Connect with us

Opinion

Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part IV

Published

on

Sri Lankan Foreign Policy since the End of the Cold War

By the end of the Cold War, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy priorities were predominantly shaped by its armed conflict with the LTTE, despite pivotal shifts in its regional and global geopolitical spaces. The significance of the country’s foreign relations was largely viewed through the lens of its strategic needs in the ongoing civil war, often overshadowing other broader regional and global developments.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987 and the subsequent establishment of the Provincial Council system under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution failed to bring lasting peace and merely perpetuated the vicious cycle of violence. Meanwhile, the uprising (1987-1989) led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and its ruthless suppression deepened the political and social turmoil and tarnished the country’s democratic credentials, further constraining the government’s ability to focus and react to broad external strategic developments. As a result, the critical shifts occurring in South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the global strategic environment after the Cold War were more or less overlooked in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy decisions.

Following the decisive military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, Sri Lanka underwent a significant shift in its politico-strategic needs, marking the beginning of a new phase in the country’s foreign policy. With the conclusion of the protracted civil war, a different set of issues came to the forefront and decided Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and geopolitical priorities. Accordingly, the evolution of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era can be divided in two distinct phases, with the end of the war in 2009 acting as a pivotal turning point.

Enduring Crises and Foreign Policy

under President Premadasa

When Ranasinghe Premadasa assumed the presidency after a violence-ridden election, Sri Lanka was mired in multi-faceted crises. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), initially deployed to supervise the Peace Accord, quickly found it embroiled in violent conflict with the LTTE in the North. Maneuvering the IPKF’s withdrawal without alienating India became a delicate and daunting challenge. Meanwhile, the brutal suppression of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurgency in the South only deepened the country’s instability and culpability, further intensifying international backlash over human rights violations.

Despite facing significant challenges, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy lacked coherence and strategic direction. The government’s foreign policy responses were often reactive, addressing events in isolation rather than within a broader strategic framework. Decision-making appeared to be driven more by immediate political considerations than by long-term objectives. As a result, Sri Lanka became entrapped in a foreign policy dilemma, struggling to manage multiple crises across various fronts simultaneously.

One of President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s key achievements was persuading/pressuring  India to withdraw the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka in 1990. However, it also strained Indo-Sri Lanka relations in the short term. One of the key achievements of President Ranasinghe Premadasa was persuading India to withdraw the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka. However, this success came at the cost-damaging Indo-Sri Lanka relations.

During a public meeting on June 1, 1989, President Premadasa demanded the complete withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka by July 29, 1989, giving India just two months’ notice. India was taken aback by the manner in which this demand was made and made it clear that Sri Lanka could not impose a unilateral deadline. India was only prepared for a phased withdrawal and had limited options. In response, India made a misguided decision to train a Tamil National Army.

In an effort to pressure India into withdrawing the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka, President Premadasa sought to leverage the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In July 1989, Sri Lanka boycotted the SAARC Ministerial-level meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan. Furthermore, Sri Lanka made it clear that it would not host the SAARC Summit scheduled later that year in Colombo. The Sri Lanka informed SAARC countries that the Summit could not precede in Colombo as long as the IPKF remained stationed in the country against its will (RavinathaAryasinha, 1997: 54)

After V.P. Singh of Janata Dal became Prime Minister of India in December 1989, the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka was expedited. In contrast to Rajiv Gandhi’s position, I.K.Gujral, the External Affairs Minister in the Janata Dal government, stated that “Tamil security is an internal matter of Sri Lanka.” He expressed hope that the Sri Lankan government had learned from the lessons of history and would no longer deny the country’s ethnic minorities their due rights (Sunday Times, 29 April 1990).

However, the rescheduled Summit for Colombo in 1990 was ultimately not held there. The Maldives insisted on hosting the summit in Malé, coinciding with the 25th anniversary of it becoming a Republic. The failure of the planned 1990 summit in Colombo also reflects the complex regional dynamics at the time.

After the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) swiftly reemerged as a formidable military and political force in the North and East of Sri Lanka, setting the stage for the onset of Eelam War II in June 1990. In the 1990s, parallel to the expansion of Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora, the LTTE’s international influence grew significantly.

Its front organisations in Western countries became increasingly active, openly fundraising, pressuring host governments on behalf of the LTTE, and even facilitating the transportation of arms and supplies to the conflict zones in Sri Lanka. This growing international network of support posed a substantial challenge to the Sri Lankan government. Moreover, the LTTE frequently framed its actions as a response to alleged human rights violations by the Sri Lankan government, using this narrative to justify its activities and gain international sympathy and support. The complexities of this issue—encompassing both military confrontations and political maneuvering—posed a formidable challenge that required a comprehensive strategy and sharp diplomatic acumen.

The Premadasa administration failed to fully recognise the growing significance of the international public sphere and the increasing prominence of international human rights frameworks. These were often dismissed as instruments of the LTTE’s propaganda. The Sri Lankan government held a largely negative view of Western countries that raised human rights concerns, perceiving these countries as supportive of the LTTE. This perception, coupled with a failure to distinguish between the LTTE and the broader ethnic conflict, impeded the government’s ability to formulate an effective strategy in response to international criticism.

Despite his unconventional approach, President Premadasa recognised that the Foreign Ministry was in disarray, lacking direction amidst the decisive challenges facing the country. In response, he established a Foreign Affairs Study Group, chaired by Dr. Gamani Corea, to address the situation (Dayan Jayatilleka, 2017). The group completed its report on restructuring Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and diplomatic missions, but before it could be presented, President Premadasa was tragically assassinated. Following his death, President Wijetunga, the caretaker president, assumed office but hesitated to take any new initiatives on the matter.

Change Vision and Restructuring under President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga

The efforts to instill a new policy vision and reshape the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) began after the People’s Alliance (PA) assumed power in 1995 under the leadership of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. By the time Kumaratunga assumed the presidency, the MFA was in disarray—lacking direction and burdened by excessive politicisation. To address this, President Kumaratunga appointed Lakshman Kadirgamar as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Drawing on his extensive experience as an international civil servant, Kadirgamar implemented reforms to streamline recruitment, promotions, and diplomatic postings, restoring some order to the MFA. At the same time, the government sought to bolster Sri Lanka’s democratic image on the international stage.

Strengthening the country’s credentials as a functional democracy was viewed as essential for garnering global support in addressing the LTTE military challenge. In this context, internal policy reforms were expected to provide strong backing to a foreign policy with a clear vision and direction.

The PA government marked a significant departure from the antagonistic stance of its predecessors towards international human rights bodies. Recognising the growing influence of the global public sphere on national policies, the PA government made a deliberate effort to engage with key international human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations. These engagements included open dialogues aimed at addressing concerns about Sri Lanka’s human rights situation.

The PA government’s commitment to international human rights standards and norms was demonstrated by its ratification of several major international human rights conventions. Additionally, the PA Government worked to strengthen domestic human rights institutions, particularly the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL), further solidifying its dedication to human rights both within Sri Lanka and on the international stage. These efforts were seen as essential for two reasons: promoting domestic reconciliation and enhancing Sri Lanka’s international credibility.

In light of the geopolitical implications of India’s strategic rise and changes in the South Asian geopolitical landscape, developing strong ties with India remained a key achievement of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under the People’s Alliance (PA) government. After decades of mutual suspicion,

accusations, and tensions, both countries recognised the importance of normalising their relations. President Chandrika Bandaranaike’s new vision and foreign policy approach provided a significant opportunity for a fresh start towards rapprochement. The Indian government’s diplomatic shift, marked by the Gujral Doctrine introduced by External Affairs Minister I. K. Gujral in 1996, further paved the way for improved bi-lateral relations. Indo-Sri Lanka relations had not been as cordial for decades as they were under President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. A key testament to the South Asian policy of the Kumaratunga administration was the 10th SAARC Summit held in Sri Lanka in 1998. During this summit, informal discussions between India and Pakistan, initiated through the personal efforts of President Kumaratunga, marked a critical development in the regional strategic context.

Under President Premadasa, Sri Lanka’s relations with Western powers, particularly Britain and the United States, began to deteriorate rapidly. For a small country like Sri Lanka, which was grappling with a significant internal armed conflict with international Diaspora linkages, navigating the post-Cold War global strategic landscape became a critical challenge. Nearly two-thirds of Sri Lanka’s export market was tied to the West—primarily Britain, the United States, and the European Union. At the same time, the LTTE’s international headquarters operated from Western capitals. Given this, Sri Lanka paid a steep price for its adversarial stance toward these Western powers. In contrast, one of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s notable achievements was her efforts to foster better relations with the West. By implementing internal democratic reforms and adopting the PA’s approach to the ethnic crisis, she created a more favourable environment for diplomatic engagement. This foreign policy shift paid off: In 1996, the United States resumed arms sales to Sri Lanka, and the US “Green Beret” corps began offering advanced training to the Sri Lankan security forces. This military support included specialized training missions by the US Navy SEALs, the US Air Force Special Operations Squadron, and the US Army’s Psychological Operations Group. The proscription of LTTE as a terrorist organization by the United States in October 1997, followed by similar designations from the United Kingdom in 2000 and Australia in 2001, dealt a severe blow to the LTTE international operations.

The dynamics of the crisis, however, posed significant obstacles to the continued implementation of this policy. Negotiations with the LTTE, which began in October 1994, collapsed on April 17, 1995, when the LTTE withdrew from both the talks and the ceasefire after four rounds of discussions. The hope of achieving a negotiated settlement with the LTTE was dashed within six months. The conflict with the LTTE once again became the central focus of foreign policy, but this time, the government’s
approach shifted from defensive to more assertive.

With the onset of Eelam War III, the government launched the Reviresa operation in November–December 1995 and regained control of Jaffna from the LTTE. In September 1996, the government conducted the Sath Jaya operation, which led to the recapture of Kilinochchi. However, the situation began to change in 1998. The government’s attempt to establish a land route to Jaffna failed, resulting in heavy human and material losses. By late 1998, military camps in Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, and Elephant Pass fell to the LTTE. Between 1999 and 2000, the Sri Lankan government forces suffered continuous setbacks on the military front.

Similarly, the proposal for the devolution of power, which had been incorporated into a draft of the new constitution, became entangled in political debates with the United National Party (UNP). The country had shown readiness to accept devolution through widespread public awareness campaigns, such as the Sudu Nelum movement. However, when the proposal was only presented to Parliament in August 2000, it was rejected by the UNP. As a result, the People’s Alliance (PA) government was unable to fulfill one of its key political promises to both the Tamil people and the international
community.

In 1999, another attempt was made to resume talks with the LTTE, this time with the prospect of third-party facilitation. President Kumaratunga explored the possibility of securing international involvement, with potential facilitators including France, a joint Commonwealth team, and the Vatican. By March 2000, the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE agreed on Norway as the mediator. With Norwegian facilitation, a Ceasefire Agreement was drafted between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, scheduled to be signed on April 11, 2001. However, two days before the signing, the LTTE
unexpectedly declared that they would not proceed with the agreement, without providing any explanation for their decision.

(To be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella



Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Opinion

‘Why we should forgive debt for poorer countries – and medical students’

Published

on

The above caption is the title of an article written by Dr. Kamran Abbasi, Editor-in-Chief of the BMJ. In it, he laments the extremely high cost of medical training, with young UK medical students burdened by an unbearable debt of around £100,000 by the time they qualify—often before they’ve earned a single penny.”

Dr. B. J. C. Perera responded to the article on 12 April 2025 by e-mail, and his response was published promptly. (doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.r744/rapid-responses).

His response is as follows:

Re: Why we should forgive debt for poorer countries—and medical students: Another perspective from Sri Lanka

Dear Editor,

The BMJ article “Why we should forgive debt for poorer countries—and medical students” certainly gives food for thought.

The real problem is that the students have to pay for everything in Western countries. Nothing really is free. There is also the cultural norm that instigates young people to leave the homes of their parents and be independent. There is a very real cost to getting educated, and this continues with post-graduation as well.

As for our country, Sri Lanka, hardly any young doctor who qualifies is saddled with an unbearable financial burden in the form of a repayable loan. Almost the vast majority of them operate as medical students from the homes of their parents, and the latter attend to the expenses. The university education is totally free, and there are no tuition fees or any other payments to be attended to. Only a very small minority of medical students take Bank Loans, and even in those, the amounts are not even remotely close to Stg pounds 100,000 which figure was quoted in the paper.

We may have our faults, but we do look after the primary, Secondary and Tertiary education of our young people. I am also a product of our free education system. If my parents had to pay for my education or I needed to get a massive bank loan, I would not be what I am today. In return, I have stayed back in Sri Lanka and repaid in full the debt I owe to our people by providing my services in our free National Health Service.

Dr B. J. C. Perera

MBBS(Cey), DCH(Cey), DCH(Eng), MD(Paed), MRCP(UK), FRCP(Edin), FRCP(Lond), FRCPCH(UK), FSLCPaed,
FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH(UK), Hony. FCGP(SL)
Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of
Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Joint Editor, Sri Lanka Journal of Child Health
Section Editor, Ceylon Medical Journal
Past President, Colombo Medical School Alumni Association (CoMSAA) – 2015
Past President, Sri Lanka Medical Association (2013).

Founder President, Sri Lanka College of Paediatricians (1996-97)

Continue Reading

Opinion

Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations:

Published

on

Mahinda

1990-2024 – Part VI

(Continued from 11 April, 2025)

Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy after the War

The domestic political context of Sri Lankan foreign policy underwent a significant shift following the end of the war in 2009. The Mahinda Rajapaksa regime that steered the war to a victorious end fanned war triumphalism in the country and used it craftily for regime stability. In contrast, a deeply melancholic atmosphere of frustration, helplessness, and defeat permeated the North. In response to the new challenges stemming from the way the war ended, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy was forced to redefine its priorities. The Sinhala nationalist clientele of the regime gave currency to anti-western rhetoric in the country in response to these challenges.

Since the end of the war, Sri Lanka’s strategic position has evolved significantly. One of the key foreign policy challenges that emerged in the wake of the conclusion of war was how to address the growing international criticism over alleged violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) during the final stages of the conflict, which gained traction in global diplomatic forums. Western powers, particularly the United States, Canada, Britain, and the European Union, pressured Sri Lanka to investigate alleged war crimes committed by both parties during the final phase of war. This led to a noticeable deterioration in Sri Lanka’s relations with these countries. How to respond to the US-backed resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) regarding alleged IHL violations, and also to potential future resolutions against Sri Lanka at the UN Security Council, became the central concern of Sri Lanka’s post-war foreign policy. Driven by this obsession, Sri Lanka is increasingly aligning itself with powers that can provide protection against such actions and shield itself from diplomatic and economic pressures from the West.

In President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s vision of economic development, known as the ‘Five Hubs’ concept, the Indian Ocean played a central role. Each of the five hubs—Maritime, Aviation, Commercial, Energy, and Knowledge—had a direct foreign policy dimension. However, there was no concrete plan or program of action to materialize these policy goals. Instead, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under Rajapaksa in the post-war period was largely preoccupied with residual issues stemming from the end of the war.

In the immediate post-war period, international pressure on Sri Lanka centered on three key issues: investigating the events of the war’s final stages amid widespread allegations of war crimes by both sides; ensuring transitional justice by identifying those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and civilian deaths; and determining the whereabouts of missing persons, many of whom were believed to have perished in the conflict.

The international community, particularly India, urged the Sri Lankan government to implement a viable political reconstruction programme for war-affected communities in the North and East, ensuring their integration into regional and central decision-making. This call emphasiz\sed the effective devolution of power under the 13th Amendment

International stakeholders expressed their willingness to support economic rebuilding in the North and East. They emphasised the urgent need for a coordinated economic recovery programme and advocated for a comprehensive reconstruction plan to restore critical services. Additionally, they stressed the importance of community involvement, ensuring that those most affected by the conflict actively participated in shaping and implementing the recovery efforts.

The issue of transitional justice and accountability emerged soon after UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited the country at the invitation of President Mahinda Rajapaksa on May 23, 2009, five days after the Sri Lankan government officially declared the war over. In the joint statement issued following the visit Sri Lanka reiterated its strong commitment to promoting and protecting human rights in accordance with international standards and emphasised the importance of an accountability process to address violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The Secretary-General expressed hope that the Sri Lankan government would take measures to address these grievances.

After Ban Ki-moon’s visit, international pressure mounted for the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism. The Sinhala nationalist clientele of the government was of the view that Sri Lanka is a sovereign and independent country and no one has a right to interfere in its domestic affairs of the country.  Initially, the UNHRC was tolerant toward Sri Lanka and willing to allow time and space for the country to develop its own mechanism to address transitional justice issues. This is evident in the resolution adopted at the eleventh Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council on May 27, 2009 (A/HRC/S11/L.1/Rev), which commended the Sri Lankan government’s efforts to address the urgent needs of internally displaced persons and welcomed its continued commitment to promoting and protecting human rights (Amal Jayawardane, 2025, p. 144).  In response to the growing international concerns over the issue of accountability and transitional justice, President Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learned and Reconciliation, as a domestic initiative, on May 15th, 2010.

To the dismay of the Sri Lankan government, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a three-member Panel of Experts on June 23, 2010. The panel, chaired by MarzukiDarusman and consisting of YasminSooka and Steven Rattner, was tasked with advising the Secretary-General on issues of accountability regarding alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war. The Sri Lankan government strongly rejected this move, calling it both unnecessary and unwarranted.

Initially, the LLRC seemed like a hasty response to Western pressures and received a lukewarm reception. However, the LLRC took its mandate seriously and presented its final report on November 15, 2011. The report offered significant observations and recommendations concerning the origins of the conflict, restitution, and other efforts toward national reconciliation. It emphasized that “the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies in the failure of successive governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil people” and stressed that “a political solution is imperative to address the causes of the conflict” (The LLRC Report, 2021).

Regarding the issue of accountability, the LLRC noted that “eyewitness accounts and other available materials indicate that significant civilian casualties occurred during the final phase of the conflict.” It recommended that “action be taken to investigate the specific instances mentioned in the observation. If investigations reveal any offenses, appropriate legal action should be taken to prosecute or punish those responsible.”

In March 2012, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted Resolution A/HRC/19/L.20, titled Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri Lanka, urging the Sri Lankan government to adopt the LLRC’s constructive recommendations and take “all necessary additional steps to fulfill its legal obligations.” However, dismissive stance of the Sri Lankan government toward international IR bodies was clearly illustrated by the manner in which UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay’ visit to Sri Lanka in August 2013 was handled.  Later that year, during its 22nd session, the UNHRC adopted another resolution calling on the Office of the High Commissioner to enhance its monitoring and reporting on Sri Lanka’s human rights situation, as well as the progress on reconciliation and accountability. This resolution required the Office to provide an oral update at the Council’s 48th session, a written update at its 49th session, and a comprehensive report at its 51st session, including further options for advancing accountability.

In response to growing international pressure, the Sri Lankan government appointed the Maxwell Paranagama Commission (Presidential Commission to Investigate Complaints of Missing Persons – PCICMP) in August 2013. The commission was tasked with investigating the disappearances of civilians in northern and eastern Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009. However, the establishment of both the Paranagama and Udulagama commissions did little to quell international concerns. The failure of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government to address the issue of accountability became apparent in the March 2014 UNHRC resolution, which called on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to investigate the allegations in order to prevent impunity and ensure accountability.

India appeared less focused on advocating for transitional justice and accountability in international forums and, instead, prioritized the political empowerment of minorities, particularly in the North and East of Sri Lanka. Alongside this, India emphasized efforts toward economic reconstruction and national reconciliation, aiming to foster stability and long-term peace.

Full implementation of the 13th Amendment became an international concern in the post-war context. In the last stage of the war, the Sri Lankan government has repeatedly assured the international community that “Sri Lanka will take measures for the effective implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution” (Human Rights Council, 2008).  Sri Lanka continued to assure the international community of its intention to offer a devolution package built on the 13th amendment to the constitution after 2009. India raised this issue in several bi-lateral diplomatic encounters. Most important is assurances given to India in this regard by Sri Lanka.

While the post-war Mahinda Rajapaksa regime faced tensions with Western powers and India, it leaned toward China, reshaping Sri Lanka’s geostrategic position in the early post-war years. Sri Lanka has maintained cordial relations with China since the early 1950s while balancing its ties with other major powers, namely India and the United States. However, after 2009, its foreign policy took a different turn, leaning more toward China at the expense of the traditional balance it had carefully maintained. This shift has had significant implications, particularly in the context of evolving regional and global geopolitical dynamics.

(To be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella

Continue Reading

Opinion

End of an Era: Passing away of Raja Uncle (Mr. Rajapaksha)

Published

on

Rajapaksha

1935 – 2025

With heavy hearts, we share the passing of our dear neighbor, mentor, and cherished friend, Raja Uncle — known formally as Mr. Rajapaksha — who passed away peacefully on April 1, 2025, at the age of 89.

For over 50 he was a constant and beloved presence in our community — someone whose actions spoke louder than words, and whose kindness left a mark on every life he touched. Gentle in spirit, firm in values, and endlessly thoughtful, he helped shape the heart of Bogahawatta with his humility, quiet strength, and unwavering dedication.

He carried himself with grace and dignity — slim, well-groomed, and strikingly handsome, with a calm confidence that made people feel at ease. He never tried to be a person who gave orders — instead, he led through respect, active listening, and thoughtful action. His leadership was never loud — it was steady, consistent, and deeply human.

A founding member of the Bogahawatta Welfare Society, Raja Uncle gave more than 40 years of devoted service to the betterment of the Bogahawatta community. In the 1980s, as the area grew and safety became a concern, he established the neighborhood watch, restoring trust and unity in a time of change.

He organized road cleaning and repair efforts, worked alongside neighbors, and played a vital role in the construction of the Bogahawatta Welfare Society headquarters, which stands today as a symbol of unity and progress.

He also cared deeply for everyday needs. For nearly 20 years, before running water was available, the community well was a lifeline. When it fell into disrepair, Raja Uncle would quietly take the responsibility to clean and maintain it, asking for no recognition. I had the honor of helping him at times, and I saw the pride and purpose behind every quiet act.

When I served as president of the local youth society, he became my mentor. With his help, we organized a talent show, community art exhibition, built a mini library, and gave young people opportunities to lead. His daughter Tharanga, the society’s secretary, worked beside him — a reflection of the values he passed on.

He also shaped my personal journey. He introduced me to a temple, and gently guided me toward a spiritual life I still hold close today.

He was our protector. If a stranger walked down our lane, he would calmly and respectfully inquire about their purpose, ensuring the safety of every home and child. During a heated argument in my youth, he stood nearby for over an hour, silently watching until it ended, and then walked me home. He didn’t lecture. He didn’t judge. He simply cared.

Every April, without fail, he was the Master of Ceremonies at the Sinhala and Tamil New Year festival. His voice, his presence, and his joyful warmth brought the entire community together in celebration year after year.

In times of sorrow, he led with compassion. He would gather neighbors to visit grieving families, sometimes traveling great distances, and delivered eloquent eulogies that offered comfort and honored lives with dignity.

What truly set Raja Uncle apart was his love — especially the remarkable bond he shared with his wife. Their marriage was the most loving I have ever witnessed. They were the love of each other’s lives — gentle, respectful, and unwavering. He never raised his voice. They never let conflict come between them. Their partnership was built on trust, affection, and shared values.

In July 1980, as public servants, the two of them stood together in protest against unjust government layoffs. They both lost their jobs, but they stood by their beliefs. They started a business together, overcame hardship side by side, and were eventually reinstated. In time, Mrs. Rajapaksha rose to a top-level position in Sri Lanka’s Department of Immigration and Emigration — a testament to her brilliance and their shared resilience.

They raised their children in a home of dignity and purpose. In a country where less than five percent were admitted to university at the time, all three — Tharanga, Lahiru, and Lasitha — were accepted. A rare and proud achievement rooted in hard work and love.

His family grew across the world — Lasitha became a British citizen, and Lahiru a citizen of Australia. Raja Uncle visited them often, maintaining the same closeness and warmth across any distance.

And perhaps the most remarkable of all: he helped lead a place that was once a quiet, forested area in the 1970s into a thriving, respected neighborhood — one so valued that even a Defense Secretary of Sri Lanka chose to make it his home. This was not the work of ambition, but of vision and service — built slowly, over decades, through trust and integrity.

To me, as his next-door neighbor, he was one of the most steady and trusted influences in my life. He showed me that a meaningful life isn’t defined by what we achieve — but by how we treat others, what we give, and how we listen. I shaped my life after him.

Although I haven’t been as closely associated with him since leaving Sri Lanka in 2000 and becoming a citizen of the United States, his memory has remained with me every step of the way. These are just a few of the memories I carry — as much as I can recall. I still wish, from the bottom of my heart, that he could be my neighbor forever — to guide me, to listen, to share his quiet vision.

He touched so many lives, across generations. There are countless stories, small and great, that live on in the hearts of those who knew him. His presence will be remembered not only through words, but in the community he shaped, the values he carried, and the lives he quietly uplifted over these 50+ years.

May his soul rest in peace, and may we carry forward the spirit he lived by — humility, strength, compassion, and quiet dedication — just as Raja Uncle did, every single day of his extraordinary life.

Continue Reading

Trending