Features
Let the Countdown Begin: Parliamentary Elections in March 2024
by Rajan Philips
President Wickremesinghe has now made repeated assurances that the presidential and parliamentary elections will be held in 2024. Financial allocations for the two elections were also announced in parliament. Parliamentary elections are expected to come first, apparently in March 2024, according to news reports citing sources close to the President. Let us assume that the sources are correct and start the political countdown before the official call is made early in the new year. It is going to be a 100-day countdown.
A parliamentary election in March will be the first parliamentary election to be held before the presidential election since the twosome began their co-existence in 1982. In that year of disgrace, President Jayewardene conducted and won the country’s first presidential election, calling the election before his first, appointed, term was over, courtesy of the Third Amendment to the Constitution. He then went on to cancel the parliamentary elections that were due that year by staging an undemocratic referendum and doubled the life of an old parliament.
The purpose of advancing the presidential election was to give himself (JRJ) time to manipulate the timing of parliamentary election. This was on top of the arbitrary power that the constitution gave the executive to dissolve parliament any time after one year of its election. This power of dissolution is an unusual, if not unique, constitutional power vested in the executive over the legislature.
So much for the much vaunted separation of powers. The 19th and 20th Amendments have somewhat limited this power, but even what is left of it privileges the executive over the legislature.
President Wickremesinghe will be exercising the presidential power of dissolution to dissolve parliament and call for elections in March 2024, before they are due more than a year later in 2025. In 1982, President Jayewardene did not want to let go of the massive majority he had in the parliament elected in 1977. He kept it going through the referendum chicanery. No one wants this parliament to keep going except the Rajapaksa MPs. The prospect of its dissolution in March is as good as it can get in the circumstances.
Ranil’s Last Hurrah
So far, President Wickremesinghe has been refusing to use the power of dissolution – in order to delay elections. Not anymore, we hope. Now it makes sense for him to dissolve parliament and have parliamentary elections before the presidential election. If the presidential elections were to come first, Ranil Wickremesinghe would likely have faced two unwelcome choices: not to run as a candidate, or to run and lose. That will be the end of his presidency and he would be long gone by the time the next parliamentary elections are held, as they are due, in 2025.
By calling parliamentary elections in March, Mr. Wickremesinghe will have the opportunity and the power to first ‘preside’ over the election in whatever way he can, and then to appoint the Prime Minister and cabinet of Ministers from among the MPs of the newly elected parliament. Neither of which he would probably be able to do if the presidential elections were to go first. In the most likely situation of no single party winning by a clear majority in the next general elections, President Wickremesinghe will be well positioned to call the shots as he pleases, and all within his constitutional powers. But not quite every shot as he might please.
First, the President should not overplay his hand. For unlike in Thailand, it would be counterproductive to try to thwart the results of a popular parliamentary election through clever-by-half executive means. Second, he has a massive trust-deficit with practically every political party in parliament other than an insufficient number of Ministers and MPs who would like to see him continue as President for their own self-serving ends. It will all depend on how the President conducts himself during the parliamentary election.
If he were to take sides or take to machinating between MPs and Parties to forge a new alliance for the election, he had better make sure that such an alliance would be a winning alliance. Otherwise, and that is more likely to be the case, he would be a goner by the time his (really Gota’s) term is up. On the other hand, if he were to exercise enlightened selfishness and stay above the electoral fray, he may have a chance to form a consensus government in the new parliament and take yet another shot at extending his political life. But that will be quite a long shot even for a man who is known for playing the long game.
The revelations that TNA MP Sumanthiran recently made in parliament, about the manner in which Ranil Wickremesinghe broke opposition consensus and broke ranks to become Gotabaya’s crisis Prime Minister, are quite damaging. Add to that, President Wickremesinghe’s recent shenanigans with the Judiciary, the Constitutional Council, and with the appointment of the IGP, have left him thoroughly discredited and untrustworthy. Adding injury to insult, he has appointed the universally lampooned and reviled Deshabandu Tennakoon as the new IGP for a three month term. The upshot of all of this is that no one contesting the next parliamentary election would like to have anything to do with President Wickremesinghe. Other than the irrationally selfish.
Framing the Elections
At the same time, there is no shortage of irrationality or selfishness in Sri Lankan politics, and going by Mr. Wickremesinghe’s long past, he is not going to remain quiet or neutral as President in the next parliamentary election. He may even pull up the abolition card and play it one more time and tack a referendum question on abolition to the vote at the parliamentary election. Whatever Ranil Wickremesinghe may or may not do, the elections should not be about Ranil Wickremesinghe, and he should not be allowed to frame the election.
The elections should be about the possibilities and the potentialities for a Sri Lanka that is finally becoming free from two decades of Rajapaksa-Wickremesinghe political monopoly. The elections will also be about how Sri Lanka is going to be led out of the economic pits by those now vying for power. Then there are carryovers all the way from the twentieth century which have not been addressed but only aggravated during the Rajapaksa yugaya of this century.
The election will be framed by the dialectic of the contenders for power and/or parliamentary seats, and their positions on the manifold issues and problems that are preoccupying the people.
The SJB and the NPP have been calling for elections for almost two years and now they will get their chance to show what they are capable of. The remnants and rumps of the historically governing parties – the UNP, the SLFP and the SLPP will not have any significant identity of their own, but they may not all go into alliances with either the SJB or the NPP. Also, in a parliamentary election there is space for political parties and individuals to enter into multiple alliances.
It will be interesting to see who will be allying with the SJB, and if any of the recognized political parties will be joining the NPP/JVP formation. Any of the Sinhalese parties who are not part of either the SJB or NPP alliances, will not likely be significant players in the election, but may gain specific weights after the election as contributors to a governing majority in return for ministerial portfolios. If it were the first-past-the-post system, the Rajapaksas would probably be wiped off the electoral slate, but some of them could still manage to return because of proportional representation and preferential voting.
The political parties of the Sri Lankan Tamils, Muslims and the Indian Tamils will have their respective, and in some cases overlapping, universes, with their corresponding national overtones. The TNA will likely have to go through a leadership change before the election which may create internal rivalries even as it tries to ward off external rivals especially in the Northern Province. In the East, Sri Lankan plurality will be electorally reproduced with proportionate returns of Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslim MPs.
Political parties of the Indian Tamils, as well as Muslim political parties, have usually joined one or the other of the two main contending alliances. Where they will land this time remains to be seen. Some are with the SJB, while those who are with the current ‘government’ of President Wickremesinghe may have to find new suitors if they are to be relevant after the elections.
Again, it will be interesting to see if the JVP would be able to attract and accommodate any of the minority political parties under its NPP umbrella. It is known that the JVP and especially its leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake have excellent working relationship with many of the Tamil, Muslim and Indian Tamil political leaders, but whether the JVP would be able to draw them into a formal alliance is one of the crucial questions that will be answered during the countdown period.
Even a broadened NPP alliance will not be broad enough if it fails to include one or more of the minority political parties. On the other hand, an NPP alliance that includes minority political parties would send a powerful signal that the JVP/NPP has come of age electorally. Anything less would only mean that the JVP continues to immature in spite of age.
The countdown and the campaign will see shifting focuses around issues along with competing defenders and detractors. The main issues and those that matter are on people’s minds and in their still harrowing living and medical experiences. Then there are issues that preoccupy the pundits and elicit editorial commentaries. How will political parties and alliances respond to them? As well, the formation of political alliances and groupings will be implicated by their positions on the issues and problems facing the country, and will in turn implicate how different issues or privileged or prioritized.
The economic crisis will provide an arresting backdrop to the election campaign. President Wickremesinghe presented his budget on November 13, outlining his purported plan to take Sri Lanka out of the economic crisis. The very next day, the Supreme Court came down with its ruling on the fundamental rights applications against decision makers in the Gotabaya Rajapaksa Administration. The Court apportioned blame for decisions made wrongfully by elected and unelected officials that precipitated Sri Lanka’s worst and its only “man-made” economic crisis.
The voters deserve to know where the SJB, the NPP and everyone else running for election stand on the economy – the current crisis, its perpetrators, and a plausible way out. The upcoming election will also provide a new opportunity for the Catholic Church hierarchy to reiterate the yet unanswered questions about the perpetrators of the 2019 Easter Sunday tragedy. There are shortages of all kinds in Sri Lanka. But there is no shortage of election issues.
Features
Rebuilding the country requires consultation
A positive feature of the government that is emerging is its responsiveness to public opinion. The manner in which it has been responding to the furore over the Grade 6 English Reader, in which a weblink to a gay dating site was inserted, has been constructive. Government leaders have taken pains to explain the mishap and reassure everyone concerned that it was not meant to be there and would be removed. They have been meeting religious prelates, educationists and community leaders. In a context where public trust in institutions has been badly eroded over many years, such responsiveness matters. It signals that the government sees itself as accountable to society, including to parents, teachers, and those concerned about the values transmitted through the school system.
This incident also appears to have strengthened unity within the government. The attempt by some opposition politicians and gender misogynists to pin responsibility for this lapse on Prime Minister Dr Harini Amarasuriya, who is also the Minister of Education, has prompted other senior members of the government to come to her defence. This is contrary to speculation that the powerful JVP component of the government is unhappy with the prime minister. More importantly, it demonstrates an understanding within the government that individual ministers should not be scapegoated for systemic shortcomings. Effective governance depends on collective responsibility and solidarity within the leadership, especially during moments of public controversy.
The continuing important role of the prime minister in the government is evident in her meetings with international dignitaries and also in addressing the general public. Last week she chaired the inaugural meeting of the Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka in the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah. The composition of the task force once again reflects the responsiveness of the government to public opinion. Unlike previous mechanisms set up by governments, which were either all male or without ethnic minority representation, this one includes both, and also includes civil society representation. Decision-making bodies in which there is diversity are more likely to command public legitimacy.
Task Force
The Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka overlooks eight committees to manage different aspects of the recovery, each headed by a sector minister. These committees will focus on Needs Assessment, Restoration of Public Infrastructure, Housing, Local Economies and Livelihoods, Social Infrastructure, Finance and Funding, Data and Information Systems, and Public Communication. This structure appears comprehensive and well designed. However, experience from post-disaster reconstruction in countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami suggests that institutional design alone does not guarantee success. What matters equally is how far these committees engage with those on the ground and remain open to feedback that may complicate, slow down, or even challenge initial plans.
An option that the task force might wish to consider is to develop a linkage with civil society groups with expertise in the areas that the task force is expected to work. The CSO Collective for Emergency Relief has set up several committees that could be linked to the committees supervised by the task force. Such linkages would not weaken the government’s authority but strengthen it by grounding policy in lived realities. Recent findings emphasise the idea of “co-production”, where state and society jointly shape solutions in which sustainable outcomes often emerge when communities are treated not as passive beneficiaries but as partners in problem-solving.
Cyclone Ditwah destroyed more than physical infrastructure. It also destroyed communities. Some were swallowed by landslides and floods, while many others will need to be moved from their homes as they live in areas vulnerable to future disasters. The trauma of displacement is not merely material but social and psychological. Moving communities to new locations requires careful planning. It is not simply a matter of providing people with houses. They need to be relocated to locations and in a manner that permits communities to live together and to have livelihoods. This will require consultation with those who are displaced. Post-disaster evaluations have acknowledged that relocation schemes imposed without community consent often fail, leading to abandonment of new settlements or the emergence of new forms of marginalisation. Even today, abandoned tsunami housing is to be seen in various places that were affected by the 2004 tsunami.
Malaiyaha Tamils
The large-scale reconstruction that needs to take place in parts of the country most severely affected by Cyclone Ditwah also brings an opportunity to deal with the special problems of the Malaiyaha Tamil population. These are people of recent Indian origin who were unjustly treated at the time of Independence and denied rights of citizenship such as land ownership and the vote. This has been a festering problem and a blot on the conscience of the country. The need to resettle people living in those parts of the hill country which are vulnerable to landslides is an opportunity to do justice by the Malaiyaha Tamil community. Technocratic solutions such as high-rise apartments or English-style townhouses that have or are being contemplated may be cost-effective, but may also be culturally inappropriate and socially disruptive. The task is not simply to build houses but to rebuild communities.
The resettlement of people who have lost their homes and communities requires consultation with them. In the same manner, the education reform programme, of which the textbook controversy is only a small part, too needs to be discussed with concerned stakeholders including school teachers and university faculty. Opening up for discussion does not mean giving up one’s own position or values. Rather, it means recognising that better solutions emerge when different perspectives are heard and negotiated. Consultation takes time and can be frustrating, particularly in contexts of crisis where pressure for quick results is intense. However, solutions developed with stakeholder participation are more resilient and less costly in the long run.
Rebuilding after Cyclone Ditwah, addressing historical injustices faced by the Malaiyaha Tamil community, advancing education reform, changing the electoral system to hold provincial elections without further delay and other challenges facing the government, including national reconciliation, all require dialogue across differences and patience with disagreement. Opening up for discussion is not to give up on one’s own position or values, but to listen, to learn, and to arrive at solutions that have wider acceptance. Consultation needs to be treated as an investment in sustainability and legitimacy and not as an obstacle to rapid decisionmaking. Addressing the problems together, especially engagement with affected parties and those who work with them, offers the best chance of rebuilding not only physical infrastructure but also trust between the government and people in the year ahead.
by Jehan Perera
Features
PSTA: Terrorism without terror continues
When the government appointed a committee, led by Rienzie Arsekularatne, Senior President’s Counsel, to draft a new law to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), as promised by the ruling NPP, the writer, in an article published in this journal in July 2025, expressed optimism that, given Arsekularatne’s experience in criminal justice, he would be able to address issues from the perspectives of the State, criminal justice, human rights, suspects, accused, activists, and victims. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), produced by the Committee, has been sharply criticised by individuals and organisations who expected a better outcome that aligns with modern criminal justice and human rights principles.
This article is limited to a discussion of the definition of terrorism. As the writer explained previously, the dangers of an overly broad definition go beyond conviction and increased punishment. Special laws on terrorism allow deviations from standard laws in areas such as preventive detention, arrest, administrative detention, restrictions on judicial decisions regarding bail, lengthy pre-trial detention, the use of confessions, superadded punishments, such as confiscation of property and cancellation of professional licences, banning organisations, and restrictions on publications, among others. The misuse of such laws is not uncommon. Drastic legislation, such as the PTA and emergency regulations, although intended to be used to curb intense violence and deal with emergencies, has been exploited to suppress political opposition.
International Standards
The writer’s basic premise is that, for an act to come within the definition of terrorism, it must either involve “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or be committed to achieve an objective of an individual or organisation that uses “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to realise its aims. The UN General Assembly has accepted that the threshold for a possible general offence of terrorism is the provocation of “a state of terror” (Resolution 60/43). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has taken a similar view, using the phrase “to create a climate of terror.”
In his 2023 report on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Secretary-General warned that vague and overly broad definitions of terrorism in domestic law, often lacking adequate safeguards, violate the principle of legality under international human rights law. He noted that such laws lead to heavy-handed, ineffective, and counterproductive counter-terrorism practices and are frequently misused to target civil society actors and human rights defenders by labelling them as terrorists to obstruct their work.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has stressed in its Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism that definitions of terrorist acts must use precise and unambiguous language, narrowly define punishable conduct and clearly distinguish it from non-punishable behaviour or offences subject to other penalties. The handbook was developed over several months by a team of international experts, including the writer, and was finalised at a workshop in Vienna.
Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023
A five-member Bench of the Supreme Court that examined the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023, agreed with the petitioners that the definition of terrorism in the Bill was too broad and infringed Article 12(1) of the Constitution, and recommended that an exemption (“carve out”) similar to that used in New Zealand under which “the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial action, is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that the person” committed the wrongful acts that would otherwise constitute terrorism.
While recognising the Court’s finding that the definition was too broad, the writer argued, in his previous article, that the political, administrative, and law enforcement cultures of the country concerned are crucial factors to consider. Countries such as New Zealand are well ahead of developing nations, where the risk of misuse is higher, and, therefore, definitions should be narrower, with broader and more precise exemptions. How such a “carve out” would play out in practice is uncertain.
In the Supreme Court, it was submitted that for an act to constitute an offence, under a special law on terrorism, there must be terror unleashed in the commission of the act, or it must be carried out in pursuance of the object of an organisation that uses terror to achieve its objectives. In general, only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” should come under the definition of terrorism. There can be terrorism-related acts without violence, for example, when a member of an extremist organisation remotely sabotages an electronic, automated or computerised system in pursuance of the organisation’s goal. But when the same act is committed by, say, a whizz-kid without such a connection, that would be illegal and should be punished, but not under a special law on terrorism. In its determination of the Bill, the Court did not address this submission.
PSTA Proposal
Proposed section 3(1) of the PSTA reads:
Any person who, intentionally or knowingly, commits any act which causes a consequence specified in subsection (2), for the purpose of-
(a) provoking a state of terror;
(b) intimidating the public or any section of the public;
(c) compelling the Government of Sri Lanka, or any other Government, or an international organisation, to do or to abstain from doing any act; or
(d) propagating war, or violating territorial integrity or infringing the sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country, commits the offence of terrorism.
The consequences listed in sub-section (2) include: death; hurt; hostage-taking; abduction or kidnapping; serious damage to any place of public use, any public property, any public or private transportation system or any infrastructure facility or environment; robbery, extortion or theft of public or private property; serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic or automated or computerised system or network or cyber environment of domains assigned to, or websites registered with such domains assigned to Sri Lanka; destruction of, or serious damage to, religious or cultural property; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with any electronic, analogue, digital or other wire-linked or wireless transmission system, including signal transmission and any other frequency-based transmission system; without lawful authority, importing, exporting, manufacturing, collecting, obtaining, supplying, trafficking, possessing or using firearms, offensive weapons, ammunition, explosives, articles or things used in the manufacture of explosives or combustible or corrosive substances and biological, chemical, electric, electronic or nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, nuclear material, radioactive substances, or radiation-emitting devices.
Under section 3(5), “any person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the nine international treaties on terrorism, ratified by Sri Lanka, also commits the offence of terrorism.” No one would contest that.
The New Zealand “carve-out” is found in sub-section (4): “The fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent or engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action, is not by itself a sufficient basis for inferring that such person (a) commits or attempts, abets, conspires, or prepares to commit the act with the intention or knowledge specified in subsection (1); or (b) is intending to cause or knowingly causes an outcome specified in subsection (2).”
While the Arsekularatne Committee has proposed, including the New Zealand “carve out”, it has ignored a crucial qualification in section 5(2) of that country’s Terrorism Suppression Act, that for an act to be considered a terrorist act, it must be carried out for one or more purposes that are or include advancing “an ideological, political, or religious cause”, with the intention of either intimidating a population or coercing or forcing a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.
When the Committee was appointed, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka opined that any new offence with respect to “terrorism” should contain a specific and narrow definition of terrorism, such as the following: “Any person who by the use of force or violence unlawfully targets the civilian population or a segment of the civilian population with the intent to spread fear among such population or segment thereof in furtherance of a political, ideological, or religious cause commits the offence of terrorism”.
The writer submits that, rather than bringing in the requirement of “a political, ideological, or religious cause”, it would be prudent to qualify proposed section 3(1) by the requirement that only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or are carried out to achieve a goal of an individual or organisation that employs “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to attain its objectives should come under the definition of terrorism. Such a threshold is recognised internationally; no “carve out” is then needed, and the concerns of the Human Rights Commission would also be addressed.
by Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne
President’s Counsel
Features
ROCK meets REGGAE 2026
We generally have in our midst the famous JAYASRI twins, Rohitha and Rohan, who are based in Austria but make it a point to entertain their fans in Sri Lanka on a regular basis.
Well, rock and reggae fans get ready for a major happening on 28th February (Oops, a special day where I’m concerned!) as the much-awaited ROCK meets REGGAE event booms into action at the Nelum Pokuna outdoor theatre.
It was seven years ago, in 2019, that the last ROCK meets REGGAE concert was held in Colombo, and then the Covid scene cropped up.

Chitral Somapala with BLACK MAJESTY
This year’s event will feature our rock star Chitral Somapala with the Australian Rock+Metal band BLACK MAJESTY, and the reggae twins Rohitha and Rohan Jayalath with the original JAYASRI – the full band, with seven members from Vienna, Austria.
According to Rohitha, the JAYASRI outfit is enthusiastically looking forward to entertaining music lovers here with their brand of music.
Their playlist for 28th February will consist of the songs they do at festivals in Europe, as well as originals, and also English and Sinhala hits, and selected covers.
Says Rohitha: “We have put up a great team, here in Sri Lanka, to give this event an international setting and maintain high standards, and this will be a great experience for our Sri Lankan music lovers … not only for Rock and Reggae fans. Yes, there will be some opening acts, and many surprises, as well.”

Rohitha, Chitral and Rohan: Big scene at ROCK meets REGGAE
Rohitha and Rohan also conveyed their love and festive blessings to everyone in Sri Lanka, stating “This Christmas was different as our country faced a catastrophic situation and, indeed, it’s a great time to help and share the real love of Jesus Christ by helping the poor, the needy and the homeless people. Let’s RISE UP as a great nation in 2026.”
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