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2024 SL presidential election: A significant shift towards liberal leftist politics

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Anura Kumara

By Amarasiri de Silva

The 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election is considered a watershed moment for several key reasons. One of the most significant aspects is the peaceful transfer of power from a neoliberal administration to the left-oriented National People’s Power (NPP), led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake. The NPP, supported by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), marked a significant shift in the country’s political landscape. Historically, the JVP was involved in two armed uprisings in 1971 and 1989 in attempts to seize control through revolutionary means, both of which failed and were violently suppressed by the government.

The election results in 2024 reflect the public’s disillusionment with traditional political parties, particularly in light of the economic crises that have plagued Sri Lanka since 2022. Ranil Wickremesinghe, the neoliberal incumbent, played a pivotal role in stabilising the economy after widespread protests ousted the Rajapaksa government. However, despite his efforts to gain public trust, the voters, particularly the younger generation, demanded change and were drawn to the progressive and socialist policies of the NPP.

The peaceful electoral victory of the NPP, with such a revolutionary past, marks a new chapter in Sri Lankan politics. This election reflects a shift from armed struggle to democratic participation, cementing the NPP’s position as a legitimate political force. Moreover, this outcome challenges the entrenched political elite and signals a potential restructuring of Sri Lanka’s political and economic system. Originating from a farming community in Anuradhapura, Dissanayake embodies the character of an ordinary citizen, contrasting with the traditional rulers of the country who come from the Radala high caste or high-class families. This marks a significant shift in Sri Lanka’s political landscape.

The 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election result, which saw the victory of the leftist NPP, backed by the JVP, is not just a change of government but a direct challenge to the long-standing political elite that has dominated the country for decades. This entrenched political class, primarily represented by parties like the UNP and the SLFP, or the SLPP or Pohottuwa, has been heavily associated with neoliberal policies, dynastic politics, and a failure to address deep socio-economic inequalities. The victory of the NPP, a party with socialist leanings, marks a significant departure from this status quo.

The shift signals a potential restructuring of both the political and economic systems in Sri Lanka. Politically, the NPP’s rise reflects a growing rejection of elite control and the consolidation of power among a few families, like the Rajapaksas, Bandaranaikes, and Wickremesinghe’s political lineage. For years, these elites shaped the country’s policies, focusing on liberal economic reforms, often criticized for favouring the wealthy and exacerbating income disparities. The NPP’s success, bolstered by the JVP’s revolutionary past, suggests a new direction, focusing on redistributing political power and fostering a more egalitarian economic structure​. Although the percentage increase of the NPP in the presidential election is attributed to the division between the UNP and the SJB, it is deeply rooted in the people’s desire for a fundamental system change. This is clearly reflected in the significant increase in the NPP’s voter base. This dramatic rise underscores the growing public demand for change and the NPP’s ability to capture the sentiments of a population eager for a new political direction. The electorate’s growing disillusionment with traditional political parties and failure to address socio-economic inequalities and governance issues has driven voters to seek an alternative in the NPP, reflecting a broader demand for transformative change in the country’s political and economic landscape.

Ranil Wickremesinghe, representing the UNP, and Sajith Premadasa, leading the SJB, have each garnered substantial support. However, their division has fragmented the votes that would otherwise likely consolidate under one party. This indicates that if the UNP and SJB had remained unified or had formed a coalition, they would have likely outperformed the NPP, reducing the latter’s influence and growth in parliamentary electoral results.

The fragmentation in the centre-right and centre-left political spaces, dominated by the UNP and SJB, has thus contributed to a scenario where a previously smaller political force like the NPP can make significant gains, as the Opposition’s division has weakened their ability to retain a majority vote share. Therefore, the NPP’s rise does not solely reflect an increase in its inherent support but rather the strategic consequences of a divided Opposition.

Economically, the NPP victory signals a potential shift toward policies prioritising social welfare, public ownership, and economic equity. The neoliberal approach championed by past governments, which included deregulation, privatisation, and aligning with global financial institutions like the IMF, faced strong opposition from the NPP and JVP. The NPP has advocated for state intervention in key sectors, wealth redistribution, and addressing the economic needs of the working class, a stark contrast to the elite-driven policies that favoured corporate interests and foreign investments​.

This outcome also challenges the traditional role of Sri Lanka in the global economy. As a small developing nation, Sri Lanka has long depended on foreign aid, loans, and investment from international actors, especially during its economic crisis. The NPP’s victory may signal a recalibration of these relationships, as the party has criticized the terms of engagement with global financial institutions, calling for more autonomy and a greater focus on domestic development​. In summary, the 2024 election represents more than just a change in leadership; it signals a broader transformation in Sri Lanka’s political and economic system, aiming to dismantle elite control and refocus governance on social justice and economic equity.

Despite the strong backing of the NPP from the oppressed and working-class voters in the 2024 Sri Lankan Presidential Election, a noticeable gap emerged in support from ethnic minorities, particularly in the North and upcountry regions. These regions are home to significant and Muslim and Tamil populations, who have historically been marginalized and continue to face social, political, and economic discrimination.

While the NPP’s platform of social justice, equity, and anti-elite rhetoric resonated with many of the country’s Sinhalese working class, the party’s message did not seem to fully address the complex grievances and historical trauma faced by these ethnic minorities. The Tamil population in the Northern Province, for instance, has long held concerns over unresolved issues from the civil war, such as the demand for justice, truth-seeking for alleged war crimes, and a genuine political solution that would grant them greater autonomy. The electoral results from the Batticaloa district reveal that the Tamil population in the region has yet to demonstrate significant allegiance to the NPP in recent elections. Batticaloa, located in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, is predominantly inhabited by Tamils and Muslims. Tamil nationalist sentiments and concerns over ethnic rights, governance, and autonomy have historically shaped the political landscape in this region.

The NPP, primarily identified with the Sinhala-majority JVP, has traditionally struggled to gain traction in the Tamil electorate. This is mainly due to the party’s historical associations and lack of focus on the specific grievances of the Tamil community, such as demands for regional autonomy, post-war reconciliation, and devolution of power. The NPP’s broader, more nationalist platform has not resonated as strongly with the Tamil voters, who tend to align with parties that explicitly advocate for Tamil rights and representation, such as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and other regional parties.

This trend was visible in the 2020 parliamentary elections and other recent elections. The NPP failed to make significant inroads in Batticaloa, with most Tamil voters favouring more localised, ethnic-based parties that they perceive as better representing their political aspirations. This lack of support for the NPP in Batticaloa can also be attributed to the deep-rooted ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka’s political sphere. Many Tamil voters may view the NPP as part of the broader Sinhala-majority political establishment, which has historically been in opposition to Tamil demands for autonomy and justice for wartime grievances. Thus, the Batticaloa results underscore the NPP’s challenges in gaining support among Tamil populations, who remain more aligned with parties that advocate for their specific ethnic and regional concerns. This reflects a broader pattern in Sri Lankan politics, where ethnic identities and regional issues often dictate voting patterns.

The NPP’s position on these matters, while generally supportive of reconciliation, may have been perceived as insufficiently robust or sensitive to the specific needs of the Tamil community. Similarly, in the upcountry regions, which Tamil-speaking plantation workers of Indian origin largely inhabit, there remains a deep history of socio-economic deprivation. While the NPP’s economic agenda could benefit these groups, there may have been doubts about whether the party could deliver on its promises, given its primary appeal to a predominantly Sinhalese electorate. Ethnic minorities in these areas may also have been wary of aligning with a party rooted in Sinhalese-majoritarian political culture despite the NPP’s efforts to position itself as a multi-ethnic, inclusive political force​.

The gap in minority support likely reflects a broader historical pattern in Sri Lankan politics, where minority communities have been cautious about backing new political movements, especially those with a strong base among the Sinhalese majority. Instead, many of these voters may have supported more established minority-friendly parties or candidates, such as the TNA in the North or the UNP, which was traditionally seen as more accommodating to minority concerns. This divergence underscores the deep ethnic and regional cleavages that continue to shape Sri Lankan electoral politics, even in the context of a broader desire for change.

The 2024 presidential election results highlight significant challenges for the new NPP government, led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Despite their platform advocating for a unified and ethnically cohesive government, the election results show that the message has not fully resonated with the country’s ethnic minorities, particularly the Tamils in the North and the upcountry Tamil communities, as well as the Muslim population. This poses a significant challenge for the NPP, which must now find ways to reconcile these disparities while fostering ethnic harmony in both economic and political spheres.

The JVP, which forms the core of the NPP, has historically struggled to build a strong base among ethnic minorities. The JVP’s revolutionary roots and prior engagement in Sinhalese-majoritarian politics during the 1971 and 1989 uprisings may have contributed to a lingering perception among minorities that the party is more focused on Sinhalese interests. Although the NPP campaigned on a platform of equality and inclusivity, it seems that these promises did not sufficiently convince the Tamil and Muslim communities, who have long demanded autonomy, recognition of their identity, and solutions to lingering post-war grievances. For the Tamil population in the Northern Province, for instance, issues such as war crimes accountability, land rights, and devolution of power remain unresolved, and the NPP’s messaging on these fronts may have lacked the specificity or reassurance they were seeking.

In the upcountry regions, where Tamil-speaking plantation workers of Indian origin face entrenched socio-economic hardships, the NPP’s broader economic reforms, while potentially beneficial, did not seem to connect with the unique struggles of these communities. Similarly, Sri Lanka’s Muslim population has faced increasing marginalization and targeted violence in recent years, and the NPP’s ability to address these concerns may be viewed with skepticism, given the JVP’s lack of a strong track record in minority issues.

The new NPP government now faces a critical challenge: how to build trust with ethnic minorities and integrate them into its broader vision of economic and political development. Achieving ethnic harmony in a deeply divided country will require more than rhetoric; it will necessitate concrete policy measures that address these communities’ historical injustices and grievances. The NPP will need to engage in meaningful dialogue with minority leaders, create mechanisms for greater political autonomy in the North and East, and ensure that economic development reaches all parts of the country, especially those that have historically been left behind. These efforts are essential not only for the success of the NPP government but also for the long-term stability and unity of Sri Lanka​.

The NPP enjoyed overwhelming support from Sinhalese-majority districts in southern Sri Lanka, particularly from areas like Hambantota, Matara, and Galle. These regions are traditionally strongholds of the working and middle classes, including lower-middle-class workers, small-scale farmers, and rural laborers, including fisher folk. Many in these communities have faced longstanding economic hardships exacerbated by social disparities, stagnating wages, and a lack of equitable development. The NPP’s promise of economic reform, social justice, and redistributive policies appealed to these voters, who saw the NPP as a chance for significant change after decades of economic neglect by successive governments.

However, this support also presents a challenge for the NPP government. These regions have high expectations for concrete improvements in living standards, income growth, and social equity. The disparity between wealthier urban centers and rural southern districts has deepened over the years, and many rural voters feel marginalized by neoliberal policies that have primarily benefited Colombo and other urban hubs. Issues like insufficient access to quality education, healthcare, infrastructure development, and fair wages are critical concerns for these communities.

To redress these grievances, the NPP government must focus on policies that address rural economic development, ensure better income distribution, and enhance social welfare systems. Programmes to improve agricultural productivity, provide subsidies for small businesses, and increase state investment in public services, like healthcare and education, will be key to bridging the socioeconomic gap. Additionally, addressing structural inequalities and creating more inclusive economic growth models will be necessary to ensure that the benefits of development are shared across the country, particularly in these southern districts that supported the NPP so strongly.​ In short, the NPP’s support base in the south reflects deep dissatisfaction with the status quo, and delivering on their expectations will require focused, equitable development strategies to tackle the economic and social challenges that have hindered growth in these communities.

Finally, in addition to the policies they propose for the country’s development, the NPP should consider adopting practical policies proposed by their Opposition, particularly the SJB.

An essential suggestion from the SJB involves introducing a system of digital economy, including providing a digital wallet for each individual. This system would allow citizens to manage their daily transactions and major purchases in a streamlined, secure digital format. Implementing such a policy could have far-reaching benefits for the new NPP government. Firstly, a digital economy with an integrated wallet system could increase government revenue by formalizing many aspects of the informal economy. It would enable a more efficient tax collection system, helping to reduce the gap between government expenditure and income. Moving towards a direct income tax system where financial transactions are monitored and taxed appropriately, this policy could generate significant revenue quickly. This would provide the necessary funds to meet the current fiscal challenges as the state grapples with a high expenditure-income gap that demands urgent solutions.

Moreover, the digital wallet could ease day-to-day financial transactions for citizens, fostering greater economic inclusivity, particularly among marginalized or underbanked communities. Creating more transparency and encouraging savings through digital means lay the foundation for a more modernized financial infrastructure.

As the NPP forms its new government, many are eager to see whether it will adopt such forward-thinking policies. Another key concern is how the NPP, with only three members in Parliament, will approach governance. There is speculation that the NPP might quickly dissolve Parliament and call for general elections. In such a scenario, the party could potentially gain enough seats to form a majority government. However, navigating the parliamentary process and creating a robust governance structure will be critical to maintaining the public’s trust and ensuring that policies like the digital economy are implemented effectively. I personally congratulate Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the new President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.



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Features

Pakistan-Sri Lanka ‘eye diplomacy’ 

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The writer handing over a donation to restore the eyesight of injured military personnel

Reminiscences:

I was appointed Managing Director of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) and Chairman of the Trincomalee Petroleum Terminals Ltd (TPTL – Indian Oil Company/ Petroleum Corporation of Sri Lanka joint venture), in February 2023, by President Ranil Wickremesinghe. I served as TPTL Chairman voluntarily. TPTL controls the world-renowned oil tank farm in Trincomalee, abandoned after World War II. Several programmes were launched to repair tanks and buildings there. I enjoyed travelling to Trincomalee, staying at Navy House and monitoring the progress of the projects. Trincomalee is a beautiful place where I spent most of my time during my naval career.

My main task as MD, CPC, was to ensure an uninterrupted supply of petroleum products to the public.

With the great initiative of the then CPC Chairman, young and energetic Uvis Mohammed, and equally capable CPC staff, we were able to do our job diligently, and all problems related to petroleum products were overcome.  My team and I were able to ensure that enough stocks were always available for any contingency.

The CPC made huge profits when we imported crude oil and processed it at our only refinery in Sapugaskanda, which could produce more than 50,000 barrels of refined fuel in one stream working day! (One barrel is equal to 210 litres). This huge facility encompassing about 65 acres has more than 1,200 employees and 65 storage tanks.

A huge loss the CPC was incurring due to wrong calculation of “out turn loss” when importing crude oil by ships and pumping it through Single Point Mooring Buoy (SPMB) at sea and transferring it through underwater fuel transfer lines to service tanks was detected and corrected immediately. That helped increase the CPC’s profits.

By August 2023, the CPC made a net profit of 74,000 million rupees (74 billion rupees)! The President was happy, the government was happy, the CPC Management was happy and the hard-working CPC staff were happy. I became a Managing Director of a very happy and successful State-Owned Enterprise (SOE). That was my first experience in working outside military/Foreign service.

I will be failing in my duty if I do not mention Sagala Rathnayake, then Chief of Staff to the President, for recommending me for the post of MD, CPC.

The only grievance they had was that we were not able to pay their 2023 Sinhala/Tamil New Year bonus due to a government circular.  After working at CPC for six months and steering it out of trouble, I was ready to move out of CPC.

   I was offered a new job as the Sri Lanka High Commissioner to Pakistan. I was delighted and my wife and son were happy. Our association with Pakistan, especially with the Pakistan Military, is very long. My son started schooling in Karachi in 1995, when I was doing the Naval War Course there. My wife Yamuna has many good friends in Pakistan. I am the first Military officer to graduate from the Karachi University in 1996 (BSc Honours in War Studies) and have a long association with the Pakistan Navy and their Special Forces. I was awarded the Nishan-e-Imtiaz  (Military) medal—the highest National award by the Pakistan Presidentm in 2019m when I was Chief of Defence Staff. I am the only Sri Lankan to have been awarded this prestigious medal so far.  I knew my son and myself would be able to play a quiet game of golf every morning at the picturesque Margalla Golf Club, owned by the Pakistan Navy, at the foot of Margalla hills, at Islamabad. The golf club is just a walking distance from the High Commissioner’s residence.

When I took over as Sri Lanka High Commissioner at Islamabad on 06 December 2023, I realised that a number of former Service Commanders had held that position earlier. The first Ceylonese High Commissioner to Pakistan, with a military background, was the first Army Commander General Anton Muthukumaru. He was concurrently Ambassador to Iran. Then distinguished Service Commanders, like General H W G Wijayakoon, General Gerry Silva, General Srilal Weerasooriya, Air Chief Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody, served as High Commissioners to Islamabad. I took over from Vice Admiral Mohan Wijewickrama (former Chief of Staff of Navy and Governor Eastern Province).

A photograph of Dr. Silva (second from right) in Brigadier
(Dr) Waquar Muzaffar’s album

One of the first visitors I received was Kawaja Hamza, a prominent Defence Correspondent in Islamabad. His request had nothing to do with Defence matters. He wanted to bring his 84-year-old father to see me; his father had his eyesight restored with corneas donated by a Sri Lankan in 1972! His eyesight is still good, but he did not know the Sri Lankan donor who gave him this most precious gift. He wanted to pay gratitude to the new Sri Lankan High Commissioner and to tell him that as a devoted Muslim, he prayed for the unknown donor every day! That reminded me of what my guru in Foreign Service, the late Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar told me when I was First Secretary/ Defence Advisor, Sri Lanka High Commission in New Delhi. That is “best diplomacy is people-to-people contacts.” This incident prompted me to research more into “Pakistan-Sri Lanka Eye Diplomacy” and what I learnt was fascinating!

Do you know the Sri Lanka Eye Donation Society has donated more than 26,000 corneas to Pakistan, since 1964 to date! That means more than 26,000 Pakistani people see the world with SRI LANKAN EYES! The Sri Lankan Eye Donation Society has provided 100,000 eye corneas to foreign countries FREE! To be exact 101,483 eye corneas during the last 65 years! More than one fourth of these donations was to one single country- Pakistan. Recent donations (in November 2024) were made to the Pakistan Military at Armed Forces Institute of Ophthalmology (AFIO), Rawalpindi, to restore the sight of Pakistan Army personnel who suffered eye injuries due to Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) blasts. This donation was done on the 75th Anniversary of the Sri Lanka Army.

Deshabandu Dr. F. G. Hudson Silva, a distinguished old boy of Nalanda College, Colombo, started collecting eye corneas as a medical student in 1958. His first set of corneas were collected from a deceased person and were stored at his home refrigerator at Wijerama Mawatha, Colombo 7. With his wife Iranganie De Silva (nee Kularatne), he started the Sri Lanka Eye Donation Society in 1961. They persuaded Buddhists to donate their eyes upon death. This drive was hugely successful.

Their son (now in the US) was a contemporary of mine at Royal College. I pledged to donate (of course with my parents’ permission) my eyes upon my death when I was a student at Royal college in 1972 on a Poson Full Moon Poya Day. Thousands have done so.

On Vesak Full Moon Poya Day in 1964, the first eye corneas were carried in a thermos flask filled with Ice, to Singapore, by Dr Hudson Silva and his wife and a successful eye transplant surgery was performed. From that day, our eye corneas were sent to 62 different countries.

Pakistan Lions Clubs, which supported this noble gesture, built a beautiful Eye Hospital for humble people at Gulberg, Lahore, where eye surgeries are performed, and named it Dr Hudson Silva Lions Eye Hospital.

The good work has continued even after the demise of Dr Hudson Silva in 1999.

So many people have donated their eyes upon their death, including President J. R. Jayewardene, whose eye corneas were used to restore the eyesight of one Japanese and one Sri Lankan. Dr Hudson Silva became a great hero in Pakistan and he was treated with dignity and respect whenever he visited Pakistan. My friend, Brigadier (Dr) Waquar Muzaffar, the Commandant of AFIO, was able to dig into his old photographs and send me a precious photo taken in 1980, 46 years ago (when he was a medical student), with Dr Hudson Silva.

We will remember Dr and Mrs Hudson Silva with gratitude.

Bravo Zulu to Sri Lanka Eye Donation Society!

 

by Admiral Ravindra C Wijegunaratne
WV, RWP and Bar, RSP, VSV, USP, NI (M) (Pakistan), ndc, psn, Bsc
(Hons) (War Studies) (Karachi) MPhil (Madras)
Former Navy Commander and Former Chief of Defense Staff
Former Chairman, Trincomalee Petroleum Terminals Ltd
Former Managing Director Ceylon Petroleum Corporation
Former High Commissioner to Pakistan

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Lasting solutions require consensus

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Social Media training

Problems and solutions in plural societies like Sri Lanka’s which have deep rooted ethnic, religious and linguistic cleavages require a consciously inclusive approach. A major challenge for any government in Sri Lanka is to correctly identify the problems faced by different groups with strong identities and find solutions to them. The durability of democratic systems in divided societies depends less on electoral victories than on institutionalised inclusion, consultation, and negotiated compromise. When problems are defined only through the lens of a single political formation, even one that enjoys a large electoral mandate, such as obtained by the NPP government, the policy prescriptions derived from that diagnosis will likely overlook the experiences of communities that may remain outside the ruling party. The result could end up being resistance to those policies, uneven implementation and eventual political backlash.

A recent survey done by the National Peace Council (NPC), in Jaffna, in the North, at a focus group discussion for young people on citizen perception in the electoral process, revealed interesting developments. The results of the NPC micro survey support the findings of the national survey by Verite Research that found that government approval rating stood at 65 percent in early February 2026. A majority of the respondents in Jaffna affirm that they feel safer and more fairly treated than in the past. There is a clear improving trend to be seen in some areas, but not in all. This survey of predominantly young and educated respondents shows 78 percent saying livelihood has improved and an equal percentage feeling safe in daily life. 75 percent express satisfaction with the new government and 64 percent believe the state treats their language and culture fairly. These are not insignificant gains in a region that bore the brunt of three decades of war.

Yet the same survey reveals deep reservations that temper this optimism. Only 25 percent are satisfied with the handling of past issues. An equal percentage see no change in land and military related concerns. Most strikingly, almost 90 percent are worried about land being taken without consent for religious purposes. A significant number are uncertain whether the future will be better. These negative sentiments cannot be brushed aside as marginal. They point to unresolved structural questions relating to land rights, demilitarisation, accountability and the locus of political power. If these issues are not addressed sooner rather than later, the current stability may prove fragile. This suggests the need to build consensus with other parties to ensure long-term stability and legitimacy, and the need for partnership to address national issues.

NPP Absence

National or local level problems solving is unlikely to be successful in the longer term if it only proceeds from the thinking of one group of people even if they are the most enlightened. Problem solving requires the engagement of those from different ethno-religious, caste and political backgrounds to get a diversity of ideas and possible solutions. It does not mean getting corrupted or having to give up the good for the worse. It means testing ideas in the public sphere. Legitimacy flows not merely from winning elections but from the quality of public reasoning that precedes decision-making. The experience of successful post-conflict societies shows that long term peace and development are built through dialogue platforms where civil society organisations, political actors, business communities, and local representatives jointly define problems before negotiating policy responses.

As a civil society organisation, the National Peace Council engages in a variety of public activities that focus on awareness and relationship building across communities. Participants in those activities include community leaders, religious clergy, local level government officials and grassroots political party representatives. However, along with other civil society organisations, NPC has been finding it difficult to get the participation of members of the NPP at those events. The excuse given for the absence of ruling party members is that they are too busy as they are involved in a plenitude of activities. The question is whether the ruling party members have too much on their plate or whether it is due to a reluctance to work with others.

The general belief is that those from the ruling party need to get special permission from the party hierarchy for activities organised by groups not under their control. The reluctance of the ruling party to permit its members to join the activities of other organisations may be the concern that they will get ideas that are different from those held by the party leadership. The concern may be that these different ideas will either corrupt the ruling party members or cause dissent within the ranks of the ruling party. But lasting reform in a plural society requires precisely this exposure. If 90 percent of surveyed youth in Jaffna are worried about land issues, then engaging them, rather than shielding party representatives from uncomfortable conversations, is essential for accurate problem identification.

North Star

The Leader of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Prof Tissa Vitarana, who passed away last week, gave the example for national level problem solving. As a government minister he took on the challenge the protracted ethnic conflict that led to three decades of war. He set his mind on the solution and engaged with all but never veered from his conviction about what the solution would be. This was the North Star to him, said his son to me at his funeral, the direction to which the Compass (Malimawa) pointed at all times. Prof Vitarana held the view that in a diverse and plural society there was a need to devolve power and share power in a structured way between the majority community and minority communities. His example illustrates that engagement does not require ideological capitulation. It requires clarity of purpose combined with openness to dialogue.

The ethnic and religious peace that prevails today owes much to the efforts of people like Prof Vitarana and other like-minded persons and groups which, for many years, engaged as underdogs with those who were more powerful. The commitment to equality of citizenship, non-racism, non-extremism and non-discrimination, upheld by the present government, comes from this foundation. But the NPC survey suggests that symbolic recognition and improved daily safety are not enough. Respondents prioritise personal safety, truth regarding missing persons, return of land, language use and reduction of military involvement. They are also asking for jobs after graduation, local economic opportunity, protection of property rights, and tangible improvements that allow them to remain in Jaffna rather than migrate.

If solutions are to be lasting they cannot be unilaterally imposed by one party on the others. Lasting solutions cannot be unilateral solutions. They must emerge from a shared diagnosis of the country’s deepest problems and from a willingness to address the negative sentiments that persist beneath the surface of cautious optimism. Only then can progress be secured against reversal and anchored in the consent of the wider polity. Engaging with the opposition can help mitigate the hyper-confrontational and divisive political culture of the past. This means that the ruling party needs to consider not only how to protect its existing members by cloistering them from those who think differently but also expand its vision and membership by convincing others to join them in problem solving at multiple levels. This requires engagement and not avoidance or withdrawal.

 

by Jehan Perera

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Unpacking public responses to educational reforms

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A pro-government demonstration calling for the implementation of the education reforms. (A file photo)

As the debate on educational reforms rages, I find it useful to pay as much attention to the reactions they have excited as we do to the content of the reforms. Such reactions are a reflection of how education is understood in our society, and this understanding – along with the priorities it gives rise to – must necessarily be taken into account in education policy, including and especially reform. My aim in this piece, however, is to couple this public engagement with critical reflection on the historical-structural realities that structure our possibilities in the global market, and briefly discuss the role of academics in this endeavour.

Two broad reactions

The reactions to the proposed reforms can be broadly categorised into ‘pro’ and ‘anti’. I will discuss the latter first. Most of the backlash against the reforms seems to be directed at the issue of a gay dating site, accidentally being linked to the Grade 6 English module. While the importance of rigour cannot be overstated in such a process, the sheer volume of the energies concentrated on this is also indicative of how hopelessly homophobic our society is, especially its educators, including those in trade unions. These dispositions are a crucial part of the reason why educational reforms are needed in the first place. If only there was a fraction of the interest in ‘keeping up with the rest of the world’ in terms of IT, skills, and so on, in this area as well!

Then there is the opposition mounted by teachers’ trade unions and others about the process of the reforms not being very democratic, which I (and many others in higher education, as evidenced by a recent statement, available at https://island.lk/general-educational-reforms-to-what-purpose-a-statement-by-state-university-teachers/ ) fully agree with. But I earnestly hope the conversation is not usurped by those wanting to promote heteronormativity, further entrenching bigotry only education itself can save us from. With this important qualification, I, too, believe the government should open up the reform process to the public, rather than just ‘informing’ them of it.

It is unclear both as to why the process had to be behind closed doors, as well as why the government seems to be in a hurry to push the reforms through. Considering other recent developments, like the continued extension of emergency rule, tabling of the Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), and proposing a new Authority for the protection of the Central Highlands (as is famously known, Authorities directly come under the Executive, and, therefore, further strengthen the Presidency; a reasonable question would be as to why the existing apparatus cannot be strengthened for this purpose), this appears especially suspect.

Further, according to the Secretary to the MOE Nalaka Kaluwewa: “The full framework for the [education] reforms was already in place [when the Dissanayake government took office]” (https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/08/12/wxua-a12.html, citing The Morning, July 29). Given the ideological inclinations of the former Wickremesinghe government and the IMF negotiations taking place at the time, the continuation of education reforms, initiated in such a context with very little modification, leaves little doubt as to their intent: to facilitate the churning out of cheap labour for the global market (with very little cushioning from external shocks and reproducing global inequalities), while raising enough revenue in the process to service debt.

This process privileges STEM subjects, which are “considered to contribute to higher levels of ‘employability’ among their graduates … With their emphasis on transferable skills and demonstrable competency levels, STEM subjects provide tools that are well suited for the abstraction of labour required by capitalism, particularly at the global level where comparability across a wide array of labour markets matters more than ever before” (my own previous piece in this column on 29 October 2024). Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS) subjects are deprioritised as a result. However, the wisdom of an education policy that is solely focused on responding to the global market has been questioned in this column and elsewhere, both because the global market has no reason to prioritise our needs as well as because such an orientation comes at the cost of a strategy for improving the conditions within Sri Lanka, in all sectors. This is why we need a more emancipatory vision for education geared towards building a fairer society domestically where the fruits of prosperity are enjoyed by all.

The second broad reaction to the reforms is to earnestly embrace them. The reasons behind this need to be taken seriously, although it echoes the mantra of the global market. According to one parent participating in a protest against the halting of the reform process: “The world is moving forward with new inventions and technology, but here in Sri Lanka, our children are still burdened with outdated methods. Opposition politicians send their children to international schools or abroad, while ours depend on free education. Stopping these reforms is the lowest act I’ve seen as a mother” (https://www.newsfirst.lk/2026/01/17/pro-educational-reforms-protests-spread-across-sri-lanka). While it is worth mentioning that it is not only the opposition, nor in fact only politicians, who send their children to international schools and abroad, the point holds. Updating the curriculum to reflect the changing needs of a society will invariably strengthen the case for free education. However, as mentioned before, if not combined with a vision for harnessing education’s emancipatory potential for the country, such a move would simply translate into one of integrating Sri Lanka to the world market to produce cheap labour for the colonial and neocolonial masters.

According to another parent in a similar protest: “Our children were excited about lighter schoolbags and a better future. Now they are left in despair” (https://www.newsfirst.lk/2026/01/17/pro-educational-reforms-protests-spread-across-sri-lanka). Again, a valid concern, but one that seems to be completely buying into the rhetoric of the government. As many pieces in this column have already shown, even though the structure of assessments will shift from exam-heavy to more interim forms of assessment (which is very welcome), the number of modules/subjects will actually increase, pushing a greater, not lesser, workload on students.

A file photo of a satyagraha against education reforms

What kind of education?

The ‘pro’ reactions outlined above stem from valid concerns, and, therefore, need to be taken seriously. Relatedly, we have to keep in mind that opening the process up to public engagement will not necessarily result in some of the outcomes, those particularly in the HSS academic community, would like to see, such as increasing the HSS component in the syllabus, changing weightages assigned to such subjects, reintroducing them to the basket of mandatory subjects, etc., because of the increasing traction of STEM subjects as a surer way to lock in a good future income.

Academics do have a role to play here, though: 1) actively engage with various groups of people to understand their rationales behind supporting or opposing the reforms; 2) reflect on how such preferences are constituted, and what they in turn contribute towards constituting (including the global and local patterns of accumulation and structures of oppression they perpetuate); 3) bring these reflections back into further conversations, enabling a mutually conditioning exchange; 4) collectively work out a plan for reforming education based on the above, preferably in an arrangement that directly informs policy. A reform process informed by such a dialectical exchange, and a system of education based on the results of these reflections, will have greater substantive value while also responding to the changing times.

Two important prerequisites for this kind of endeavour to succeed are that first, academics participate, irrespective of whether they publicly endorsed this government or not, and second, that the government responds with humility and accountability, without denial and shifting the blame on to individuals. While we cannot help the second, we can start with the first.

Conclusion

For a government that came into power riding the wave of ‘system change’, it is perhaps more important than for any other government that these reforms are done for the right reasons, not to mention following the right methods (of consultation and deliberation). For instance, developing soft skills or incorporating vocational education to the curriculum could be done either in a way that reproduces Sri Lanka’s marginality in the global economic order (which is ‘system preservation’), or lays the groundwork to develop a workforce first and foremost for the country, limited as this approach may be. An inextricable concern is what is denoted by ‘the country’ here: a few affluent groups, a majority ethno-religious category, or everyone living here? How we define ‘the country’ will centrally influence how education policy (among others) will be formulated, just as much as the quality of education influences how we – students, teachers, parents, policymakers, bureaucrats, ‘experts’ – think about such categories. That is precisely why more thought should go to education policymaking than perhaps any other sector.

(Hasini Lecamwasam is attached to the Department of Political Science, University of Peradeniya).

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

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