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2024 SL presidential election: A significant shift towards liberal leftist politics

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2 years ago

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Anura Kumara

By Amarasiri de Silva

The 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election is considered a watershed moment for several key reasons. One of the most significant aspects is the peaceful transfer of power from a neoliberal administration to the left-oriented National People’s Power (NPP), led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake. The NPP, supported by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), marked a significant shift in the country’s political landscape. Historically, the JVP was involved in two armed uprisings in 1971 and 1989 in attempts to seize control through revolutionary means, both of which failed and were violently suppressed by the government.

The election results in 2024 reflect the public’s disillusionment with traditional political parties, particularly in light of the economic crises that have plagued Sri Lanka since 2022. Ranil Wickremesinghe, the neoliberal incumbent, played a pivotal role in stabilising the economy after widespread protests ousted the Rajapaksa government. However, despite his efforts to gain public trust, the voters, particularly the younger generation, demanded change and were drawn to the progressive and socialist policies of the NPP.

The peaceful electoral victory of the NPP, with such a revolutionary past, marks a new chapter in Sri Lankan politics. This election reflects a shift from armed struggle to democratic participation, cementing the NPP’s position as a legitimate political force. Moreover, this outcome challenges the entrenched political elite and signals a potential restructuring of Sri Lanka’s political and economic system. Originating from a farming community in Anuradhapura, Dissanayake embodies the character of an ordinary citizen, contrasting with the traditional rulers of the country who come from the Radala high caste or high-class families. This marks a significant shift in Sri Lanka’s political landscape.

The 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election result, which saw the victory of the leftist NPP, backed by the JVP, is not just a change of government but a direct challenge to the long-standing political elite that has dominated the country for decades. This entrenched political class, primarily represented by parties like the UNP and the SLFP, or the SLPP or Pohottuwa, has been heavily associated with neoliberal policies, dynastic politics, and a failure to address deep socio-economic inequalities. The victory of the NPP, a party with socialist leanings, marks a significant departure from this status quo.

The shift signals a potential restructuring of both the political and economic systems in Sri Lanka. Politically, the NPP’s rise reflects a growing rejection of elite control and the consolidation of power among a few families, like the Rajapaksas, Bandaranaikes, and Wickremesinghe’s political lineage. For years, these elites shaped the country’s policies, focusing on liberal economic reforms, often criticized for favouring the wealthy and exacerbating income disparities. The NPP’s success, bolstered by the JVP’s revolutionary past, suggests a new direction, focusing on redistributing political power and fostering a more egalitarian economic structure​. Although the percentage increase of the NPP in the presidential election is attributed to the division between the UNP and the SJB, it is deeply rooted in the people’s desire for a fundamental system change. This is clearly reflected in the significant increase in the NPP’s voter base. This dramatic rise underscores the growing public demand for change and the NPP’s ability to capture the sentiments of a population eager for a new political direction. The electorate’s growing disillusionment with traditional political parties and failure to address socio-economic inequalities and governance issues has driven voters to seek an alternative in the NPP, reflecting a broader demand for transformative change in the country’s political and economic landscape.

Ranil Wickremesinghe, representing the UNP, and Sajith Premadasa, leading the SJB, have each garnered substantial support. However, their division has fragmented the votes that would otherwise likely consolidate under one party. This indicates that if the UNP and SJB had remained unified or had formed a coalition, they would have likely outperformed the NPP, reducing the latter’s influence and growth in parliamentary electoral results.

The fragmentation in the centre-right and centre-left political spaces, dominated by the UNP and SJB, has thus contributed to a scenario where a previously smaller political force like the NPP can make significant gains, as the Opposition’s division has weakened their ability to retain a majority vote share. Therefore, the NPP’s rise does not solely reflect an increase in its inherent support but rather the strategic consequences of a divided Opposition.

Economically, the NPP victory signals a potential shift toward policies prioritising social welfare, public ownership, and economic equity. The neoliberal approach championed by past governments, which included deregulation, privatisation, and aligning with global financial institutions like the IMF, faced strong opposition from the NPP and JVP. The NPP has advocated for state intervention in key sectors, wealth redistribution, and addressing the economic needs of the working class, a stark contrast to the elite-driven policies that favoured corporate interests and foreign investments​.

This outcome also challenges the traditional role of Sri Lanka in the global economy. As a small developing nation, Sri Lanka has long depended on foreign aid, loans, and investment from international actors, especially during its economic crisis. The NPP’s victory may signal a recalibration of these relationships, as the party has criticized the terms of engagement with global financial institutions, calling for more autonomy and a greater focus on domestic development​. In summary, the 2024 election represents more than just a change in leadership; it signals a broader transformation in Sri Lanka’s political and economic system, aiming to dismantle elite control and refocus governance on social justice and economic equity.

Despite the strong backing of the NPP from the oppressed and working-class voters in the 2024 Sri Lankan Presidential Election, a noticeable gap emerged in support from ethnic minorities, particularly in the North and upcountry regions. These regions are home to significant and Muslim and Tamil populations, who have historically been marginalized and continue to face social, political, and economic discrimination.

While the NPP’s platform of social justice, equity, and anti-elite rhetoric resonated with many of the country’s Sinhalese working class, the party’s message did not seem to fully address the complex grievances and historical trauma faced by these ethnic minorities. The Tamil population in the Northern Province, for instance, has long held concerns over unresolved issues from the civil war, such as the demand for justice, truth-seeking for alleged war crimes, and a genuine political solution that would grant them greater autonomy. The electoral results from the Batticaloa district reveal that the Tamil population in the region has yet to demonstrate significant allegiance to the NPP in recent elections. Batticaloa, located in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, is predominantly inhabited by Tamils and Muslims. Tamil nationalist sentiments and concerns over ethnic rights, governance, and autonomy have historically shaped the political landscape in this region.

The NPP, primarily identified with the Sinhala-majority JVP, has traditionally struggled to gain traction in the Tamil electorate. This is mainly due to the party’s historical associations and lack of focus on the specific grievances of the Tamil community, such as demands for regional autonomy, post-war reconciliation, and devolution of power. The NPP’s broader, more nationalist platform has not resonated as strongly with the Tamil voters, who tend to align with parties that explicitly advocate for Tamil rights and representation, such as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and other regional parties.

This trend was visible in the 2020 parliamentary elections and other recent elections. The NPP failed to make significant inroads in Batticaloa, with most Tamil voters favouring more localised, ethnic-based parties that they perceive as better representing their political aspirations. This lack of support for the NPP in Batticaloa can also be attributed to the deep-rooted ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka’s political sphere. Many Tamil voters may view the NPP as part of the broader Sinhala-majority political establishment, which has historically been in opposition to Tamil demands for autonomy and justice for wartime grievances. Thus, the Batticaloa results underscore the NPP’s challenges in gaining support among Tamil populations, who remain more aligned with parties that advocate for their specific ethnic and regional concerns. This reflects a broader pattern in Sri Lankan politics, where ethnic identities and regional issues often dictate voting patterns.

The NPP’s position on these matters, while generally supportive of reconciliation, may have been perceived as insufficiently robust or sensitive to the specific needs of the Tamil community. Similarly, in the upcountry regions, which Tamil-speaking plantation workers of Indian origin largely inhabit, there remains a deep history of socio-economic deprivation. While the NPP’s economic agenda could benefit these groups, there may have been doubts about whether the party could deliver on its promises, given its primary appeal to a predominantly Sinhalese electorate. Ethnic minorities in these areas may also have been wary of aligning with a party rooted in Sinhalese-majoritarian political culture despite the NPP’s efforts to position itself as a multi-ethnic, inclusive political force​.

The gap in minority support likely reflects a broader historical pattern in Sri Lankan politics, where minority communities have been cautious about backing new political movements, especially those with a strong base among the Sinhalese majority. Instead, many of these voters may have supported more established minority-friendly parties or candidates, such as the TNA in the North or the UNP, which was traditionally seen as more accommodating to minority concerns. This divergence underscores the deep ethnic and regional cleavages that continue to shape Sri Lankan electoral politics, even in the context of a broader desire for change.

The 2024 presidential election results highlight significant challenges for the new NPP government, led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Despite their platform advocating for a unified and ethnically cohesive government, the election results show that the message has not fully resonated with the country’s ethnic minorities, particularly the Tamils in the North and the upcountry Tamil communities, as well as the Muslim population. This poses a significant challenge for the NPP, which must now find ways to reconcile these disparities while fostering ethnic harmony in both economic and political spheres.

The JVP, which forms the core of the NPP, has historically struggled to build a strong base among ethnic minorities. The JVP’s revolutionary roots and prior engagement in Sinhalese-majoritarian politics during the 1971 and 1989 uprisings may have contributed to a lingering perception among minorities that the party is more focused on Sinhalese interests. Although the NPP campaigned on a platform of equality and inclusivity, it seems that these promises did not sufficiently convince the Tamil and Muslim communities, who have long demanded autonomy, recognition of their identity, and solutions to lingering post-war grievances. For the Tamil population in the Northern Province, for instance, issues such as war crimes accountability, land rights, and devolution of power remain unresolved, and the NPP’s messaging on these fronts may have lacked the specificity or reassurance they were seeking.

In the upcountry regions, where Tamil-speaking plantation workers of Indian origin face entrenched socio-economic hardships, the NPP’s broader economic reforms, while potentially beneficial, did not seem to connect with the unique struggles of these communities. Similarly, Sri Lanka’s Muslim population has faced increasing marginalization and targeted violence in recent years, and the NPP’s ability to address these concerns may be viewed with skepticism, given the JVP’s lack of a strong track record in minority issues.

The new NPP government now faces a critical challenge: how to build trust with ethnic minorities and integrate them into its broader vision of economic and political development. Achieving ethnic harmony in a deeply divided country will require more than rhetoric; it will necessitate concrete policy measures that address these communities’ historical injustices and grievances. The NPP will need to engage in meaningful dialogue with minority leaders, create mechanisms for greater political autonomy in the North and East, and ensure that economic development reaches all parts of the country, especially those that have historically been left behind. These efforts are essential not only for the success of the NPP government but also for the long-term stability and unity of Sri Lanka​.

The NPP enjoyed overwhelming support from Sinhalese-majority districts in southern Sri Lanka, particularly from areas like Hambantota, Matara, and Galle. These regions are traditionally strongholds of the working and middle classes, including lower-middle-class workers, small-scale farmers, and rural laborers, including fisher folk. Many in these communities have faced longstanding economic hardships exacerbated by social disparities, stagnating wages, and a lack of equitable development. The NPP’s promise of economic reform, social justice, and redistributive policies appealed to these voters, who saw the NPP as a chance for significant change after decades of economic neglect by successive governments.

However, this support also presents a challenge for the NPP government. These regions have high expectations for concrete improvements in living standards, income growth, and social equity. The disparity between wealthier urban centers and rural southern districts has deepened over the years, and many rural voters feel marginalized by neoliberal policies that have primarily benefited Colombo and other urban hubs. Issues like insufficient access to quality education, healthcare, infrastructure development, and fair wages are critical concerns for these communities.

To redress these grievances, the NPP government must focus on policies that address rural economic development, ensure better income distribution, and enhance social welfare systems. Programmes to improve agricultural productivity, provide subsidies for small businesses, and increase state investment in public services, like healthcare and education, will be key to bridging the socioeconomic gap. Additionally, addressing structural inequalities and creating more inclusive economic growth models will be necessary to ensure that the benefits of development are shared across the country, particularly in these southern districts that supported the NPP so strongly.​ In short, the NPP’s support base in the south reflects deep dissatisfaction with the status quo, and delivering on their expectations will require focused, equitable development strategies to tackle the economic and social challenges that have hindered growth in these communities.

Finally, in addition to the policies they propose for the country’s development, the NPP should consider adopting practical policies proposed by their Opposition, particularly the SJB.

An essential suggestion from the SJB involves introducing a system of digital economy, including providing a digital wallet for each individual. This system would allow citizens to manage their daily transactions and major purchases in a streamlined, secure digital format. Implementing such a policy could have far-reaching benefits for the new NPP government. Firstly, a digital economy with an integrated wallet system could increase government revenue by formalizing many aspects of the informal economy. It would enable a more efficient tax collection system, helping to reduce the gap between government expenditure and income. Moving towards a direct income tax system where financial transactions are monitored and taxed appropriately, this policy could generate significant revenue quickly. This would provide the necessary funds to meet the current fiscal challenges as the state grapples with a high expenditure-income gap that demands urgent solutions.

Moreover, the digital wallet could ease day-to-day financial transactions for citizens, fostering greater economic inclusivity, particularly among marginalized or underbanked communities. Creating more transparency and encouraging savings through digital means lay the foundation for a more modernized financial infrastructure.

As the NPP forms its new government, many are eager to see whether it will adopt such forward-thinking policies. Another key concern is how the NPP, with only three members in Parliament, will approach governance. There is speculation that the NPP might quickly dissolve Parliament and call for general elections. In such a scenario, the party could potentially gain enough seats to form a majority government. However, navigating the parliamentary process and creating a robust governance structure will be critical to maintaining the public’s trust and ensuring that policies like the digital economy are implemented effectively. I personally congratulate Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the new President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.


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Features

BRICS upholds inclusive growth; re-affirms South-South cooperation

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19 hours ago

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2026/09/17

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BRICS political leaders at the 2026 New Delhi summit.(BBC)

A principal highlight of the recently concluded BRICS 2026 summit in New Delhi was the grouping’s unambiguous championing of the empowerment of ordinary people everywhere. This was yet another notable coming together of Southern governments over matters of common concern alright but it was the grouping’s people-oriented thinking that struck the impartial commentator as particularly important this time around.

The latter accent merits underscoring in view of the widespread perception that Southern oriented international organizations, such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), have had their day, so to speak. However the BRICS summit not only re-affirmed NAM principles but gave proof of its willingness to complement the main undertakings of NAM. Accordingly, causes such as South-South cooperation, international economic and social equity, multilateralism, international peace and the need to uphold the current UN-centred world order received resounding and fresh emphasis.

Particularly encouraging for those espousing Southern development concerns was the stressing of the historic ‘Bandung Principles’ in the New Delhi Declaration which crowned the summit deliberations. As is known, it was the ‘Bandung Spirit’ of 1955 that paved the way for the establishment of NAM and South-South cooperation in a major way. As such the ‘Spirit’ was primary in helping to reshape international development discourse and in giving it a pro-people bent. That is, development correctly conceived was birthed.

The New Delhi Declaration said in this regard: ‘We recall the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia that proclaimed general principles, including equality, independence, non-intervention and mutual benefit. We stress that the Bandung Spirit serves as a reference in the pursuit of a fairer, more inclusive, and representative multilateral system.’

‘Geopolitics’ was not glossed over or ignored in New Delhi, but it is quite forgotten by some sections of opinion in particularly Sri Lanka that BRICS, while being an important Southern counter-balance in terms of power to the global North is also essentially about international economic growth with equity. The New Delhi summit helped to put right this conceptual imbalance in what groupings such as BRICS ought to be thinking and doing.

Even more precisely, people should be at the heart of development and in the exertions and preoccupations of international organizations claiming to represent the South. Southern governments equipped with economic and military might in particular remain important but it is people’s empowerment that ought to be the overriding consideration.

The latter concerns help stress the cruciality of democratic development since it is the latter that facilitates best the well being of people. Unfortunately, BRICS happens to be top-heavy with authoritarian governments that could deliver economic growth but not equity. It is fully representative, participatory governance that could best deliver to the people their essential needs and not totalitarian governments.

This is a complex dilemma for BRICS. It could be resolved somewhat by admitting more and more pro-people, democratic states into the BRICS fold to counter-balance the power and influence of authoritarian states. At present among the principal BRICS countries it’s only India that meets most of the criteria for democratic development.

Hopefully, more and more Southern democracies would see it fit to join BRICS in consideration of the latter’s potential to be a prime ‘economic powerhouse’ of the world. Equally hopefully, people’s empowerment in the true sense would come to be valued as a crucial merit for BRICS membership. It is relevant to stress that the fulfillment of the fundamental rights of a people is integral to their complete empowerment.

A grave negative fallout from the Trump administration’s current militarism is that more and more states world wide would come to value military heft over people’s empowerment. Consequently, the preference for military power could lead to countries wanting BRICS membership for the wrong reasons. That is, security through collective armed might would come to matter over all else and the world would be rendered an increasingly ‘dangerous place’.

But thinking people would expect from BRICS a more responsible role in world affairs and prefer to have from it inspirational guidance in democratic development, correctly understood.

A commitment by BRICS at the summit of considerable importance to world peace that should not be underplayed is its commitment to the UN system and the strengthening of International Law. The relevant quote from the Declaration spoke of BRICS’ ‘Commitment to strengthening multilateralism and multi-polarity and upholding International Law, including the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’

Coming at a time when the UN is seen by some as a spent force, lacking effectiveness, the above endorsement of the UN Charter and International Law is of crucial significance. This amounts to solidly upholding the post World War Two order despite current largely rhetorical assertions that it is fast unraveling.

While UN reform remains a compelling necessity, the endorsement of the UN-centred order holds out the possibility of some of the BRICS heavyweights, who are currently acting in violation of International Law, eventually getting back to conduct that would be more in keeping with the requirements of International Law.

The UN could put these developments to constructive use by redoubling its efforts to work out diplomatic solutions to the current conflicts and wars that are showing no signs of being receptive to fresh peace efforts.

Two of these theatres of conflict are the Middle East and the Ukraine. While the US, Israel, Russia and Iran would need to be engaged by the UN with exceptional persuasive power to sort out the conflicts where they have come to feature directly and indirectly, the relevant BRICS members’ commitments to world peace and multilateralism could be used as instruments of moral pressure perhaps to induce them to get onto the path of peaceful conflict resolution.

The wide consensus among the BRICS powers amounts to their scoring a significant political victory over the US and its allies. Their espousal of international peace and the UN Charter exposes the US as being at cross purposes with peace-oriented and democratic sections world wide. Specifically, the moral and intellectual poverty of the Trump administration is being revealed glaringly.

This does not amount to a condemnation of the people of the US perse. It is just that some of them have voted quite unwisely. As a first step towards correcting this situation they could make good use of the upcoming mid term elections to register their strong disapproval of the Trump administration and the political extremists among the US Right. Course correction is not impossible.

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Not I — We: A new uniform will mean nothing if the person inside it is left behind

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20 hours ago

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2026/09/17

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by Mahil Dole

Senior Superintendent of Police (Retd.)

Sri Lanka Police has just marked 160 years. The parades were in order. The sentence that should have followed them has not been written with enough force. A police service that is pulled by politics, rewarded for individual glory and tried every night on social media cannot protect a country that is now a maritime hinge for international narcotics and financial crime. The political authority must decide, not in a speech, but in conduct, whether this force belongs to the law or to the loudest faction of the week.

That is not a plea. It is a warning.

The political hierarchy and the police hierarchy now agree that the service needs a new outlook, beginning with the uniform. The cut and the kit are not yet settled. That conversation is overdue. Criminals have moved into containers, encrypted apps and international logistics. An officer equipped for a quieter decade is less able to detect, and less able to come home.

Sophistication of kit is essential. Body-worn cameras, communications and protective equipment that match the threat are not luxuries. They keep a policeman alive.

If the first decision of this compact is only what the officer will wear, the wrapping will be modern and the person untouched. The priority is not a new silhouette. It is a different person inside the uniform.

The officer is a human being

He and she is a product of this complicated society. The fractures that run through the village, the school and the social-media feed run through the recruit. Communal suspicion, religious identity and ethnic memory are not checked at the armoury gate. The question treated as delicate is operational: is this officer mentally geared for ordinary crime and for communal, religious and ethnic conflict?

What is his stand if he belongs to one community and is sent into a dispute involving another? How will the parties look at him? How will the media frame the first photograph? That decides whether a crowd sees the law or “the other side.” We are all Sri Lankans. The sentence is easy on a Police Day banner. It is hard at a junction when rumour is already ahead of the patrol.

Every officer, from constable to gazetted rank, must be trained for these issues as deliberately as for a baton. Not one lecture at Katukurunda: recurring, scenario-based work on mixed neighbourhoods, mixed complainants, and keeping personal faith out of the method of work. The media will hunt the communal angle; parties to a conflict will hunt the ethnic one. The only answer that holds is an officer whose first identity on duty is Sri Lankan and whose first loyalty is the law.

That is “We.” Assuming the uniform dissolves identity is how a single incident becomes a national story.

What they have been is not what they can remain

From the 1866 ordinance this service has been the state’s civilian arm, colonial order-keeping, post-independence law and order, then a wartime partner that buried its dead beside the armed forces. Specialised units were built for terrorism, organised crime and financial intelligence. The same institution was used as a residual army, a political instrument and a promotion marketplace. Loyalty too often attached to a person, not to the law. Easter Sunday made the price visible. So did every file that moved, or stalled, according to who was in office.

A history of sacrifice does not excuse a present of capture. It makes the capture more shameful.

What they are today

On paper the force is large, some 79,000 authorised, 609 stations. On the ground it is thin. More than 4,300 officers have left since 2020. Vacancies exceed 30,000. Shifts of twelve to eighteen hours are still treated as normal. Distress is still logged as discipline rather than welfare. That is waste, not toughness.

Crime has two faces, and both strike national security. Gang violence over narcotics still produces shootings. Sri Lanka also sits on feeder routes moving Afghan and Pakistani product toward other markets. Harbour and high-sea detections in the hundreds of kilograms are no longer rare. Ice hidden in towels at Colombo Port; heroin pulled from multi-day trawlers; scam compounds and frozen assets in the billions of rupees, these are not “ordinary crime.” They buy influence and fund the next consignment.

The third battlefield is information. Reels and anonymous accounts impersonate officers, launder rumour as fact, and reward the man who seeks a following. Inside the service the culture still teaches “I”: my file, my photograph, my briefing. Rank is being treated as a prize. It is a trust.

The container that became a campaign

Late August 2026, officers opened containers at the Colombo International Container Terminal and recovered some 463 to 472 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, concealed in towels, originating from Pakistan and valued in the billions of rupees. Suspects including foreign nationals were arrested. The United States DEA publicly associated itself with the intelligence. The criminal case sits with the Central Crime Investigation Bureau.

That is a success. It should have been protected as a success.

Instead, an internal process review, ordered by the Inspector General into how information moved between bureaux, was translated on social media into another story: that the IGP and Senior DIG Ranmal Kodituwakku were being “chambered” over the detection. An Opposition MP warned, correctly, that putting the officers who delivered the raid under a public microscope will teach the service the wrong lesson.

State the distinction without apology. A criminal file is about the network and the money. A process file is about timelines and chain of custody. A blog is neither. Collapsing a Senior DIG’s recorded statement into “the hierarchy is in the dock” is not accountability. It is a gift to those who packed the towels. After a half-tonne interdiction, a process review is normal; leaking it as a morality play is not. Complete the inquiry on the record. If negligence is found, deal with it. If not, say so. Half-spoken files let rumour colonise the institution.

Training, technology and a mind that can bear the load

The IGP and the hierarchy must stop treating training as a calendar ornament. Immediate programmes are required, not next year’s paper.

First

, the evolving issues: communal and religious tension, narrative operations, child and women protection, financial and cyber crime, harbour interdiction, the law of arrest.

Second

, the technologies: digital evidence, data protection under the Personal Data Protection Act, disciplined open-source work, body-worn cameras that protect the public and officers alike.

Third

, mental health as operational infrastructure, counselling an Inspector can use without becoming a Legal Division case, and early recognition of burnout before it becomes a headline.

Incentives must follow: allowances for certified competencies, promotion credit for courses applied, not for attendance photographs. Asking for sophistication at the port with no path to acquire it is theatre.

A new uniform that can carry a camera, worn by an officer unprepared for the society he polices, is a costume. The station, the cell, the unseen hour Look next at where this officer lives and works. Many stations are old, congested and unhygienic. Living standards on duty are low. You cannot demand a different person in the uniform and house him as if he were expendable.

Cells are a particular failure of command. Too many sit out of sight of the men on duty. They are dilapidated. What happens inside goes unnoticed until a death, an assault or an escape. That is a design of our own buildings, not a secret of the underworld. A cell that cannot be seen cannot be defended in court or in conscience. Refurbish, fix sightlines, monitor what the Constitution requires, and treat an escape as a failure of supervision before it becomes a press note.

These are not welfare extras. They are the conditions under which evidence is kept, suspects are held, and officers decide whether the job is still worth the family cost.

The health of the officer is the health of the public

One of the first duties of the hierarchy is the health of the policeman and his family. A sick officer with a sick child is not “uncommitted.” He is a risk to himself, to the next raid, and to the citizen at the counter. Police hospitals are few. Officers in rural stations cannot reach them in time. The IGP should not wait for a building programme. Speak to the health authorities now. Arrange priority access for officers and their families at government hospitals. Dedicated wards or reserved beds are not a privilege class. They are the minimum owed to people sent into harm, and into other people’s crises, at every hour.

Good health is a good mind. A good mind is good care for the people. No uniform compensates for an officer who has not slept, has not been treated, and cannot reach a Police hospital.

What they must be tomorrow

The country does not need more decoration. It needs a service the public can approach without fear and that no politician can casually redirect: intelligence-led against networks that threaten the state; digitally capable and legally bounded; trained for communal heat as well as narcotics; housed and treated as human beings; collectively minded. We hold the ground, not I cleared the file.

The constable at the junction and the analyst tracing a hawala chain are the same institution. National security is not a specialist’s private property.

To the policymakers and the political authority

You have agreed with the Police hierarchy on a new outlook. Use it for more than cloth.

Independence is not the IGP’s personal autonomy. It is the institution’s ability to apply the law without fear or favour, and still answer to the law. You cannot have that and also have a Police summoned, transferred or publicly undermined according to the needs of the week.

Appointment and removal of the Inspector General must remain a process, not patronage. The National Police Commission must exercise its powers over promotions, transfers and discipline without being hectored from the gallery. Cabinet sets policy and budget. It does not choose Tuesday’s suspect. Comment from the House on the guilt of named officers while a file is open is not oversight. It is interference under another name.

If you want an apolitical Police, stop using internal inquiry as a factional weapon and social media as a substitute bench. Different treatment of files is the old disease. Naming it only when the officer is someone you dislike is the same disease.

Then fund what a new uniform implies: immediate training, habitable stations, cells that can be seen, and a health arrangement with the Ministry of Health that does not leave a rural sergeant’s family outside the gate. Announcing kit and withholding living conditions is not reform. It is dressing the service for a photograph.

The public has a part. Distinguish error from crime. Cooperate with the officer who is fair; demand consequences where he is not. In conflict, look at the uniform as the law, not as a census of name, faith or village. Do not outsource judgement to an anonymous account.

The stand It is not I. It should be We.

A new uniform will not make an officer Sri Lankan. Training, health, housing, an apolitical file, and a command that treats him as a human being might. A service that thinks in individual glory will be outrun by networks that think in systems. A political class that thinks in capture will keep receiving detections and wondering why the pipeline never closes. A country that argues about the cloth while the person inside it is exhausted, untrained for communal fire, and unseen in a dilapidated cell block is not preparing for tomorrow. It is rearranging the wardrobe.

The law cannot serve two masters. Neither can the uniform, old or new.

(This analysis is offered in the interest of national security, institutional reform, and public safety)

Mahil Dole, SSP (Retd.), served as Deputy Director in charge of the Counter-Terrorism Desk of the State Intelligence Service and later as Intelligence Coordinator to the Inspector General of Police. He is a former Member of the Sri Lanka Wakfs Board and author of Security Beyond Enforcement: Practical Approaches for a Safer Nation. Email – mahildole54@gmail.com

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Features

The Miss World 2026 scene …

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20 hours ago

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2026/09/17

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History was made under the lights on 05th September, as Joheirry Mola Dominguez, of the Dominican Republic, was crowned Miss World 2026 by outgoing queen Suchata Chuangsri of Thailand at April 2nd Square in Nha Trang, Vietnam.

It is only the second Miss World title for the Dominican Republic; 44 years after Mariasela Álvarez’s win in 1982. Reports described it as an “emotional and historic moment” for the nation.

Joheirry, 24, beat 110 other delegates to take the crown.

A dedicated educator and community advocate, she holds a degree in Business Management and Administration from Universidad Iberoamericana. She is Founder and President of “Voices of Tomorrow”, an initiative expanding access to English education for children in vulnerable communities. She also teaches Literature and Social Studies in English, and works as a correspondent for Univision New York’s Ventana a Quisqueya.

Her advocacy won hearts

It was her advocacy that won hearts.

“My Beauty With a Purpose is to take English programmes to kids in vulnerable communities,”

she said at the Grand Final. “Because I believe that when they know this language, the opportunities, the doors that can open to their life, it’s huge. English is a tool that will stay with them and benefit them for the rest of their lives.”

Spain’s Elisabeth Reynés finished 1st Runner-Up, while Malaysia’s Taanusiya Chetty, also winner of Beauty With a Purpose, took 2nd Runner-Up.

The Top 6 included Vietnam’s Le Nguyen Bao Ngoc, Eritrea’s Snit Habteab, and South Africa’s Romanda Hombir.

The 75th Anniversary edition, hosted for the first time in Vietnam, was a spectacle before 20,000 spectators. Staged on a 110+ meter outdoor platform by Nha Trang beach, the square was lit up with huge LED screens and high-power sound.

Even heavy rain during the Americas & Caribbean segment couldn’t dampen spirits. Umbrellas and raincoats popped up and the show resumed 15 minutes later. Nobody left. That’s dedication.

With 111 ambassadors, cultural dances, ao dai performances, and the seaside backdrop, officials called it a celebration of beauty, talent, confidence, and social responsibility.

With 20,000 people, rain or shine, screaming, cheering, live-streaming, waving flags… it was, indeed, pure Miss World magic.

For Sri Lanka, Prathibha Liyanaarachchi did not make the Top 40 at the 73rd Miss World Festival, but she reached the finalist stages of four fast-track events — Top Model, Talent, Sports, and Beauty With a Purpose.

Miss World magic: The square was lit up with huge LED screens and high-power sound

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