has now progressed on to even the ability to execute quite a few tasks and manoeuvres that were once the sole duties of doctors. Certain AI programmes are now designed to make tricky diagnoses, offer mental counselling, detect drug interactions, read and diagnose images, forecast results, and review scientific articles, to name a few amongst other capabilities. As the aptitudes of AI increase, the roles of doctors are likely to change. In the future, there is a real possibility that physicians would increasingly be placed in supervisory roles in semiautonomous systems, while retaining responsibility but with reduced independence.
Philosopher Walter Benjamin, in the 1930s, wrote that photography and cinema would have a telling effect on paintings and painters. It was argued that the introduction of visual images would render painting and painters quite obsolete. Many belittled the artistic value of photographs, just as today, many ask whether AI can truly understand illness or empathise with discomfort. The opponents of photography theorised that original works of art, such as paintings, had a so-called aura and that there was something special about an original artwork compared to a reproduction as a photo image, and that the painting echoed its singular history and unique trajectory through time, space, and social meaning.
Today’s doctors have something comparable. Their professional authority was grounded in their unique training, the practical wisdom that they had accrued, their face-to-face presence with patients, and their nuanced clinical judgment. Like an original painting, medical expertise appeared singular and inseparable from the clinician who exercised it rather than from the tools or institutions that supported the physician’s practice.
Now enters the latest AI initiative in healthcare. As documented in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) on the 13th of April 2026, it is the very first AI DRUG PRESCRIBER. It originated in the state of Utah of the United States of America, which is the 45th state admitted to the Union on the 4th of January 1896, and is well-known for its unique geography, including the Great Salt Lake and its “Mighty 5” national parks: Zion, Bryce Canyon, Arches, Capitol Reef, and Canyonlands.
In January 2026, the State of Utah publicised a first-of-its-kind partnership with an AI company to develop an AI-based programme to prescribe medications without physician involvement. The AI prescriber package sold by the company Doctronic is claimed to conduct a “comprehensive medical assessment” that “mirrors the clinical decision-making process a licensed physician would follow“. Originally, it was intended to focus on prescription renewals, and the software is designed to prescribe almost 200 drugs, including corticosteroids, statins, antidepressants, hormones, and anticoagulant agents. It has the potential to develop into an autonomous system that could even provide original prescriptions without the involvement of doctors.
There are perceived advantages to AI prescribing in a world facing shortages of primary care physicians, as well as certain specialists. The public health goal is to make sure that patients have access to safe, effective drugs and continue receiving them for as long as it is appropriate. There are documented scientific studies in Western countries on non-adherence, failure to take the drugs of a first prescription, and failure to get refill prescriptions. True enough, AI could reduce pervasive medication errors, enhance process efficiency, and free physicians to focus on complex diagnostic tasks or human-to-human interactions.
Yet for all that, technology-driven revolutions can also cause damage, create waste, and even destabilise the medical connection. They could reduce the patient-clinician encounters and substantially reduce the prospects for physicians to spot other problems and for patients to raise anxieties and ask questions. Doctors have to go through a rigorous process of training and demonstration of clinical fitness to be allowed to practice medicine. AI prescribers face no equivalent safety process. AI companies generally do not openly reveal the precise operational details of the software’s abilities to make medical decisions. In the Utah deal, generalisations were offered, including that the AI prescriber is “trained on established medical protocols,” and that its algorithm continues to progress through “feedback loops.” However, they are far from the absolute detailed guarantees that training of a physician offers.
In the American System of Governance, most states have long maintained foundational laws for dispensing medicines, positioning licensed physicians and pharmacists as essential caretakers and even as gatekeepers. Federal Law requires that any drug that “is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law” must be dispensed only “upon a written prescription of a practitioner licensed by law“. AI prescribers are not licensed “practitioners” of medicine, and here, Utah has waived state requirements. It has waived State Laws for businesses with novel ideas deemed potentially beneficial to consumers.
Under the main FDA statute, an AI prescriber comes under an “instrument, apparatus, implement, or machine clearly intended for use in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,” which makes it an FDA-regulated medical device. The 21st Century Cures Act of 2016 created exemptions for software involving administrative support, general wellness, or electronic record storage. For clinical software, the FDA has generally exercised enforcement discretion only for tools that aid physician decisions. By design, AI prescribers remove the physician, meaning that FDA oversight is required.
However, in the Utah deal, the company has apparently not attempted to approach the FDA about the technology, thereby working on the presumption that the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine. True enough, Federal Law and the FDA itself express that the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine. However, Federal Law also emphasises that medical devices and drugs must be legally sold and used within a legitimate patient-clinician relationship. Federal Law does not permit the replacement of physicians with unlicensed computers.
The scientific aspects of the conundrum imply that the current political administration appears to be disregarding some of the federal oversight. Since its 2025 inauguration, the executive branch of the current administration has rescinded previous AI governance orders, encouraged the removal of policies that might impair innovation, and issued an executive order aimed at reducing federal funds for states that strictly regulate AI. The USA Commissioner of Food and Drugs has clearly emphasised the need for AI innovation. Given this antiregulatory environment for AI, the prospect of federal intervention against initiatives like AI prescribers appears to be quite slim.
As federal and state regulators retreat, private parties have stepped in. The Joint Commission (TJC), a private, non-profit organisation that functions as the primary accrediting body for healthcare organisations, recently released non-binding guidance urging healthcare organisations to establish internal AI governance structures and rigorously measure outcomes. The success of AI prescribers will ultimately depend on the acceptance of health systems, which should demand robust evidence of safety and effectiveness, optimally in the form of clinical trials.
Tort law, a branch of civil law that deals with public wrongs such as situations where one person’s behaviour causes some form of harm or loss to another, remains a potential avenue for addressing patient harm because Utah’s agreement leaves such remedies intact. However, injured patients face significant hurdles. Courts will have to determine whether AI could be held to the same standard of care as a human physician. A product liability lawsuit would typically require a plaintiff to show that there was a reasonable alternative design, a challenge for AI black-box technologies. Furthermore, companies might argue that patients “assumed the risk” of using the AI prescriber. However, that is not a complete defence.
AI prescribing would be safest under concurrent state and federal oversight. Yet Utah has granted a state waiver, and FDA compliance has not been demonstrated. Other companies may take the lesson that they can bypass federal safety standards, and they may race into the market to ensure they are not left behind.
Some examples beg for caution. The FDA fell behind in regulating flavoured e-cigarettes, which are now ubiquitous and have contributed to a youth e-cigarette epidemic, which has even reached Sri Lanka. The sheer scale of the unauthorised market and the subsequent legal tactics used by tobacco companies turned premarket requirements into a mere technicality. If AI prescribing becomes the industry standard before safety and liability frameworks are established, the power problem may render future regulation infeasible.
Although AI offers the promise of increased efficiency and expanded access, the evasion of legal obligations by early movers raises profound concerns. The company that is marketing the AI Prescriber is operating in a unique legal “grey zone” that has sparked intense debate among regulators and medical associations.
Incorporating AI into modern health care must be evidence-based and responsible. Physicians and health systems should insist that AI technologies should not be allowed to bypass long-standing and proven legal guardrails governing medical products. That needs to be the axiom that should apply not only to the Western nations but to the whole wide world.
by Dr B. J. C. Perera
MBBS(Cey), DCH(Cey), DCH(Eng), MD(Paediatrics), MRCP(UK), FRCP(Edin), FRCP(Lond), FRCPCH(UK), FSLCPaed, FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH(UK), Hony. FCGP(SL)
Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
An Independent Freelance Correspondent.
Features
From the Handbook for Bad Political Appointments
The Geathiswaran Chapter:
Dr. Ganesanathan Geathiswaran, Sri Lanka’s Deputy High Commissioner in Chennai is in hot water, dragging in with him the Foreign Ministry as well as the Sri Lanka government into a worthless controversy. It stands as a classic example of a misplaced political appointment to a sensitive public position paid for by hapless Sri Lankan taxpayers. And that too by a government that came to power promising not to politicise appointments.
Why would a meeting between a Sri Lankan diplomat and a group of fishermen in South India in the last week of March 2026 be controversial? After all, illegal fishing in Sri Lankan waters by South Indian fishermen from the Tamil Nadu area, which negatively impacts the livelihoods of mostly Tamil-speaking Sri Lankan fishing communities, is a perennial problem that neither Sri Lankan nor Indian governments have been able to resolve. This is also a consistent political issue in Tamil Nadu politics. In this context, a Sri Lankan diplomat meeting local fishermen might well be within his job description. But the issue is how and where such a meeting should take place. The bottom line is that it should not be a public event.
Speaking to The Hindu on 5April 2026, Geathiswaran insisted his presence in the meeting was a “routine visit” and that the event was not organised by any political party. He also said, “I’m not here to do politics” and “I have nothing to do with politics.” He further insisted, “I did not take part in any political campaign. It was in an open area along the seashore. The meeting was not on a stage and in a public area.” These utterances show both Geathiswaran’s naivety, woeful lack of experience and understanding of the nature of politics in the region where he is our country’s chief diplomat.
Be that as it may, let us look at the optics and substance of the said event. According to information circulating in the media in both Sri Lanka and India, the Deputy High Commissioner attended a meeting with local fishermen in Puducherry. It was not a closed-door meeting. It appears, the Sri Lankan diplomat was invited to the event or it was coordinated by Jose Charles Martin, the leader of the newly formed political party, Latchiya Jananayaga Katchi (LJK). Though launched only in 2025, the LJK has been making inroads into Tamil Nadu politics mostly funded by the business interests and funds of Martin’s father, the well-known lottery tycoon, Santiago Martin. LJK joined the BJP-led NDA in the ongoing Puducherry Assembly Elections of 2026. Moreover, as indicated in the photographs in circulation, one can easily see the presence of several BJP politicians including V. P. Ramalingam, BJP’s Puducherry president and a candidate in the Raj Bhavan constituency.
Members of Martin’s family are craftily aligned with different Tamil Nadu political formations. Jose Charles Martin himself is contesting the Puducherry electoral area as a BJP ally, while his mother is contesting from the AIADMK, and his brother-in-law is contesting as a candidate of the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) party.
Therefore, Geathiswaran’s assertion that the event was not organised by a political party is blatantly false. Further, the event does not become non-political just because of the absence of a stage just as much as a stage does not provide political attributes merely because of its higher elevation. It is unacceptable that a diplomat hand-picked by the Sri Lankan President for the important station of Chennai, thereby depriving the appointment of a senior career diplomat with years of work experience and awareness of political nuance and optics, can be allowed to be this naïve.
It is in this context that Pawan Khera, a senior leader of the Indian National Congress, complained in an X post on 4 April tagging the Indian External Affairs Minister noting that Geathiswaran’s participation in the meeting was “a gross violation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations”, according to which “diplomats ‘have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.’” He also noted in his post that the diplomat was invited by the leader of the LJK and also referred to the presence of senior BJP politicians. Leaving aside the overemphasis of the Vienna Convention, which in this instance makes no sense, the issue at hand is the complete lack of common sense on the part of the Sri Lankan diplomat that allowed this controversy to arise in the first place. Despite his insistence on not engaging in politics, which in the case is likely true, this was very clearly a political event, politically conceived, perceived and packaged, organised by a political party, and conducted in the presence of allied politicians who were contesting in a local election. As a foreign diplomatic representative, Geathiswaran should have the cerebral wherewithal to make the distinction or at least seek guidance from his superiors at the Foreign Ministry in Colombo.
Diplomats need not shy away from controversy if it makes sense and benefits the nation. But the incident under reference is purely nonsensical from any perspective. This brings me back to Geathiswaran’s appointment as Sri Lanka’s Deputy High Commissioner in Chennai, itself. What unique experiences did he bring to the post? Of course, he is Tamil-speaking. So are hundreds of thousands of other citizens in the country including potentially competent, well-trained, intelligent and experienced career diplomats. I am not saying that political appointments are necessarily unfavourable, though not ideal unless they bring to the service expertise that the Foreign Service does not have. But what quality and qualification does Geathiswaran possess for the position that is lacking in a career foreign service officer?
Does he bring in access to the different segments of Tamil Nadu political landscape that no one else has? If so, should this controversy not have arisen in the first place, owing to the good connections to the entire political spectrum? In short, he brings absolutely nothing to his office and the country he represents. He also does not have any diplomatic or any other public or private sector experience that would have injected sense and nuance into the present posting. His only qualification is the close political connection to the NPP through family.
This fiasco brings to mind some ideas I presented in 2024 in the government’s own newspaper, the Observer two weeks before the NPP government was established and about one month after President Dissanayake assumed office. Since those conditions still remain valid and the present incident raises the same alarm I raised then, I think it is worth reflecting on them yet again:
“During the last three decades, particularly during the Rajapaksa administration, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Service saw a significant nosedive … In real terms what this means is, the Foreign Service has been encroached by individuals purely based on their political and nepotistic connections, with little or no regard for requisite qualifications, expertise or experience. This is observed not only at ambassadorial level, but also right down to the junior levels in our overseas missions … The main reason for the sorry state of the Sri Lanka Foreign Service is that it has been problematically and parochially politicised over a long period of time, without any pushback … Political appointments are a serious problem. Due to the appointment of completely unqualified individuals on political patronage, there are very few intelligent and well-trained personnel in our embassies in the major cities of the world who are able to proactively work in the country’s interest, when problems arise at the global level. Furthermore, it is also not apparent if there are officials in the Ministry who can advise their unenlightened political superiors without fear and stand their ground on principle. This situation has come about as a matter of simple personal survival and bread-and-butter purposes, owing to which both the larger interest of the Service and self-respect of officers have been clearly compromised.”
Is this not what the Chennai incident also indicates? Geathiswaran being a wrongful appointment is one matter. But it also appears that he did not even have the common sense to seek advice before the meeting in Puducherry or such advice was simply not forthcoming or heeded, as political appointees are generally considered a know-it-all bunch who have the ears of the political hierarchy, and therefore above the norms and regulations that apply to mere career officials.
For many of us the advent of the NPP to power signified the dismantling of the culture of political patronage in which diplomatic postings were rewards for loyalty and friendships. It took less time for the present government than others to go against its own repeatedly stated pre-election positions and to stuff the Foreign Service with incompetent individuals. The present fiasco authored by one of these appointees exemplifies the consequences of this continuing malpractice.
Let me leave readers and government apologists with the words of Tom Nichols, former professor at the U.S. Naval War College about Trumpian ambassadorial appointments, as this applies to our country too: “[With some of his ambassador choices], Trump has elevated diplomatic incompetence to an art.”
Sri Lanka just might outdo the mighty US President on this score.
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