The leadership is also presenting the agreement as a victory because, in Tehran’s argument, the US and Israel failed to achieve their main objectives.

They did not force Iran into surrender, did not remove the Islamic Republic from power, did not end Iran’s nuclear programme through military action, and did not break Iran’s links to Hezbollah.

Instead, Iran is still at the negotiating table, with Lebanon included in the framework and sanctions relief being discussed.

But this official narrative is contested inside Iran.

One hard-line MP, the deputy chair of parliament’s National Security Committee, has reportedly described the draft deal as a document that would turn Iran into an American colony.

He also accused negotiators of ignoring the supreme leader’s directive not to re-open the Strait of Hormuz to shipping.

That criticism matters because it does not come from outside the system. It comes from within one of the institutions meant to oversee national security.

For months, hard-line voices in parliament, state-aligned media and nightly pro-government gatherings have argued that the US cannot be trusted.

They point to the fact that diplomacy was still taking place shortly before the war began, and say the Trump administration used negotiations as cover while Israel and the US prepared military action. For them, any deal with Washington risks looking like appeasement.

Yet some of these voices appear quieter now. That may suggest that the decision to proceed has been authorised from the highest levels of the state. It does not mean there is full unity.

It might suggest that, for now, the centre of power has judged that the cost of rejecting a deal may be greater than the cost of absorbing hard-line anger.

Economic pressure is central to that calculation.

Iran’s leadership may present the agreement as the result of military leverage, including pressure around the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on US and regional energy interests. But the economy has also forced Tehran’s hand.

The war, sanctions, restrictions on shipping, reduced access to oil markets and hard currency, and very high inflation have all squeezed the country and ordinary Iranians.

For many families, the question is not whether the agreement sounds like victory, but whether it lowers prices and reduces fear of another round of war.

US Vice-President JD Vance has said Iran would not receive taxpayer money but could gain access to billions of dollars if it fulfills its commitments and sanctions are eased. That allows Tehran to sell the deal as a path to investment and reconstruction rather than dependency on America.

Still, the risks are obvious. The details of the memorandum have not been fully published, and negotiations are expected to begin in Switzerland on Friday.

The most difficult issues, the future of Iran’s enriched uranium, the level of enrichment allowed, verification, sanctions relief, Hormuz and Lebanon, remain to be discussed in the talks.

There is also uncertainty over Israel. Its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has rejected reports that Israel will withdraw from southern Lebanon, saying Israeli forces will remain in Lebanon for as long as necessary.

Donald Trump, meanwhile, has publicly criticised Israel’s conduct in Lebanon, saying too many people have been killed. He also said he was unhappy with an Israeli strike on Beirut shortly before the Iran-US deal was reached, while insisting his relationship with Netanyahu remained excellent.

For Tehran, this visible friction between Washington and Israel is useful. It can be presented as evidence that Iran’s pressure has complicated Israel’s freedom of action. But it also makes the deal fragile.

If Israel continues operations in Lebanon, Iran will face pressure to respond. If Washington cannot restrain Israel, Tehran’s claim that Lebanon is covered by the memorandum may quickly be tested.

The reaction from BBC Persian’s audience suggests the official victory narrative is landing unevenly.

One audience member said they had been very worried about another Israeli attack, but even after hearing about the agreement, they had “no trust” and were worried about whether the country would be properly managed if the deal lasted.

Another anti-regime Iranian, who initially supported US military action, asked what the US attack had achieved, since if it did not lead to political change in Iran: “Our hope was that the ruling system would change. But apart from misery, inflation, and further damage to the economy, what benefit did it have for people?”

Others were more sympathetic to the government’s line. One audience member described Iran as the winner, saying the war showed sanctions are lifted not through “begging”, but through the use of power.

Another welcomed the agreement more cautiously, saying it allowed people to return to work and life with greater peace of mind. “I think it is temporary,” they said, “but we needed a few months of breathing space and calm.”

That may be the most realistic reading. The Islamic Republic is selling the deal as victory because it cannot easily sell it as necessity.

But for many Iranians, its success will not be measured by slogans. It will be measured by whether the war stops, whether prices ease, whether sanctions relief arrives, and whether the leadership can manage the next phase without another sudden escalation.

[BBC]