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Anti-Terrorism Bill aimed at creating fascist dictatorship – II

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By Kalyananda Tiranagama 
(Continued from yesterday)

Under the ATB, committing a terrorist act resulting in murder is punishable with death penalty; under the CTB it was punishable with life imprisonment; Under both Bills in the case of any other offence of terrorism, with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years and fine not exceeding Rs. one million. In addition, the Court may order forfeiture of all movable and immovable property of the offender – S.4

Penalty for attempt, abetment or conspiracy to commit any such offence is imprisonment tor a term not exceeding 15 years and fine not exceeding Rs. one million.

Once this Bill becomes law:

Government Medical Officers Association (GMOA) will not be able to resort to strike action to compel the government not go ahead with signing ETCA with India or Free Trade Agreement with Singapore or, as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling the govt. of Sri Lanka to do or to abstain from doing any act and as such action results in causing serious risk to the health and safety of the public or section thereof

Trade unions in the Petroleum Corporation, Ceylon Electricity Board, Water Resources Board, Railways or any other sector directly affecting the life of the people will not be able to carry on a mass protest campaign combined with strike action against the moves of the government to privatize state institutions, as their action may result in causing serious obstruction or damage to essential services or supplies.

People’s organizations or opposition political parties will not be able to carry on any mass agitation campaign demanding the government to take steps to conduct provincial council or general elections as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling the govt. of Sri Lanka to do any act and as such action may result in causing serious damage to property, including public or private property, any place of public use, a state or govt. facility, any public or private transportation system, or any infrastructure facility or environment.

Any People’s or professional organization or political party will not be able to carry on a protest campaign at the Indian High Commission against the signing of ETCA or granting of Mattala or Palaly Airports to India or at the British High Commission against sponsoring a Resolution against Sri Lanka at the Geneva UNHRC or at the US Embassy against setting up a naval facility at Trincomalee as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling any other government to abstain from doing any act and as such action may result in causing serious damage to property, including public or private property, any place of public use, facility, any public or private transportation system, or any infrastructure facility or environment.

No People’s organization or political party will be able to carry on a protest campaign at the UNDP Office in Colombo protesting against the UNHRC Resolution against Sri Lanka or demanding the withdrawal of baseless allegations of war crimes against armed forces of Sri Lanka as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling an international organization to abstain from doing any act and as such action may result in causing serious damage to property, including public or private property, any place of public use, facility, any public or private transportation system, or any infrastructure facility or environment.

Police Directives curtailing Freedom of Movement

S; 62 of the CTB and S. 61 of the ATB enables the Police to take pre-emptive action preventing any public protest being conducted. Under S.61 of the Bill, on receipt of information that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed, a police officer not below the rank of a SSP may issue any one or more of the following directives to the public:

not to enter any specified area or premises;

to leave a specified area or premises;

not to leave a specified area or premises and to remain within such area or premises;

not to travel on any road;

not to transport anything or not to provide transport to anybody;

to suspend the operation of a specified public transport system;

k. not to congregate at any particular location;

l. not to hold a particular meeting, rally or procession;

m. not to engage in any specified activity.

Directives to be issued with prior approval of a Magistrate.

Directives to be published in the gazette and given wide publicity through other means.

Period of operation of a directive not to exceed 24 hours continuously at a time, and for a total period of 72 hours.

Military assistance may be obtained to give effect to any such directive.

Police may cordon off such area to give effect to such directive.

During the period of operation of such directive and the following 24 hours, the police may,

stop, question and search any person found within the effective area of such directive; b. enter and search any premises; c. stop any person who may attempt to enter or remain in the effective area of such directive.

Police may arrest any person who may act contrary to the directive.

Acting contrary to any such directive is an offence punishable by a Magistrate with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding Rs. 5000/- or both.

Any person who – a. violates or acts in contravention of an order made in terms of this Act; or b. wilfully fails or neglects to comply with a direction issued in terms of this Act; c. fails to provide information or provide false or misleading information in response to a question put to him by a police officer conducting an investigation under this Act, or; d. wilfully prevents or hinders the implementation of a lawful order or directive issued under this Act is guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years and a fine not exceeding Rs, 500,000. – S. 14

Police Power to intercept letters and other private Communications

Police given power to intercept letters and other private communications and listen to telephone conversations for investigation purposes under these Bills. To determine whether one or more persons are conspiring, planning, preparing or attempting to commit an offence under this Act, a Police Officer not below the rank of a SP may obtain a Court order to intercept, read, listen or record any postal message, electronic mail, or any telephone, voice, internet or video conversation or conference or any communication through any other means. – S. 67 CTB; S. 66 ATB

All Responsible Officers Liable to be Punished

When a people’s organization or a professional association is charged with an offence under this Bill, the entire leadership of the association will become liable to be punished. According to S. 97 of the Bill, where an offence is committed by a body of persons, every director, principal executive officer, every officer of that body responsible for its management and control, shall be deemed to be guilty of such offence.

Creeping Emergency Regulations into the Bill arming the President with Extraordinary Dictatorial Powers to Curb Democratic Rights

Review and Repeal of the Public Security Ordinance is one of the Recommendations made by the UN HRC in its Periodic Reports on Sri Lanka. The Yahapalana government gave an undertaking to do that. As Public Security Ordinance is part of the Constitution, the government cannot repeal or amend it without amending the Constitution.

When there is a serious threat to the law and order or national security or maintenance of essential services, the government declares a state of emergency in the country and make emergency regulations to deal with the situation. State of Emergency has to be approved by Parliament once a month. Otherwise it will lapse. What the government has done is to creep some of the provisions generally brought into force under the Emergency Regulations into the Bill so that it will become part of the normal law of the country.

None of the following provisions are found in the PTA. They are generally found only in the Emergency Regulations made under the Public Security Ordinance. Under Ss. 81 – 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the CTB, the Minister has been entrusted with Emergency Powers to issue Proscription Orders – S. 81; Restriction Orders – S. 82; and Curfew Orders – S. 83; to declare prohibited places – S. 84; and call out Armed Forces – S. 85. Now by the ATB, the President will be vested with these powers.

Threat of Proscription of Organizations

Notwithstanding anything in any other written law, on a recommendation made by the IGP or at the request of a foreign government, the President may proscribe any organization, initially for a period of one year, where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such organization is engaged in any act amounting to an offence under this Act, or acting in an unlawful manner prejudicial to the national security of Sri Lanka or any other country.

To proscribe an organisation under the Bill it need not engage in any terrorist activity prejudicial to the national security of the country. Under S. 82 (1) of the Bill, notwithstanding anything in any other written law, the President can proscribe any organization where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such organization is engaged in any act amounting to an offence under the Act, or is acting in an unlawful manner prejudicial to the national security of Sri Lanka or any other country.

(2) A Proscription Order may be made by the President for giving effect to – (a) a recommendation made by the IGP; or (b) a request made by any foreign government.

A Proscription Order may include one or more of the following prohibitions : Prohibiting (a) any person being a member; (b) recruiting members; (c) any person acting in furtherance of its objectives; (d) meetings, activities and programs being conducted; ( e) use of bank accounts; (f) entering into contracts; (g) raising funds or receiving grants; (h) transferring funds and assets; (i) lobbying and canvassing; (j) any publication of any material in furtherance of its objectives. A Proscription Order remains valid for a period of one year. It can be extended for one year at a time.

The organisations like the GMOA, Inter University Students Federation, Trade Unions in all public institutions and services and Farmers’ organizations that frequently carry on strikes crippling health services or agitational campaigns obstructing highways to compel the government to do or to refrain from doing certain acts will not be able to carry on their campaigns without facing the danger of being proscribed.

Imposition of Restriction Orders

On a recommendation of the IGP, the President may, with sanction of the High Court, issue a Restriction Order on any person, where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such person is making preparations to commit an offence under the Act and the conduct of such person can be investigated without arresting him, restricting (a) his movement outside the place of his residence; (b) travelling overseas; (c) travelling within Sri Lanka; (d) travelling outside the normal route between his place of residence and place of employment; (e) communication or association or both with particular persons specified in the order; (f) engaging in certain specified activities facilitating the commission of an offence under the act; (g) requiring such person to report to any police station on a specified day. – S. 83

Though there was a somewhat similar provision in S. 11 of the PTA in relation to a person concerned in any terrorist activity as defined in the PTA, this is much wider.

Police Directives issued in the guise for the protection of the public under S. 62 of the Bill can also be issued only under the Emergency Regulations. There is no similar provision in the PTA.

Such restrictions may be imposed remaining valid for a period, not exceeding one month at a time, up to 6 months.

The Court shall cause the Order served on the person and require the IGP to take all necessary steps to enforce it.

This talk of obtaining High Court sanction and serving and enforcing the Order through the involvement of Court is a façade adopted to cover up the arbitrary and undemocratic nature of the executive acts with judicial authority.

In the Counter Terrorism Bill, it is not the Court, but the Minister who shall cause the Order served on the person and require the IGP to take all necessary steps to enforce it.

Acting in contravention of a Restriction Order is an offence punishable by High Court with imprisonment up to 3 years and a fine not exceeding Rs. 300,000. – S. 83 (7)

Issuing Curfew Orders

Under S. 84 of the Bill, notwithstanding the provisions in the Public Security Ordinance, the President, may by Order published in the Gazette, declare a Curfew Order covering the entire country or part of the country, for the purposes of (a) controlling, detecting or investigating the occurrence of systematic and widespread acts of terrorism and other offences under the Act; (b) for the protection of national and public security from such acts; or (c) to prevent the systematic and widespread committing of acts of terrorism and other offences under the Act.

It is lawful for a Police officer to use reasonable force as may be necessary to ensure compliance with a Curfew Order. Violation of a curfew order is an offence punishable by a Magistrate with a fine not exceeding Rs. 300,000. (To be continued)



Opinion

IMF’s failure to tackle corruption in Sri Lanka

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Anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of Sri Lanka’s $2.9 billion bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was the first time in Asia that an IMF programme was explicitly linked to a comprehensive anti-corruption diagnostic and specific legislative measures.

At the press conference announcing the deal, Senior Mission Chief Peter Breuer said that the IMF had emphasised that anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of the programme. He added that the IMF would subject Sri Lanka to a comprehensive governance diagnostic exercise, making it the first Asian economy to undergo such an exercise, which will assess corruption and governance vulnerabilities in Sri Lanka and provide prioritised and sequenced recommendations. “Sri Lanka will be the first country in Asia to undergo a governance diagnostic exercise by the IMF. We look forward to further engagement and collaboration with stakeholders and civil society organisations on this critical reform area,” the IMF official said.

An extract from the Technical Assistance Report on Governance Diagnostic Assessment, Sri Lanka  (September 30, 2023) is as follows; “The report highlights immediate and short-term measures to address key corruption issues, as well as structural reforms that require more time and resources but are essential to strengthen governance and initiate lasting change. The recommendations are designed as a coherent approach to improving governance through a focus on: clarity of authority and responsibility for core functions; financial and operational independence of essential accountability and law enforcement institutions; transparency in government practices and performance, especially relating to the planning, spending, and accounting for the use of public funds and assets; inclusive, accessible, and rule-based means to enforce private agreements and challenge official behaviour; and efficient mechanisms for making information public and holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour”.

Further, the agreement required Sri Lanka to implement several specific, actionable measures to curb corruption vulnerabilities:

New Anti-Corruption Legislation: The government passed the landmark Anti-Corruption Act in 2023, which expanded the powers of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), required electoral candidates and officials to declare their assets, and introduced protections for whistleblowers.

Fiscal and Procurement Reforms: The IMF programme included commitments to improve public financial management, increase tax transparency, and advance public procurement laws to eliminate political interference and cronyism in government contracts.

The IMF Executive Board is supposed to continuously track these anti-corruption and governance benchmarks during its periodic programme reviews to ensure compliance. The IMF officials’ last visit to Sri Lanka was from March 26th to April 9th when they reviewed the progress of the programme, decided that it was going well and approved the release of the final tranche. Their statement did not carry any reference to the activities of the government regarding control of corruption.

The Letter of Intent submitted by the government at the conclusion of the review becomes relevant under these circumstances. It was officially released on May 29, 2026. One of the critical undertakings by the government, according to the Letter of Intent, relates to cost-recovery pricing, the government has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining cost-recovery pricing for fuel and electricity.

Going by available communications, apparently the IMF has not inquired into what caused the increase of cost of production of electricity. Cost of electricity production has gone up due to increased use of diesel, as low quality coal is not producing the required amounts. The coal that has been recently imported has been found to be of low quality and the government has said the losses due to this misadventure will not be shifted to the people. The irregularities in the coal procurement process that has happened recently is no secret, the Auditor General’s report has pointed out the flaws in the said procedure. Ironically, the IMF programme highlights the need to have fool proof procurement and tender procedures, and emphasises “holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour” as the above quoted Technical Assistance Report mentions, yet it is silent on this matter showing its lack of responsibility. And it wants cost-recovery pricing for electricity! This may be taken as proof that the IMF is not very much concerned about the plight of the poor.

Further, these policies and recommendations of the IMF may substantiate the accusations made by left oriented organisations that the IMF insists on austerity measures, often at the expense of welfare expenditure, in order to serve neoliberalism. The clauses on corruption control in its agreement with the government appear to be mere lip service and window dressing. If no follow-up action is taken on these requirements, such clauses have no meaning and serve no useful purpose. If it is a responsible organisation, the IMF should have called for an impartial inquiry into the coal procurement procedure, for it is mandated to ensure transparency and integrity in these procedures. Moreover, if it is concerned about the welfare of the public it should not have asked for cost-recovery pricing of electricity when the reason for the increased cost could be corruption. Instead of going into the matter of corruption the IMF asks the government to recover the losses from the people. Cannot it think of a fairer means of recovering these losses instead of burdening the already impoverished people?

Thus, the question arises whether the IMF is a tool of imperialism. Many critics, particularly in the Global South, argue that the IMF functions as an instrument of financial imperialism or neo-colonialism. Structural Adjustment Programmes of the IMF ties its emergency loans to strict conditions like austerity, privatisation, and deregulation. Critics argue these demands dismantle local welfare systems, strip developing nations of their sovereignty, and open their markets to exploitation by multinational corporations. Further, the wealthy nations, particularly the United States and European powers, hold the majority of voting shares and effectively control the institution, dictating economic policy to weaker states. Critics claim that IMF-mandated currency devaluations artificially lower the cost of raw materials and natural resources in developing countries, benefiting wealthy creditor nations which amount to resource extraction.

Another matter of concern is that the interest rate for IMF loans to Sri Lanka, contrary to common belief that it is concessionary, is 5% which is pretty high and may be unbearable to a poor country like Sri Lanka. The country was in a woeful state in 2022 and was forced to declare bankruptcy, and seek IMF assistance. If we seriously examine the cause of this economic disaster, we will see that it was due to the economic policies the country had been following since independence. We import more than we export and take loans to meet the shortfall. This practice has gone on and on and is continued at present. No government, including the present one, despite its left leaning claims, had attempted to correct this colossal mistake. Our debt burden is frightening, less said about it the better.

The obvious solution to this problem would have been to achieve self-sufficiency in our essential needs, like food, and reduce reliance on imports. Most of our needs in food and other essentials could be locally produced. The IMF may not recommend such a course of action. It would want us to remain a poor country, struggling in the vicious cycle of import-export-debt quagmire.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga

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Opinion

When the decisive vote changes hands: Sri Lanka’s next electoral shift may already be underway

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In the summer of 1789, as the French Revolution gathered momentum, delegates of the National Assembly assembled in Versailles to debate the future of France. The seating arrangement inside the chamber was not planned to shape political vocabulary for centuries to come. Yet it did. Those who favoured sweeping political change, greater equality, and the dismantling of inherited privilege gravitated to the left side of the hall. Those who defended the monarchy, established institutions, and traditional social hierarchies took their seats on the right. What began as a matter of convenience soon became a political metaphor. More than two centuries later, we still speak of the “left” and the “right” to describe competing visions of society.

Since then, the terms have evolved and acquired different meanings across countries and historical periods. Yet, the broad distinction remains remarkably durable. Ideologies associated with the left generally place greater emphasis on social, political, and economic equality, often advocating a more active role for the state in addressing disparities and expanding collective welfare. Ideologies associated with the right tend to place greater value on tradition, market mechanisms, authority, and various forms of social hierarchy, arguing that stability and prosperity emerge from preserving established institutions and incentives. Most political movements, of course, occupy positions somewhere between these poles, combining elements of both traditions in different proportions.

Few elections have altered the course of Sri Lankan politics as dramatically as the general election of 1977. Sweeping to power with an unprecedented five-sixths majority in Parliament, the United National Party ushered in a new political and economic era under the leadership of J. R. Jayewardene. He would later become the country’s first Executive President under a constitutional framework that vested extensive powers in the office. The changes that followed reflected a decisive move towards market-oriented reforms and a political outlook that leaned more to the right than anything Sri Lanka had previously experienced.

Yet even a political machine as formidable as the UNP’s could not hold power indefinitely. After nearly seventeen years of dominance, its grip on the electorate weakened. In 1994, the pendulum swung once again, bringing Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The victory was widely interpreted as a return to a more socially conscious and centre-left political vision.

What followed was not merely a change of government but the emergence of a recurring pattern in Sri Lankan political landscape. Since 1994, governments of varying compositions and personalities have risen to power with crucial support from parties and constituencies positioned on the left of the political spectrum. Whether through formal coalitions, strategic alliances, or ideological influence, the left has often provided the decisive electoral weight needed to secure victory. In many cases, without that support, the arithmetic of power would have looked very different.

Yet it is equally important to recognise what Sri Lanka has not become. Despite the enduring influence of left-wing thought, the country has never embraced an uncompromising far-left political project. Instead, successive governments have largely occupied a centre-left space, balancing market economics with welfare commitments, nationalism with social reform, and political pragmatism with egalitarian aspirations. The result has been a political landscape where power changes hands, parties rise and fall, and personalities dominate headlines, but the centre of gravity remains remarkably leftist. Sri Lanka’s electorate has repeatedly rewarded those who speak the language of social justice, even while stopping short of endorsing political extremes.

One possible explanation for this enduring centre-left tendency lies not in political parties themselves, but in the cultural formation of the electorate. For much of the period between the 1960s and the liberalisation of the economy in 1977–78, Russian literature occupied a prominent place in Sri Lanka’s reading culture. Affordable translations of the works of writers such as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Gorky, Chekhov and Pushkin circulated widely among students, teachers and ordinary readers. Alongside their literary value, these works exposed generations of Sri Lankans to questions of social justice, class inequality, collective responsibility and the moral obligations of society toward the vulnerable.

By the early 1990s, the generation that had grown up reading this literature had come of age politically. As they entered the electorate in larger numbers, they helped shape the contours of public opinion. Their voting preferences did not necessarily favour revolutionary socialism or radical left-wing politics. Rather, they appeared to support governments that combined commitments to welfare, social protection and egalitarian ideals with the practical realities of governing a developing nation. In this sense, the centre-left orientation that has characterised much of Sri Lanka’s political landscape since 1994 may owe as much to the country’s literary and intellectual culture as to the strategies of political parties themselves.

Yet there is an apparent paradox at the heart of this story. While successive governments often drew legitimacy from centre-left political ideals, their economic policies frequently moved in a different direction. Confronted by fiscal constraints, global economic pressures and shifting geopolitical realities, they operated within an international economic order largely shaped by market-oriented principles. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund exerted considerable influence over economic policymaking, encouraging reforms associated more closely with liberalisation, fiscal discipline and market efficiency than with traditional left-wing economics.

It was thus a balancing act that defined Sri Lankan governance for decades after 1994: governments elected on promises of social justice and collective welfare, yet compelled to pursue economic strategies shaped by the imperatives of a global market economy. Politically, the country remained centre-left. Economically, it often travelled along a more market-oriented path.

Sri Lanka may have settled its political direction for the next few years, but the next truly decisive moment may arrive closer to 2030. By then, the composition of the electorate will have changed once again. A growing share of voters will belong to Generation Z and Generation Alpha, generations whose intellectual and cultural worlds differ markedly from those that came before them.

If the electorate that emerged in the 1990s was shaped, in part, by the values encountered in Russian literature and a reading culture that emphasised questions of social responsibility, collective welfare and inequality, the generations now entering political maturity have been formed by a different landscape altogether. Their influences are increasingly digital, global and instantaneous, are shaped more by algorithms and by social media feeds, content creators and transnational cultural currents. Many have grown up in a world where entrepreneurship, individual success, innovation and market-driven solutions occupy a far more visible place in public discourse.

This generational shift is unfolding alongside broader transformations in global politics. Across much of the world, including major powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States, contemporary political movements that emphasise markets, national interests, economic competitiveness, and stronger state authority have gained momentum. Whether these trends will find a lasting echo in Sri Lanka remains a question that deserves careful attention, not merely as an electoral matter, but as one intertwined with some of the defining challenges of our time.

Today, concerns of national sovereignty, security, strategic influence and even soft power are increasingly mediated through economic strength and market performance. Nations are judged not only by their political ideals but also by their ability to compete, innovate and secure their place within an interconnected global economy. Sri Lanka, still navigating the aftermath of economic crisis and charting its future development path, finds itself at the centre of these debates.

Against this backdrop, if the decisive vote is gradually passing from a generation shaped by the books that once filled the nation’s shelves to one shaped by the screens that now fill its hands, the question therefore does not simply become who will win the next election. It is whether the intellectual and cultural influences that shaped Sri Lanka’s centre-left political consensus can retain their hold on a new electorate formed by different experiences, different technologies, and different aspirations.

If every era is ultimately defined by the stories it tells itself, what story is the next generation of Sri Lankan voters already beginning to write? Will it move the centre of gravity towards a more market-oriented, centre-right vision? The answer may well determine not only the outcome of future elections, but the ideological direction of Sri Lanka itself.

By Viran Maddumage PhD (Reading), Macquarie University,
and Sanduni Rathnayake, AAL

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Opinion

For attention of Education Minister

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Reimagining Sri Lanka’s Old Boys’ Unions into Lifelong Alumni Ecosystems A National Call for Ethical Citizenship, Educational Transformation and Social Renewal

For more than a century, Sri Lanka’s schools and colleges have produced generations of citizens who contributed immensely to the nation’s administration, education, medicine, engineering, law, agriculture, business, military service, arts, and leadership. Alongside these institutions emerged Old Boys’ Unions and alumni associations that represented far more than ceremonial organisations. They symbolised loyalty, institutional pride, brotherhood, continuity, and shared values that transcended generations. In many ways, these alumni associations became the emotional and moral extension of school life itself.

However, Sri Lanka now stands at a crossroads. While annual dinners, jubilees, and big matches continue to preserve nostalgia and tradition, many alumni organisations are increasingly struggling to remain relevant to younger generations. The modern world has changed rapidly, yet many alumni systems have remained largely unchanged. Today’s youth face digital disruption, migration pressures, economic uncertainty, social fragmentation, mental stress, and intense competition. As a result, younger alumni increasingly seek practical value from institutional networks through mentorship, career guidance, entrepreneurship support, emotional wellbeing systems, digital networking, and lifelong learning opportunities. Unfortunately, many traditional alumni associations continue functioning mainly as event-driven organisations rather than dynamic ecosystems capable of supporting individuals throughout life.

Globally, leading educational institutions in countries such as Singapore, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and India have transformed their alumni organisations into sophisticated lifelong engagement ecosystems. These institutions maintain integrated digital platforms that support graduates from the moment they leave school until retirement and beyond. Their alumni systems provide mentorship, startup incubation, executive education, mental health assistance, professional networking, welfare support, diaspora engagement, retirement communities, and AI-driven alumni management systems. These modern ecosystems have evolved into strategic human capital development platforms that strengthen institutions, economies, and societies.

Sri Lanka possesses one of the strongest school identity cultures in Asia. The emotional attachment Sri Lankans maintain toward their alma mater remains exceptionally powerful even decades after leaving school. This cultural strength presents a historic national opportunity. If properly restructured, professionally governed, digitally transformed, and strategically managed, Sri Lankan alumni associations could become one of the country’s strongest long-term mechanisms for shaping ethical citizenship, reducing corruption, strengthening social cohesion, and nurturing morally grounded future generations.

One of the major weaknesses in modern society is that moral guidance and ethical accountability often decline sharply after formal schooling ends. During school life, students operate within structured environments shaped by discipline, institutional culture, accountability, and values. Yet, once individuals leave school, many gradually disconnect from those value systems and become increasingly exposed to political manipulation, unethical business cultures, social isolation, corruption, and declining civic responsibility. The absence of long-term moral ecosystems contributes significantly to the erosion of social ethics within society.

This is where modern Alumni Ecosystems can play a transformative role. A properly functioning alumni system should not merely preserve memories of the past. It should reinforce ethical citizenship and moral accountability throughout adulthood. Alumni communities can continuously remind individuals where they came from, what values shaped them, and what responsibilities they carry toward society. Such ecosystems can cultivate leadership ethics, civic consciousness, professional integrity, and social responsibility across generations. In this context, alumni associations become not merely educational bodies, but important instruments of national governance and social development.

A well-managed alumni ecosystem can therefore contribute meaningfully toward building a corruption-free society. Ethical peer influence, mentorship from respected senior alumni, intergenerational accountability, and strong institutional identity can discourage unethical behaviour and reinforce integrity in professional and public life. Sri Lanka should envision a future where every student entering adulthood remains connected to a structured lifelong support network. School leavers could receive career guidance and mentorship, entrepreneurs could access ethical business networks and investment opportunities, migrant professionals could reconnect globally through alumni platforms, and retired alumni could continue contributing through mentoring and community service. Elderly alumni could receive welfare support, companionship, and dignity during the later stages of life.

Another important concept is the “1950 Generation Acid Test” for alumni organisations. The true strength of an alumni association should not be measured merely by the number of events conducted or sponsorships obtained. Instead, institutions must ask how many of their oldest surviving alumni — particularly those born around 1950 or earlier — remain actively connected, respected, cared for, and meaningfully engaged by the institution. The demographic profile, wellbeing, engagement, and continued institutional connectivity of the oldest surviving members should be recognized as one of the most important indicators of the true strength, ethical legitimacy, and long-term sustainability of any alumni ecosystem.

Sri Lanka now urgently requires a National Alumni Transformation Framework under the Ministry of Education. Such a framework should modernise alumni constitutions, establish professional alumni offices, digitise databases, introduce transparent governance standards, integrate youth representation, strengthen diaspora engagement, establish welfare and wellness units, and create lifelong mentorship ecosystems. A structured tripartite partnership involving the College Alumni Association, the Principal of the respective college, and the Provincial Education Authorities could become a transformative governance mechanism to ensure continuity, accountability, intergenerational engagement, and value-based citizenship development.

Sri Lanka’s long-term transformation will not be achieved through infrastructure development alone. It will be achieved through people — and people are shaped not only during schooling, but through the lifelong communities they remain connected to afterward. The next decade may therefore determine whether Sri Lanka’s Old Boys’ Unions gradually decline into ceremonial nostalgia-driven organisations or evolve into intelligent, intergenerational Alumni Ecosystems capable of shaping ethical citizenship, corruption-free leadership cultures, and national transformation itself.

by Dammike Kobbekaduwe
FIPM (SL), Member-CIPM (SL), MBA (HRM)Founder Director of the Proprietary Planters Alliance (Pvt) Ltd

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