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Why Do We Need An Anti-Terrorism Act When We Have A Public Security Ordinance?

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by Dr Nihal Jayawickrama

It is difficult to comprehend why the Government is seeking to introduce a monstrosity of a Bill, ostensibly to combat terrorism, when it has, and has had at its disposal for several decades, a law with sufficient flexibility to prevent and deal with all forms of threats to the security of our country and its peoples.

The Public Security Ordinance

In June 1947, a few months before Ceylon’s first parliamentary election, the State Council enacted the Public Security Ordinance. It was a time when both the private and public sectors of the country were virtually crippled by strike action. Demanding better living conditions, higher wages, and trade union and political rights for government employees, nearly 50,000 workers had come out in what was then the biggest ever strike organized in the country. On June 5, 1947, the police opened fire on a demonstration in Colombo, killing a government clerk, V. Kandasamy. Five days later, the Minister of Home Affairs Mr. (later Sir) Arunachalam Mahadeva, presented the Public Security Ordinance in the State Council. He did not even attempt to disguise the fact that the Bill he was presenting was motivated by the general strike. Seventy-six years later, that law remains not only in our statute book, but also entrenched in the Constitution.

The Public Security Ordinance enables the President, by merely placing his signature on a proclamation, to declare a state of public emergency if it appears to him to be necessary to do so in the interests of public security and the preservation of public order, or for the maintenance of supplies essential to the life of the community. Upon his doing so, he is empowered to legislate through emergency regulations. An emergency regulation, which may even provide for the detention of persons, has the legal effect of over-riding, amending, or suspending the operation of any law other than the Constitution. It comes into force immediately upon it being made by the President, without the need for its publication.

The Public Security Ordinance has also conferred special powers on the President which he may exercise without declaring a state of public emergency.

He may call out the members of all or any of the armed forces to assist the police in the maintenance of public order in any area.

He may impose a curfew in any area.

He may declare any service to be an essential service, and any person who fails to provide that service, or impedes, obstructs, delays, or restricts the carrying on of that service will be guilty of an offence.

This immense power vested in the President is counter-balanced in several ways. The declaration of a state of public emergency is limited in duration to one month at a time. The making of a proclamation must be communicated to Parliament forthwith. The proclamation will expire after 14 days unless Parliament, by resolution, approves it. No proclamation may now remain in force beyond 90 days unless it is approved by Parliament by a two-thirds majority of all its members. These are some of the safeguards provided for in the Public Security Ordinance against the abuse of the extraordinary powers conferred by it on the President.

The following are some of the threats, or perceived threats, to public security which have been addressed by invoking the Public Security Ordinance.

The Hartal 1953

It was in 1953, during the second Parliament, that the Public Security Ordinance was invoked for the first time. In the budget presented that year by Finance Minister J.R. Jayewardene, the subsidy on rice was removed, postal rates and railway fares were increased, and the free midday meal was abandoned. To protest against these measures, the trade unions and left-wing political parties organized a “hartal” (a general stoppage of work) on August 12, 1953. In many parts of the country there were several outbreaks of violence and much damage to public property. Lorries carrying produce were set on fire, the Manning market was completely gutted, several schools were destroyed, and rail tracks were obstructed. On the same day, on the advice of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake, the Acting Governor-General Sir Alan Rose declared a state of emergency and imposed a dawn to dusk curfew throughout the country. Several left-wing politicians were detained. Order was restored, but not until several deaths occurred at the hands of the military. The responsibilities he had to bear had a negative impact on the health of the Prime Minister who resigned his office two months later.

Communal conflict 1958

Communal tensions that had begun to simmer on the issue of language rights reached a crescendo with the presentation of the Official Language Bill in June 1956 in an empty House of Representatives that was barricaded with banks of barbed wire and guarded by steel-helmeted policemen. On Galle Face Green, Tamil parliamentarians who were performing satyagraha were physically attacked. The violence spread from Colombo to the eastern province, and continuing communal discord took a turn for the worse with a tar brush campaign when the Government introduced the “Sri” numberplate. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact brought Buddhist priests and Sinhalese extremists into the fray. In October 1957, a march to Kandy led by J.R. Jayewardene seeking spiritual aid to achieve the abrogation of the B-C Pact led to more violence. In May 1958, a wave of violence broke out in the North and East following the derailment of a train carrying delegates to the Federal Party Convention in Batticaloa. In Colombo, mobs attacked and looted Tamil businesses, set cars ablaze, and killed several Tamil persons. As the killing, arson and looting spread throughout the island like a prairie fire, the Governor-General invoked the Public Security Ordinance, declared a state of emergency, imposed a curfew, proscribed the Federal Party and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and placed their leaders under house arrest. Over 4,000 Tamils and 2,000 Sinhalese were transported to safety in convoys on the high seas. Peace eventually returned to the Island.

Assassination of the Prime Minister 1959

The third occasion for invoking the Public Security Ordinance was in 1959. At around 10 a.m. on September 25 of that year, Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was shot at his residence by a Buddhist monk and was rushed to hospital, from where he issued a statement appealing for restraint and patience. At 11 a.m. the Governor-General Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, having spoken briefly with Mr. Bandaranaike in hospital, and apparently to prevent an angry multitude embarking on reprisals against Buddhist monks, invoked the Public Security Ordinance and declared a state of emergency throughout the country. At 8 a.m. on the following morning, the Prime Minister passed away. At 11.15 on the same day, following a meeting of the Cabinet at Queen’s House, the Governor-General appointed W. Dahanayake, the Acting Leader of the House, as Prime Minister.

Following Mr. Bandaranaike’s state funeral, a series of bizarre events took place. As speculation about the identity of Bandaranaike’s assassins reached fever pitch, and it was openly insinuated that people in very high places were privy to the conspiracy, a rigorous press censorship was introduced by emergency regulations, covering a variety of subjects including news of the murder probe. Following the arrest of the female Minister of Health and the brother of the Minister of Finance, the government parliamentary group expelled the Prime Minister, and the latter sacked ten of his Ministers. Finally, left with no alternative but to dissolve Parliament, due to a rapid erosion of support in both Houses, Prime Minister Dahanayake revoked the state of emergency on December 3, 1959. At the general election that followed, the Prime Minister was defeated in his own constituency.

Since 1961, the Public Security Ordinance was invoked on numerous occasions, by successive governments, to deal with a variety of governance issues. For example:

Civil Disobedience in the North 1961

On January 1, 1961, the Official Language Act became fully operative. Attempts to reach accord on the use of the Tamil language had been unsuccessful. On February 20. 1961, the Federal Party commenced a “satyagraha” in five centres – Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Batticaloa and Trincomalee, against the language policy of the Government, preventing access to kachcheris and other government office in those districts. When the Federal Party announced the establishment of their own postal service, police service and land kachcheris, the Government declared a state of emergency on April 18 “to take effective measures to deal with the situation”. The Federal Party was proscribed, detention orders were issued, and a curfew was imposed.

An Abortive Coup d’etat

On the night of January 27, 1962, while a state of emergency was in force, the Government received reliable information that certain senior officers of the police and armed forces had conspired to arrest some Ministers and other political leaders and to overthrow the Government. The arrests were scheduled to be made that night. The fact that the Public Security Ordinance was already in operation enabled the Government to arrest the coup leaders and to foil the plot and commence and complete an immediate investigation.

Electricity Department Strike

On March 5, 1964, a 30-day state of emergency was declared to deal with a strike in the Electricity Department. According to the Government, “the sewerage system in Colombo, oil, telecommunications, the loading and unloading of ships in the harbour – all are at a standstill. Many factories have come to a halt”. Following personal service orders served on certain electrical engineers, in pursuance of which they were taken to their places of work and compelled to work, the strike was called off and services restored.

Protests against the Tamil Language Regulations

On January 8, 1966, when regulations under the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958 were presented to Parliament, massive demonstrations organized by Opposition parties took place. A procession of nearly 10,000 persons, led by Buddhist monks, left the Vihara Maha Devi Park and commenced a march in the direction of Parliament. At Kollupitiya, the police opened fire after tear gas and baton-charging had failed. A Buddhist monk was killed, and several others injured. A state of emergency was declared, and a curfew imposed in Colombo and its suburbs.

Reduction in the rice ration

A state of emergency was suddenly declared at midnight on December 18, 1966, and all public meetings were banned, local authority elections were postponed, and demonstrations and processions permitted only with the approval of the competent authority in each district. On the following morning, Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake announced that, owing to a world shortage of rice, the ration of two measures would be reduced to one, and that would be issued free of charge. Matured by experience and conscious of the fact that “rice” was the most sensitive and explosive issue in the country, the Government struck what was obviously a pre-emptive blow. However, other measures were to follow. Devaluation, and the sealing of the “Jana Dina” newspaper were some of them. For reasons best known to the Government, the state of emergency continued to be renewed, with parliamentary approval, until January 18, 1969.

The JVP Insurgency

On March 1971, Governor-General William Gopallawa declared a state of public emergency. Prime Minister Sirima Bandaranaike explained to Parliament that information had been received that secret cells had been formed; that arms, ammunition and other deadly weapons were being collected or manufactured; that a large cache of hand bombs had exploded in a hut in Dedigama killing five persons; nine crates containing hand bombs had been discovered in a shrub jungle in Pindeniya; and that an explosion in the Peradeniya campus, which damaged the roof of Marrs Hall, had led to the discovery of hand bombs and large quantities of explosive material used in the manufacture of hand bombs. Despite this pre-emptive action, the Government was militarily unprepared for the concentrated armed attacks that were launched on April 5, 1971.

With shot guns, hand bombs and locally made hand grenades, a massive attack was launched on police stations throughout the country between April 5 – 11, a total of 93 police stations were attacked and overrun; 35 police stations went under insurgent control, and in these provincial towns and villages revolutionary government replaced the civil administration completely. However, powers under the Public Security Ordinance enabled the Government to bring the situation under control; to accommodate approximately 10,000 insurgents who had been arrested; to secure the surrender of an additional 6,000; to establish a special investigation unit; and to perform all the other tasks required to bring the leadership to trial and release the others progressively in such numbers as not to create any security problems in the areas to which they returned.

Conclusion

The Public Security Ordinance appeared to have lost its relevance when, in July 1979, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act came into force. That law did not prevent the bloody ethnic conflict which commenced in that year and continued for the next 30 years. It did not prevent, even with all the information made available to the relevant authorities, the colossal Easter Sunday massacre. The fundamental difference between the Public Security Ordinance and the proposed Anti-Terrorism Act is that, while the former may be utilized only when the need arises, the latter will remain forever, not merely as a dark cloud over the heads of all the citizens of Sri Lanka, but as a permanent ogre, watching every movement, every normal act of human behaviour, waiting for the opportunity to swoop down and grab its prey.



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Democracy faces tougher challenges as political Right beefs-up presence

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An anti-Hamas people’s protest in the Gaza. (BBC)

It is becoming increasingly evident that the democracy-authoritarianism division would be a major polarity in international politics going forward. It shouldn’t come as a surprise if quite a few major states of both East and West gain increasing inspiration from the ‘world’s mightiest democracy’ under President Donald Trump from now on and flout the core principles of democratic governance with impunity.

It is the political Right that would gain most might in this evolving new scheme of things. Whether it be the US itself, France, Israel or Turkey, to name just a few countries in the news, it is plain to see that the Right is unleashing its power with hardly a thought for the harm being done to key democratic institutions and norms.

In fact, Donald Trump and his Republican hard liners led from the front, so to speak, in this process of unleashing the power of the Right in contemporary times. It remains a very vital piece of history that the Right in the US savaged democracy’s most valued institutions on January 6, 2021, when it ran amok with the tacit backing of Trump in the US Capitol.

What was being challenged by the mob most was the ‘will of the people’ which was manifest in the latter’s choice of Joe Biden as US President at the time. To date Trump does not accept that popular verdict and insists that the election in question was a flawed one. He does so in the face of enlightened pronouncements to the contrary.

The US Right’s protégé state, Israel, is well on course to doing grave harm to its democratic institutions, with the country’s judiciary being undermined most. To cite two recent examples to support this viewpoint, the Israeli parliament passed a law to empower the country’s election officials to appoint judges, while Prime Minister Netanyahu has installed the new head of the country’s prime security agency, disregarding in the process a Supreme Court decision to retain the former head.

Such decisions were made by the Netanyahu regime in the face of mounting protests by the people. While nothing new may be said if one takes the view that Israel’s democratic credentials have always left much to be desired, the downgrading of a democratic country’s judiciary is something to be sorely regretted by democratic opinion worldwide. After all, in most states, it is the judiciary that ends up serving the best interests of the people.

Meanwhile in France, the indications are that far Right leader Marine Le Pen would not be backing down in the face of a judicial verdict that pronounces her guilty of corruption that may prevent her from running for President in 2027. She is the most popular politician in France currently and it should not come as a surprise if she rallies further popular support for herself in street protests. Among other things, this will be proof of the growing popular appeal of the political Right. Considering that France has been a foremost democracy, this is not good news for democratic opinion.

However, some heart could be taken from current developments in the Gaza and Turkey where the people are challenging their respective dominant governing forces in street protests largely peacefully. In the Gaza anti-Hamas protests have broken out demanding of the group to step down from power, while in Turkey, President Erdogan’s decades-long iron-fist rule is being challenged by pro-democracy popular forces over the incarceration of his foremost political rival.

Right now, the Turkish state is in the process of quashing this revolt through a show of brute force. Essentially, in both situations the popular demand is for democracy and accountable governance and such aims are generally anathema in the ears of the political Right whose forte is repressive, dictatorial rule.

The onus is on the thriving democracies of the world to ensure that the Right anywhere is prevented from coming to power in the name of the core principles and values of democracy. Right now, it is the European Union that could fit into this role best and democratic opinion is obliged to rally behind the organization. Needless to say, peaceful and democratic methods should be deployed in this historic undertaking.

Although the UN is yet to play an effective role in the current international situation, stepped up efforts by it to speed up democratic development everywhere could yield some dividends. Empowerment of people is the goal to be basically achieved.

Interestingly, the Trump administration could be seen as being in league with the Putin regime in Russia at present. This is on account of the glaringly Right wing direction that the US is taking under Trump. In fact, the global balance of political forces has taken an ironic shift with the hitherto number one democracy collaborating with the Putin regime in the latter’s foreign policy pursuits that possess the potential of plunging Europe into another regional war.

President Trump promised to bring peace to the Ukraine within a day of returning to power but he currently is at risk of cutting a sorry figure on the world stage because Putin is far from collaborating with his plans regarding Ukraine. Putin is promising the US nothing and Ukraine is unlikely to step down from the position it has always held that its sovereignty, which has been harmed by the Putin regime, is not negotiable.

In fact, the China-Russia alliance could witness a firming-up in the days ahead. Speculation is intense that the US is contemplating a military strike on Iran, but it would face strong opposition from China and Russia in the event of such an adventurist course of action. This is on account of the possibility of China and Russia continuing to be firm in their position that Western designs in the Gulf region should be defeated. On the other hand, Iran could be expected to hit back strongly in a military confrontation with the US.

Considering that organizations such as the EU could be expected to be at cross-purposes with the US on the Ukraine and connected questions, the current world situation could not be seen as a replication of the conventional East-West polarity. The East, that is mainly China and Russia, is remaining united but not so the West. The latter has broadly fragmented into a democratic states versus authoritarian states bipolarity which could render the international situation increasingly unstable and volatile.

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Chikungunya Fever in Children

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Chikungunya fever, a viral disease transmitted by mosquitoes, poses a significant health concern, particularly for children. It has been around in Sri Lanka sporadically, but there are reports of an increasing occurrence of it in more recent times. While often associated with debilitating joint pain in adults, its manifestations in children can present unique challenges. Understanding the nuances of this disease is crucial for effective management and prevention.

Chikungunya fever is caused by the chikungunya virus (CHIKV), an alphavirus transmitted to humans through the bites of infected Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus mosquitoes. These are the same mosquitoes that transmit dengue and Zika viruses, highlighting the overlapping risks in many areas of the world. It is entirely possible for chikungunya and dengue to co-circulate in the same area, leading to co-infections in individuals.

When a mosquito bites a person infected with CHIKV, it ingests the virus. After a period of growth and multiplication of the virus within the mosquito, the virus can be transmitted to another person through subsequent bites. Therefore, the mosquito acts as a vector or an intermediate transmitting agent that spreads the disease, but not as a reservoir of the disease. The spread of chikungunya is influenced by environmental factors that support mosquito breeding, such as stagnant water and warm climates. Urbanization and poor sanitation can exacerbate the problem by creating breeding grounds for these mosquitoes.

The clinical presentation of chikungunya in children can vary, ranging from mild to severe. While some infected children may even be asymptomatic and be normal for all intents and purposes, others can experience a range of symptoms, including a sudden onset of high fever, a common initial symptom. Pain in the joints of the body, while being a hallmark of chikungunya in adults, may be less pronounced in children. However, they can still experience significant discomfort and this must be kept in mind during processes of diagnosis and treatment. It is also important to remember that joint pains can present in various forms, as well as in different locations of the body. There is no characteristic pattern or sites of involvement of joints. Muscle aches and pains can accompany the fever and joint pain as well. A headache, too, could occur at any stage of the disease. Other symptoms may include nausea, vomiting, and fatigue as well.

A reddish elevated rash, referred to in medical jargon as a maculopapular rash, is frequently observed in children, sometimes more so than in adults. While chikungunya is known to cause such a rash, there is a specific characteristic related to nasal discoloration that is worth noting. It is called the “Chik sign” or “Brownie nose” and refers to an increased darkening of the skin, particularly on the nose. This discolouration just appears and is not associated with pain or itching. It can occur during or after the fever, and it can be a helpful clinical sign, especially in areas with limited diagnostic resources. While a generalised rash is a common symptom of chikungunya, a distinctive darkening of the skin on the nose is a particular characteristic that has been observed.

In some rare instances, particularly in infants and very young children, chikungunya can lead to neurological complications, such as involvement of the brain, known as encephalitis. This is associated with a change in the level of alertness, drowsiness, convulsions and weakness of limbs. Equally rarely, some studies indicate that children can experience bleeding tendencies and haemorrhagic manifestations more often than adults.

Diagnosis is typically made through evaluating the patient’s symptoms and medical history, as well as by special blood tests that can detect the presence of CHIKV antibodies (IgM and IgG) or the virus itself through PCR testing.

There is no specific antiviral treatment for chikungunya. Treatment focuses on relieving symptoms and allowing the body to recover on its own. Adequate rest is essential for recovery, and maintaining hydration is crucial, especially in children with fever. Paracetamol in the correct dosage can be used to reduce fever and pain. It is important to avoid aspirin, as it can increase the risk of a further complication known as Reye’s syndrome in children. In severe cases, hospitalisation and supportive care may be necessary.

While most children recover from chikungunya without any major issues, some may experience long-term sequelae. Joint pain can persist for months or even years in some individuals, impacting their quality of life. In rare cases, chikungunya can lead to chronic arthritis. Children that have suffered from neurological complications can have long term effects.

The ultimate outcome or prognosis for chikungunya in children is generally favourable. Most children recover fully within a few days or a couple of weeks. However, the duration and severity of symptoms can vary quite significantly.

Prevention is key to controlling the spread of chikungunya. Mosquito control is of paramount importance. These include eliminating stagnant water sources where mosquitoes breed, using mosquito repellents, wearing long-sleeved clothing and pants, using mosquito nets, especially for young children and installing protective screens on windows and doors. While a chikungunya vaccine is available, its current use is mainly for adults, especially those traveling to at risk areas. More research is being conducted for child vaccinations.

Chikungunya outbreaks can strain healthcare systems and have significant economic consequences. Public health initiatives aimed at mosquito control and disease surveillance are crucial for preventing and managing outbreaks.

Key considerations for children are that some of them, especially infants and young children, are more vulnerable to severe chikungunya complications and early diagnosis and supportive care are essential for minimising the risk of long-term sequelae. Preventing mosquito bites is the most effective way to protect children from chikungunya. By understanding the causation, clinical features, treatment, and prevention of chikungunya, parents, caregivers, and healthcare professionals can work together to protect children from this illness that could sometimes be quite debilitating.

Dr B. J. C. Perera 

MBBS(Cey), DCH(Cey), DCH(Eng), MD(Paed), MRCP(UK), FRCP(Edin), FRCP(Lond), FRCPCH(UK), FSLCPaed, FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH(UK), Hony. FCGP(SL)

Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Joint Editor, Sri Lanka Journal of Child Health and Section Editor, Ceylon Medical Journal

Founder President, Sri Lanka College of Paediatricians – 1996-97)

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The Great and Little Traditions and Sri Lankan Historiography

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Prof. Obeyesekere

Power, Culture, and Historical Memory:

(Continued from yesterday)

Newton Gunasinghe, a pioneering Sri Lankan sociologist and Marxist scholar, made significant contributions to the study of culture and class in Sri Lanka by incorporating the concepts of great and little traditions within an innovative Marxist framework. His theoretical synthesis offered historians a fresh perspective for evaluating the diversity of past narratives.

At the same time, Michel Foucault’s philosophical intervention significantly influenced the study of historical knowledge. In particular, two of his key concepts have had a profound impact on the discipline of history:

1. The relationship between knowledge and power – Knowledge is not merely an objective truth but a manifestation of the power structures of its time.

2. The necessity of considering the ‘other’ in any conceptual construction – Every idea or framework takes shape in relation to its opposite, highlighting the duality inherent in all intellectual constructs.

These concepts challenged historians to rethink their approaches, prompting them to explore the dynamic interplay between knowledge, power, and culture. The existence of Little Tradition prompted historians to pay attention to ‘other’ histories.

The resurgence of ethnic identities and conflicts has brought renewed attention to the dichotomy of culture, steering the discourse in a new direction. The ethnic resurgence raises three key issues. First, the way non-dominant cultures interpret the past often differs from the narratives produced by dominant cultures, prompting the question: What is historical truth? Second, it underscores the importance of studying the histories of cultural identities through their own perspectives. Finally, and most importantly, it invites reflection on the relationship between ‘Little Traditions’ and the ‘Great Tradition’—how do these ‘other’ histories connect to broader historical narratives?

When the heuristic construct of the cultural dichotomy is applied to historical inquiry, its analytical scope expands far beyond the boundaries of social anthropology. In turn, it broadens the horizons of historical research, producing three main effects:

1. It introduces a new dimension to historical inquiry by bringing marginalised histories to the forefront. In doing so, it directs the attention of professional historians to areas that have traditionally remained outside their scope.

2. It encourages historians to seek new categories of historical sources and adopt more innovative approaches to classifying historical evidence.

3. It compels historians to examine the margins in order to gain a deeper understanding of the center.

The rise of a new theoretical school known as Subaltern Studies in the 1980s provided a significant impetus to the study of history from the perspective of marginalised and oppressed groups—those who have traditionally been excluded from dominant historical narratives and are not linked to power and authority. This movement sought to challenge the Eurocentric and elitist frameworks that had long shaped the study of history, particularly in the context of colonial and postcolonial societies. The writings of historians such as Ranajit Guha and Eric Stokes played a pioneering role in opening up this intellectual path. Guha, in particular, critiqued the way history had been written from the perspective of elites—whether colonial rulers or indigenous upper classes—arguing that such narratives ignored the agency and voices of subaltern groups, such as peasants, laborers, and tribal communities.

Building upon this foundation, several postcolonial scholars further developed the critical examination of power, knowledge, and representation. In her seminal essay Can the Subaltern Speak?, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak questioned whether marginalized voices—especially those of subaltern women—could truly be represented within dominant intellectual and cultural frameworks, or whether they were inevitably silenced by hegemonic. Another major theorist in this field, Homi Bhabha, also focused on the relationship between knowledge and social power relations. His analysis of identity formation under colonialism revealed the complexities of power dynamics and how they persist in postcolonial societies.

Together, these scholars significantly reshaped historical and cultural studies by emphasising the voices and experiences of those previously ignored in dominant narratives. Their work continues to influence contemporary debates on history, identity, and the politics of knowledge production.

The Sri Lankan historiography from very beginning consists of two distinct yet interrelated traditions: the Great Tradition and the Little Traditions. These traditions reflect different perspectives, sources, and modes of historical transmission that have influenced the way Sri Lanka’s past has been recorded and understood. The Great Tradition refers to the formal, written historiography primarily associated with elite, religious, and state-sponsored chronicles. The origins of the Great Tradition of historiography directly linked to the introduction of Buddhism to the island by a mission sent by Emperor Asoka of the Maurya dynasty of India in the third century B.C. The most significant sources in this tradition include the Mahāvaṃsa, Dīpavaṃsa, Cūḷavaṃsa, and other Buddhist chronicles that were written in Pali and Sanskrit. These works, often compiled by Buddhist monks, emphasise the island’s connection to Buddhism, the role of kingship, and the concept of Sri Lanka as a sacred land linked to the Buddha’s teachings. The Great Tradition was influenced by royal patronage and aimed to legitimise rulers by presenting them as protectors of Buddhism and the Sinhala people.

In contrast, the Little Tradition represents oral histories, folk narratives, and local accounts that were passed down through generations in vernacular languages such as Sinhala and Tamil. These traditions include village folklore, ballads, temple stories, and regional histories that were not necessarily written down but played a crucial role in shaping collective memory. While the Great Tradition often portrays a centralised, Sinhala-Buddhist perspective, the Little Tradition captures the diverse experiences of various communities, including Tamils, Muslims.

What about the history of those who are either unrepresented or only marginally represented in the Great Tradition? They, too, have their own interpretations of the past, independent of dominant narratives. Migration from the four corners of the world did not cease after the 3rd century BC—so what about the cultural traditions that emerged from these movements? Can we reduce these collective memories solely to the Sokari Nadagams?

The Great Traditions often celebrate the history of the ruling or majority ethnic group. However, Little Traditions play a crucial role in preserving the historical memory and distinct identities of marginalised communities, such as the Vedda and Rodiya peoples. Beyond caste history, Little Traditions also reflect the provincial histories and historical memories of peripheral communities. Examples include the Wanni Rajawaliya and the Kurunegala Visthraya. The historical narratives presented in these sources do not always align with those of the Great Tradition.

The growth of caste histories is a key example of Little Historical Traditions. Jana Wansaya remains an important source in this context. After the 12th century, many non-Goigama castes in Sri Lanka preserved their own oral historical traditions, which were later documented in written form. These caste-based histories are significant because they provide a localised, community-centered perspective on historical developments. Unlike the dominant narratives found in the Great Tradition, they capture the social, economic, and cultural transformations experienced by different caste groups. For instance, the Karava, Salagama, and Durava castes have distinct historical narratives that have been passed down through generations.

Ananda S. Kulasuriya traced this historical tradition back to the formal establishment of Buddhism, noting that it continued even after the decline of the Polonnaruwa Kingdom. He identified these records as “minor chronicles” and classified them into three categories: histories of the Sangha and Sasana, religious writings of historical interest, and secular historical works. According to him, the first category includes the Pujavaliya, the Katikavatas, the Nikaya Sangrahaya, and the Sangha Sarana. The second category comprises the Thupavamsa, Bodhi Vamsa, Anagatha Vamsa, Dalada Sirita, and Dhatu Vamsa, along with the two Sinhalese versions of the Pali Hatthavanagalla Vihara Vamsa, namely the Ehu Attanagalu Vamsa and the Saddharma Ratnakaraya. The third category consists of works that focus more on secular events than religious developments, primarily the Rajavaliya. Additionally, this category includes the Raja Ratnakaraya and several minor works such as the Sulu Rajavaliya, Vanni Rajavaliya, Alakesvara Yuddhaya, Sri Lanka Kadaim Pota, Kurunegala Vistaraya, Buddharajavaliya, Bamba Uppattiya, Sulu Pujavaliya, Matale Kadaim Pota, Kula Nitiya, and Janavamsaya (Kulasuriya, 1978:5). Except for a few mentioned in the third category, all other works are products of the Great Historical tradition.

Over the last few decades, Gananath Obeyesekera has traversed the four corners of Sri Lanka, recovering works of the Little Historical Traditions and making them accessible for historical inquiry, offering a new lens through which to reread Sri Lankan history. Obeyesekera’s efforts to recover the Little Historical Traditions remind us that history is never monolithic; rather, it is a contested space where power, culture, and memory continuously shape our understanding of the past. By bringing the Little Historical Traditions into the fold of Sri Lankan historiography, Obeyesekera challenges us to move beyond dominant narratives and embrace a more pluralistic understanding of the past. The recovery of these traditions is not just an act of historical inquiry but a reminder that power shapes what we remember—and what we forget. Sri Lankan history, like all histories, is a dialogue between great and little traditions and it is to engage both of them. His latest work, The Doomed King: A Requiem for Sri Vikrama Rajasinghe, is a true testament to his re-reading of Sri Lankan history.

BY GAMINI KEERAWELLA

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