22-A and Catch-22

Friday 7th October, 2022

Sanity has prevailed; the parliamentary debate on the 22nd Amendment (22-A) to the Constitution Bill has been postponed. The government seems to have got cold feet due to stiff resistance offered by the Opposition and even a section of the ruling SLPP to the controversial Bill.The process of tinkering with the 1978 Constitution to effect changes to the executive presidency has taken a zigzag course. The first successful attempt to reduce the executive powers of the President was made in 2001, and it paved the way for the 17th Amendment (17-A), which led to the establishment of the Constitutional Council and the Independent Commissions to depoliticise some vital state institutions.

 About nine years later, 17-A was deep-sixed, and the 18th Amendment (18-A) introduced to restore the powers of the executive presidency. In 2015, all those who voted for 18-A in Parliament, save one or two, backed the 19th Amendment (19-A), which reduced the executive powers of the President. Then came the 20th Amendment (20-A), which strengthened the executive presidency again. A fresh attempt is now being made to weaken the presidency through 22-A.

The government has, in its wisdom, chosen to bite off more than it can chew. It does not have a two-thirds majority to secure the passage of the 22-A Bill, and, worse, the SLPP is divided thereon, with the Basil Rajapaksa faction openly opposing it. If the pro-Rajapaksa MPs do not back the 22-A Bill, it will be a dead duck.

Why the government is in a mighty hurry to have the 22-A Bill passed defies comprehension. It has, true to form, got its priorities mixed up. What the country needs at this juncture is not a new Constitution or an amendment to the existing one, but an all-out attempt to sort out the economic crisis, which has the potential to unleash anarchy, which will render all laws useless.

Opposition to the 22-A Bill emanates mostly from its opponents’ fear that the government is planning to introduce some committee-stage amendments thereto without judicial sanction, thereby weakening, if not doing away with, the constitutional safeguards currently in place against moves being made to divide the country. The critics of the 22-A Bill also argue that President Ranil Wickremesinghe is under pressure from the UNHRC, India, and the US-led western powers to enable the full implementation of the 13th Amendment (13-A), and clear the way for federalism. Their fear is not unfounded. There have been instances where governments compassed their sinister ends by stuffing Bills with questionable sections at the committee stage and steamrollering them through Parliament.

Laws become faits accomplis in this country once they are passed owing to the absence of a constitutional provision for the post-enactment judicial review of legislation. There are some precedents. It has now been revealed that in 1988, the J. R. Jayewardene government surreptitiously inserted a section into the Parliamentary Elections Act by having an amendment Bill changed, after its ratification, to allow political parties to engineer National List vacancies and appoint persons of their choice to Parliament. This provision has made a mockery of Article 99 (A) and Article 101 (H) of the Constitution. In 2017, the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government smuggled a slew of sections into the Provincial Council Elections (Amendment) Bill to postpone the provincial council elections indefinitely. It is argued in some quarters that 20-A prohibits such alterations and additions; Article 78 of the Constitution says ‘any amendment proposed to a Bill in Parliament shall not deviate from the merits and principles of such Bill’. But some constitutional experts are of the view that no legal remedy will be available even if changes are made to the 22-A Bill at the committee stage because laws cannot be challenged in courts after their enactment. There’s the rub.

The SLPP itself has opposed the government’s decision to put the 22-A Bill to the vote. On the one hand, it seems to think that a strong executive presidency is necessary for its survival, which hinges on the Executive President’s ability to rule the country with an iron fist and hold anti-government protesters at bay, and on the other hand, it does not have a two-thirds majority to secure the passage of the Bill, and is very likely to suffer a serious setback in Parliament if a vote is taken thereon. It is also possible that the SLPP has resorted to brinkmanship to have the 22-A Bill amended to prevent the President from dissolving Parliament after the expiration of two and a half years of its term. But how will the SLPP muster 150 votes even if it decides to back the Bill. As it stands, the chances of the 22-A Bill being ratified are extremely remote, but given the sheer number of MPs who are willing to defect, it is difficult to predict the outcomes of votes in Parliament.

President Wickremesinghe will stand to gain if the status quo remains, provided he is not under international pressure to have the 22-A Bill passed with provision for the full implementation of 13-A; he will be able to enjoy unbridled executive powers, and leverage his ability to dissolve Parliament in about six months to tame the SLPP parliamentary group, which needs elections like a hole in the head.

Let the government be urged to delay the debate on the 22-A Bill further and reveal the proposed changes to it thereby allowing an extensive public discussion to take place thereon. It has to show its hand, and give a cast-iron guarantee that it will not stuff the Bill with sections sans judicial sanction at the committee stage, which has become a sort of constitutional wormhole. The need for introducing constitutional provision for the post-enactment judicial review of legislation cannot be overemphasised.