Features
Premadasa Rex (1988-1993)
Despite unceasing violence in both north and south of the country, the second presidential election was scheduled to be held on December 19, 1988. Nominations were called for by November 10, 1988. All political parties were in a state of confusion due to the prevailing “reign of terror”. Many politicians of all parties had been summarily executed either by the LTTE or the JVP. With the announcement at a large party rally in Colombo by JRJ that Prime Minister Premadasa will take over as party leader and presidential candidate, former rivals had closed ranks with him and were eyeing the prime minister’s post which would be dispensed at the discretion of the new President.
Canny Premadasa let it be known that he would appoint the person who brought him the largest number of votes at the coming election. Opposition parties particularly the SLFP, MEP, minority parties and even the JVP, explored possibilities of fielding a common candidate against the UNP. That would have been possible if JRJ or Gamini became the candidate. But with the confirmation of Premadasa as the UNP’s presidential contender that effort failed and the SLFP was made to carry the brunt of the challenge to Premadasa.
The JVP then insisted on a boycott of the election and threatened to kill anyone who entered the contest. This was largely aimed at Mrs. Bandaranaike who became the choice of the SLFP. The JVP attempted to assassinate her. They also wrecked her first meeting held in Embilipitya which was well known as pro JVP territory. In the event Mrs. B was badly handicapped in her fight with Premadasa who also won over to his side Ossie Abeygunasekera – a brilliant speaker and the second in command at one time of Vijaya Kumaratunga. He was drafted to humiliate Mrs. B and gather all those votes which would have invariably gone to her if Premadasa was not in the running. The success of this strategy was clearly seen in the final results when Premadasa won by a whisker.
To say that is not to take anything away from the indomitable courage displayed by Premadasa as a campaigner. He completely sidelined JRJ and used emissaries like Rukman Senanayake to try and make peace with the JVP. In his manifesto he pledged to send the IPKF back to India which was the demand of both the JVP and LTTE. He told both those militant formations that he too was an “outsider” like them and unsubtly messaged that he was a member of a minority and a deprived caste just like the Karaiyas vis a vis the Vellalas in the north and the Karawe vis a vis the Goigama in the south. He had no hesitation in characterising his adversary as a “radala” – an epithet which had been flung at Mrs. B. by the conventional left [“Radala Ammandi”].
There were reports that the leadership of the JVP were divided on the possibility of a non-Bandaranaike “common candidate- like Dinesh Gunawardena. But that proposal had been vetoed by their strong University Students Federation which had greater freedom of movement than Wijeweera and the top leaders who were in hiding from the armed services. These leaders were unable to swiftly communicate their decisions to the negotiators who met at “Woodlands” under the presidency of Rukman Senanayake who reported directly to Premadasa on a regular basis.
The election was held on December 10 amidst unprecedented violence. 104 SLFP activists were killed according to author Malalgoda Bandutilleke. Many election officials and voters were killed because they disobeyed the JVP order to boycott the election. This led to an unprecedented low poll but it was sufficient to finalize the results and declare a winner – a stupendous achievement. The results of the Presidential election were as follows:
R Premadasa [UNP] – 2,569,199 [50.43 percent]
Sirimavo Bandaranaike [SLFP] – 2,289,860 [44.95 percent]
Ossie Abeygunasekera [SLMP] – 235,719 [4.63 percent]
Majority 227,339
It was clear that Premadasa had won a noteworthy victory and given the UNP a new lease of life. He had managed to clear the 50 percent barrier to avoid a runoff and his “nominee” Ossie had drawn off enough votes to ensure the defeat of Mrs. B. It was a good example of the thoroughness with which the new President undertook any task. As predicted by JRJ, Mrs. B did not come to the Elections Commissioner’s office to hear the result and congratulate the winner. She believed that she had been robbed of a victory and went to courts to challenge the verdict.
As usual this case dragged on and was dismissed by the Supreme Court after Premadasa’s tragic demise. This in reality was Mrs. B s final fling since she had to concede the party leadership to her daughter CBK, who won in 1994. It was her “last hurrah” and Premadasa whom she had reviled throughout his career had the last laugh.
Maligawa
JRJ with his pretensions to royalty had addressed the nation via radio from the “Pattirippuwa” of the Dalada Maligawa after taking the oaths of office in 1977. Premadasa decided to follow suit but as to be expected he gilded the lily by making it a family occasion. He took his wife, who by now had become a dominant influence on her husband, and their two children to the “Pattirippuwa” and addressed the nation via TV. Anura Goonasekera, the Director of Information who pointed out technical difficulties of such a broadcast had been summarily dismissed and his successor Guruge had cobbled together his Outside Broadcasting Unit [OBU] to ensure a live broadcast.
As mentioned in Volume One of my autobiography Anura never returned to public service after that debacle and died prematurely in Singapore at the age of 62. Knowing the value of having a favourite who would do his bidding in the media field the new President appointed AJ Ranasinghe as the State Minister in charge of the subject. The new State Minister made a public pronouncement that he was willing “even to eat a soup made out of his patrons sandals”. This culinary promise no doubt endeared him even more to Premadasa. The President then won over the Diyawadana Nilame, Neranjan Wijeratne, through patronage by way of providing vehicles, government bungalows and extra funding to win his loyalty.
Earlier he had as Minister of Housing provided a “Ran Viyana” or “Golden canopy” to the Maligawa. He later extended patronage to the senior monks of Asgiriya and Malwatta and became a popular and sought after leader by the Sangha thereby undercutting a traditional base of the SLFP. It was an achievement that JRJ neither desired nor attempted to gain. But Premadasa had no difficulty with the monks during the whole of his tenure. My brother in law SM Tennekone was the Government Agent of Kandy at that time and his fellow Rajan. and my Peradeniya contemporary, Gamini Gunawardene was the Superintendent of Police of Central Province. They were both favourites of the President and were his “eyes and ears”. He did not have much faith in the local politicians whom he looked upon as Gamini Dissanayake supporters. He also was in touch with some key mudalalis in town who would finance the monks when requested by him. He thus secured that flank as no UNP leader had done before or after. This was a significant achievement for the only UNP leader who did not belong to the majority caste.
General Election
The new President dissolved Parliament and fixed the general election for the new Parliament to be held on February 15, 1989. Nominations were fixed for a week ending on January 6. A short date was given so that the UNP could capitalize on Premadasa’s victory and the ensuing confusion among opposition parties. The opposition could not coalesce as they usually did into an electoral alliance, which added to the UNPs advantage. Premadasa skillfully prevented the minority parties forming an alliance with the opposition by bringing down the “cut off” point for selection to Parliament from 12.5 percent of votes polled to five percent. It opened the door for greater representation by minority parties. The country was to pay heavily for this opportunism later when all manner of parties, especially communal ones, began to enter the fray knowing that they could enter Parliament with a lesser number of votes.
The JVP intensified their terror tactics to intimidate both candidates and voters. Many candidates from all leading parties were killed during the campaign as well as a large number of village level officials, particularly grama sevakas, who were in charge of servicing polling stations and the state officials conducting the poll.
The results favoured the UNP although the PR system which was introduced for this election precluded a 1977 like sweep. Another feature of the new system was the emphasis on “block votes” be they caste, community, voter recognition or largeness of the electorate. Party seniors who had a district wide profile found it easier to get votes from the whole electoral district. Name recognition was the name of the game. Let us track the dimensions of the UNP victory by analyzing the aggregates of representatives in a few key districts:
Colombo; UNP 12, SLFP 6, MEP 2.
Gampaha; UNP 10, SLFP 6.
Kalutara; UNP 9, SLFP 5.
Kandy; UNP 8, SLFP 4.
Nuwara Eliya; UNP 5, SLFP 2.
Galle; UNP 7, SLFP 5.
Hambantota; UNP 5, SLFP 2.
Kurunegala; UNP 10, SLFP 5.
It was a clean sweep and a personal victory for the new President. He was so elated that he believed that no one would go against this mandate won for the party by him. Therefore he began aggressively to change the victorious party in his own anti-elitist image. He was mindful of the fact that he had earlier created a “de facto” party-the Puravesi Peramuna, with its own program of action. Several of the new MPs led by Gamini Fonseka had been leading lights in the Peramuna. In international affairs he had a contemptuous approach to India and the UK. All this hubris was to have serious consequences for him in a few years time.
An equally important result of the PR system was the allocation of a substantial number of seats to the opposition, particularly the SLFP, based on the number of votes polled. What would have been a rout under the first past the post system was avoided and nearly all the district leaders of the SLFP were returned to Parliament. Their numbers provided a launching pad for an impeachment motion as we shall see later.
However with a larger number of MPs the internal rivalries in the SLFP came into the open. The writ of Mrs. B was challenged by a group from within the party led by Anura Bandaranaike. A few like Stanley Tillekeratne were openly hostile and were not averse to compromises with Premadasa citing earlier discrimination against them by Mrs. B. The once powerful SLFP was imploding in the face of defeat and the election of a new President who was more anti-Bandaranaike than anti SLFP.
Cabinet
Having installed himself with pomp and glory the new President with characteristic speed then turned to man management. He set about appointing a Cabinet on February 18, 1989 and reshuffling his administrative staff, security services and the administrative service. I will say more about the Cabinet appointments in the next chapter. But it was clear that he wanted full control of the government apparatus before he tackled the many issues that he had highlighted in his manifesto.
As a sign of change and his desired unfettered loyalty he made the surprise selection of DB Wijetunga as the Prime Minister thereby thwarting the ambitions of Lalith and Gamini who had wholeheartedly supported him at the Presidential election. To gild the lily he had appointed Wijetunga as the Minister of Finance as well. But by appointing his favourite civil servant R Paskaralingam as the Secretary to the Treasury he signaled that he would use Wijetunga only as a cover for his own control of the Finance Ministry.
The second most important Cabinet appointment was that of Ranjan Wijeratne as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was entrusted with the negotiations with India to get the IPKF out of the country. He thereby not only hoped to satisfy the LTTE and the JVP but also give expression to his deep seated hostility to India led by the Gandhi family. Later we will analyze the exchange of letters between him and Rajiv Gandhi which in tone was both undiplomatic and offensive. Wijeratne was the king pin in the Presidents strategy to deal with the Indians as well as the LTTE and JVP.
Ranjan had proved himself to be a loyal supporter of Premadasa even to the extent of challenging his relative JRJ on the need to fully support the latter’s candidacy. However there were times when Pramadasa was suspicious of the actions of his Foreign Minister whom he suspected of consulting JRJ. He brought in Bradman Weerakoon to be his “eyes and ears”. At the same time he appointed his accomplice Bernard Tillekeratne as his Foreign Secretary. As the later writings of Indian High Commissioners to Colombo reveal they were often confused by the contradictory stances of the President and his advisors. For instance when Ranjan discussed a final date for the withdrawal of the IPKF which did not fit the President’s deadline he was about to be replaced as a former Indian High Commissioner Mehrotra discloses in his memoirs. After the departure of the IPKF, Premadasa reshuffled his cabinet and Ranjan was replaced by Harold Herath who was a novice in this field and would unhesitatingly carry out his boss’s orders.
With Sirisena Cooray at the helm of the UNP he was overconfident of his hold on his MPs and often humiliated them for their alleged lethargy. Some Cabinet Ministers told me that their weekly meetings were a nightmare. They were at the receiving end regularly of Premadasa’s abuse. It was a mistake that would come to haunt him later as we shall see in the next chapter.
Next week Lalith and Gamini
(Excerpted from vol. 3 of the Sarath Amunugama autobiography In The Political Arena (1992-2022)
“Kill me, but do not kill my good name”
President Premadasa ✍️
Features
Who Owns the Clock? The Quiet Politics of Time in Sri Lanka
(This is the 100th column of the Out of the Box series, which began on 6 September, 2023, at the invitation of this newspaper – Ed.)
A new year is an appropriate moment to pause, not for celebration, but to interrogate what our politics, policies, and public institutions have chosen to remember, forget, and repeat. We celebrate the dawn of another brand-new year. But whose calendar defines this moment?
We hang calendars on our walls and carry them in our phones, trusting them to keep our lives in order, meetings, exams, weddings, tax deadlines, pilgrimages. Yet calendars are anything but neutral. They are among humanity’s oldest instruments of power: tools that turn celestial rhythms into social rules and convert culture into governance. In Sri Lanka, where multiple traditions of time coexist, the calendar is not just a convenience, it is a contested terrain of identity, authority, and fairness.
Time is never just time
Every calendar expresses a political philosophy. Solar systems prioritise agricultural predictability and administrative stability; lunar systems preserve religious ritual even when seasons drift; lunisolar systems stitch both together, with intercalary months added to keep festivals in season while respecting the moon’s phases. Ancient India and China perfected this balancing act, proving that precision and meaning can coexist. Sri Lanka’s own rhythms, Vesak and Poson, Avurudu in April, Ramadan, Deepavali, sit inside this wider tradition.
What looks “technical” is actually social. A calendar decides when courts sit, when budgets reset, when harvests are planned, when children sit exams, when debts are due, and when communities celebrate. It says who gets to define “normal time,” and whose rhythms must adapt.
The colonial clock still ticks
Like many postcolonial societies, Sri Lanka inherited the Gregorian calendar as the default language of administration. January 1 is our “New Year” for financial statements, annual reports, contracts, fiscal plans, school terms, and parliamentary sittings, an imported date shaped by European liturgical cycles and temperate seasons rather than our monsoons or zodiac transitions. The lived heartbeat of the island, however, is Avurudu: tied to the sun’s movement into Mesha Rāshi, agricultural renewal, and shared rituals of restraint and generosity. The result is a quiet tension: the calendar of governance versus the calendar of lived culture.
This is not mere inconvenience; it is a subtle form of epistemic dominance. The administrative clock frames Gregorian time as “real,” while Sinhala, Tamil, and Islamic calendars are relegated to “cultural” exceptions. That framing shapes everything, from office leave norms to the pace at which development programmes expect communities to “comply”.
When calendars enforce authority
History reminds us that calendar reforms are rarely innocent. Julius Caesar’s reshaping of Rome’s calendar consolidated imperial power. Pope Gregory XIII’s reform aligned Christian ritual with solar accuracy while entrenching ecclesiastical authority. When Britain finally adopted the Gregorian system in 1752, the change erased 11 days and was imposed across its empire; colonial assemblies had little or no say. In that moment, time itself became a technology for governing distant subjects.
Sri Lanka knows this logic. The administrative layers built under colonial rule taught us to treat Gregorian dates as “official” and indigenous rhythms as “traditional.” Our contemporary fiscal deadlines, debt restructurings, even election cycles, now march to that imported drumbeat, often without asking how this timing sits with the island’s ecological and cultural cycles.
Development, deadlines and temporal violence
Modern governance is obsessed with deadlines: quarters, annual budgets, five-year plans, review missions. The assumption is that time is linear, uniform, and compressible. But a farmer in Anuradhapura and a rideshare driver in Colombo do not live in the same temporal reality. Monsoons, harvests, pilgrimage seasons, fasting cycles, school term transitions, these shape when people can comply with policy, pay taxes, attend trainings, or repay loans. When programmes ignore these rhythms, failure is framed as “noncompliance,” when in fact the calendar itself has misread society. This mismatch is a form of temporal violence: harm produced not by bad intentions, but by insensitive timing.
Consider microcredit repayment windows that peak during lean agricultural months, or school examinations scheduled without regard to Avurudu obligations. Disaster relief often runs on the donor’s quarterly clock rather than the community’s recovery pace. In each case, governance time disciplines lived time, and the least powerful bend the most.
Religious time vs administrative time
Sri Lanka’s plural religious landscape intensifies the calendar question. Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity relate to time differently: lunar cycles, solar markers, sacred anniversaries. The state acknowledges these mainly as public holidays, rather than integrating their deeper temporal logic into planning. Vesak is a day off, not a rhythm of reflection and restraint; Ramadan is accommodated as schedule disruption, not as a month that reorganises energy, sleep, and work patterns; Avurudu is celebrated culturally but remains administratively marginal. The hidden assumption is that “real work” happens on the Gregorian clock; culture is decorative. That assumption deserves challenge.
The wisdom in complexity
Precolonial South and East Asian calendars were not confused compromises. They were sophisticated integrations of astronomy, agriculture, and ritual life, adding intercalary months precisely to keep festivals aligned with the seasons, and using lunar mansions (nakshatra) to mark auspicious thresholds. This plural logic admits that societies live on multiple cycles at once. Administrative convenience won with the Gregorian system, but at a cost: months that no longer relate to the moon (even though “month” comes from “moon”), and a yearstart with no intrinsic astronomical significance for our context.
Towards temporal pluralism
The solution is not to abandon the Gregorian calendar. Global coordination, trade, aviation, science, requires shared reference points. But ‘shared’ does not mean uncritical. Sri Lanka can lead by modelling temporal pluralism: a policy posture that recognises different ways of organising time as legitimate, and integrates them thoughtfully into governance.
Why timing is justice
In an age of economic adjustment and climate volatility, time becomes a question of justice: Whose rhythms does the state respect? Whose deadlines dominate? Whose festivals shape planning, and whose are treated as interruptions? The more governance assumes a single, imported tempo, the wider the gap between the citizens and the state. Conversely, when policy listens to local calendars, legitimacy grows, as does efficacy. People comply more when the schedule makes sense in their lives.
Reclaiming time without romanticism
This is not nostalgia. It is a pragmatic recognition that societies live on multiple cycles: ecological, economic, ritual, familial. Good policy stitches these cycles into a workable fabric. Poor policy flattens them into a grid and then blames citizens for falling through the squares.
Sri Lanka’s temporal landscape, Avurudu’s thresholds, lunar fasts, monsoon pulses, exam seasons, budget cycles, is rich, not chaotic. The task before us is translation: making administrative time converse respectfully with cultural time. We don’t need to slow down; we need to sync differently.
The last word
When British subjects woke to find 11 days erased in 1752, they learned that time could be rearranged by distant power. Our lesson, centuries later, is the opposite: time can be rearranged by near power, by a state that chooses to listen.
Calendars shape memory, expectation, discipline, and hope. If Sri Lanka can reimagine the governance of time, without abandoning global coordination, we might recover something profound: a calendar that measures not just hours but meaning. That would be a reform worthy of our island’s wisdom.
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Medicinal drugs for Sri Lanka:The science of safety beyond rhetoric
The recent wave of pharmaceutical tragedies in Sri Lanka, as well as some others that have occurred regularly in the past, has exposed a terrifying reality: our medicine cabinets have become a frontline of risk and potential danger. In recent months, the silent sanctuary of Sri Lanka’s healthcare system has been shattered by a series of tragic, preventable deaths. The common denominator in these tragedies has been a failure in the most basic promise of medicine: that it will heal, not harm. This issue is entirely contrary to the immortal writings of the Father of Medicine, Hippocrates of the island of Kos, who wrote, “Primum non nocere,” which translates classically from Latin as “First do no harm.” The question of the safety of medicinal drugs is, at present, a real dilemma for those of us who, by virtue of our vocation, need to use them to help our patients.
For a nation that imports the vast majority of its medicinal drugs, largely from regional hubs like India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the promise of healing is only as strong as the laboratory that verifies these very same medicinal drugs. To prevent further problems, and even loss of lives, we must demand a world-class laboratory infrastructure that operates on science, not just sentiment. We desperately need a total overhaul of our pharmaceutical quality assurance architecture.
The detailed anatomy of a national drug testing facility is not merely a government office. It is a high-precision fortress. To meet international standards like ISO/IEC 17025 and World Health Organisation (WHO) Good Practices for Pharmaceutical Quality Control Laboratories, such a high-quality laboratory must be zoned into specialised units, each designed to catch a different type of failure.
* The Physicochemical Unit: This is where the chemical identity of a drug is confirmed. Using High-Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC) and Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry (GC-MS), scientists determine if a “500mg” tablet actually contains 500mg of the active ingredient or if it is filled with useless chalk.
* The Microbiology Suite: This is the most critical area for preventing “injection deaths.” It requires an ISO Class 5 Cleanroom: sterile environments where air is filtered to remove every microscopic particle. Here, technicians perform Sterility Testing to ensure no bacteria or fungi are present in medicines that have to be injected.
* The Instrumentation Wing: Modern testing requires Atomic Absorption Spectrometers to detect heavy metal contaminants (like lead or arsenic) and Stability Chambers to see how drugs react to Sri Lanka’s high humidity.
* The injectable drug contamination is a serious challenge. The most recent fatalities in our hospitals were linked to Intravenous (IV) preparations. When a drug is injected directly into the bloodstream, there is no margin for error. A proper national laboratory must conduct two non-negotiable tests:
* Bacterial Endotoxin Testing (BET): Even if a drug is “sterile” (all bacteria are dead), the dead bacteria leave behind toxic cell wall products called endotoxins. If injected, these residual compounds cause “Pyrogenic Reactions” with violent fevers, organ failure, and death. A functional lab must use the Limulus Amoebocyte Lysate (LAL) test to detect these toxins at the parts-per-billion level.
* Particulate Matter Analysis: Using laser obscuration, labs must verify that no microscopic shards of glass or plastic are floating in the vials. These can cause fatal blood clots or embolisms in the lungs.
It is absolutely vital to assess whether the medicine is available in the preparation in the prescribed amounts and whether it is active and is likely to work. This is Bioavailability. Sri Lanka’s heavy reliance on “generic” imports raises a critical question: Is the cheaper version from abroad as effective as the original, more expensive branded formulation? This is determined by Bioavailability (BA) and Bioequivalence (BE) studies.
A drug might have the right chemical formula, but if it does not dissolve properly in the stomach or reach the blood at the right speed, it is therapeutically useless. Bioavailability measures the rate and extent to which the active ingredient is absorbed into the bloodstream. If a cheaper generic drug is not “bioequivalent” to the original brand-named version, the patient is essentially taking a useless placebo. For patients with heart disease or epilepsy, even a 10% difference in bioavailability can lead to treatment failure. A proper national system must include a facility to conduct these studies, ensuring that every generic drug imported is a true “therapeutic equivalent” to the brand-named original.
As far as testing goes, the current testing philosophy is best described as Reactive, rather than Proactive. The current Sri Lankan system is “reactive”: we test a drug only after a patient has already suffered. This is a proven recipe for disaster. To protect the public, we must shift to a Proactive Surveillance Model of testing ALL drugs at many stages of their dispensing.
* Pre-Marketing Approval: No drug should reach a hospital shelf without “Batch Release” testing. Currently, we often accept the manufacturer’s own certificate of analysis, which is essentially like allowing students to grade their own examination answers.
* Random Post-Marketing Surveillance (PMS): Regulatory inspectors must have the power to walk into any rural pharmacy or state hospital, pick a box of medicine at random, and send it to the lab. This could even catch “substandard” drugs that may have degraded during shipping or storage in our tropical heat. PMS is the Final Safety Net. Even the best laboratories cannot catch every defect. Post-Marketing Surveillance is the ongoing monitoring of a drug’s safety after it has been released to the public. It clearly is the Gold Standard.
* Pharmacovigilance: A robust digital system where every “Adverse Drug Reaction” (ADR) is logged in a national database.
* Signal Detection: An example of this is if three hospitals in different provinces report a slight rash from the same batch of an antibiotic, the system should automatically “flag” that batch for immediate recall before a more severe, unfortunate event takes place.
* Testing for Contaminants: Beyond the active ingredients, we must test for excipient purity. In some global cases, cheaper “glycerin” used in syrups was contaminated with diethylene glycol, a deadly poison. A modern lab must have the technology to screen for these hidden killers.
When one considers the Human Element, Competence and Integrity, the very best equipment in the world is useless without the human capital to run it. A national lab would need the following:
* Highly Trained Pharmacologists and Microbiologists and all grades of staff who are compensated well enough to be immune to the “lobbying” of powerful external agencies.
* Digital Transparency: A database accessible to the public, where any citizen can enter a batch number from their medicine box and see the lab results.
Once a proper system is put in place, we need to assess as to how our facilities measure up against the WHO’s “Model Quality Assurance System.” That will ensure maintenance of internationally recognised standards. The confirmed unfavourable results of any testing procedure, if any, should lead to a very prompt “Blacklist” Initiative, which can be used to legally bar failing manufacturers from future tenders. Such an endeavour would help to keep all drug manufacturers and importers on their toes at all times.
This author believes that this article is based on the premise that the cost of silence by the medical profession would be catastrophic. Quality assurance of medicinal compounds is not an “extra” cost. It is a fundamental right of every Sri Lankan citizen, which is not at all subject to any kind of negotiation. Until our testing facilities match the sophistication of the manufacturers we buy from, we are not just importing medicine; we are importing potential risk.
The promises made by the powers-that-be to “update” the testing laboratories will remain as a rather familiar, unreliable, political theatre until we see a committed budget for mass spectrometry, cleanroom certifications, highly trained and committed staff and a fleet of independent inspectors. Quality control of therapeutic medicines is not a luxury; it is the price to be paid for a portal of entry into a civilised and intensively safe healthcare system. Every time we delay the construction of a comprehensive, proactive testing infrastructure, we are playing a game of Russian Roulette with the lives of our people.
The science is available, and the necessary technology exists. What is missing is the political will to put patient safety as the premier deciding criterion. The time for hollow rhetoric has passed, and the time for a scientifically fortified, transparent, and proactive regulatory mechanism is right now. The good health of all Sri Lankans, as well as even their lives, depend on it.
Dr B. J. C. Perera
MBBS(Cey), DCH(Cey), DCH(Eng), MD(Paediatrics), MRCP(UK), FRCP(Edin), FRCP(Lond), FRCPCH(UK), FSLCPaed, FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH(UK), Hony. FCGP(SL)
Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Joint Editor, Sri Lanka Journal of Child Health
Section Editor, Ceylon Medical Journal
Features
Rebuilding Sri Lanka Through Inclusive Governance
In the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah, the government has moved swiftly to establish a Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding Sri Lanka with a core committee to assess requirements, set priorities, allocate resources and raise and disburse funds. Public reaction, however, has focused on the committee’s problematic composition. All eleven committee members are men, and all non-government seats are held by business personalities with no known expertise in complex national development projects, disaster management and addressing the needs of vulnerable populations. They belong to the top echelon of Sri Lanka’s private sector which has been making extraordinary profits. The government has been urged by civil society groups to reconsider the role and purpose of this task force and reconstitute it to be more representative of the country and its multiple needs.
The group of high-powered businessmen initially appointed might greatly help mobilise funds from corporates and international donors, but this group may be ill equipped to determine priorities and oversee disbursement and spending. It would be necessary to separate fundraising, fund oversight and spending prioritisation, given the different capabilities and considerations required for each. International experience in post disaster recovery shows that inclusive and representative structures are more likely to produce outcomes that are equitable, efficient and publicly accepted. Civil society, for instance, brings knowledge rooted in communities, experience in working with vulnerable groups and a capacity to question assumptions that may otherwise go unchallenged.
A positive and important development is that the government has been responsive to these criticisms and has invited at least one civil society representative to join the Rebuilding Sri Lanka committee. This decision deserves to be taken seriously and responded to positively by civil society which needs to call for more representation rather than a single representative. Such a demand would reflect an understanding that rebuilding after a national disaster cannot be undertaken by the state and the business community alone. The inclusion of civil society will strengthen transparency and public confidence, particularly at a moment when trust in institutions remains fragile. While one appointment does not in itself ensure inclusive governance, it opens the door to a more participatory approach that needs to be expanded and institutionalised.
Costly Exclusions
Going down the road of history, the absence of inclusion in government policymaking has cost the country dearly. The exclusion of others, not of one’s own community or political party, started at the very dawn of Independence in 1948. The Father of the Nation, D S Senanayake, led his government to exclude the Malaiyaha Tamil community by depriving them of their citizenship rights. Eight years later, in 1956, the Oxford educated S W R D Bandaranaike effectively excluded the Tamil speaking people from the government by making Sinhala the sole official language. These early decisions normalised exclusion as a tool of governance rather than accommodation and paved the way for seven decades of political conflict and three decades of internal war.
Exclusion has also taken place virulently on a political party basis. Both of Sri Lanka’s post Independence constitutions were decided on by the government alone. The opposition political parties voted against the new constitutions of 1972 and 1977 because they had been excluded from participating in their design. The proposals they had made were not accepted. The basic law of the country was never forged by consensus. This legacy continues to shape adversarial politics and institutional fragility. The exclusion of other communities and political parties from decision making has led to frequent reversals of government policy. Whether in education or economic regulation or foreign policy, what one government has done the successor government has undone.
Sri Lanka’s poor performance in securing the foreign investment necessary for rapid economic growth can be attributed to this factor in the main. Policy instability is not simply an economic problem but a political one rooted in narrow ownership of power. In 2022, when the people went on to the streets to protest against the government and caused it to fall, they demanded system change in which their primary focus was corruption, which had reached very high levels both literally and figuratively. The focus on corruption, as being done by the government at present, has two beneficial impacts for the government. The first is that it ensures that a minimum of resources will be wasted so that the maximum may be used for the people’s welfare.
Second Benefit
The second benefit is that by focusing on the crime of corruption, the government can disable many leaders in the opposition. The more opposition leaders who are behind bars on charges of corruption, the less competition the government faces. Yet these gains do not substitute for the deeper requirement of inclusive governance. The present government seems to have identified corruption as the problem it will emphasise. However, reducing or eliminating corruption by itself is not going to lead to rapid economic development. Corruption is not the sole reason for the absence of economic growth. The most important factor in rapid economic growth is to have government policies that are not reversed every time a new government comes to power.
For Sri Lanka to make the transition to self-sustaining and rapid economic development, it is necessary that the economic policies followed today are not reversed tomorrow. The best way to ensure continuity of policy is to be inclusive in governance. Instead of excluding those in the opposition, the mainstream opposition in particular needs to be included. In terms of system change, the government has scored high with regard to corruption. There is a general feeling that corruption in the country is much reduced compared to the past. However, with regard to inclusion the government needs to demonstrate more commitment. This was evident in the initial choice of cabinet ministers, who were nearly all men from the majority ethnic community. Important committees it formed, including the Presidential Task Force for a Clean Sri Lanka and the Rebuilding Sri Lanka Task Force, also failed at first to reflect the diversity of the country.
In a multi ethnic and multi religious society like Sri Lanka, inclusivity is not merely symbolic. It is essential for addressing diverse perspectives and fostering mutual understanding. It is important to have members of the Tamil, Muslim and other minority communities, and women who are 52 percent of the population, appointed to important decision making bodies, especially those tasked with national recovery. Without such representation, the risk is that the very communities most affected by the crisis will remain unheard, and old grievances will be reproduced in new forms. The invitation extended to civil society to participate in the Rebuilding Sri Lanka Task Force is an important beginning. Whether it becomes a turning point will depend on whether the government chooses to make inclusion a principle of governance rather than treat it as a show of concession made under pressure.
by Jehan Perera
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