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The next 25 years: How will the economy takeoff and how will it land?

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by Rajan Philips

President Wickremesinghe has a charming or annoying way, depending on who is listening, of switching between flippancy and seriousness no matter what the occasion is. Addressing the Sri Lanka Economic Summit 2022, an annual event organized by the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, with ‘Resetting from turmoil to opportunity’ as this year’s theme, the President reportedly shocked the business audience, deadpanning, “What reforms, when we don’t have an economy!” To an audience that was apparently agog for serious revelations about an economic reform plan, the President said, “What is the plan for reform? Frankly, I have no plan for it.” But he had a program to announce and called it, ‘The Next 25 Years.’

Mr. Wickremesinghe has been harping on 25 years for some time now. That is the President’s expectation for Sri Lanka to reach economic growth and prosperity by 2048, a hundred years after becoming independent from colonial rule in 1948. The 2023 budget that passed its Third Reading on Thursday is supposed to be the launching pad for the anticipated economic recovery over the next 25 years. Hence, the President’s program: The Next 25 Years. Not to come across as being too cynical, there is nothing to substantiate this 25 year recovery program except the President’s word for it. The problem is he has a ‘word’ for everything, but little of consequence has come out of his word over the last 45 years as a parliamentarian, and four months as a parliamentary President.

He summarily wants national reconciliation achieved before independence day on February 4. We will know more about it after the All Party Conference scheduled for Monday, December 11. In the meantime, he has teased everyone with his allusion to resurrecting the District Development Councils, and used his 50th anniversary celebration as a lawyer to issue a clarion call for all fellow lawyers to come together to achieve national reconciliation. That would be fun. Getting all the lawyers to reach unanimity on something, anything. Especially, reconciliation!

Three Interventions

No presidential call, however, to all the Economists in the country to come together to help launch Sri Lanka’s 25-year economic recovery program. Economists are fewer in number and more competent in their discipline, which is also far less susceptible to pettifogging lawyerly arguments. After the President’s 2023 Budget, I have been looking at three interventions in the public domain, one by a political leader and two by noted Economists. The interventions are significant for not only what they say, but also for what they do not say.

The political leader is JVP’s Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD), who, as I wrote last week made a substantial speech on the economy and the political situation in the country at a public meeting in Badulla. The mainstream media has by and large ignored it. According to JVPers, mainstream media always ignores them except to dig up 1971 and 1988 whenever there is something to report on the JVP. Nonetheless, the JVP leader deserves more media coverage than a nondescript like Channa Jayasumana who seems to have wormed his way to get media coverage in spite of his abominable record in maliciously attacking Dr. Shihabdeen Shafi, the Kurunegala gynecologist, to get on the SLPP candidate list.

That aside, AKD’s Badulla speech is a graphic exposition of how terrible things are – from unaffordable prices to collapsing industries to rampant corruption. But there is nothing in the speech by way of specific remedies, except for the general assertion that elections must be held soon and the people must elect a new leadership, i.e., the JVP, to take over. He wants the country to take a leap of faith and endorse the JVP, not quite unlike President Wickremesinghe’s message to the country to take a leap of faith with him for the Next 25 Years.

The two economic intervenors I am referring to are Prof. Sirimal Abeyratne and Dr. Nimal Sanderatne, both of whom are weekly Sunday Times columnists. Abeyratne’s November 27 column is appropriately entitled, “Road to a ‘developed country’ in 2048,” and describes the budgetary vision as an “export-oriented, competitive economy led by the private sector.” The scale of the desired export expansion is ambitious – a continuous $3 billion increase in exports year over year for 25 years. Or an annual increase of 25% from the 2021 export total of $12.5 billion.

Perhaps the projected export growth is not to be deemed daunting, because after 25 years Sri Lanka’s total export value would be still under $100 billion in comparison to other export-successful Asian countries whose totals are already in the $300-$400 billion range. China is in a league of its own with an export total of $3.3 trillion. But China has a different problem, as is currently being noted by demographers. It is that the country is facing a population decline by 50% at the end of this century if not 30 years sooner. It will be quite a load off for the planet, but it is going to be an excruciating challenge for the Chinese society.

As for Sri Lanka, the annual export growth of $3 billion is to be matched by an equal yearly increase of $3 billion in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Sri Lanka’s FDI in 2021 dropped to a paltry $600 million, quite a way lower than Malaysia ($11.6 billion), Singapore ($99.1 billion), Thailand ($11.4 billion) and Vietnam ($15.2 billion). Curiously, the Next 25 Years are going to see exports and FDI increasing at the same rate and by the same amount to reach almost the same totals in 2048 – exports: $87 billion, and FDI: $76 billion. In contrast, the above mentioned Asian countries except Singapore have high export/FDI ratios – between 20 to 30. Is Sri Lanka going to miss out on productivity, or is productivity not meant to be a consideration for the Next 25 Years?

The more important question is how are these export and FDI growth projections going to be achieved from year to year, if they are to be the roadway for Sri Lanka to become a developed country and join the high income club with a per capita membership fee of $12,695? Prof. Abeyratne lists four pre-requisites, three of which are included in the budget. They are the introduction of a “single agency,” consolidating the current BOI, EDB, SLECIC and NEDA pillars and posts into a single window, to facilitate trade and investment; New Economic Zones in different parts of the country; and bilateral and multilateral Free Trade Area (FTA) agreements. None of which are new and have been tried and talked of before. The fourth requirement is what Prof. Abeyratne calls the “unilateral reform process,” which he considers to be “much more fundamental to export growth” than everything else. And this is what President Wickremesinghe cavalierly shot down at the Sri Lankan Economic Summit!

There is something else missing here. To achieve an annual export growth target of $3 billion, is it possible and is it not necessary to identify where this growth is going to come from? What is the contribution to growth from the already established export industries? Which among them have potential for growth and how could they be encouraged to expand? What are the industries that have plateaued but still need to be supported to maintain their production levels? Should there be an effort to identify potential new industries which are grounded on evidence and market potential, and not on snake-oil-sales-pitch about automobile-assembly plants? Would it make sense to have an export-product-mix and use it as a basis for opening target-oriented single agency, economic zones, and free trade areas?

The same day (November 27) Sunday Times column, Nimal Sanderatne hits the nail on the head by drawing attention to the enormity of the challenge of achieving the 2023 Budget objectives given “the political conditions in the country, production constraints in all sectors of the economy and the recessionary conditions abroad.” In his December 4 column, Dr. Sanderatne raises the possibility that the IMF’s $2.9 billion Extended Finance Facility may not be finalized even by March 2023. While it was overly optimistic on the part of everyone in Colombo to expect a smooth path to IMF’s support, Sanderatne is concerned about the geopolitical dynamic involving the restructuring of Sri Lanka’s debt to China and its political implications in Sri Lanka.

He alludes to something that few would have thought could become a possibility. And that is the likelihood of, as Sanderatne suggests, China blocking the IMF facility and offering an alternative “bailout package with Chinese financial and commodity assistance.” Nimal Sanderatne further suggests that based on Mahinda Rajapaksa’s speech during the budget debate, “such a programme would have the support of a large and influential component of the Government” led by Mahinda Rajapaksa and the SLPP. This would place President Wickremesinghe in a quandary, and it would also explain his scurrying for alternative funding sources in the World Bank, the ADB and Japan.

Takeoff and Landing

Geopolitical reality is what it is and it is Sri Lanka’s unique karma to have become indebted all at once to China, India, and the Paris Club lenders that includes Japan, and now has to find a way to restructure these debts without ruffling anyone’s feathers. Perhaps there is no denying that Ranil Wickremesinghe is the most suitable man for this unenviable task, but what is frustrating about him is that by his peculiar modes of operation he undermines his own suitability in the context of domestic politics. Put another way, there are serious hurdles to overcome before Sri Lanka can even get on the road to recovery, and the President has to engage the country far more substantively than by flippantly flinging mantras such as The Next Twenty Five Years.

To segue into a different theme, a January 2017 Working Paper (#641) in the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) Working Paper Series, is on the subject, “Takeoffs, Landing and Economic Growth.” The paper (authored by Debayan Pakrashi and Paul Frijters) lists the takeoff and landing status of 22 South Asian and Southeast Asian economies. It provides a brief discussion on the experiences of Japan, the East Asian Tigers, the tiger cub economies, the People’s Republic of China, and India. Sri Lanka is included in the list, but not in the discussion.

Eighteen countries are identified as having had an economic takeoff including the year of takeoff. Only four countries are noted as having landed. The four countries with the takeoff and landing years are: Hong Kong (1960-1995), Japan (1946-1974), Malaysia (1968-1998), and Singapore (1966-1998). Sri Lanka’s year of takeoff is noted as 1990 but there has been no landing, at least not till 2017 when the ADBI Paper was published. We know now that the economy crash-landed in 2021. What will be its takeoff mechanism for the President’s Next 25 Year flight from its crash-landing state now. And how will it land again?

I am ending with the questions I stated in the title. There are abler people to answer them, both “as a point of method and as a point of substance,” to recall Professor W.W. Rostow, who I believe was the first to introduce the concept of economic takeoff in his celebrated 1960 monograph entitled, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. I was briefly introduced to Rostow in the 1970s by Peradeniya Economics Lecturer N. Balakrishnan as part of his lectures on Economics to Engineering students. Years later I read a Marxist critique of Rostow that Hector Abhayavardhana wrote when he was living in New Delhi before his return to Sri Lanka in 1964.

Now, should I be thankful to President Wickremesinghe for rekindling old interests? Re-reading Rostow, I find several resonances in Sri Lanka’s modern economic history as well as its current takeoff challenges. Hopefully, I would be able throw some light burden on those who feel constrained to read this column. Before that, let us wait and see what the President is going to surprise us with, next week, on his other big file: National Reconciliation.


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Relief without recovery

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A US airstrike on an Iranian oil storage facility

The escalating conflict in the Middle East is of such magnitude, with loss of life, destruction of cities, and global energy shortages, that it is diverting attention worldwide and in Sri Lanka, from other serious problems. Barely four months ago Sri Lanka experienced a cyclone of epic proportions that caused torrential rains, accompanied by floods and landslides. The immediate displacement exceeded one million people, though the number of deaths was about 640, with around 200 others reported missing. The visual images of entire towns and villages being inundated, with some swept away by floodwaters, evoked an overwhelming humanitarian response from the general population.

When the crisis of displacement was at its height there was a concerted public response. People set up emergency kitchens and volunteer clean up teams fanned out to make flooded homes inhabitable again. Religious institutions, civil society organisations and local communities worked together to assist the displaced. For a brief period the country witnessed a powerful demonstration of social solidarity. The scale of the devastation prompted the government to offer generous aid packages. These included assistance for the rebuilding of damaged houses, support for building new houses, grants for clean up operations and rent payments to displaced families. Welfare centres were also set up for those unable to find temporary housing.

The government also appointed a Presidential Task Force to lead post-cyclone rebuilding efforts. The mandate of the Task Force is to coordinate post-disaster response mechanisms, streamline institutional efforts and ensure the effective implementation of rebuilding programmes in the aftermath of the cyclone. The body comprises a high-level team, led by the Prime Minister, and including cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, provincial-level officials, senior public servants, representing key state institutions, and civil society representatives. It was envisaged that the Task Force would function as the central coordinating authority, working with government agencies and other stakeholders to accelerate recovery initiatives and restore essential services in affected regions.

Demotivated Service

However, four months later a visit to one of the worst of the cyclone affected areas to meet with affected families from five villages revealed that they remained stranded and in a state of limbo. Most of these people had suffered terribly from the cyclone. Some had lost their homes. A few had lost family members. Many had been informed that the land on which they lived had become unsafe and that they would need to relocate. Most of them had received the promised money for clean up and some had received rent payments for two months. However, little had happened beyond this. The longer term process of rebuilding houses, securing land and restoring livelihoods has barely begun. As a result, families who had already endured the trauma of disaster, now face prolonged uncertainty about their future. It seems that once again the promises made by the political leadership has not reached the ground.

A government officer explained that the public service was highly demotivated. According to him, many officials felt that they had too much work piled upon them with too little resources to do much about it. They also believed that they were underpaid for the work they were expected to carry out. In fact, there had even been a call by public officials specially assigned to cyclone relief work to go on strike due to complaints about their conditions of work. This government official appreciated the government leadership’s commitment to non corruption. But he noted the irony that this had also contributed to a demotivation of the public service. This was on the unjustifiable basis that approving and implementing projects more quickly requires an incentive system.

Whether or not this explanation fully captures the situation, it points to an issue that the government needs to address. Disaster recovery requires a proactive public administration. Officials need to reach out to affected communities, provide clear information and help them navigate the complex procedures required to access assistance. At the consultation with cyclone victims this was precisely the concern that people raised. They said that government officers were not proactive in reaching out to them. Many felt they had little engagement with the state and that the government officers did not come to them. This suggests that the government system at the community level could be supported by non-governmental organisations that have the capacity and experience of working with communities at the grassroots.

In situations such as this the government needs to think about ways of motivating public officials to do more rather than less. It needs to identify legitimate incentives that reward initiative and performance. These could include special allowances for those working in disaster affected areas, recognition and promotion for officers who successfully complete relief and reconstruction work, and the provision of additional staff and logistical support so that the workload is manageable. Clear targets and deadlines, with support from the non-governmental sector, can also encourage officials to act more proactively. When government officers feel supported and recognised for the extra effort required, they are more likely to engage actively with affected communities and ensure that assistance reaches those who need it most.

Political Solutions

Under the prevailing circumstances, however, the cyclone victims do not know what to do. The government needs to act on this without further delay. Government policy states that families can receive financial assistance of up to Rs 5 million to build new houses if they have identified the land on which they wish to build. But there is little freehold land available in many of the affected areas. As a result, people cannot show government officials the land they plan to buy and, therefore, cannot access the government’s promised funds. The government needs to address this issue by providing a list of available places for resettlement, both within and outside the area they live in. However, another finding at the meeting was that many cyclone victims whose lands have been declared unsafe do not wish to leave them. Even those who have been told that their land is unstable feel more comfortable remaining where they have lived for many years. Relocating to an unfamiliar area is not an easy decision.

Another problem the victims face is the difficulty of obtaining the documents necessary to receive compensation. Families with missing members cannot prove that their loved ones are no longer alive. Without official confirmation they cannot access property rights or benefits that would normally pass to surviving family members. These are problems that Sri Lanka has faced before in the context of the three decade long internal war. It has set up new legal mechanisms such as the provision of certificates of absence validated by the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) in place of death certificates when individuals remain missing for long periods. The government also needs to be sensitive to the fact that people who are farmers cannot be settled anywhere. Farming is not possible in every location. Access to suitable land and water is essential if farmers are to rebuild their livelihoods. Relocation programmes that fail to take these realities into account risk creating new psychological and economic hardships.

The message from the consultation with cyclone victims is that the government needs to talk more and engage more directly with affected communities. At the same time the political leadership at the highest levels need to resolve the problems that government officers on the ground cannot solve. Issues relating to land availability, legal documentation and livelihood restoration require policy decisions at higher levels. The challenge to the government to address these issues in the context of the Iran war and possible global catastrophe will require a special commitment. Demonstrating that Sri Lanka is a society that considers the wellbeing of all its citizens to be a priority will require not only financial assistance but also a motivated public service and proactive political leadership that reaches out to those still waiting to rebuild their lives.

 

by Jehan Perera

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Supporting Victims: The missing link in combating ragging

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A recent panel discussion at the University of Peradeniya examined the implications of the Supreme Court’s judgement on ragging, in which the Court recognised that preventing ragging requires not only criminal penalties imposed after an incident occurs but also systems and processes within universities that enable victims to speak up and receive support. Bringing together perspectives from law, university administration, psychology and students, the discussion sought to understand why ragging continues to persist in Sri Lankan universities despite the existence of legal prohibitions. While the discussion covered legal and institutional dimensions, one theme emerged clearly: addressing ragging requires more than laws and disciplinary rules. It requires institutions that are capable of supporting victims.

Sri Lanka enacted the Prohibition of Ragging and Other Forms of Violence in Educational Institutions Act No. 20 of 1998 following several tragic incidents in universities, during the 1990s. Among the most widely remembered is the death of engineering student S. Varapragash at the University of Peradeniya in 1997. Incidents such as this shocked the country and revealed the consequences of allowing violent forms of student hierarchy to persist. The 1998 Act marked an important legal intervention by recognising ragging as a criminal offence. The law introduced severe penalties for individuals found guilty of engaging in ragging or other forms of violence in educational institutions, including fines and imprisonment.

Despite the existence of this law for nearly three decades, prosecutions under the Act have been extremely rare. Incidents continue to surface across universities although most are not reported. The incidents that do reach university administrations are dealt with internally through disciplinary procedures rather than through the criminal justice system. This suggests that the problem does not lie solely in the absence of legal provisions but also in the ability of victims to come forward and pursue complaints.

The tragic reminders; the cases of Varapragash and Pasindu Hirushan

Varapragash, a first-year engineering student at the University of Peradeniya, was forced by senior students to perform extreme physical exercises as part of ragging, resulting in severe internal injuries and acute renal failure that ultimately led to his death. In 2022, the courts upheld the conviction of one of the perpetrators for abduction and murder. The case illustrates not only the brutality of ragging but also how long and difficult the path to justice can be for victims and their families. Even when victims speak about their experiences, they may not always disclose the full extent of what they have endured. In the case of Varapragash, the judgement records that the victim told his father that he was asked to do dips and sit-ups. Varapragash’s father had testified that it appeared his son was not revealing the exact details of what he had to endure due to shame.

More than two decades after the death of Varapragash, the tragedy of ragging continues. The 2025 Supreme Court judgement arose from the case of Pasindu Hirushan, a 21-year-old student of the University of Sri Jayewardenepura, who sustained devastating head injuries at a fresher’s party, in March 2020, after a tyre sent down the stairs by senior students struck him. He became immobile, was placed on life support, and returned home only months later. If the Varapragash case exposed the deadly consequences of ragging in the 1990s, the Pasindu Hirushan case demonstrates that universities are still failing to prevent serious violence, decades after the enactment of the 1998 Act. It was against this background of continuing institutional failure that the Supreme Court issued its Orders of Court in 2025. Among the key mechanisms emphasised by the judgement is the establishment of Victim Support Committees within universities.

Why do victims need support?

Ragging in universities can take many forms, including verbal humiliation, physical abuse, emotional intimidation and, in some instances, sexual harassment. While all forms of ragging can have serious consequences, incidents involving sexual harassment often present additional barriers for victims who wish to come forward. Victims may hesitate to complain due to weak institutional mechanisms, fear of retaliation, or uncertainty about whether their experiences will be taken seriously. In many cases, those who speak out are confronted with questions that shift attention away from the alleged misconduct and onto their own behaviour: why did s/he continue the conversation?; why did s/he not simply disengage, if the harassment occurred as claimed?; why did s/he remain in the environment?; or did his/her actions somehow encourage the accused’s behaviour? Such responses illustrate how easily victims can be subjected to a second layer of scrutiny when they attempt to report incidents. When individuals anticipate disbelief, minimisation or blame, silence may appear safer than disclosure. In such circumstances, the presence of a trusted institutional body, capable of providing guidance, protection and support, become critically important, highlighting the need for effective Victim Support Committees within universities.

What Victim Support Committees must do

As expected by the Supreme Court, an effective Victim Support Committee should function as a trusted institutional mechanism that places the safety and dignity of victims at the centre of its work. The committee must provide a safe and confidential point of contact through which victims can report incidents of ragging without fear of intimidation or retaliation. It should assist victims in understanding and pursuing available complaint procedures, while also ensuring their immediate protection where there is a risk of continued harassment. Recognising the psychological harm ragging may cause, the committee should facilitate access to counselling and emotional support services. At a practical level, it should also help victims document incidents, record statements, and preserve evidence that may be necessary for disciplinary or legal proceedings. The committee must coordinate with university authorities to ensure that complaints are addressed promptly and responsibly, while maintaining strict confidentiality to protect the identity and well-being of those who come forward. Beyond responding to individual cases, Victim Support Committees should also contribute to broader awareness and prevention efforts, within universities, helping to create an environment where ragging is actively discouraged and students feel safe to report incidents. Without such support, the process of pursuing justice can become overwhelming for individuals who are already dealing with the emotional impact of abuse.

Making Victim Support Committees work

According to the Orders of Court, these committees should include representatives from the academic and non-academic staff, a qualified counsellor and/or clinical psychologist, an independent person, from outside the institution, with experience in law enforcement, health, or social services, and not more than three final-year students, with unblemished academic and disciplinary records, appointed for fixed terms. Further, universities must ensure that committees consist of individuals who possess both expertise and genuine commitment in areas such as student welfare, psychology, gender studies, human rights and law enforcement, in line with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s directions, rather than consisting largely of ex officio positions. If treated as routine administrative positions, rather than responsibilities requiring specialised knowledge, sensitivity and empathy, these committees risk becoming symbolic rather than functional.

Greater transparency in the appointment process could strengthen the credibility of these committees. Universities could invite expressions of interest from individuals with relevant expertise and demonstrated commitment to supporting victims. Such an approach would help ensure that the committees benefit from the knowledge and dedication of those best equipped to fulfil this role.

The Supreme Court judgement also introduces an important safeguard by giving the University Grants Commission (UGC) the authority to appoint members to university-level Victim Support Committees. If exercised with integrity, this provision could help ensure that these committees operate with greater independence. It may also help address a challenge that sometimes arises within institutions, where individuals, with relevant expertise, or strong commitment to addressing issues, such as violence, harassment or student welfare, may not always be included in institutional mechanisms due to internal administrative preferences. External oversight by the UGC could, therefore, create opportunities for such individuals to contribute meaningfully to Victim Support Committees and strengthen their effectiveness.

Ultimately, the success of the recent judgement will depend not only on the directives it issued, the number of committees universities establish, or the number of meetings they convene, or other box-checking exercises, but on how sincerely those directives are implemented and the trust these committees inspire among students and staff. Laws can prohibit ragging, but they cannot by themselves create environments in which victims feel safe to speak. That responsibility lies with institutions. When universities create systems that listen to victims, support them and treat their experiences with seriousness, universities will become places where dignity and learning can coexist.

(Udari Abeyasinghe is attached to the Department of Oral Pathology at the University of Peradeniya)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

by Udari Abeyasinghe

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Big scene … in the Seychelles

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Mirage: Off to the Seychelles for fifth time

Several of our artistes do venture out on foreign assignments but, I’m told, most of their performances are mainly for the Sri Lankans based abroad.

However, the group Mirage is doing it differently and they are now in great demand in the Seychelles.

Guests patronising the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, in the Seychelles, is made up of a wide variety of nationalities, including Russians, Chinese, French and Germans, and they all enjoy the music dished out by Mirage, and that is precisely why they are off to the Seychelles … for the fifth time!

The band is scheduled to leave this month and will be back after three weeks, but their journey to the Seychelles will continue, with two more assignments lined up for 2026.

In August it’s a four-week contract, and in December another four-week contract that will take in the festive celebrations … Christmas and the New Year.

Donald’s birthday
celebrations

According to reports coming my way, it is a happening scene at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, whenever Mirage is featured, and the band has even adjusted its repertoire to include local and African songs.

They work three hours per day and six days per week at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant.

Donald Pieries:
Leader, vocalist,
drummer

Led by vocalist and drummer Donald Pieries, many say it is his

musical talents and leadership that have contributed to the band’s success.

Donald, who celebrated his birthday on 07 March, at the Irish Pub, has been with the group through various lineup changes and is known for his strong vocals.

He leads a very talented and versatile line up, with Sudham (bass/vocals), Gayan (lead guitar/vocals), Danu (female vocalist) and Toosha (keyboards/vocals).

Mirage performs regularly at venues like the Irish Pub in Colombo and also at Food Harbour, Port City.

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