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‘Transitional Justice’ in Sri Lanka: Is it of any use?

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Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera at the UNHRC in 2015.(Picture courtesy Sunanda Deshapriya)

by Dharshan Weerasekera

Ever since the victory of the Sri Lankan armed forces against the LTTE in May 2009, the international community has been calling on successive governments in this country to ensure ‘transitional justice.’ These governments, in turn, have spent tens of millions of rupees on such efforts. Unfortunately, there has been little or no critical analysis in local newspapers or academic journals over whether the concept of ‘transitional justice’ is applicable to Sri Lanka. It is in the public interest to begin such a discussion.

I argue that, the concept is inapplicable to Sri Lanka. ‘Transitional justice,’ as originally conceived by international law experts, is intended for countries where the rule of law has completely collapsed, i. e., where all democratic processes along with the institutions for the administration of justice have collapsed. There is no evidence that such a situation prevailed in Sri Lanka at the close of the LTTE war. For instance, even at the height of the conflict, the normal courts continued to operate throughout much of the island. Therefore, if the aforesaid concept is to be applied here, it has to be modified. For reasons that will be explained later, there is no evidence that this has happened either.

In this article, I will discuss: i) the history of the concept,’ ii) its application in Sri Lanka, and iii) provide an assessment of such application.

The History of the Concept

According to Oleksii Plotnikov, a visiting fellow at Cordozo School of Law in the US, the concept of transitional justice emerged in the context of the fall of the Soviet Union as a means of addressing the collapse of the institutions of governance in the former Soviet states. He traces the origin of the term to a conference in Salzburg in 1992, attended by policymakers and scholars from the West along with the post-Soviet countries. He says:

“Rudi Teitel, who participated in the Salzburg Conference, claims personal authorship: ‘transitional justice is an expression I coined in 1991 at the time of the Soviet collapse and on the heels of the 1980s Latin American transitions to democracy. In proposing this terminology my aim was to account for the self-conscious construction of a distinctive conception of justice associated with political change following past oppressive rule.’” (‘Defining Transitional Justice: Scholarly Debate and UN Precision,’ p. 54.)

To fast forward to the early 2000s, the UN took up the concept and expanded it beyond regime-change situations to include post-conflict situations as well. The UN Security Council, in a well-known report in 2004, defined ‘transitional justice’ as: “The full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s coming to terms with a legacy of large scale past abuses in order to secure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.” (UN Doc. S/2004/616, 23rd August 2004.)

Such, then, is the history of the concept. To repeat, it was originally intended to address regime-change situations and post-conflict situations where a country’s institutions of governance had completely collapsed.

The application of the concept to Sri Lanka

The ‘Yahapalana government’ (2015-2019) is the first Sri Lankan government to fully embrace the concept of transitional justice. At the 30th session of the Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in September 2015, the then Foreign Minister, the late Mangala Samaraweera, announced that the government had a comprehensive plan to address accountability and reconciliation issues. He said:

“The government of Sri Lanka recognizes fully that the process of reconciliation involves addressing the four broad areas of truth-seeking, justice, reparations and non-recurrence, and for non-recurrence to become truly meaningful the necessity of reaching a political settlement that addresses the grievances of the Tamil people.” (Foreign Minister’s Statement at the General Debate, 14th September 2015, www.mfa.gov.lk)

He proceeded to lay out the government’s plans in regard to each of the said components, to wit: truth-seeking (a ‘Truth Commission’ along with an Office on Missing Persons), justice (a hybrid court including foreign judges), reparations (an Office on Reparations), non-recurrence (constitutional reforms involving the full implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.) These ingredients were later incorporated into resolution 30/1 adapted by the Council in October 2015. The government of Sri Lanka co-sponsored that resolution.

Assessment

There are two problems with the application of the concept ‘transitional justice’ to Sri Lanka. First, as mentioned earlier, the concept was originally intended to address situations where the institutions of governance, especially those dealing with the administration of justice, have completely collapsed. There is no evidence that this had happened at the close of the LTTE war in May 2009. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the end of the war made it possible for the government to reassert the authority of the old institutions, especially that of the courts, in the areas that had fallen into the hands of the LTTE. This is confirmed, albeit indirectly, by no less than the Human Rights Council (UNHRC). In the resolution on Sri Lanka adapted by following a special session on 27th May 2009, the Council states:

“Welcoming the conclusion of hostilities and the liberation by the Government of Sri Lanka of tens of thousands of its citizens that were kept by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam against their will as hostages, as well as the efforts by the Government to ensure the safety and security of all Sri Lankans and to bring permanent peace to the country.” (UN Doc. A/HRC/S-11/1)

If the Council had considered that law and order had completely collapsed in this country, it could not have made such a statement. Second, I concede that the four components of truth-seeking, justice, reparations and non-recurrence are internationally recognized processes for pursuing transitional justice. The question, however, is whether they are to be pursued in sequence – ie starting with truth-seeking and then followed by the others based on the findings of the aforesaid effort -or each independently of the others. Common sense and reason suggest that the former should be the case, because of the following reasons.

Without first knowing the facts as to what may have happened during a conflict, it is difficult to see how one could decide on methods of holding people accountable for alleged crimes, assign reparations, or formulate constitutional reforms to address the causes of such conflict. It appears that the government, in resolution 30/1, has agreed to pursue each of the transitional justice processes in question independently of the others. This is unreasonable. For instance, if ‘truth-seeking’ and ‘constitutional reforms’ are to run parallel to each other, what happens if the findings of the truth- seeking process are at variance with the proposed constitutional reforms?

One must also consider the following matter in regard to the above. Between 2010-2015, ie during the Mahinda Rajapaksa Administration, the government launched two domestic mechanisms: The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission and the Paranagama Commission. Rightly or wrongly, these constitute official attempts at truth-seeking by a Government of Sri Lanka. In these circumstances, successor governments cannot simply ignore the findings of such Commissions unless they first establish that the said findings are wrong.

The ‘Yahapalana government’ never produced a report that critically assessed the conclusions and recommendations of either the LLRC or the Paranagama Commission reports and deemed them to be wrong. Hence, for all practical purposes, one must presume that these conclusions and recommendations were valid at the time of the UNHRC’s 30th session. It is important to note that, neither the LLRC nor the Paranagama Commission recommend hybrid courts or constitutional reforms involving the full implementation of the 13th Amendment. They do recommend a ‘truth commission’ and reparations. They advise, however, that these things be done in way that avoids internationalizing the reconciliation process.

Conclusion

‘Transitional justice,’ as the name implies, is intended for a temporary purpose. In times of peace, the normal democratic processes, along with the institutions for the administration of justice, are supposed to protect the rights of the people. Arguably, normalcy has now returned to the former conflict-zone in Sri Lanka. The question is whether, the existence of transitional justice processes could potentially stifle the growth of the regular institutions for the administration of justice, especially the courts, or worse, become a means of continually re-opening old wounds.

The present government has inherited a complicated legacy in regard to transitional justice. On the one hand, it is obliged to ensure justice to the people. On the other, it has to satisfy the international community that it is not reneging on commitments made in resolution 30/1. If processes that go beyond the normal courts are necessary to ensure justice to the people, they will have to be explored. The government, however, has vowed to do everything in its power to prevent the wasting of public funds. In these circumstances, it is hoped that the relevant officials will re-evaluate whether continuing with transitional justice initiatives stemming from resolution 30/1 is in the country’s interest, and if not, bring such initiatives to a formal close.

(Dharshan Weerasekera is the author of, ‘A UNHRC Resolution of Questionable Legality on Sri Lanka and its Importance as a Catalyst for Future UN Reform’ (2024) 10 Groningen Journal of International Law 120)



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Rebuilding the country requires consultation

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A positive feature of the government that is emerging is its responsiveness to public opinion. The manner in which it has been responding to the furore over the Grade 6 English Reader, in which a weblink to a gay dating site was inserted, has been constructive. Government leaders have taken pains to explain the mishap and reassure everyone concerned that it was not meant to be there and would be removed. They have been meeting religious prelates, educationists and community leaders. In a context where public trust in institutions has been badly eroded over many years, such responsiveness matters. It signals that the government sees itself as accountable to society, including to parents, teachers, and those concerned about the values transmitted through the school system.

This incident also appears to have strengthened unity within the government. The attempt by some opposition politicians and gender misogynists to pin responsibility for this lapse on Prime Minister Dr Harini Amarasuriya, who is also the Minister of Education, has prompted other senior members of the government to come to her defence. This is contrary to speculation that the powerful JVP component of the government is unhappy with the prime minister. More importantly, it demonstrates an understanding within the government that individual ministers should not be scapegoated for systemic shortcomings. Effective governance depends on collective responsibility and solidarity within the leadership, especially during moments of public controversy.

The continuing important role of the prime minister in the government is evident in her meetings with international dignitaries and also in addressing the general public. Last week she chaired the inaugural meeting of the Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka in the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah. The composition of the task force once again reflects the responsiveness of the government to public opinion. Unlike previous mechanisms set up by governments, which were either all male or without ethnic minority representation, this one includes both, and also includes civil society representation. Decision-making bodies in which there is diversity are more likely to command public legitimacy.

Task Force

The Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka overlooks eight committees to manage different aspects of the recovery, each headed by a sector minister. These committees will focus on Needs Assessment, Restoration of Public Infrastructure, Housing, Local Economies and Livelihoods, Social Infrastructure, Finance and Funding, Data and Information Systems, and Public Communication. This structure appears comprehensive and well designed. However, experience from post-disaster reconstruction in countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami suggests that institutional design alone does not guarantee success. What matters equally is how far these committees engage with those on the ground and remain open to feedback that may complicate, slow down, or even challenge initial plans.

An option that the task force might wish to consider is to develop a linkage with civil society groups with expertise in the areas that the task force is expected to work. The CSO Collective for Emergency Relief has set up several committees that could be linked to the committees supervised by the task force. Such linkages would not weaken the government’s authority but strengthen it by grounding policy in lived realities. Recent findings emphasise the idea of “co-production”, where state and society jointly shape solutions in which sustainable outcomes often emerge when communities are treated not as passive beneficiaries but as partners in problem-solving.

Cyclone Ditwah destroyed more than physical infrastructure. It also destroyed communities. Some were swallowed by landslides and floods, while many others will need to be moved from their homes as they live in areas vulnerable to future disasters. The trauma of displacement is not merely material but social and psychological. Moving communities to new locations requires careful planning. It is not simply a matter of providing people with houses. They need to be relocated to locations and in a manner that permits communities to live together and to have livelihoods. This will require consultation with those who are displaced. Post-disaster evaluations have acknowledged that relocation schemes imposed without community consent often fail, leading to abandonment of new settlements or the emergence of new forms of marginalisation. Even today, abandoned tsunami housing is to be seen in various places that were affected by the 2004 tsunami.

Malaiyaha Tamils

The large-scale reconstruction that needs to take place in parts of the country most severely affected by Cyclone Ditwah also brings an opportunity to deal with the special problems of the Malaiyaha Tamil population. These are people of recent Indian origin who were unjustly treated at the time of Independence and denied rights of citizenship such as land ownership and the vote. This has been a festering problem and a blot on the conscience of the country. The need to resettle people living in those parts of the hill country which are vulnerable to landslides is an opportunity to do justice by the Malaiyaha Tamil community. Technocratic solutions such as high-rise apartments or English-style townhouses that have or are being contemplated may be cost-effective, but may also be culturally inappropriate and socially disruptive. The task is not simply to build houses but to rebuild communities.

The resettlement of people who have lost their homes and communities requires consultation with them. In the same manner, the education reform programme, of which the textbook controversy is only a small part, too needs to be discussed with concerned stakeholders including school teachers and university faculty. Opening up for discussion does not mean giving up one’s own position or values. Rather, it means recognising that better solutions emerge when different perspectives are heard and negotiated. Consultation takes time and can be frustrating, particularly in contexts of crisis where pressure for quick results is intense. However, solutions developed with stakeholder participation are more resilient and less costly in the long run.

Rebuilding after Cyclone Ditwah, addressing historical injustices faced by the Malaiyaha Tamil community, advancing education reform, changing the electoral system to hold provincial elections without further delay and other challenges facing the government, including national reconciliation, all require dialogue across differences and patience with disagreement. Opening up for discussion is not to give up on one’s own position or values, but to listen, to learn, and to arrive at solutions that have wider acceptance. Consultation needs to be treated as an investment in sustainability and legitimacy and not as an obstacle to rapid decisionmaking. Addressing the problems together, especially engagement with affected parties and those who work with them, offers the best chance of rebuilding not only physical infrastructure but also trust between the government and people in the year ahead.

 

by Jehan Perera

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PSTA: Terrorism without terror continues

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When the government appointed a committee, led by Rienzie Arsekularatne, Senior President’s Counsel, to draft a new law to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), as promised by the ruling NPP, the writer, in an article published in this journal in July 2025, expressed optimism that, given Arsekularatne’s experience in criminal justice, he would be able to address issues from the perspectives of the State, criminal justice, human rights, suspects, accused, activists, and victims. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), produced by the Committee, has been sharply criticised by individuals and organisations who expected a better outcome that aligns with modern criminal justice and human rights principles.

This article is limited to a discussion of the definition of terrorism. As the writer explained previously, the dangers of an overly broad definition go beyond conviction and increased punishment. Special laws on terrorism allow deviations from standard laws in areas such as preventive detention, arrest, administrative detention, restrictions on judicial decisions regarding bail, lengthy pre-trial detention, the use of confessions, superadded punishments, such as confiscation of property and cancellation of professional licences, banning organisations, and restrictions on publications, among others. The misuse of such laws is not uncommon. Drastic legislation, such as the PTA and emergency regulations, although intended to be used to curb intense violence and deal with emergencies, has been exploited to suppress political opposition.

 

International Standards

The writer’s basic premise is that, for an act to come within the definition of terrorism, it must either involve “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or be committed to achieve an objective of an individual or organisation that uses “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to realise its aims. The UN General Assembly has accepted that the threshold for a possible general offence of terrorism is the provocation of “a state of terror” (Resolution 60/43). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has taken a similar view, using the phrase “to create a climate of terror.”

In his 2023 report on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Secretary-General warned that vague and overly broad definitions of terrorism in domestic law, often lacking adequate safeguards, violate the principle of legality under international human rights law. He noted that such laws lead to heavy-handed, ineffective, and counterproductive counter-terrorism practices and are frequently misused to target civil society actors and human rights defenders by labelling them as terrorists to obstruct their work.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has stressed in its Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism that definitions of terrorist acts must use precise and unambiguous language, narrowly define punishable conduct and clearly distinguish it from non-punishable behaviour or offences subject to other penalties. The handbook was developed over several months by a team of international experts, including the writer, and was finalised at a workshop in Vienna.

 

Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023

A five-member Bench of the Supreme Court that examined the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023, agreed with the petitioners that the definition of terrorism in the Bill was too broad and infringed Article 12(1) of the Constitution, and recommended that an exemption (“carve out”) similar to that used in New Zealand under which “the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial action, is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that the person” committed the wrongful acts that would otherwise constitute terrorism.

While recognising the Court’s finding that the definition was too broad, the writer argued, in his previous article, that the political, administrative, and law enforcement cultures of the country concerned are crucial factors to consider. Countries such as New Zealand are well ahead of developing nations, where the risk of misuse is higher, and, therefore, definitions should be narrower, with broader and more precise exemptions. How such a “carve out” would play out in practice is uncertain.

In the Supreme Court, it was submitted that for an act to constitute an offence, under a special law on terrorism, there must be terror unleashed in the commission of the act, or it must be carried out in pursuance of the object of an organisation that uses terror to achieve its objectives. In general, only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” should come under the definition of terrorism. There can be terrorism-related acts without violence, for example, when a member of an extremist organisation remotely sabotages an electronic, automated or computerised system in pursuance of the organisation’s goal. But when the same act is committed by, say, a whizz-kid without such a connection, that would be illegal and should be punished, but not under a special law on terrorism. In its determination of the Bill, the Court did not address this submission.

 

PSTA Proposal

Proposed section 3(1) of the PSTA reads:

Any person who, intentionally or knowingly, commits any act which causes a consequence specified in subsection (2), for the purpose of-

(a) provoking a state of terror;

(b) intimidating the public or any section of the public;

(c) compelling the Government of Sri Lanka, or any other Government, or an international organisation, to do or to abstain from doing any act; or

(d) propagating war, or violating territorial integrity or infringing the sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country, commits the offence of terrorism.

The consequences listed in sub-section (2) include: death; hurt; hostage-taking; abduction or kidnapping; serious damage to any place of public use, any public property, any public or private transportation system or any infrastructure facility or environment; robbery, extortion or theft of public or private property; serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic or automated or computerised system or network or cyber environment of domains assigned to, or websites registered with such domains assigned to Sri Lanka; destruction of, or serious damage to, religious or cultural property; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with any electronic, analogue, digital or other wire-linked or wireless transmission system, including signal transmission and any other frequency-based transmission system; without lawful authority, importing, exporting, manufacturing, collecting, obtaining, supplying, trafficking, possessing or using firearms, offensive weapons, ammunition, explosives, articles or things used in the manufacture of explosives or combustible or corrosive substances and biological, chemical, electric, electronic or nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, nuclear material, radioactive substances, or radiation-emitting devices.

Under section 3(5), “any person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the nine international treaties on terrorism, ratified by Sri Lanka, also commits the offence of terrorism.” No one would contest that.

The New Zealand “carve-out” is found in sub-section (4): “The fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent or engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action, is not by itself a sufficient basis for inferring that such person (a) commits or attempts, abets, conspires, or prepares to commit the act with the intention or knowledge specified in subsection (1); or (b) is intending to cause or knowingly causes an outcome specified in subsection (2).”

While the Arsekularatne Committee has proposed, including the New Zealand “carve out”, it has ignored a crucial qualification in section 5(2) of that country’s Terrorism Suppression Act, that for an act to be considered a terrorist act, it must be carried out for one or more purposes that are or include advancing “an ideological, political, or religious cause”, with the intention of either intimidating a population or coercing or forcing a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.

When the Committee was appointed, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka opined that any new offence with respect to “terrorism” should contain a specific and narrow definition of terrorism, such as the following: “Any person who by the use of force or violence unlawfully targets the civilian population or a segment of the civilian population with the intent to spread fear among such population or segment thereof in furtherance of a political, ideological, or religious cause commits the offence of terrorism”.

The writer submits that, rather than bringing in the requirement of “a political, ideological, or religious cause”, it would be prudent to qualify proposed section 3(1) by the requirement that only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or are carried out to achieve a goal of an individual or organisation that employs “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to attain its objectives should come under the definition of terrorism. Such a threshold is recognised internationally; no “carve out” is then needed, and the concerns of the Human Rights Commission would also be addressed.

 

by Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne
President’s Counsel

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ROCK meets REGGAE 2026

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JAYASRI: From Vienna, Austria

We generally have in our midst the famous JAYASRI twins, Rohitha and Rohan, who are based in Austria but make it a point to entertain their fans in Sri Lanka on a regular basis.

Well, rock and reggae fans get ready for a major happening on 28th February (Oops, a special day where I’m concerned!) as the much-awaited ROCK meets REGGAE event booms into action at the Nelum Pokuna outdoor theatre.

It was seven years ago, in 2019, that the last ROCK meets REGGAE concert was held in Colombo, and then the Covid scene cropped up.

Chitral Somapala with BLACK MAJESTY

This year’s event will feature our rock star Chitral Somapala with the Australian Rock+Metal band BLACK MAJESTY, and the reggae twins Rohitha and Rohan Jayalath with the original JAYASRI – the full band, with seven members from Vienna, Austria.

According to Rohitha, the JAYASRI outfit is enthusiastically looking forward to entertaining music lovers here with their brand of music.

Their playlist for 28th February will consist of the songs they do at festivals in Europe, as well as originals, and also English and Sinhala hits, and selected covers.

Says Rohitha: “We have put up a great team, here in Sri Lanka, to give this event an international setting and maintain high standards, and this will be a great experience for our Sri Lankan music lovers … not only for Rock and Reggae fans. Yes, there will be some opening acts, and many surprises, as well.”

Rohitha, Chitral and Rohan: Big scene at ROCK meets REGGAE

Rohitha and Rohan also conveyed their love and festive blessings to everyone in Sri Lanka, stating “This Christmas was different as our country faced a catastrophic situation and, indeed, it’s a great time to help and share the real love of Jesus Christ by helping the poor, the needy and the homeless people. Let’s RISE UP as a great nation in 2026.”

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