Features

Sri Lanka’s great IMF lie

Published

4 years ago

2023/02/26

Decades of looking to the IMF for salvation has yielded only crises. Sri Lanka’s economic crisis demands urgent relief measures for a desperate citizenry and a new, self-sufficient model of development

by Ahilan Kadirgamar and Devaka Gunawardena

Sri Lanka has been subject to a great lie: the IMF solution! For close to a year now, the country has been implementing the International Monetary Fund’s recommendations with complete obedience. The sudden devaluation of the Sri Lankan rupee, a drastic increase in interest rates, the withdrawal of fuel subsidies and severe cuts to state expenditure all amount to harsh austerity measures. The consequence is economic devastation as the country sinks into a depression. Millions now suffer dwindling incomes, tremendous increases in the cost of living, food insecurity and even starvation.

Yet the much-touted IMF funds presented as a way to salvation, a meagre USD 2.9 billion over four years under the proposed agreement, have proved elusive. Compare this amount to Sri Lanka’s foreign earnings for last year, which added up to USD 18 billion. The IMF insists that Sri Lanka first convince a range of creditors to commit to restructuring its defaulted external debt before the organisation’s Executive Board will release the funds. But Sri Lanka’s economy is in free fall. Its GDP contracted by roughly a tenth last year and is on the path to continued contraction this year. Under these circumstances, the IMF agreement and its paltry funds may as well go into the dustbin.

Some of us have seen this crisis coming for a long time. A few months after the end of the civil war in May 2009, Sri Lanka obtained an IMF Stand-By Arrangement of USD 2.6 billion. This gave the green light to a considerable inflow of speculative foreign capital, in addition to commercial borrowings at extremely high interest rates in the form of International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs). At that point, the warning bells began ringing for critical analysts who could see the consequences. But back-slapping and self-congratulation among Sri Lanka’s elites continued amid a boom in economic growth built on a dubious basis, including speculative investment in urban beautification and needlessly large infrastructure projects. This debt-driven boom soon petered out.

Sri Lanka then faced balance-of-payments problems, which pushed it towards an IMF Extended Fund Facility of USD 1.5 billion in June 2016. Some of us sounded the alarm again as the government at the time, led by Ranil Wickremesinghe, pursued another IMF-led solution. But, again, our critique fell on deaf ears. Worryingly, the following month, with the IMF’s approval, Sri Lanka went ahead and floated another USD 1.5 billion in ISBs. Indeed, the latest IMF agreement – the 16th deal between Sri Lanka and the organisation over the decades – offered nothing new. Rather, it promoted Sri Lanka’s continued liberalisation of trade and capital accounts, dating back to the opening of the economy in 1978. The crisis tendencies in the Sri Lankan economy were ramified through adherence to IMF packages.

Historical memory is short in Sri Lanka, particularly among the elite. The crisis accelerated with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic three years ago. Again, we warned of the imminent dangers of an unsustainable balance of payments and the need to drastically reassess and reprioritise imports for the purpose of maintaining foreign reserves, given decreasing streams of foreign earnings. That would have meant restricting the import of luxury consumer goods while using the available foreign exchange for essential supplies and intermediate goods necessary to boost domestic production. The arrogant Rajapaksa regime then in power nevertheless persisted in the blind hope that fortunate times were just around the corner. It argued that tourism, for example, would soon pick up. Meanwhile, the opposition and neoliberal think-tanks proposed yet another IMF agreement as the magic bullet. Worse, they even started calling for an early default on Sri Lanka’s external debt. Their convoluted logic was that once the country defaulted, it would have to surrender to the IMF and all its conditionalities, such as austerity and fiscal consolidation. There could be no way forward other than with the IMF.

That is exactly what the government led by Gotabaya Rajapaksa did in April 2022. It prematurely defaulted on its external debt while the finance minister went on pilgrimage to Washington DC to the annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank. The default was premature because only USD 78 million in debt-servicing was due that month, while the next large ISB repayment, of USD 1 billion, was due in July 2022. Only in Sri Lanka could the elite celebrate when the country defaulted on its sovereign debt for the first time in its history. They were confident that Sri Lanka would get bridge financing from donors, an IMF agreement with additional funds in three months, and a rapid process of debt restructuring. Ten months later, the outcome of these expectations remains a shameful zero. There is no more bridge financing. No IMF funds. And an agreement on debt restructuring appears uncertain at best.

Given all the above, Sri Lanka is a case in point of consistently insipid economic policymaking. It is also a study in how the myth of an IMF quick-fix can paralyse a country, putting on hold policies and relief measures urgently needed to help a citizenry drowning in economic depression. As the country awakes to the great lie of an IMF solution, it is forced to go back to the drawing board – not just to deal with the social devastation and political backlash that the IMF agreement is bound to generate, but also because the global order that provided its reference points is unravelling.

From debt to a new development model

Sri Lanka’s long engagement with the IMF and the broader neoliberal policy consensus – austerity, privatisation, and the liberalisation of trade and capital markets – has been an utter and complete failure. Nevertheless, for the IMF and Sri Lanka’s establishment, resolution of the crisis appears to call for the introduction of austerity measures like the ones applied to many other countries that have experienced sovereign default, along with restructuring of defaulted debt. The idea is that Sri Lanka’s problems are rooted in a fundamental mismatch between its macroeconomic indicators and the debt it has accumulated.

This framework is being applied, however, in the context of a world order that is fast breaking down because of the contradictions of neoliberal globalisation. Over the last decades, the push for free trade, unfettered global financial flows and the privatisation of essential services has continued to expose countries to the crisis-ridden dynamics of global capitalism. But everything appears to be coming to a head, epitomised in many ways by the case of Sri Lanka. As major publications such as the Financial Times have noted, although exogenous shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic and war in Ukraine have played a role, these have interacted with underlying trends in the global economy. This includes extreme wealth inequality and an unsustainable model of growth driven by financialisation, exposed most vividly by the global financial crisis of 2008.

In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, however, and coincident with the end of the civil war, Sri Lanka was one of a series of emerging market “success stories” celebrated by boosters of neoliberalism. Now that the country’s shaky financial structure has been exposed, establishment commentators around the world are instead using Sri Lanka as an example of crony capitalism and corruption. Supposedly, such bad actors can only be routed by further imposing the rationality of the market on public institutions. Whereas the big banks in the United States responsible for the 2008 crisis obtained bailouts from the state because they were “too big to fail,” Sri Lanka is apparently small enough that the rules of moral hazard once again apply. The failed logic of the neoliberal development model – including the reliance on external-oriented policies, from tourism to foreign commercial borrowings – here justifies further entrenching it through austerity. Because of the country’s severe economic crisis, however, such a remedy means that people suffer and possibly even perish from what the sociologist Karl Polanyi called “social exposure.” Child malnutrition is skyrocketing and food insecurity is becoming pervasive – recent estimates from the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation indicate that roughly a fourth of Sri Lanka’s population is food insecure. Even this extreme suffering is unlikely to dislodge the elite consensus about an IMF solution. But the disruptive political and social consequences, and resulting waves of agitation, will continue.

Moreover, Sri Lanka’s crisis is occurring at the conjuncture of major global developments. Global growth, especially in trade, is likely to continue slowing in the face of a complex set of challenges, from geopolitical polarisation to the impact of climate change. In this scenario, how can Sri Lanka’s debt be made sustainable by further exposing the country to these chilling headwinds? The central plank of the IMF solution – that Sri Lanka achieve a primary surplus by 2025 – stands in direct contradiction to the lack of the public investment needed to cope with these shocks. Conventional debt-sustainability analysis is predicated on the belief that by engaging in macroeconomic reforms such as fiscal consolidation, defaulting countries can regain their financial footing by having the surplus funds to both repay old loans and service new ones. However, in the case of Sri Lanka, which is already undergoing an economic depression, national private investment is withdrawing, and speculative capital is fleeing the country. The idea that foreign investors will step in to fill the breach flies in the face of Sri Lanka’s long experience with similar false projections.

Sri Lanka did not always have an unshakeable belief in the benefits of subordination to global capital. After the 1956 general election, there was a clear push to challenge the colonial relations in which the country’s comprador elites were embedded. Through a new balance of class forces, there was much greater emphasis on industrialisation focussed on import substitution, to try and diversify the economy away from plantation exports. Sri Lanka undertook major investments in critical industries, such as those producing intermediate and capital goods, including with support from socialist countries. But even these efforts were constrained by over-reliance on a narrow political base among the urban working class and a lack of rural mobilisation. By the time of the global economic downturn of the 1970s, the radical wing of the left-leaning United Front was led by NM Perera, the finance minister. It made a belated attempt to prioritise self-sufficiency in food production and address the immediate concerns of working-class people, especially given rising global prices for essential goods. But these efforts failed due to internal contradictions within the ruling coalition led by the bourgeois Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the consolidation of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and state repression, external pressure from the West and the rising frustration of the electorate.

The subsequent regime, led by JR Jayewardene, introduced the open-economy reforms in 1978, which meant a strong emphasis on liberalisation. Sri Lanka’s engagement with the outside world reverted to subordination to powerful institutions that represented the interests of global capital. The IMF and the World Bank provided the necessary justification in terms of access to external finance. Meanwhile, the Jayewardene regime suppressed organised labour, including by crushing the general strike of 1980. In this and other ways, the regime prepared a more conducive terrain for extraction and exploitation. The beginning of the civil war between the government and Tamil separatists in the country’s north and east in 1983 put some constraints on this approach, as the state continued to rely on mobilisation in the south. But the overall trajectory was epitomised by the collapse of any real alternative to neoliberal policies. The consensus was that for Sri Lanka to develop it would have to import its economic vision from outside – a vision clearly shaped by the interests of global capital. The processes of financialisation and debt-driven growth accelerated with the end of the civil war.

This strategy has failed to bear fruit in terms of real improvements in working people’s livelihoods. It has also triggered the current crisis. Nevertheless, in the many years since Sri Lanka embarked on liberalisation, justification for foreign commercial borrowing has been rooted in the enduring assumption that the country need only “unlock its growth potential”. A range of services and industries meant to earn foreign exchange have been bandied as model opportunities. After the early days of the open economy, it became clear that a developed garment industry was not a precursor to moving up the “global value chain.” This was especially true in the absence of a clear, concerted intervention by the state in the form of industrial policy. Global institutions and policy-makers then pivoted to celebrating the rise of the service economy, including the boom in tourism. Sri Lanka continued to depend, however, on a hidden economy of remittances from migrant workers abroad, which is also now under strain.

The idea that Sri Lanka can achieve higher stages of development by pursuing the same growth path rooted in dependency on the external sector is a non-starter. The neoliberal development model has collapsed. The Sri Lankan establishment has practically admitted as much by seeking lower-income status for the country to obtain more concessional financing from international donors and aid agencies. At the same time, the government, led by Ranil Wickremesinghe, is eager to celebrate the return of tourists after a long absence caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the Easter Sunday terror attacks in 2019. But the reality is that tourism will not be enough to revive Sri Lanka’s growth during a period of painful austerity. The same goes for any number of hare-brained ideas that may now be touted by the country’s economic establishment in the absence of serious thinking about an alternative development model.

Sri Lanka’s lop-sided economic structure, with a bloated import bill and unrestrained financial speculation, now faces a reckoning. The years of conspicuous consumption through imports from abroad are over. The question is, how can investment be channelled into those sectors necessary for the country to achieve self-sufficiency in the goods and services ordinary people need for survival? This perspective is a far cry from the IMF solution, which presupposes Sri Lanka’s continued subordination to a global economic structure that has clearly failed. Taking up the question of an alternative means returning to issues that had supposedly been bypassed with the triumph of neoliberal globalisation. It requires revisiting the many “reforms” – from the push for trade and capital-account liberalisation to the promotion of foreign direct investment and privatisation – that it has entailed.

Towards self-sufficiency

Under these circumstances, the idea of self-sufficiency offers a crucial response to the rapidly changing, uncertain global order. This churn may provide an opportunity for foresighted actors within Sri Lanka to demand a fundamental re-conceptualisation of how external engagement fits into the country’s development model. If it is imperative to revive the country’s domestic food production, for example, how would this flow into a broader rethinking of the composition of intermediate imports needed for production? What type of external financing would be necessary to develop the domestic food system?

Sri Lanka’s domestic debt is also a critical part of the equation for overcoming the current economic depression. That includes the need for counter-cyclical spending, as opposed to pro-cyclical policies of fiscal consolidation. But external development finance would also continue to play a role. The key question is whether such borrowings are integrated into a process of planning, so that an alternative development vision takes precedence over the mainstream understanding of market-steered investment that has long shaped countries such as Sri Lanka. The country must push back against global capital geared towards the sole end of financial extraction. Indeed, the lion’s share of foreign direct investment into Sri Lanka went into speculative investment in real estate rather than ventures that increased local industrial production. Development financing should be reconfigured as part of a bottom-to-top restructuring of the economy, along with changes in trade policy away from excessive imports. That is necessary both to repay the current debt – with deep haircuts for creditors, if not debt cancellations – and as a means to develop Sri Lanka in the long run.

This alternative goes back to similar points made by development economists such as Ha-Joon Chang and Abhijit Sen, who were early critics of the Washington Consensus. Such critical economists recognised the flaws in the previous model of import substitution, but they framed it as an ongoing concern of the balance of social and class forces required to ensure that capital, as it grows, is also disciplined to invest in critical sectors. In Sri Lanka’s case, that process of disciplining capital must now include prioritising imports of essential and intermediate goods necessary for production. It also requires revamping the defunct public-distribution system to ensure food security and prevent outright starvation. As the economy stabilises, further measures must also include redistribution and investment through a wealth tax on existing property and assets.

Sri Lanka has to have stronger debates about its development vision, including a rethink on relations between its rural and urban arenas. There must be greater room for rural industries rooted in the livelihoods and reproductive needs of ordinary people. This is a far cry from the elites’ vision of the economy, which has repeatedly driven Sri Lanka into financial difficulties. There is now tremendous anger in the country because of the devastating fall in living standards. This discontent, in addition to the unravelling global order, may finally trigger a break with liberalisation.

For the IMF, of course, a programme rooted in self-sufficiency with wealth taxes and reinvigorated public investment will be a step too far. It is entrenched in its own institutional processes, despite the organisation’s fuzzy rhetoric around its newfound supposed awareness of the social implications of austerity-driven bailout agreements. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka’s crisis may offer a turning point for those global and domestic coalitions that are aiming to push back against renewed subordination to global financial capital. That means rethinking a number of trends that have long coalesced under the banner of economic liberalisation. After decades of repeated mistakes and failures, with consequences for the people on an unprecedented scale, will the establishment at last be forced to reconsider Sri Lanka’s development model? Himal Southasian

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Features

Why ‘Southasianness’ should continue to matter for the ‘SAARC Eight’

Published

4 hours ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Ambassador Ravinatha Aryasinha (at centre of top table), other dignitaries and the RCSS team at the formalization of the SAU-RCSS agreement.

At a time when Sri Lanka’s foreign policy is coming under intense scrutiny by some local sections it is only right that impartial and independent commentators shed some clarity on what fundamental foreign policy directions Sri Lanka ought to take. The extremely fluid and complex nature of current international politics renders such an understanding crucially important.

Given its vulnerabilities in a number of spheres Sri Lanka has no choice but to persist in broadly following the path of Non-alignment. That is, it should be ‘a friend of all and an enemy of none’, to the extent possible. However, it does not follow that in the process it could compromise what is seen as its national interest.

The latter point needs stressing against the backdrop of the criticisms the Sri Lankan government has been attracting from some quarters over what is made out to be some opaqueness in security and defence cooperation agreements it has entered into with India. It remains advisable for the Sri Lankan government to enter into pacts of this nature with India, but the government is obliged to disclose the contents of these agreements to the Sri Lankan people without undue delay in consideration of the uncompromisable sovereign rights of a people in a democracy.

However, there is no denying that the government should make it a central foreign policy premise to always work in cooperation with India. A consideration of what it cost Sri Lanka in the past to be in a disharmonious relationship with India and how such policy missteps worked against Sri Lanka’s best interests ought to dictate to Sri Lanka the advisability of maintaining uninterrupted cordial ties with India. Moreover, common sense ought to drive home to a country the costs of being at loggerheads with one’s closest neighbour who has also proved a ‘ready friend in deed.’

That said, it is the bounden duty of Sri Lanka’s diplomatic community or establishment to ensure that such cooperation does not degenerate into a policy of subservience towards India. That is, finesse and farsightedness in local diplomacy become prime requirements.

While India’s geographical location and physical size, besides her other strengths, contribute towards her centrality in regional and world affairs, her neighbours would be thinking and acting far-sightedly if they not only focus on India and her legitimate interests but also ensure continuous friction-free intra-South Asian relations. That is, for them collective South Asian well being should be of fundamental importance.

Much more than for India perhaps, such harmonious ties are of inestimable importance to India’s neigbours who are up against multiple vulnerabilities which are to a great extent regionally rooted. The latter could never, that is, afford to take their minds off the region’s collective development prospects.

The above are some of the reasons why it could prove highly counter-productive and self-defeating for the ‘South Asian Eight’ to render dormant and ineffective the historic SAARC organization. Rather than ‘dead’ SAARC has been allowed to drift into the ‘Limbo of Forgotten Things.’

The growing inter-dependence of the ‘SAARC Eight’ ought to impress on the collectivity the need to step-up regional cooperation in multiple areas which impinge on its members’ legitimate interests. For instance, the youth-led ‘Cockroach’ revolts, first in India and subsequently outside, should convince South Asia that it is continuing to be plagued in a major way by poverty and equity-linked issues. That is, West-inspired, largely market economics-dictated ways to see an end to poverty are simply not working completely.

Likewise climate-related questions are ravaging South Asia in unimaginable ways; Nepal being just one case in point. The rationale for regional cooperation remains valid and undefeated. It is time for revived and stepped-up SAARC cooperation. That is, the solutions to the region’s development dilemmas need to be found in mainly the region.

This amounts to making a case for a continued sense of ‘Southasianness’ among the SAARC countries. That is the conviction should be firm that they know their developmental challenges best and that answers to these issues must be primarily evolved by the grouping itself in cooperation with concerned sections.

From the above viewpoints the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo did very well to tie-up with the South Asian University (SAU), India, to increase public awareness on the developmental problems affecting South Asia and for initiating a number collaborative measures that aim at ameliorating them. The relevant agreement was formalized in early September at the RCSS. The sealing of the pact took place under the aegis of SAU President Prof. K.K. Aggarwal and RCSS Executive Director Ambassador Ravinatha Aryasinha.

A press release issued by the organizations said the collaboration aims ‘to foster research networks, partnerships and collaborations for transformative change across South Asia.’ It also mentioned that the partnership marked the first agreement to be signed by SAU with an independent think tank in Sri Lanka.

Among other things, pacts such as the above are bold moves in the direction of fostering a spirit of intellectual independence in those areas of the South facing some of the stiffest developmental challenges. Rather than ‘import’ solutions to these challenges from outside the region, the SAU-RCSS initiative aims at fostering fresh approaches to evolving solutions to problems that are uniquely South Asian.

It is hoped that the SAU and RCSS initiative while leading a to a greater degree of Southern intellectual independence in the area of development thinking would also help in kick-starting the SAARC process all over again in a major way.

What ought to lend fresh urgency to the latter undertakings are fast-breaking current developments in international politics. It ought to be perceived by the most underdeveloped regions of the South that going forward their well being would matter least or not at all to the major powers of both East and West.

For example at the time of writing the foremost among US and Chinese political leaders are meeting in the US in what is made out to be a historic coming together of sorts to address issues of common concern. It is highly unlikely that the parties would be addressing the economic preoccupations of the least developed countries. The same goes for other states that matter from the East and West.

Essentially, the US and China would be looking at ways of strengthening business ties that matter majorly for them. The South and its issues would prove to be of peripheral interest, if at all they happen to matter to the protagonists. Such developments ought to be fresh reminders to the South and their collaborative organizations that there is no escaping self-help and joint solidarity.

Features

Is Sri Lanka prepared for global literacy crisis?

Published

4 hours ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Prof. M.W. Amarasiri de Silva

Adult literacy has for a long time been one of Sri Lanka’s greatest sources of pride, serving as a social indicator that has set the country apart from several of its neighbours in the region. For many years Sri Lanka has been recognised for keeping its literacy rates at a level like those of middle-income countries and even some high-income ones, even though it has faced economic difficulties and political instability. However, since new global research has now shown an unexpected and concerning decline in adult literacy in several high-income countries, it is important to consider what this means for Sri Lanka.

The phenomenon described by Jishnu Das, Yash Dhuldhoya and Ethan Sager, the unexplained fall in functional literacy among adults in wealthy nations. calls for a more thorough examination of the nature of literacy, the pressures exerted by the modern information environment, and the vulnerabilities that Sri Lanka might encounter as it moves towards a more digital, ageing and complex society. Even though Sri Lanka’s basic literacy rates remain high and steady, the global trend acts as a warning that literacy is not a fixed accomplishment but a dynamic capability which must be continually fostered, safeguarded and adapted to changing circumstances.

Decline in functional literacy

The drop in literacy rate in high-income countries is not due to people losing the ability to read or write in the ordinary way. On the contrary, it reflects a decline in functional literacy, which is the capacity to deal with, understand, and apply information in real-life situations. This kind of literacy involves following instructions, comprehending official documents, using digital interfaces, interpreting medical information, and making sense of complicated texts that demand continuous attention.

Researchers stress that the decline cannot be attributed merely to disruptions caused by COVID-19 or the increasing use of smartphones; instead, there is going on something more fundamental: a weakening of the cognitive and informational bases that adults need to function properly in modern society. In countries such as the United States, the percentage of adults regarded as functionally illiterate has increased significantly, indicating that even highly educated societies are having difficulty in keeping up the skills required to handle ever more complex streams of information.

Sri Lanka immune?

At first sight, Sri Lanka seems to be immune from this trend. The country’s adult literacy rate is still above 92 per cent and youth literacy is even higher. According to the 2024 Census, literacy rates exceed 97 per cent among people aged ten and over, with nearly equal levels between the sexes. These figures show the continued strength of Sri Lanka’s system of free education, a system which in the past has guaranteed widespread access to school and has produced generation after generation of citizens who could read and write at a basic level.

There has also been a steady improvement in educational attainment, with an increasing number of adults finishing secondary education and a larger proportion going on to tertiary institutions. Unlike the mysterious drops observed in rich countries, Sri Lanka’s literacy figures demonstrate stability and even a slight improvement.

However, although the surface appearance is reassuring, an even more complicated reality exists. The literacy figures for Sri Lanka only record basic literacy, that is, the ability to read and write simple sentences, and they do not include measures of functional literacy. It is impossible to tell from these statistics whether adults can interpret a bank statement, understand a medical prescription, use an online government portal, or critically assess information that is spreading on social media. As is shown by the global trend, having a high level of basic literacy does not ensure a strong degree of functional literacy. On the contrary, functional literacy can fall even if basic literacy stays the same. This difference is important for Sri Lanka, particularly since the country is currently experiencing rapid digitalization, demographic ageing, and social change.

Major risk factor

A major risk factor is the move towards digital information environments. In high-income countries, researchers believe that the prevalence of smartphones and short-form digital content may be diminishing people’s ability to engage in deep reading. Nowadays, individuals take in information in short, rapid segments by scrolling through social media feeds, quickly reading headlines, and viewing short videos. Such behaviour decreases the opportunity for sustained reading, which is necessary for keeping comprehension, critical thinking, and the capacity to deal with complex information intact.

Sri Lanka is going through a comparable change. There has been a sharp increase in the number of people using smartphones, and social media sites have become the main sources of news, leisure, and communication. Although there are many advantages to having digital access, it also results in a situation where superficial reading becomes the standard approach and could therefore lead to a decline in functional literacy over time.

Demographic ageing as challenge

A further challenge that is coming up is demographic ageing. Sri Lanka is rapidly moving towards becoming an ageing society, with an increasing number of older people who might experience cognitive decline, have less exposure to new information, and enjoy few opportunities for further learning. In high-income countries, ageing populations have led to a fall in functional literacy since older individuals have had difficulty adapting to digital systems and complicated bureaucratic procedures.

The older generation in Sri Lanka, many whom were educated many decades ago under different curriculum standards, could end up becoming increasingly vulnerable in a world in which essential services, such as banking and healthcare, are being moved online. If appropriate support is not provided, the country may witness a growing gap between basic literacy and functional literacy among older adults.

In Sri Lanka, the way in which administration and the workplace are organised has in the past placed greater trust in personal communication and on basic forms of documentation. What in high-income countries would require complex reading is instead carried out through face-to-face contact in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, this situation is now changing. Government services are becoming available online, banks are introducing digital systems, and in workplaces there is an increasing need for employees to use electronic systems. Since these changes are happening at a faster rate, the demand for functional literacy will increase. Should adults not be able to meet these new demands, Sri Lanka might start to see the kind of decline in literacy that has been seen in other places.

Misinformation and disinformation

Another worry is the spread of misinformation and disinformation. In Sri Lanka, there has already been the quick dissemination of false information via social media, with this having an impact on public health, politics, and social cohesion. Since functional literacy is essential for allowing people to assess sources, doubt the claims made, and tell the difference between reliable information and falsehoods, a lack of functional literacy causes societies to be more open to manipulation, polarisation, and confusion.

The fact that there has been a global drop in functional literacy at the same time as misinformation has increased points to a dangerous feedback cycle: when literacy is low people become more prone to misinformation, and the misinformation in turn damages their ability to think critically about information. Given that the country has a high level of social media use and a lack of digital literacy training, Sri Lanka should take this risk seriously.

Even though there are these risks, Sri Lanka has several advantages which can assist in avoiding a drop in functional literacy. The country’s system of basic education is still strong, showing high enrolment figures and good results in basic literacy.

Families in Sri Lanka still place a great deal of importance on education and reading is still a respected cultural activity. Furthermore, because of its relatively small size and the fact that it has a centralized form of government, it is more efficient than in bigger countries to carry out nationwide literacy campaigns. These strengths offer a firm basis for developing new strategies for protecting and improving functional literacy.

Literacy a process

It should be realised by Sri Lanka that attaining literacy is not a single accomplishment achieved in childhood. In the modern world, literacy must be a skill that is constantly put into practice, kept up to date and adapted to changing circumstances. The fact that adult literacy is declining worldwide shows that even in wealthy countries with well-developed education systems deterioration can occur if adults are not supported in keeping their cognitive and informational abilities. Sri Lanka cannot afford to be careless.

It is necessary for the country to invest in adult education, in programmes concerning digital literacy and in the development of cognitive skills for all age groups. It also needs to establish ways of measuring functional literacy rather than just basic literacy so that policymakers can detect emerging weaknesses and act in advance.

A vital measure is to increase the opportunities for adult learning. Although Sri Lanka has effective literacy programmes based in schools, the country’s infrastructure for adult education is limited. Community centres, libraries, universities, and vocational institutes should take on a more significant role by providing courses, workshops, and reading programmes which are tailored for adults. The programmes should place an emphasis not just on reading and writing but also on digital navigation, critical thinking, and information processing. Adults should be given the chance to practise the skills that are necessary for them to function effectively in a rapidly changing world.

Importance of digital literacy programmes

It is just as important to have digital literacy programmes. Since an increasing number of services are being offered online, adults need to learn how to use digital tools with confidence and in a safe manner. This involves knowing how to fill out online forms, moving around on government websites, using banking apps, and being able to spot misinformation. The digital literacy courses available should be accessible, affordable, and adapted to different age groups, especially older adults who might feel put off by technology. Schools can also contribute by incorporating digital literacy into their curriculum so that future generations acquire good functional literacy skills from an early age.

Sri Lanka should also investigate introducing policies which promote cognitive health among older people. Since cognitive decline can lead to a deterioration of functional literacy, it becomes more difficult for older individuals to deal with information. It is possible to help keep cognitive function by setting up programmes that promote reading, social interaction, physical activity, and continued learning. During regular medical visits, healthcare professionals should include cognitive assessments so that any problems affecting literacy-related skills can be picked up early.

Sri Lanka needs to create tools for measuring functional literacy, since the figures available on basic literacy give an incomplete account of the country’s capabilities. By using assessments of functional literacy like those employed in high-income countries, Sri Lanka would be able to monitor how well its adults can apply their literacy skills in real-life situations.

Features

From Colombo to Vegas: Sri Lankan talent shines at WCOPA

Published

4 hours ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Chris with Sachini Ayendra, the very first contestant who represented Sri Lanka at WCOPA 2015 / Bronze winner at WCOPA 2026 Natharie Wickramasinghe with her parents

The World Championships of Performing Arts (WCOPA) is known globally as the Olympics of performing arts, but Sri Lankans came to know of it more closely when Natharie Wickramasinghe, representing Team Sri Lanka at WCOPA 2026, in Las Vegas, earned a Bronze Medal in the Ethnic/Folklore Dance category.

Behind Sri Lanka’s WCOPA journey is Sri Lanka-born Chris Rajendra, who migrated to the United States in 2007, and deserves special congratulations.

Passionate about discovering and promoting talent, Chris has been actively involved in the pageant and performing arts, industry since 2002.

A major milestone came in 2015, when he introduced WCOPA, to Sri Lanka, for the first time, creating an international platform for Sri Lankan performers.

Sachini Ayendra became the very first candidate to represent Sri Lanka at WCOPA, in 2015, marking the beginning of Team Sri Lanka’s journey.

Chris served as National Director for Team Sri Lanka from 2015 to 2018, and has returned to the role for the 2026–2027 term, continuing his commitment to identifying, developing and promoting Sri Lankan talent internationally.

His involvement in pageantry and performing arts includes:

Recruiter, Miss Nevada United States – 2014

Chris Rajendra: National Director – WCOPA Team Sri Lanka

Manager, Miss Colombia Las Vegas – 2013 to 2017

Director for the West Coast and International Divisions of Ms. Latina International and Ms. International World – 2017

National Director for Team Sri Lanka – WCOPA, 2015–2018 and 2026–2027

Co-National Director for Team USA – WCOPA 2026

In the USA, Chris began his career in retail before transitioning into insurance and financial services, where he built extensive experience in sales, marketing, leadership and business development.

He owned and operated a brokerage, affiliated with multiple insurance companies, and later served as Marketing Director with Transamerica and World Financial Group.

As his business expanded across Las Vegas and California, he continued to hone his expertise in sales, marketing and client relations. He now works as a Sales Executive at Hilton Grand Vacations.

Looking ahead, Chris will shortly launch the application process for Team Sri Lanka 2027, giving talented Sri Lankan performers another opportunity to represent the country on the world stage.

The 2027 World Championships of Performing Arts will take place in Las Vegas, USA, in July or August 2027.

Through his work in both the corporate and performing arts worlds, Chris Rajendra continues to combine leadership, networking and talent development — creating opportunities for Sri Lankan performers to showcase their abilities on a global platform.