Features
The NPP keeps winning, India and Pakistan keep fighting
More revealing than the results of the local government elections are the political reactions to them. There are as many interpretations of the LG election results as there are political pundits constantly looking to chip away at the still budding NPP’s political goodwill. More disturbing than any other world news is the flashpoint on the subcontinent with India and Pakistan seemingly spoiling for yet another border fight between them. For now, each side would seem to have served its military purpose and claimed victory. But belligerent rhetoric continues at the political level and in the social media that now includes the online expansion of the once stoic print medium.
The continuing rhetoric, including India’s for-now largely rhetorical threat to dam the downstream flow of the Indus waters to Pakistan, means that tensions in the subcontinent are not going to ease any time soon. With the current political changes in Bangladesh souring the relationship between Dhaka and Delhi, India is now flanked east and west by recalcitrant neighbours. The landlocked Himalayan countries aside, Sri Lanka might be India’s only friend now in South Asia. Sri Lanka can comfortably sit on the fence, to borrow Jawaharlal Nehru’s felicitous phrase, mind its own business and grow its exports, while avoiding the fruitless diplomatic forays of the 1960s and the non-alignment rhetoric of the 1970s.
Who won the LG Elections?
The answer depends on who is replying. So, here’s mine among several others. One regular commentator in an English newspaper admitted to harbouring reservations that the election of an NPP government may have taken Sri Lanka to seeing the last of a free and fair election in the country. So, with great relief he announced that regardless of the election results the NPP had “passed with flying colours” the test of the “commitment to multiparty democracy”. Not at all funnily, the commentator also asserted that his reservations were “not an unfounded fear, as the experience in many countries, where political fundamentalists or the militant left had won national power, has almost uniformly revealed.”
That in fact flies in face of history of many countries where electoral democracy has been threatened by political fundamentalists of a different kind or militants of the other hand. The darkest current example is of course the US, where an elected president is unabashedly trying to upend the oldest constitutional democracy in the world. Until the Supreme Court put an end to it India’s central governments, especially when Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister, frequently ran roughshod over the functioning of electoral democracy at the state level. Mrs. Gandhi infamously tried that even at the centre by imposing Emergency Rule in 1975.
In Sri Lanka, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, President Jayewardene and President Ranil Wickremesinghe have used different methods to postpone or cancel elections. As for fairness and freeness of elections, it is the (parliamentary) political Left in Sri Lanka that has been their most consistent guardians from the two national elections and the infamous Dedigama by-election before independence, to every election held after independence. It has also been the hallmark of the Sri Lankan Left not to challenge an election result in court.
The JVP emerged as the antithesis to parliamentary democracy, but over the last 20 years it has mellowed, evolved and expanded as the NPP into a practitioner of parliamentary democracy. The JVP’s violence is past, and no one has accused the JVP/NPP of resorting to violence, corruption, vote-purchasing, or vote-impersonation to achieve electoral wins. It is not the best in every political aspect, but it is certainly far better in many aspects than every other political party. And at a time when politics is quite turbulent in many countries including our three large neighbours, Sri Lanka is quite even-keeled. While the people and the voters of Sri Lanka deserve a ton of credit for Sri Lanka’s even-keeled status at present, the NPP government also deserves due credit, perhaps far more than any of its predecessors this century.
Apart from giving credit to the NPP government for not subverting elections and for facilitating political stability, let us also look at some of the interpretive questions that have been raised about the results of the LG elections. There is a hugely feigned surprise that the NPP fell far short of the 61.56% vote share it got in the 2024 parliamentary election and dropping to 43.76% in Tuesday’s LG election. What is conveniently unmentioned is that the voter turnout also fell from 69% in the parliamentary election to 62% in the LG election. In the September 2024 presidential election, the voter turnout was a high 79% and President AKD polled 42.31%.
A parallel take on the election is to compare the results this week and those of the February 2018 LG election that was won by the newly minted SLPP. The point that is emphasized is that the SLPP won that election from the opposition while the NPP fought the recent election with all the resources of the state at its disposal. The fact is also that the UNP and the SLFP then in an unholy tandem government fought the 2018 LG election with all the state resources they could muster and still came up woefully short.
That might be beside the point, but the real point is that the voter turnout in that election was a high 80% and the SLPP polled 40.47% (not 44.6% as mistakenly noted by some), the UNP 29.42% and the SLFP 12.1%. The still more relevant point is also that the NPP polled 5.75% in the 2018 LG election and is now at 43.76% in 2025, while the SLPP has slid from 40.47% in 2018 to a paltry 9.19% in 2025. The combined SJB (21.69%) and UNP (4.69%) vote total share of 26.38% is also lower than the 29.42% share that the then undivided UNP managed in 2018.
In terms of seats captured, between 2018 and 2025 the NPP ballooned from 434 seats to 3,927 seats while the SLPP has shrunk from 3,436 seats to 742 seats, while the SJB that was unborn in 2018 has managed to win 1,767 seats in 2025. The SLPP won 231 Councils in 2018 and has zero councils now, while the NPP has grown from zero Councils in 2018 to winning 265 Councils now, although it is not having absolute majority of the seats in all the Councils where it has won the largest number of seats. The SJB with 14 Councils is actually placed third after the ITAK with 35 Councils, but only 377 seats and 3% of the total vote. The abnormality is the manifestation of the relative territorial advantage of the ITAK, which is also more illusive than of any practical benefit.
Who Lost in the North & East?
The LG electoral map displayed by Ada Derana (and copied here) is splashed up by just two colours: the ITAK’s purple bordering the northeast coastline and bulging into the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts, while the rest of the island is a mass of NPP red, with sprinklings of SJB yellow here and there including Mannar.
Much has been made of ITAK’s return to electoral supremacy in the north and east, reversing the NPP’s landslide success in the November parliamentary election. It has also been suggested that inasmuch as the NPP government and President AKD personally invested heavily in their campaign in the two provinces, the results are a repudiation of their efforts to woo the Tamils and expand the NPP base in the North and East. I for one see the results quite differently.
Of the five northern districts, the ITAK swept three – Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, but the NPP came second in all three of them. The NPP also came first in both Mannar, which was actually a three-way split between the NPP, SJB and the ITAK; as well as Vavuniya, where the NPP and the SJB shared the spoils leaving the ITAK to hold on to the Vavuniya Urban Council only. In the Eastern Province, NPP won Trincomalee and Ampara, while the ITAK held on to Batticaloa – the only district that the NPP lost in the parliamentary election. So, it is more even-stevens than repudiation of any kind.
There are two other aspects to the northeast results. The pre-election writeups in the Tamil universe focused more on the challenge to the ITAK from the other Tamil parties than its contest with the NPP. Specifically, parties and alliances involving the ACTC and DTNA were expected to outperform the ITAK and even challenge the latter’s leadership in Tamil politics. Whether he was being set up as a strawman or not, the LG elections were fancied to propel Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam as the next Tamil leader filling the void left by the late R. Sampanthan. Those expectations have been frustrated by the election results. The ITAK is still the ‘accredited’ (AJ Wilson’s term) Tamil political party, and it has put its detractors in their place. As well, the ITAK may find it more congenial to work with the NPP than collaborate with its Tamil competitors.
What is remarkable at the national level is that the NPP is the first political party in Sri Lanka’s history to systematically try to establish itself spatially and socially, in every part of the country and among all sections of its people, and it is now showing some consistent rewards for its efforts. What the Local Government electoral map is showing is that the NPP came first in all the red areas and second in all the purple as well as yellow areas. That is something that should be celebrated and not cavilled at as repudiation in the North and East.
What is also noteworthy at the national level is the disarray of the opposition parties in comparison to the political discipline shown by the NPP. Going forward, the NPP must hasten to add tangible results that are commensurate with the people’s goodwill that it continues to command. In the absence of an effective opposition, the government may want to consider setting up its own sounding boards of independent people to provide criticisms and suggestions on the performance of individual ministers and the government as a whole. Perhaps the current system of parliamentary committees could be used to provide forums for consistent public interventions. Without a mechanism for public feedback and responsive changes the government may lose itself in the intoxication of its own rhetoric. The NPP could and should do better. And the country deserves even better.
by Rajan Philips
Features
Regime change and the vacuum:Strategic lessons of Iraq and Libya
by Col. (R) Nalin Herath
There is a question that the international community must periodically ask itself: What happens to a State after its regime has been ousted?
The question is particularly relevant when examining Iraq and Libya. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were authoritarian rulers. Their governments were associated with political repression, human-rights violations and the suppression of political opposition. None of this should be ignored or excused. But recognising the failures of authoritarian rule does not prevent us from asking another, equally important strategic question:
Did the removal of these regimes adequately prepare for what came next?
The experience of Iraq and Libya suggests that removing a ruler is considerably easier than replacing the political, administrative and security architecture around that ruler.
Danger of confusing regime change with State reconstruction
A state is more than its leader. It consists of institutions, security forces, civil servants, courts, political structures, infrastructure, economic systems and, perhaps most importantly, an accepted monopoly over the legitimate use of force. When an authoritarian system has concentrated enormous power around one individual, removing that individual can expose weaknesses that were previously hidden. The strategic mistake is to assume that once the dictator has gone, a democratic and stable state will naturally emerge. History does not support such an assumption. The aftermath of Iraq demonstrates this particularly clearly. Following the 2003 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order No. 2, formally dissolving the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi Army, among other security institutions. A US congressional report later documented the enormous consequences of this decision, including the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of military personnel from the institutional framework of the state. Whatever the intentions behind the decision, the strategic consequence was that an established security structure had to be rebuilt while the country was simultaneously experiencing political upheaval and growing violence. That is a dangerous combination.
Iraq: Removing the structure before building the replacement
Saddam Hussein’s government was unquestionably authoritarian. It also reflected a complicated sectarian and political structure in which members of the Sunni minority occupied disproportionate positions of power despite being a demographic minority. But the question for strategic planners should not simply be whether Saddam deserved to remain in power. The question should have been:
What institutional structure would replace the system once he was removed?
An army can be politically controlled without being politically representative. A bureaucracy can serve an authoritarian government while still providing essential state functions. A security institution can be reformed without necessarily being destroyed. The distinction between reforming institutions and eliminating institutions is therefore critical. The post-2003 experience demonstrated the consequences of institutional disruption. Security vacuums contributed to insurgency and instability, while the process of rebuilding Iraq’s security forces took place amid an increasingly deteriorating security environment. The lesson is not that authoritarian institutions should never be reformed. The lesson is that state capacity should not be casually destroyed without a credible replacement.
Libya: prosperity, authoritarianism and institutional fragility
Libya presents an even more complicated case. Gaddafi’s government was authoritarian and deeply personalised. Political freedom was severely restricted, and the security apparatus was deliberately structured around regime survival. Yet Libya, under Gaddafi, also used substantial oil revenues to fund education, healthcare, infrastructure and social services. World Bank data from around the end of the Gaddafi era show life expectancy reaching approximately 75 years by 2011, skilled attendance at birth at 100 percent and measles immunisation at 98 percent. This does not prove that Gaddafi’s system was politically legitimate. It demonstrates something different: economic and social outcomes can coexist with authoritarian political structures.
The Great Man-Made River illustrates the scale of Libya’s investment ambitions. The World Bank described the project as one of the world’s largest engineering schemes, involving thousands of kilometres of planned pipelines to transport water from deep desert aquifers toward the populated coastal belt. The original project was estimated at approximately US$ 25 billion over several phases. Again, this should not become nostalgia for dictatorship. It should become a lesson in state capacity.
What happened after Gaddafi?
The post-2011 experience is perhaps the clearest illustration of the vacuum problem. Libya did not simply move from dictatorship to a consolidated democratic state. Instead, competing armed groups, political factions and institutions emerged. A UN economic and social affairs analysis concluded that the fall of the Gaddafi regime exposed weak state institutions and that the post-Gaddafi period was characterised by the proliferation of armed militias and institutional fragmentation.
The World Bank has similarly described how the security vacuum allowed armed groups to expand, while attempts to integrate them into the formal security apparatus produced a hybrid system in which state institutions and powerful armed groups operated alongside one another. This is the heart of the lesson. The consequences of regime change were also evident in Libya. The 2012 Benghazi attack, later portrayed in 13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi, illustrated the security vacuum that emerged after Gaddafi’s fall. The collapse of central authority allowed militias and competing armed groups to fill the space left by weakened state institutions. The lesson is clear: removing a regime may achieve military victory, but without a credible plan to rebuild the state, victory can quickly become a security vacuum.
When the state withdraws, something else occupies the space. If the replacement is not a legitimate national institution, the vacuum can be filled by militias, tribes, ideological movements, criminal networks or competing political authorities. The vacuum does not remain empty.
Terrorism question
There is another uncomfortable issue. Authoritarian regimes frequently suppress political and armed movements through coercive security systems. When those systems disappear abruptly, previously contained organisations can find new operating space. This does not mean that dictatorship is an appropriate method of counterterrorism. It means that counterterrorism cannot be separated from State capacity. The international community therefore needs to distinguish between defeating a particular terrorist organisation and maintaining the institutional conditions that prevent multiple armed actors from competing for power. The destruction of one regime does not automatically eliminate the forces that created insecurity. Sometimes it creates an environment in which those forces multiply.
Strategic mistake: winning the war but losing the peace
Military intervention can have a clearly defined operational objective. State reconstruction does not. A military campaign may successfully remove a government in weeks or months. Building legitimate institutions can take decades.This creates a fundamental strategic asymmetry. The shorter the planning horizon for intervention, the greater the danger of a long-term vacuum. The international community therefore needs to think beyond the first question: How do we remove the regime?
It must ask: Who governs the country the next morning? Who controls the borders? Who controls the security forces? Who pays government employees? Who maintains electricity, water and hospitals? Who protects critical infrastructure? Who administers justice? Who prevents armed groups from becoming alternative governments? Who provides political legitimacy? And perhaps most importantly: Who possesses the authority to enforce the decisions of the new state? If there are no convincing answers, regime change is only the beginning of the problem.
The lesson should not be that the United States or its allies should never intervene. Nor should it be that Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi should be rehabilitated as models of governance. The lesson is more practical. Regime change must never be confused with state-building.
Before dismantling an established political order, external powers need a credible understanding of the institutions that will replace it. Security-sector reform should normally distinguish between individuals who must be removed and institutions that must be preserved. A national army may need reform. A ministry may need restructuring. A security service may need accountability and civilian oversight. But destroying institutional capacity without having an operational replacement can create consequences far beyond the original objective.
Wider geopolitical lesson
The consequences of Iraq and Libya did not remain within their borders. State fragmentation affects neighbouring countries, migration, organised crime, arms trafficking, terrorism, energy markets and regional power competition. In today’s interconnected world, a failed transition in one country can become a security problem for an entire region. That is why intervention planning should include not only military objectives but also political, economic, humanitarian and security-sector objectives. The most important planning document may therefore not be the operational plan for removing the regime. It may be the plan for Day One after the regime has disappeared.
History should not be written as a simple choice between dictatorship and democracy. The real strategic challenge is more complicated. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were dictators. Their governments committed serious abuses, and their populations had legitimate grievances. But the failures of authoritarian rule do not automatically justify the destruction of state institutions without a credible plan for rebuilding them. The experience of Iraq and Libya demonstrates a fundamental principle of international security: A political vacuum is not neutral space. Someone will fill it. If legitimate national institutions cannot fill that space, armed groups, sectarian interests, extremist organisations or foreign-backed factions may do so. The ultimate lesson for the United States, its allies and the wider international community is therefore straightforward:
Removing a regime may win the immediate battle. Building a legitimate, functioning and secure state determines whether the intervention succeeds in the long term. The world should learn to ask not only “How do we remove the dictator?”. It must also ask:
“What happens to the country when he is gone?”
That may be the most important strategic question of all.
(The writer is the Secretary General of the Ceylon Chamber of Shipping, former Director General of the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), and former Spokesman of the Ministry of Defence. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the London Dialogue. His areas of expertise include international relations, geopolitics, maritime affairs, national security, economic policy, and strategic governance. He is a consultant at JITT Group and a member of World Pace Board.).
Features
‘Death at the Sign of the Rook’
Tales of Mystery and Suspense – 23
By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha
As I have noted with regard to the adventures of John Rebus, I am indebted to Dinali Fernando and her husband Steve for whole hosts of thrillers. The latter strongly recommended Kate Atkinson when I borrowed four books. I wondered about this, for I had not been too impressed with her debut novel, Behind the Scenes at the Museum, which was amongst the entries I had to judge for the Eurasian section of the Commonwealth Writing Prize. Two decades later, I had forgotten what it had been about.
But I am glad Steve persuaded me to read her. Kate Atkinson is distinctively British, and Death at the Sign of the Rook is set in a country house and the surrounding village, and seems a modern descendant of the laidback Agatha Christies I so much enjoy.
There are, however, many differences in that we have a policeman who can go rogue, like Rebus, with again a female sidekick who has a mind of her own, again like Rebus. But Jackson Brodie has retired and set up as a private investigator, while Reggie, a young lady, is still in the police.
There is a lesbian couple living in the converted dairy of the manor house, as has occurred in Agatha Christie too, in A Murder is Announced. But they are peripheral to the story, unlike Ben, the brother of one of them who left the army after losing a leg in Afghanistan. When he turns up at the Manor House to shelter from a snowstorm, along with its chatelaine, Lady Milton, he is asked to answer the door as various characters turn up, including Jackson and Reggie, who then starts fantasising about him.
The others who turn up are two couples, one from America, who have paid for a murder weekend at the hotel. The family is impoverished, and has sold lots of pictures to survive, but most recently a Turner had been stolen, almost certainly by Lady Milton’s housekeeper Sophie, who vanished one night along with the picture. Reggie had been involved in that investigation, but there had been no trace of either picture or young lady.
Jackson Brodie suspects a connection between that theft and the one he has been called in to investigate, which has not been reported to the police. The picture hung opposite the bed of an old woman whose carer vanished after she died, along with it. Her children, adopted twins, have asked Jackson to investigate and also try to trace the carer, though he suspects something strange in that they did not go to the police.
Brodie, in studying the stolen art, is also struck by the disappearance of a Rembrandt from a house in Scotland, along with a member of the cleaning staff. He thinks the three women might be the same one.
But Brodie’s assumption that the three women who vanished when valuable pictures did were identical would not have helped except that Beatrice, as she was also called, kept turning up, including to the funeral home where the old lady’s body was kept. And then that picture turned up, in the village church, and was found by the local vicar, Simon Cate, whose life story is also a prominent feature of the novel. He was an aspiring actor but then smitten by faith, and became a priest, but in time he lost his faith. His wife left him after the death of their son, and he is now in this backwater, where he feels he is of no use to anyone. But he has a great feel for living beings, and his most successful service has been one in which he blessed pets. And he was deeply concerned about the bees that Ben looks after for his sister and her wife.
He too staggers into the manor house in the midst of the storm, in which everyone concerned loses their way comprehensively. But amongst those Ben lets in is a man in a tracksuit with cuts and bruises, who then vanishes after he has been led to a bedroom, when Ben went in search of brandy. We soon work out that it is the escaped murderer about whom Reggie has been alerted.
Simon also turns up, through the back door, carrying the picture and also a gun, for he has found the dead body of one of his parishioners when he went to her house in search of his mobile phone. She had been shot and he had picked up the gun he found there. But he could not tell the police, for though he called he had lost his voice, and for the last few days had communicated only through writing.
This chaotic mix of characters at the manor house is further complicated by the group of players putting on the murder mystery play though some members have either cried off or died before reaching the venue. So, there is much doubling up and confusion over who is an actor and who is not.
The grand now largely empty rooms of the manor house, and its various odd passages and multiple doors, make it a splendid set for the lunacy that runs on and on. Reggie finds herself in a pantry Atkinsonwith a dead body, though this turns out to be the nanny who fell down the stairs and was put there by Lady Milton’s younger son. And there is high drama on the roof when the murderer nearly kills Ben, but he is saved by Reggie, and when he tries to kill Brody with an axe, he is shot by Beatrice, who has been the maid who served at the dinner before the murder mystery play, and explains to Brody how she has managed all her thefts.
And then in the melee, she vanishes on a motorbike, along with the daughter of the old lady’s adopted daughter, the only person who seemed to grieve at the funeral, and to whom the old lady had left her house in a codicil to
her will, which her children have not known about. She leaves the picture to the carer, but it is brought to Simon Cate as he lies in hospital, recovering from a heart attack which adds confusion to the play.
Wonderfully convoluted, but all very clear, despite the headlong pace of the book and its shifts from one scene to another, from one character to another (or rather combinations of them) and from one-time span to another. A writer and a detective well worth looking out for. e more books by her on Dinali’s shelves.
Features
Safety, security and teamwork in aviation
by Capt. (Ret.).G.A. Fernando, MBA
There are three essential components to a commercial airline operation: safety, security and teamwork.
Aviation and teamwork at the ‘sharp’ end of a commercial aircraft, i.e. the flight deck, is unique. Unlike many other teams, it may be quite literally the first and the last time a particular combination of small teams of two, three, or four individual airmen (or women) will fly together. Sometimes even in the same airline that employs them.
Therefore, to make conditions safe and practical, while understanding and trusting tech other, they have to rely on a series of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and ‘Normal’ and ‘Emergency’ checklists for every conceivable situation. That is, to be able to do the right things, and do things right. In fact, there is a saying in aviation to the effect that ‘if you make a mistake in aviation, be original and make a new one’.
To ensure that safety standards are constantly maintained, airline pilots’ proficiency is tested every six months, in simulators, under the supervision of examiners from the civil aviation regulator. In Sri Lanka that organisaton is the Civil Aviation Authority-Sri Lanka (CAASL). Three simulator checks are conducted every 12 months in keeping with the tenet that ‘practice makes perfect’. A pithy adage not confined to the world of aviation warns that ‘prior preparation prevents piss-poor performance’.
The simulator exercises include rejected takeoffs, including in cross-wind situations, landings, engine fires and/or engine failures from a variety of causes, cabin pressurisation failure, precision and non-precision approaches, and landings in bad visibility – amongst other conditions that could be expected in actual flight.
In addition, a flight in a real airplane, on a regular passenger service under the supervision of an examiner from the airline, is undertaken to ensure that the company’s standard practices and procedures are carried out and maintained as prescribed in the airline’s manuals. These publications are in turn approved by the national regulator.
Finally, flight crew members must take a written test annually, on emergency equipment locations and procedures, with 90% as the pass mark.
Since the mid-1980s it has been mandatory for airline pilots to undertake a Crew Resource Management (CRM) programme once every two years. This training essentially emphasises what to do and what not to do to, in a specific emergency situation, or even during normal operations, to make the team cohesive and effective. During the course, the CRM facilitators discuss recent incidents and accidents that have occurred. Results of those events are recorded and could be retrieved, when necessary, by the official aviation bodies.
Not unexpectedly, it is demanding on a pilot to fulfill these requirements on a regular basis throughout his/her career, along with presenting for a bi-annual medical examination, all with the objective of retaining one’s licence to operate an aircraft. It may not be understood, therefore, by persons outside the aviation industry, or even some working in other aspects of an airline organisation, that it is often the passion for flight that keeps many pilots doing what they do to earn a living.
Security
Another important factor is the challenge of maintaining security in all aspects of airline operations, not least in the cockpit. The challenges are many, with new ones surfacing almost every day. It is therefore essential to be always prepared for the activities and ‘methods’ of perpetrators seeking to wreak evil on an aircraft and its occupants. As it is impossible for any airline or national security organisation to cover all aspects, systematic management of risks to effect a safe outcome becomes imperative.
Flydubai Incident
In the recent Flydubai incident of 30 September, 2026, a first officer (co-pilot) attacked the captain of the flight with a crash axe to accomplish his sinister motives, into which investigations are continuing. For the time being, it prompts the questions: should the crash axe be easily accessible to the flight crew? Or even be there at all? I believe it is a case of assessing the greater risk.
With regard to that event, and the circumstances that led to it, other deterrents could have been applied more thoroughly. For example, more thorough screening of pilots’ and other crewpersons’ backgrounds, with emphasis on their mental health, ideological affiliations and previous employment history. Separately, during a time of conflict in the Middle East, should Flydubai have even been operating between Dubai and Tel Aviv? Notwithstanding that cost-cutting and profit maximisation are key aims of any business, an airline’s apparent failure to conduct adequate psychological profiling of flight crew members, while continuing to operate ‘profitable’ routes, regardless of potential danger, can only be regarded and condemned as greed and disregard for human lives.
( Captain. Fernando, RCyAF, SLAF, Air Ceylon, Air Lanka, Singapore Airlines (SIA), SriLankan Airlines, Former Chief Pilot, Air Lanka Boeing 737, Former Deputy Chief Pilot, Lockheed L 1011, Former Crew Resource Management (CRM) Facilitator, SIA, Former Deputy Director (Air Operations) CAASL, Former President, Aircraft Owners and Operators Association Sri Lanka (AOAOASL), President, The Colombo Flying Club, Representative for Aviation, Organisation of Professional Associations (OPA), Hony, and Member Sri Lanka Society of Transport and Logistics.)
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