Midweek Review

War against separatist terrorism: Gen. Daya Rathnayake’s narrative

Published

1 year ago

2025/06/4

General (retd) Daya Rathnayake presents a copy of ‘Sri Lankawe Bedumwadi Thrasthawadaya 1975-2009’ to Army Commander Lieutenant General Lasantha Rodrigo at the SLF recently.

‘Sri Lankawe Bedumwadi Thrasthawadaya 1975-2009’

(Separatist Terrorism in Sri Lanka 1975 to 2009) made reference to major military operations conducted against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). A very interesting point made was the absence of major military operations after the disastrous Agni Keela (Anvil of Fire) offensive launched on April 24, 2001, in the Jaffna peninsula. That offensive had been aimed at regaining Elephant Pass that was abandoned in April 2000. The Agni Keela debacle stunned the military. That was the last major action undertaken by the military before the People’s Alliance defeat at the 2001 general election leading to the signing of the Norwegian arranged one-sided Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) advantageous to the LTTE. The military remained passive until the LTTE initiated offensive action in the second week of August 2006. The 2001-2006 period saw massive expansion of the LTTE as the southern political leadership pulled in different directions, thereby giving the LTTE a sense of certain victory. Resumption of large scale hostilities, simultaneously in both eastern and northern theaters in August 2006, underscored the level of the LTTE preparedness.

The war against separatist terrorism could have been brought to a successful conclusion much earlier if not for utterly irresponsible, foolish, politically motivated and treacherous actions of successive governments.

President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s handling of the war (January 1989-May 1993) is a glaring case in point. Premadasa’s ill-conceived political strategies that had caused so much destruction at the onset of Eelam War IV, in June 1990, demoralised the armed forces and resulted in debilitating setbacks. Premadasa prolonged the war that lasted two decades (From Eelam War II to IV/ 1990 to 2009).

Former Army Commander General Daya Rathnayake, in his recently launched memoirs ‘Sri Lankawe Bedumwadi Thrasthawadaya 1975-2009’ (Separatist Terrorism in Sri Lanka 1975 to 2009) briefly dealt with Premadasa’s handling of the war, after becoming the President on January 02, 1989. Perhaps, Rathnayake should have elaborated on Premadasa’s period, as the LTTE underwent a drastic transformation during Premadasa’s time. Premadasa not only directed the military to fully cooperate with the LTTE, the group was also provided with both arms, ammunition and finance, at the taxpayers’ expense.

Rathnayake, nor the previous ex-military officers who authored books on the conflict, never really bothered to examine this aspect. Premadasa ordered the disbursement of funds to the LTTE, just months after he took office as the President. There is irrefutable evidence that Premadasa had the then Finance Secretary, R. Paskaralingam, release to the Tigers Rs 5 mn each time, on August 09, September 15, 27, November 11, 30, and December 13, 1989. In the following year, again Rs 5 mn each were released to the LTTE on January 08, 30, February 20, March 02, 21, April 19, 20, and June 06 and 08. Premadasa’s decision to release Rs 50 mn on November 05, 1990, is a mystery as, by then, the LTTE had taken the upper hand in the Eelam War II. Why did Premadasa release Rs 50 mn about five months after the resumption of fighting and the strategic loss of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, north of Vavuniya? That foolish action had never been explained and no one in authority bothered to examine Premadasa’s action.

The 21st Commander of the Army Rathnayake (August 1, 2013, to February 21, 2015) succeeded General Jagath Jayasuriya (July 15, 2009, to July 31, 2013), the man who earned the wrath of war-winning Army commander, General Sarath Fonseka, for obvious reasons. President Mahinda Rajapaksa brought in Jayasuriya as Fonseka’s successor, amidst developing turmoil over his decision to replace Fonseka.

Dispute between the Rajapaksas and Fonseka

The unprecedented dispute between the Rajapaksas and Fonseka, over the latter’s entry into politics, seeking the highest office in 2010, threw the country into political turmoil as never before. That undermined the post-war defence of armed forces in the face of war crimes accusations, propagated by Western powers. The election of Maithripala Sirisena as President, in January 2015, paved the way for Fonseka to receive the coveted Field Marshal’s appointment in May 2015. In Oct ober, the same year, just two months after the parliamentary polls, the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government treacherously co-sponsored an accountability resolution against its own war-winning armed forces. Rathnayake relinquished command a couple of weeks before Fonseka’s appointment as Field Marshal.

One-time Rajapaksa loyalist Rathnayake teamed-up with experienced writer Major Sarath Jayawardena to author a highly readable book that explained the conflict lucidly. The book launch took place amidst the ongoing controversy over the National People’s Power (NPP) government’s handling of the 16th Anniversary of the crushing defeat rendered to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the battlefield. Rathnayake received appointment as Secretary to the Ministry of Industries in July 2021. Previously he served as Chairman of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA,) but quit amidst controversy. In the run-up to the last presidential election, Rathnayake pledged his support to presidential candidate Sajith Premadasa.

People found fault with the government over President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s decision not to attend the May 19 event. But, the President, who is also the Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces ,at the last moment, fortunately, changed his mind, thereby averting a major blunder.

Let me get back to the work of the two authors.

They dealt with the beginning on a low intensity conflict, the gradual development of hostilities, to a full scale conventional war, the Indian military deployment here (August 1987 to March 1990), resumption of war between the government and the LTTE, in June 1990, on and off peace negotiations, and the collapse of the Norwegian peace initiative, finally leading to the destruction of the group whose military prowess surprised the world. But, as the authors pointed out, Sri Lanka, too, contributed to the enemy’s battlefield success. Rathnayake explained one major blunder caused by Premadasa at the onset of Eelam War II.

The then Major Rathnayake had been at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH), Colombo, when fighting raged in the East, in the second week of June 1990. The senior author had been the duty officer at the JOH. Rathnayake is, perhaps, one of the few military personnel to observe the then State Defence Minister, the late Ranjan Wijeratne, Defence Secretary the late General Cyril Ranatunga, and then IGP the late Ernest Perera, issuing orders for the armed forces, and police, to surrender to the LTTE.

Rathnayake names the then Lt. Colonel Hiran Halangoda, the Commanding Officer of the first battalion of Gemunu Watch (1GW), as the one who refused to heed the treacherous directive issued by the JOH. Sri Lanka never bothered to examine the conduct of political and military leadership during the conflict. Even 17 years after the conclusion of the war, no government took tangible measures to conduct a thorough examination of the conflict.

Although several senior retired officers had written about the conflict, in addition to wartime Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who himself served the celebrated Gajaba Regiment, the armed forces hadn’t made a collective effort to record the conflict. Co-author Maj. Jayawardena, in his brief but quite useful narrative, explained the overall shortcomings in the armed forces’ efforts. Jayawardena pointed out how Mahavamsa, too, failed to receive the confidence of all.

In spite of the discrepancy in the number of police deaths, as a result of the treacherous directive issued by the UNP government, the Police Department, according to Rathnayake and Jayawardena, definitely lost more than 600 officers and men.

Pooneryn debacle

Rathnayake and Jayawardena discussed the Pooneryn debacle and the subsequent pullout from the area. The losses suffered by the Army as a result of the multi-pronged attack on the Pooneryn-Nagathevanthurai naval detachment, in early November 1993, underscored the failure on the part of the command structure.

The writer was surprised the authors failed to mention the then Army Commander Cecil Waidyaratne acceptance of responsibility for the Pooneryn debacle and resigned on December 31, 1993. During the 30-year conflict, Waidyaratne was the only service chief to relinquish command following a debacle. The authors also depend on the memoirs of Sivakamy Sivasubramaniyam, alias Thamilini, the LTTE’s Women’s Wing leader whose memoirs were launched after the conclusion of the conflict and attracted much public attention. Thamilini’s THIYUNU ASIPATHAKA SEWANA YATA received appreciation from many, though some of those who still cannot stomach the LTTE’s defeat found fault with her for obvious reasons.

Thamilini died of cancer in October 2015, seven years after she surrendered to the Army on the Vanni east front.

The latest book from an ex-Army commander can influence the Sinhala readers, especially at a time when a concentrated attempt was being made to downplay the bloody conflict, ignoring innumerable sacrifices made by the armed forces to preserve the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Regardless of the strategic political-military blunders and battlefield miscalculations, the armed forces ultimately brought the war to a successful conclusion.

Rathnayake explained the loss of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road at the onset of the Eelam War II, on June 11, 1990, soon after the LTTE broke the14-month honeymoon with Premadasa. That stretch of road, north of Vavuniya, remained under LTTE control till the armed forces regained the area in the first week of January 2009.

The authors referred to memoirs of several retired officers, including the late Maj. General Sarath Munasinghe, the late Maj. Gen. Cyril Ranatunga (he was one of those shortsighted persons who, at the behest of Premadasa, ordered the police and the military to surrender), Maj General Wasantha Perera, General Gerry de Silva, General Kamal Gunaratne and Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda. However, the authors should have paid attention to Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka’s memoirs ‘The Army Commander’s Promise to the Nation’, as well as Special Forces veteran Dhammi Hewage ‘Fighting on Two Fronts’ and armourd corps veteran Ranjan Wijedasa’s ‘Unburied Man.’

Rathnayake and his co-author also left out wartime Defence Secretary Lt. Colonel Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s autobiography ‘Gota’s War.’ Authored by political analyst and Sri Lanka’s former Permanent Representative in Geneva C.A. Chandraprema. ‘Gota’s War’, whatever the criticism directed at its author, is the most comprehensive post-war work on the conflict.

Post-war failure

All those who authored books on the conflict, so far, failed pathetically to build a strong defence of war-winning armed forces against wild war crimes allegations, especially emanating from the West. Sri Lanka’s failure to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations propagated by interested parties, including those represented in Parliament, is a mystery. Seventeen years after the successful conclusion of the conflict, the country is in a deepening political-economic-social crisis. The absence of long queues for essentials, as in 2022, does not mean we are out of the woods. In spite of national elections that paved the way for the NPP to secure both the presidency and 2/3 majority in Parliament, the country is certainly not out of the woods yet.

The current armed forces leadership, in consultation with the NPP government, should at least now establish an expert team, consisting of wartime GoCs of the fighting Divisions and Task Forces, or their senior representatives, and other key officers, now retired, to formulate a strategy that would go beyond memoirs of any particular officer. The inclusion of Gajaba Regiment veteran Chagi Gallage, who played a significant role in military operations that cleared the Eastern theatre of operations (2006-2007), and then contributed immensely to the success in the Vanni theatre (2007-2009). Gallage, who had been the then Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s original choice to command Task Force 1, subsequently named 58 Division, the celebrated formation that figured prominently in the destruction of the LTTE. General Shavendra Silva, who retired on January 01, 2025, gave unparalleled leadership to that division after Chagi Gallage suffered a sudden heart attack, is credited with causing massive losses on the enemy, both in terms of territory, men and material.

Sri Lanka’s failure to counter unsubstantiated war crimes accusations, even 17 years after the emphatic defeat of the LTTE, cannot be discussed without taking into consideration Sarath Fonseka switching allegiance to the UNP in 2009. Fonseka’s political move wrong-footed the war-winning military. UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe ensnared the Sinha Regiment veteran who had no option but to join an unholy alliance that included the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) led Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

The man, who was supposed to lead Sri Lanka’s defence against war crimes accusations, himself contributed to the Geneva plot by alleging Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa ordered the 58 Division to execute those who surrendered on the Vanni east front. Fonseka’s declarations in the run-up to the 2010 presidential election undermined the country in no small measure.

As to why Fonseka got on the same political platform with the TNA that had recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of Tamil speaking people, way back in 2001, is still a mystery. Fonseka’s contentious move divided the war-winning Army and repercussions are still being felt, that being the worst type of treachery. Although retired officer’s right to enter active politics cannot be challenged under any circumstances, Fonseka’s alliance with those who relentlessly pursued hostile campaigns against the military during the conflict, caused immense damage.

The US, the UK and Canada have taken specific punitive measures against selected officers, while the UN held Sri Lanka responsible for over 40,000 civilian deaths out of thin air. But none of them ever sanctioned Fonseka over accusations though the world accepted he spearheaded the successful ground offensive from Colombo as he knew the terrain like the back of his hand.

The ex-top brass must contribute to a collective effort to set the record straight. The country cannot any further delay a cohesive bid to counter the Geneva challenge and action taken by individual countries as part of their overall political strategy to cultivate voters of Sri Lankan origin. There cannot be a better example than Canada that relentlessly pursued Sri Lanka. The appointment of Gary Anandasangaree as their Public Safety Minister recently highlighted the danger the Canadian strategy posed as Sri Lanka still remained ignorant of the developing scenario.

The Tamil Guardian recently declared moves to establish a second Tamil genocide monument, close on the heels of one put up in Brampton, Ontario. Naïve Sri Lankan leadership seems to be struggling to cope up with the Canadian onslaught.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

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Midweek Review

Opp. caught up in CIABOC offensive

Published

5 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mahinda Rajapaksa leaving CIABOC on 12 June, 2026

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) on 12 June questioned former President Mahinda Rajapaksa regarding the USD 2 Mn bribe allegation directed at the late SriLankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena, whose body was found on 8 May in a close relative’s home in Kollupitiya. Chandrasena’s alleged suicide sent shock waves through political circles and interested parties questioned the circumstances leading to him being granted bail on 6 May on cash bail of Rs. 500,000 with three sureties of Rs. 10 million each. The Colombo Magistrate court also imposed a travel ban. The issue at hand is as to how Mohamed Riswan and Mohamed Irshan stood as sureties for Chandrasekera. Of all the investigations undertaken by the CIABOC, the USD 2 Mn bribe case is the most politically charged probe.

Of the Rajapaksas, former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa is so far the last to be indicted. CIABOC on 19 June filed indictments before the Colombo High Court against him and two others Sepalika Saman Kumari and Keerthi Bandara Kotagama. According to the charges, the accused are alleged to have committed the offence of corruption and aided and abetted the commission of the offence by using official influence to pressure certain government officials, attached to the Office for Reparations, to obtain compensation amounting to Rs. 8.85 million for a property built on a state land by Shasheendra and destroyed by marauding Aragalaya mobs.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) government last week emphasised, in no uncertain terms, that it wouldn’t tolerate the growing Opposition challenge.

Amidst the growing controversy over the continuing detention of retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. in terms of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), under humiliating conditions, in connection with the ongoing investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, police arrested Sugeeshwara Bandara, leader of the New People’s Front (NPF). The Central Crime Investigation Bureau (CCIB) apprehended him on 18 June and the Fort Magistrate’s Court remended him till 1 July..

The CCIB also apprehended Binoy Hettiarachchi who was accompanying Bandara. Hettiarachchi served as a media coordinator at the former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office. Police intercepted their vehicle at Kollupitiya where the arrests were made like in an action-packed movie. Hettiarachchi was freed four hours later.

But, it would be better to identify Bandara as the former private secretary to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as well as the Director General of Special Projects at the Presidential Secretariat in the wake of Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over the presidency.

Accused of receiving two salaries simultaneously, under the President’s Expenditure Head, Bandara who managed the media for Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in the run-up to the 2019 presidential election, is under investigation for abuse of government vehicles and employing government workers for political work.

Having launched his political career as the Colombo District organiser of the alliance New People’s Front, a breakaway faction of the UPFA, in February, 2024, Bandara contested the November, 2024, parliamentary polls on the New Democratic Front (NDF) ticket. But, of late, Bandara, as the leader of NPF, became one of the most active opposition activists, aligned with the political grouping, dubbed People’s United Opposition, operating from Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office.

Bandara drew the wrath of the government when he launched a noisy protest outside Finance Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma’s residence at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, on 26 April, where he and his protesting supporters were given a shower of excreta. The group, led by Bandara, demanded the Finance Secretary’s resignation over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. No less a person than President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reacted angrily to Bandara’s actions.

Acknowledging the right for legitimate protests, the President warned against protests directed at residences of officials. On 18 April, Bandara led a protest outside Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha’s recently built luxury residence at Weliwita, Kaduwela, where he questioned how the JVPer managed to build such a home as he was on record as having repeatedly said that he lived a difficult life.

The police apprehended Bandara as he was returning from a meeting between senior representatives of the People’s United Opposition and the IMF Colombo at the Tiki Bar, Shangri-La. In spite of negligible parliamentary presence, with those elected on the NDF ticket at the last parliamentary election not really speaking in one voice, the Flower Road project has become a headache for the government.

In fact, the Flower Road operation has been causing continuous harassment to the NPP, while the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) struggled to play its anticipated role as the main Opposition. Instead of conducting a cohesive campaign against the cocky NPP government, members of the SJB seem to be pulling in different directions at the expense of the common opposition front.

Regardless of the Wickremesinghe-led grouping vowing to press ahead with its campaign, the arrest of Bandara is obviously meant to have a detrimental impact on the activities of the Opposition.

It would be pertinent to mention that Bandara had been among those who stayed with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the President’s House, in Colombo, as a massive protest erupted on 9 July, 2022. Bandara was among the last to flee the President’s House as the military withdrew, amidst mounting pressure on their positions.

The police arrested Bandara as former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa moved the Court of Appeal in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution to prevent him being arrested under the PTA. The wartime Defence Secretary sought the court intervention in the wake of police probing the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage and obtaining a travel ban against him.

The court heard Romesh de Silva PC’s submissions on behalf of the ex-President on 18 June. The court deferred the hearing to 24 June. The crux of the matter is that the ex-President fears that the CID is about to arrest him on the basis of a statement made by fugitive Azad Moulana, in Paris, linking Sallay directly with the Easter Sunday carnage.

NPP intensifies pressure

The NPP seems confident of its current course of action meant to pin down the Opposition. In spite of unbridled corruption being the major issue on the post-war election platform, no political party succeeded in going flat-out against the political opposition.

However, the NPP allowed the judicial process to continue. The first major sentencing was announced on 2 April, 2025, just six months after the parliamentary polls, handsomely won by the NPP. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) moved the Colombo High Court successfully against the former Chief Minister of the North Central Province S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon.

Colombo High Court No. 01 Judge Adithya Patabendige sentenced him in terms of Section 70 of the Bribery Act. The HC declared the former CM perpetrated malpractices by ordering fuel to his personal secretary’s vehicle. The personal secretary happened to be Shanthi Chandrasena, wife of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, a former Cabinet Minister and one of the most powerful Ministers to represent the North Central province.

The ex- Chief Minister and the second accused, his personal secretary, were convicted guilty of two charges. Both were sentenced to 16 years rigorous imprisonment and were also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200,000/- with an additional two-year prison term in case of default.

Deputy Director General Asitha Anthoney appeared on behalf of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption.

There had never been any really coordinated CIABOC campaign against corruption. No political party, or a particular family, felt threatened by CIABOC. Both those in and outside Parliament acted with impunity. They feared no one. There was no need to be because the powerful and the influential operated above the law.

Just a couple of weeks after sentencing of S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon and Shanthini Chandrasena, the CIABOC arrested the latter’s husband, one-time Deputy Economic Development Minister and Special Projects Minister, S.M. Chandrasena. The CIABOC took him into custody on 4 July, 2025.

The CIABOC accused the former Minister of causing loss to the government by distributing seed corn, imported at a cost of Rs 25 mn, in 2024, among the farmer community in the Anuradhapura district, at a subsidised price. The distribution had taken place ahead of the 2015 presidential election contested by Mahinda Rajapaksa and estranged former SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena. The CIABOC alleged that Chandrasena exerted undue influence on the Director (Planning) and other officers of the District Secretariat and distributed seeds through his political allies to gain an advantage in the 2015 presidential election and incurred a loss to the government.

Chandrasena was granted bail on 1 August, 2025. He was indicted on 12 June before the Colombo High Court.

Before further discussing the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, let me introduce the top leadership of CIABOC. The Commission consists of Justice W.M.N.P. Iddawela (Chairman), K.B. Rajapakse and Chethiya Goonesekera P.C, with High Court judge R.S.A. Dissanayake as its Director General.

The sentencing of the S. M. Ranjith Samarakoon didn’t really bother his side. The arrest of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, too, didn’t really upset those facing charges. But, sentencing of former Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage and former Sathosa Chairman and former Trade Minister Nalin Fernando on 29 May, 2025, sent shock waves through the Opposition.

The Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar sentenced Aluthgamage and Fernando for committing the offence of corruption by purchasing 14,000 carrom boards and 11,000 checkers boards through Sathosa, allegedly to distribute to schools and sports clubs selected by the Sports Ministry, and distributing them to party offices of the government, during the 2015 presidential election campaign thereby, causing a loss of over 53 million rupees to the government, stunned the Opposition.

Aluthgamage was sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, Fernando received a sentence of 25 years of rigorous imprisonment. Additionally, a fine of Rs. 100,000 (hundred thousand) was imposed for each count.

The CIABOC’s Assistant Director General Mrs. Anuththara Jayasinghe and Assistant Director General Mrs. Thushari Dayaratne conducted the prosecution.

During the Yahapalana government Aluthgamage spearheaded a high profile anti-corruption campaign, dubbed ‘Yahapalana Top 10 kamba horu’. The then Joint Opposition (JO) group, led in Parliament by Dinesh Gunawardena, published a 750-page book, targeting the Yahapalana ministers. Mahindananda, who spearheaded that campaign, is now serving a long sentence.

The JO group consists of UPFA lawmakers who declined to throw their weight behind the then President Sirisena aligned with the UNP.

Let me mention the names of those against whom the accusations were made by the JO.

Yahapalana corruption

The JO dealt with 10 major cases. (1) The Treasury bond scams perpetrated in 2015 and 2016. Accusations were directed at Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ravi Karunanayake and Governor Central Bank Arjuna Mahendran. The losses were estimated at Rs 26 bn. (2) causing losses amounting to Rs 10 bn through the fraudulent import of vehicles. Ravi Karunanayake was named the chief culprit (3) Misappropriation of Mahapola funds to the tune of Rs. 1 bn. Allegations were directed at Malik Samarawickrema (4) Stealing from an insurance scheme implemented for the benefit of those going for employment in West Asia. The JO accused Thalatha Atukarale of misappropriating funds amounting Rs 1.5 bn (5) Receiving Rs 1.5 bn through the leasing of Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema and R. Paskaralingam were named the offenders (6) Kabir Hashim was accused of causing a loss of Rs 54 bn by cancelling aircraft ordered from Airbus Industries for the national carrier (7) fraudulent activities pertaining to the release of paddy stocks held by the government. The JO estimated the losses caused to the government at Rs 10 bn. (8) Scam in vehicle parts. Ravil Karunanayake was accused of causing losses amounting to Rs. 6.5 bn, (9 A) Dr. Rajitha Senaratne was accused of leasing of the Modera fisheries harbor and procurement of eight vessels to catch fish, fraudulently, and thereby causing losses up to Rs 1 bn, (9B) The JO also found fault with Dr. Senaratne for perpetrating Rs 1.5 bn fraud in the procurement of medicine and lastly (10) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema, R. Paskaralingam and Charitha Ratwatte were blamed for a massive fraud in the procurement of coal for the Norochcholai coal-fired power plant. That particular fraud was estimated at Rs 5 bn.

Although the JO transformed itself to Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) later, to successfully contested the 2019 presidential election, none of the above-mentioned cases were investigated. As far as we know, none of those cases had been dealt with during the SLPP rule, from November, 2019, to July, 2022. Faced with an externally backed regime change operation, the SLPP invited Wickremesinghe, who had been named by them in three major corruption cases, to accept the premiership in May, 2022, and presidency in July same year.

So far, there is no indication whether the mentioned JO allegations had received the attention of the CIABOC or the Attorney General of the government. As far as we know of all the politicians and officials, Wickremesinghe is the only one facing imminent threat due to the ongoing case pertaining to him visiting the UK in September, 2023, to join his wife Prof. Maithree at the University of Wolverhampton at her graduation ceremony.

Wickremesinghe has been accused of squandering nearly 17 mn rupees at a time the country was in deep economic turmoil. The Fort Magistrate’s court is scheduled to take up the case on 8 July.

SLPP parliamentary group leader Namal Rajapaksa is also facing a major legal challenge. The former Minister has been indicted on charges of criminal misappropriation of Rs. 70 mn in connection with the controversial Krrish project. The indictments have been forwarded to the Colombo High Court by the Attorney General, alleging that Namal Rajapaksa misappropriated funds by receiving Rs. 70 million from the Indian real estate company for the development of rugby in Sri Lanka.

Yoshitha Rajapaksa, too, has been dealt with by the CIABOC. The Rajapaksas have been accused of lowering qualifications required to join the executive branch of the Navy and then sending him to the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom at taxpayers’ expense. Produced before the Colombo Additional Magistrate, Yoshitha was released on three personal bail bonds of Rs. 5 million each.

Producing Yoshitha before court on 17 June, Deputy Director General of the Bribery Commission, Ruvini Wickramasinghe declared: “”Your Honour, the complaint regarding this incident was received on June 25, 2016. Accordingly, the Commission initiated investigations. The complaint states that the suspect had participated in naval training programmes held in England and Ukraine by misusing government funds, while depriving qualified applicants of such opportunities. At that time, this individual, who is a civilian in the dock today, was also a civilian in 2006 when he was deemed eligible for the Royal Navy Young Officer training at the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom. The opportunities to receive this training are extremely limited. Your Honour, selection to this prestigious course is usually based on being the most outstanding cadet officer during a two-year training period or based on performance during training. However, this suspect, although a civilian in 2006, was proposed and included in the list and was sent for the course in haste.”

The Deputy Director General also stated that Yoshitha Rajapaksa had undergone medical examinations required for overseas training even before being officially recruited into the Navy.

The court was also told that though Sri Lanka previously received scholarships from the UK the Rajapaksa government funded Yoshitha to the tune of Rs 6.2 mn.

Opp. attacks CIABOC

The Opposition has repeatedly attacked the CIABOC with its Director General Ranga Dissanayake being the primary target. Accusing Dissanayake of being a JVPer, the Opposition has repeatedly questioned the conduct of the High Court judge demanding that the CIABOC inquired into the top official’s conduct, especially with regard to the alleged suicide of former Sri Lankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena who had been under investigation pertaining to the receiving of USD 2 mn bribe to facilitate procurement aircraft from Airbus Industrie during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term.

Former Foreign Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris, a regular speaker at Flower Road media briefings, alleged that the CIABOC was a political tool in the NPP’s hands.

A section of the Opposition to question the circumstances one-time JVP heavyweight Nandana Gunatilleke died in January this year at the Ragama Teaching Hospital after accusing Dissanayake of pursuing an agenda beneficial to the JVP, a charge denied by the High Court judge. When the writer raised the allegations with Dissanayake, he emphatically denied any wrongdoing on his part https://island.lk/ciaboc-dg-denies-jvp-link/.

The CIABOC has simply ignored accusations directed at its DG who proved through his actions that he really meant high profile public pronouncements against corruption.

Former Deputy Minister and ex-MP Sarana Gunawardena was sentenced to a total of 16 years rigorous imprisonment by the Colombo High Court on June 8, 2026.

During the Yahapalana administration many cases, filed by the CIABOC as well as the Attorney General, were either dismissed or dropped due to lapses on their part. The accused in such cases were ex-MP Sajin Vass Gunawardena, ex-EP Chief Minister Sivanesathurei Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan, ex-Ministers Johnston Fernando, Rohitha Abeygunawardena, Basil Rajapaksha, Mahindananda Aluthgamage and Janaka Bandara Tennakoon and former AG and CJ Mohan Peiris.

Regardless of Opposition protests, the public appreciate tangible action against corruption. However, the NPP has not been free from serious allegations against it since the last general elections. The release of suspicious 323 containers, plus two containers filled with ice, in January, 2025, followed by the massive coal scam perpetrated in September 2025, loss of over USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury and controversial Aswesuma payments, as well as wealth, accumulated by NPP Ministers as revealed by declarations made to CIABOC, shocked the electorate.

The NPP has failed to counter allegations. The circumstances under which Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigned, along with Energy Secretary Udayanga Hemapala, on 17 April, just a week after the NPP defeated the no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition against the Energy Minister. dealt a devastating blow to the NPP’s much touted integrity. The NPP couldn’t explain as to why a person under investigation by the CIABOC for an alleged fraud perpetrated during the Yahapalana government was accommodated in President Dissanayake’s first Cabinet. Indicted before the Colombo High Court, Jayakody’s case commenced last week.

Asset declarations of some NPP Ministers have shocked the country. The SJB has called for CIABOC to investigate them without delay and prove that CIABOC was not only going after the Opposition. Ministers Lal Kantha and Wasantha Samarasinghe are two of the top JVPers who have attracted attention as the Opposition hits back at the government.

SJB MP Mujibur Rahuman said that the JVP/NPP owed an explanation as to how their members amassed so much wealth since 2024 as they repeatedly claimed their inability to meet even their basic needs. But, their asset declarations exposed their blatant lies.

Midweek Review

Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

Published

5 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Listening to the Winds, Reading the Waves:

Prof. Gamini Keerawella’s latest publication, Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945 will be launched on 5 August at the Auditorium of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS). The keynote address will be delivered by Prof. T. V. Paul, James, McGill Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Canada and the former President of the International Studies Association (ISA).

Prof. Keerawella, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Peradeniya, has dedicated hisbook to the memory of Dr. Newton Gunasinghe, the eminent sociologist and Marxist theoretician who encouraged him to venture beyond disciplinary frontiers. In many respects, this work represents a successful realization of that intellectual endeavour. In her testimonial to back cover of the book, Dr. Radhika Coomaraswamy observes that “Gamini Keerawella offers a nuanced and layered account of the Indian Ocean region’s strategic evolution from the era of decolonization to the contemporary phase of intensifying great-power rivalry. Its distinctive analytical perspective makes it an important contribution to the study of international relations, maritime geopolitics, and regional strategic dynamics.” This assessment accurately captures the significance of the work, and I fully endorse her judgement.

This volume constitutes the final publication of a trilogy that explores the evolving dynamics of international relations from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective. The first study examined the trajectory of Sri Lanka’s defence and foreign policy, while the second revisited the origins, evolution, and principal constituent elements of international relations as an academic discipline from a Global South perspective. The present work broadens the analytical canvas by tracing the shifting geopolitical contours of the Indian Ocean since 1945 and examining the evolving interplay between great-power competition and regional agency.

Indian Ocean not merely maritime transit space

At the heart of Prof. Keerawella’s analysis is the argument that the Indian Ocean is not merely a maritime space of transit but a living archive whose language is inscribed in tides, trade, and collective memory. To uncover the deeper structures that have shaped the region, he draws on Michel Foucault’s concept of the archaeology of knowledge, probing beneath the visible layers of historical experience to reveal successive strata of thought, exchange, and power. This approach enables him to trace the multiple origins of the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical significance through the sedimented traces of how the ocean has been known, governed, and imagined across time. Complementing this perspective is Fernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée, which provides the framework for understanding the long-term evolution of Indian Ocean geopolitics. As Keerawella notes, for Braudel, history unfolds not as a single linear sequence but as a layered field of continuity and change, revealing the deeper architecture of the past—the slow yet powerful currents that shape political and economic developments beneath the surface of events (Keerawella 2026: xxiii).Prof. Keerawella further notes that later historians such as K. N. Chaudhuri and M. N. Pearson drew on Braudel’s insights and adapted them to understand the Indian Ocean as a polycentric world.

Prof. Keerawella argues that the terms employed in the title of this work—Winds, Waves, and Currents—evoke the ocean’s dual language of surface movement and underlying structure. In his reading, winds and waves signify motion: the visible and often turbulent forces that carry ships, peoples, commodities, and ideas across shifting maritime frontiers. Currents, by contrast, refer to the deeper and less visible forces that shape historical trajectories and connect coasts and continents through enduring patterns of interaction. As he observes, while winds and waves represent the restless dynamics of the ocean’s surface, currents embody the slower yet more consequential energies that operate beneath it, binding disparate regions into a larger maritime system (2026: xx).

Metaphors and Conceptual Foundation

Building on this conceptual foundation, the author employs winds, waves, and currents not merely as metaphors but also as analytical categories. Winds represent changing strategic directions and geopolitical realignments; waves denote recurring cycles of commerce, conflict, and interaction; and currents symbolize the deep structural forces that connect societies across space and time. Viewed from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective, the volume demonstrates how a strategically located small state at the centre of the Indian Ocean perceives and navigates this maritime space through its own strategic lens. The book opens by situating Sri Lanka within the intersecting forces of history, geography, and power that have shaped the Indian Ocean world. It advances the notion of a dual strategic consciousness that has informed Sri Lanka’s external engagements: a persistent sense of vulnerability, rooted in colonial experience and geographical exposure, coexisting with a cosmopolitan outlook forged through centuries of maritime exchange. Prof. Keerawella contends that this dual consciousness constitutes the underlying framework through which Sri Lanka has historically interpreted and responded to developments in its external environment.

Winds and Waves is a comprehensive study comprising eleven chapters and an extensive introduction that establishes the analytical foundations of the work by treating the ocean simultaneously as text and method. The opening chapter situates Sri Lanka within the wider Indian Ocean system, tracing the island’s navigation through shifting configurations of power while emphasising the agency of small states. The Indian Ocean is presented not merely as a strategic arena but also as a moral and political space, linking Sri Lanka’s historical experience to the broader aspirations and consciousness of the Global South.

Revisiting British withdrawal

The book revisits Britain’s withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, arguing that it was not simply a consequence of post-war decline but the culmination of deeper structural transformations in the international system. Decolonisation, Afro-Asian nationalism, and the emergence of bipolarity fundamentally altered the regional order and created the conditions for Britain’s retreat. In turn, this withdrawal opened the way for superpower competition, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, transforming the Indian Ocean into major theatre of Cold War geopolitics.

A substantial portion of the volume is devoted to examining the policies and strategic trajectories of the major powers. The author traces American engagement from Cold War containment through post-Cold War maritime predominance to contemporary Indo-Pacific formulations, demonstrating that U.S. strategy has evolved through the interaction of structural imperatives and changing strategic discourses. Particular attention is paid to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War, which is interpreted as a transformative event that exposed the limits of military hegemony and accelerated patterns of strategic hedging and multi-alignment among regional actors. The book also explores the Soviet Union’s entry into the Indian Ocean in 1968 and the subsequent re-emergence of Russia under Vladimir Putin through selective naval deployments, arms transfers, and strategic partnerships, illustrating what the author characterises as the recurrent rhythms of great-power engagement in the region.

The rise of China receives extensive treatment as one of the most significant structural developments of the twenty-first century. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, port development projects, and naval modernisation, China has translated growing economic power into expanding strategic influence. The author contrasts Beijing’s assertive posture in the South China Sea with its relatively restrained approach in the Indian Ocean, where economic diplomacy and cooperative security initiatives have assumed greater prominence. Equally significant is the discussion of India’s transformation from a regional power into an emerging global strategic actor. The evolution of Indian maritime strategy—from Nehruvian custodianship to contemporary blue-water ambitions—demonstrates how a rising power navigates structural constraints while expanding its strategic reach. Initiatives such as SAGAR, naval modernization, and deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia have positioned India as a central actor in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.

Roles of Japan and EU examined

The volume also examines the roles of Japan and the European Union in shaping the contemporary maritime order. Japan’s transition from post-war restraint to proactive strategic engagement, embodied in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, illustrates how middle powers adapt to changing geopolitical realities through coalition-building and maritime capacity enhancement. The European Union’s engagement is portrayed through less visible but nevertheless significant mechanisms, including trade, development cooperation, maritime governance, and norm diffusion, contributing to what the author terms a form of “quiet-making multipolarity” that encourages restraint, stability, and pragmatic cooperation.

Moving beyond conventional geopolitics, the book broadens the analytical framework to address a range of non-traditional security challenges confronting South Asia in general and Sri Lanka in particular. Climate change, piracy, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, public health vulnerabilities, and digital insecurity are examined as transnational challenges that transcend the capabilities of individual states. The author argues that these issues reveal the limits of unilateral action and underscore the growing importance of cooperation, collective action, institutional innovation, and middle-power leadership in maritime governance.

Prof. Keerawella further situates the Indian Ocean within the wider context of the emerging Asian Century. Asia’s resurgence—driven principally by China and India and reinforced by the dynamism of Southeast Asia—is presented as a major reconfiguration of global power. In this transformation, the Indian Ocean functions as a vital maritime artery connecting energy resources, manufacturing centres, and consumer markets. At the same time, the author cautions against deterministic interpretations, emphasising that the realisation of the Asian Century remains contingent upon how the region responds to persistent inequalities, environmental challenges, governance deficits, and intensifying strategic competition.

Assessing how SL has navigated shifts

The book concludes by returning to Sri Lanka and assessing how the country has navigated contemporary shifts in the regional and global balance of power under the National People’s Power (NPP) government that emerged in the aftermath of the Aragalaya of 2022. The author demonstrates how economic crisis, demands for accountability, and aspirations for a new political culture have reshaped the domestic context within which foreign policy is conducted. Under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sri Lanka is portrayed as pursuing a carefully calibrated strategy that combines engagement with international financial institutions, enhanced cooperation with India in defence and energy sectors, continued economic engagement with China, and functional security relations with the United States. The government’s response to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War—rejecting military access requests from all parties while extending humanitarian assistance—serves as an illustration of the author’s broader argument that strategic flexibility, principled neutrality, and diplomatic agility remain essential for small states navigating an increasingly complex Indian Ocean order.

Taken together, the book advances several interconnected propositions. First, the Indian Ocean is entering an increasingly multipolar era in which power is exercised through complex networks of cooperation, competition, and interdependence rather than rigid alliance structures. Second, small states are neither passive spectators nor mere proxies of great powers; they possess strategic agency and navigate competing pressures through hedging, diversification, and calibrated diplomacy. Third, Sri Lanka’s strategic behaviour—characterised by navigating asymmetry through flexibility and ambiguity—reflects a historically rooted dual consciousness that combines vulnerability with cosmopolitan engagement. Fourth, non-traditional security challenges and environmental governance are no longer peripheral concerns but central components of the evolving regional order.

Need for adaptive navigation

Prof. Keerawella argues that contemporary statecraft in the Indian Ocean requires adaptive navigation rather than rigid alignment. In a fluid and contested maritime environment, survival and influence depend less on resisting structural change than on understanding and responding to it with prudence, flexibility, and strategic clarity. The book therefore offers important insights into how small states can transform structural vulnerability into strategic agency and convert exposure into opportunities for engagement within a changing regional order.

Combining historical depth with contemporary analysis, it provides a nuanced understanding of the interaction between great-power competition, regional transformation, and the strategic choices of smaller states. The book will be of considerable value to students and scholars of international relations, political science, strategic studies, and maritime affairs, while also offering useful perspectives to policymakers, diplomats, and practitioners. Equally important, it opens several promising avenues for future research on the Indian Ocean and the emerging Indo-Pacific order.

Hermeneutic approachs

Methodologically, the study draws upon hermeneutic approaches to examine the geopolitical and maritime environments that shape relationships among states, societies, and historical processes. The result is a work that is both analytically rigorous and intellectually engaging. This review has sought less to evaluate the book in a conventional sense than to introduce its central themes and encourage a wider readership to engage with its arguments. Having highlighted the many merits of the volume, it is worth noting one technical shortcoming: the absence of an index. Given the book’s wide thematic scope and rich empirical content, the inclusion of an index would have significantly enhanced its value as a reference tool for researchers and students alike.

In sum, Prof. Keerawella listens attentively to the winds, reads the waves with analytical precision, and traces the deeper currents that shape the Indian Ocean world. The outcome is Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945, a timely and thought-provoking contribution published by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies.

Reviewed by
Dr. Ramesh Ramasamy
Department of Political Science, University
of Peradeniya