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New-Old Foreign Policy?

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by Dr Sarala Fernando

Foreign policy is usually defined in terms of the international promotion and protection of the country’s national interests which includes the projection of the country image abroad to attract aid, trade and investment cooperation. Today, with rising nationalism and in the backdrop of de-globalization, more than ever before, foreign policy-making is looking inward as seen most visibly in President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” campaign pledge. However, as practitioners can testify, “reliability” and “continuity” are also hallmarks of a robust foreign policy. This is why the style of “disruption”, familiar in business strategy and characteristic of Mr Trump, does not sit well with traditional diplomacy and has caused consternation and criticism of the US, not least from long time partners like Canada and the EU.

Yet to be fair to Mr Trump, he is carrying out his election pledges, building the controversial wall on the border with Mexico, re-negotiating or taking the US out of multilateral agreements which were considered unfavourable to US interests whether on trade or climate change, stopping funding of UN organizations (like WHO) whose operational behavior was considered inimical to US interests, finding a “permanent” solution to the Middle East question including by moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, working towards bringing American soldiers back home from old theatres of war like the Korean peninsular and Afghanistan etc. Despite the criticism from home and abroad, President Trump has persisted in his roller coaster course, probably propelled by the need to cultivate his main constituent voting blocs before the November Presidential election, ignoring the calls for global accommodation.

In this background, it is perhaps not surprising that on the heels of resounding election results, reversals on foreign policy appear to be also taking place in Sri Lanka. However the problem is that before the elections, there had been a general consensus among all the political parties as to the value of Sri Lanka’s traditional non-aligned foreign policy. President Gotabaya’s visionary speech at Ruwanvelisaya had moreover outlined a policy of “neutrality” to avoid being sucked into power rivalry, friendship- with- all in the expectation of reciprocal respect for our sovereignty (mutuality principle) and open to the need for international cooperation including with the UN on the SDGs . This speech should be made available on the Foreign Ministry website as it sets out important foreign policy objectives.

In that context, eyebrows were raised in Sri Lanka when newly appointed Foreign Secretary Admiral Professor Jayanath Colombage in the course of his first press interviews referred to Sri Lanka’s new strategic security policy as having an “India first” approach while adding that Colombo would remain open to dealing with other key players for “economic development”. Speculation is rife whether this means a departure from non-alignment which traditionally includes such provisions as non- participation in foreign military pacts, non- stationing of military bases and foreign troops on its soil etc. With Maldives recently entering into a security pact with the US, the question many are asking is whether the ‘new policy’ pronouncement by Foreign Secretary Colombage is a precursor to Sri Lanka signing the pending security and development agreements with the US (ACSA, SOFA and MCC) which had become so controversial in the eyes of the public. This speculation is also linked to the recent signing by the Maldives of a security pact with the US. It is said that India had been supportive of this new development despite some press commentary in India about the “crowding” of security interests in the Indian Ocean. India has lately become a major source of funds for the Maldives, thereby countering the early Chinese influence.

To give the affable Foreign Secretary his due, perhaps the phrase “putting India first” was just awkward, suggesting a courteous “kowtow” to a big neighbour, intended to reassure India that its security concerns would be addressed on a priority basis. However, with regard to the well known Indian complaint of Chinese submarines arriving in Sri Lanka unannounced, could these concerns have been better addressed by enacting a transparent and clear policy on port calls as suggested by former Foreign Secretary Palihakkara?

The central problem here is that for many years Sri Lanka’s bilateral relations with India have been characterized as driven more by competition than by cooperation on a gamut of issues such that people are just plain distrustful of our giant neighbour. Soon after independence there were the issues of illicit immigration and contraband smuggling from India, the settling of the maritime border, the disputed sovereignty over Kachchativu and citizenship for the indentured labour from India. In the last three matters, bilateral diplomatic negotiations, complex and lengthy were eventually brought to conclusion, with India being persuaded to move on some of the more difficult points of contention such as its initial refusal to take back any of its citizens. I will not touch on the troubled relationship during the conflict years which my colleague John Gooneratne has amply documented in his book as the “Decade of Confrontation”. While the bilateral relationship can be managed, for better or worse, there remains the need to accept that, looking back on the diplomatic history, more often than not, respective national interests have diverged, so that careful identification of our national interests and building domestic public support for foreign policy changes, becomes key.

Centre-State politics have complicated India’s relations with its neighbours as pointed out by many academics and some commentators have argued that, of late, bilateral relations have deteriorated over new legislation brought in by the Modi government altering the status of Jammu and Kashmir, thereby affecting Pakistan, imposing restrictions affecting the residence status of those from neighboring states such as Bangladesh and developments on defining of the border affecting Nepal. But the Modi government has the strength of its parliamentary majority in Delhi which enables it to divorce foreign policy-making from centre-state politics. Perhaps this is why India has recently been able to offer Sri Lanka not only military training but also arms and equipment, judging by press reports on the prospects for increased bilateral security cooperation.

This leaves observers wondering whether Foreign Secretary Colombage’s “kowtow” had domestic political undertones and was intended to soften India’s stance with regard to the current campaign in Sri Lanka to amend the 13th Amendment? However India has always reiterated in its official statements the call for a full implementation of 13A which arose out of the 1987 Indo- Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka.

 

On this matter, it should be remembered that India drives a hard bargain in respect of bilateral relations with its neighbours and it is difficult to see how they will retreat from the 1987 Agreement which has been interpreted as imposing a “lock” on Sri Lanka’s security policy and the use of its ports through the “secret” Annexures. One does not talk much today of these Annexures because they reflect India’s anxiety at the time over the US presence and its military bases in the Indian Ocean, which position has been totally reversed in the current era with India and the US becoming strategic security partners.

There has also been recent references in Sri Lanka to the 1971 Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace proposal made by Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike to the UN. However, this proposal has a historic context being linked to the expulsion of the indigenous inhabitants of Diego Garcia to make way for an American naval base. The IOPZ initiative eventually lost steam in the UN coming up against the doctrines of freedom of navigation on the high seas for all ships guaranteed by the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention. In Sri Lanka too there was opposition by those who argued that IOPZ was designed to keep extra- regional naval powers out of the Indian Ocean, and would have the effect of leaving room for regional powers to hold sway, at least two of them holding nuclear weapons. A different situation existed in South East Asia where ZOPFAN or Nuclear Free Zone of Peace worked as a confidence building measure for mutual security among members of ASEAN precisely because none of the ASEAN countries held nuclear weapons.

There is also difficulty in accepting Foreign Secretary Colombage’s view that there could be a separation between security and economic interests in developing bilateral relations with nations. India finally moved towards liberalizing its economy in the early 1990’s and since then it has been possible to build synergies with Sri Lanka, as seen in the ISLFTA and increased investment etc. However, looking back at the time of the armed conflict, which country helped us with our security needs, from planes to arms, ammunition and equipment ? Which “old friend” stood with us at the UN ready to help us even in the Security Council if need should arise when human rights attacks inspired by elements of the Tamil diaspora, were launched by the West over the conduct of the war? Can we forget the lessons of history while moving forward the “new” on the “old” security policy?

With much talk today of the impending new Cold War and the looming conflict between the US and China, priority should instead be given to carefully balance both bilateral relationships and avoid any impression of “taking sides”. In this background, there has been some speculation about the new diplomatic appointments to India and China. On the one hand, a former Minister, close to President Gotabaya, with strong personal connections to the US, given Cabinet rank ( a first in Sri Lanka) and posted to New Delhi as opposed to a charming light-weight to Beijing, whose appointment as Foreign Secretary broke the string of professional appointments from within the Foreign Service. While Delhi may be pleased to see the new appointment as a downgrading of the Sri Lanka- China relationship, what would be the reaction in Beijing?

( –  re ref to Palitha Kohona as reputed to have been a representative for a Chinese  company – I just thought it sounds “catty” . Although I saw this info in various press articles previously before the appointment was announced, in the present context it seems to have been wiped out of the cv etc on the net so best leave it out.

(Sarala Fernando PhD, retired from the Foreign Ministry as Additional Secretary and her last Ambassadorial appointment was as Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva. She writes now on foreign affairs, diplomacy and protection of heritage).


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Features

Relief without recovery

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A US airstrike on an Iranian oil storage facility

The escalating conflict in the Middle East is of such magnitude, with loss of life, destruction of cities, and global energy shortages, that it is diverting attention worldwide and in Sri Lanka, from other serious problems. Barely four months ago Sri Lanka experienced a cyclone of epic proportions that caused torrential rains, accompanied by floods and landslides. The immediate displacement exceeded one million people, though the number of deaths was about 640, with around 200 others reported missing. The visual images of entire towns and villages being inundated, with some swept away by floodwaters, evoked an overwhelming humanitarian response from the general population.

When the crisis of displacement was at its height there was a concerted public response. People set up emergency kitchens and volunteer clean up teams fanned out to make flooded homes inhabitable again. Religious institutions, civil society organisations and local communities worked together to assist the displaced. For a brief period the country witnessed a powerful demonstration of social solidarity. The scale of the devastation prompted the government to offer generous aid packages. These included assistance for the rebuilding of damaged houses, support for building new houses, grants for clean up operations and rent payments to displaced families. Welfare centres were also set up for those unable to find temporary housing.

The government also appointed a Presidential Task Force to lead post-cyclone rebuilding efforts. The mandate of the Task Force is to coordinate post-disaster response mechanisms, streamline institutional efforts and ensure the effective implementation of rebuilding programmes in the aftermath of the cyclone. The body comprises a high-level team, led by the Prime Minister, and including cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, provincial-level officials, senior public servants, representing key state institutions, and civil society representatives. It was envisaged that the Task Force would function as the central coordinating authority, working with government agencies and other stakeholders to accelerate recovery initiatives and restore essential services in affected regions.

Demotivated Service

However, four months later a visit to one of the worst of the cyclone affected areas to meet with affected families from five villages revealed that they remained stranded and in a state of limbo. Most of these people had suffered terribly from the cyclone. Some had lost their homes. A few had lost family members. Many had been informed that the land on which they lived had become unsafe and that they would need to relocate. Most of them had received the promised money for clean up and some had received rent payments for two months. However, little had happened beyond this. The longer term process of rebuilding houses, securing land and restoring livelihoods has barely begun. As a result, families who had already endured the trauma of disaster, now face prolonged uncertainty about their future. It seems that once again the promises made by the political leadership has not reached the ground.

A government officer explained that the public service was highly demotivated. According to him, many officials felt that they had too much work piled upon them with too little resources to do much about it. They also believed that they were underpaid for the work they were expected to carry out. In fact, there had even been a call by public officials specially assigned to cyclone relief work to go on strike due to complaints about their conditions of work. This government official appreciated the government leadership’s commitment to non corruption. But he noted the irony that this had also contributed to a demotivation of the public service. This was on the unjustifiable basis that approving and implementing projects more quickly requires an incentive system.

Whether or not this explanation fully captures the situation, it points to an issue that the government needs to address. Disaster recovery requires a proactive public administration. Officials need to reach out to affected communities, provide clear information and help them navigate the complex procedures required to access assistance. At the consultation with cyclone victims this was precisely the concern that people raised. They said that government officers were not proactive in reaching out to them. Many felt they had little engagement with the state and that the government officers did not come to them. This suggests that the government system at the community level could be supported by non-governmental organisations that have the capacity and experience of working with communities at the grassroots.

In situations such as this the government needs to think about ways of motivating public officials to do more rather than less. It needs to identify legitimate incentives that reward initiative and performance. These could include special allowances for those working in disaster affected areas, recognition and promotion for officers who successfully complete relief and reconstruction work, and the provision of additional staff and logistical support so that the workload is manageable. Clear targets and deadlines, with support from the non-governmental sector, can also encourage officials to act more proactively. When government officers feel supported and recognised for the extra effort required, they are more likely to engage actively with affected communities and ensure that assistance reaches those who need it most.

Political Solutions

Under the prevailing circumstances, however, the cyclone victims do not know what to do. The government needs to act on this without further delay. Government policy states that families can receive financial assistance of up to Rs 5 million to build new houses if they have identified the land on which they wish to build. But there is little freehold land available in many of the affected areas. As a result, people cannot show government officials the land they plan to buy and, therefore, cannot access the government’s promised funds. The government needs to address this issue by providing a list of available places for resettlement, both within and outside the area they live in. However, another finding at the meeting was that many cyclone victims whose lands have been declared unsafe do not wish to leave them. Even those who have been told that their land is unstable feel more comfortable remaining where they have lived for many years. Relocating to an unfamiliar area is not an easy decision.

Another problem the victims face is the difficulty of obtaining the documents necessary to receive compensation. Families with missing members cannot prove that their loved ones are no longer alive. Without official confirmation they cannot access property rights or benefits that would normally pass to surviving family members. These are problems that Sri Lanka has faced before in the context of the three decade long internal war. It has set up new legal mechanisms such as the provision of certificates of absence validated by the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) in place of death certificates when individuals remain missing for long periods. The government also needs to be sensitive to the fact that people who are farmers cannot be settled anywhere. Farming is not possible in every location. Access to suitable land and water is essential if farmers are to rebuild their livelihoods. Relocation programmes that fail to take these realities into account risk creating new psychological and economic hardships.

The message from the consultation with cyclone victims is that the government needs to talk more and engage more directly with affected communities. At the same time the political leadership at the highest levels need to resolve the problems that government officers on the ground cannot solve. Issues relating to land availability, legal documentation and livelihood restoration require policy decisions at higher levels. The challenge to the government to address these issues in the context of the Iran war and possible global catastrophe will require a special commitment. Demonstrating that Sri Lanka is a society that considers the wellbeing of all its citizens to be a priority will require not only financial assistance but also a motivated public service and proactive political leadership that reaches out to those still waiting to rebuild their lives.

 

by Jehan Perera

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Supporting Victims: The missing link in combating ragging

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A recent panel discussion at the University of Peradeniya examined the implications of the Supreme Court’s judgement on ragging, in which the Court recognised that preventing ragging requires not only criminal penalties imposed after an incident occurs but also systems and processes within universities that enable victims to speak up and receive support. Bringing together perspectives from law, university administration, psychology and students, the discussion sought to understand why ragging continues to persist in Sri Lankan universities despite the existence of legal prohibitions. While the discussion covered legal and institutional dimensions, one theme emerged clearly: addressing ragging requires more than laws and disciplinary rules. It requires institutions that are capable of supporting victims.

Sri Lanka enacted the Prohibition of Ragging and Other Forms of Violence in Educational Institutions Act No. 20 of 1998 following several tragic incidents in universities, during the 1990s. Among the most widely remembered is the death of engineering student S. Varapragash at the University of Peradeniya in 1997. Incidents such as this shocked the country and revealed the consequences of allowing violent forms of student hierarchy to persist. The 1998 Act marked an important legal intervention by recognising ragging as a criminal offence. The law introduced severe penalties for individuals found guilty of engaging in ragging or other forms of violence in educational institutions, including fines and imprisonment.

Despite the existence of this law for nearly three decades, prosecutions under the Act have been extremely rare. Incidents continue to surface across universities although most are not reported. The incidents that do reach university administrations are dealt with internally through disciplinary procedures rather than through the criminal justice system. This suggests that the problem does not lie solely in the absence of legal provisions but also in the ability of victims to come forward and pursue complaints.

The tragic reminders; the cases of Varapragash and Pasindu Hirushan

Varapragash, a first-year engineering student at the University of Peradeniya, was forced by senior students to perform extreme physical exercises as part of ragging, resulting in severe internal injuries and acute renal failure that ultimately led to his death. In 2022, the courts upheld the conviction of one of the perpetrators for abduction and murder. The case illustrates not only the brutality of ragging but also how long and difficult the path to justice can be for victims and their families. Even when victims speak about their experiences, they may not always disclose the full extent of what they have endured. In the case of Varapragash, the judgement records that the victim told his father that he was asked to do dips and sit-ups. Varapragash’s father had testified that it appeared his son was not revealing the exact details of what he had to endure due to shame.

More than two decades after the death of Varapragash, the tragedy of ragging continues. The 2025 Supreme Court judgement arose from the case of Pasindu Hirushan, a 21-year-old student of the University of Sri Jayewardenepura, who sustained devastating head injuries at a fresher’s party, in March 2020, after a tyre sent down the stairs by senior students struck him. He became immobile, was placed on life support, and returned home only months later. If the Varapragash case exposed the deadly consequences of ragging in the 1990s, the Pasindu Hirushan case demonstrates that universities are still failing to prevent serious violence, decades after the enactment of the 1998 Act. It was against this background of continuing institutional failure that the Supreme Court issued its Orders of Court in 2025. Among the key mechanisms emphasised by the judgement is the establishment of Victim Support Committees within universities.

Why do victims need support?

Ragging in universities can take many forms, including verbal humiliation, physical abuse, emotional intimidation and, in some instances, sexual harassment. While all forms of ragging can have serious consequences, incidents involving sexual harassment often present additional barriers for victims who wish to come forward. Victims may hesitate to complain due to weak institutional mechanisms, fear of retaliation, or uncertainty about whether their experiences will be taken seriously. In many cases, those who speak out are confronted with questions that shift attention away from the alleged misconduct and onto their own behaviour: why did s/he continue the conversation?; why did s/he not simply disengage, if the harassment occurred as claimed?; why did s/he remain in the environment?; or did his/her actions somehow encourage the accused’s behaviour? Such responses illustrate how easily victims can be subjected to a second layer of scrutiny when they attempt to report incidents. When individuals anticipate disbelief, minimisation or blame, silence may appear safer than disclosure. In such circumstances, the presence of a trusted institutional body, capable of providing guidance, protection and support, become critically important, highlighting the need for effective Victim Support Committees within universities.

What Victim Support Committees must do

As expected by the Supreme Court, an effective Victim Support Committee should function as a trusted institutional mechanism that places the safety and dignity of victims at the centre of its work. The committee must provide a safe and confidential point of contact through which victims can report incidents of ragging without fear of intimidation or retaliation. It should assist victims in understanding and pursuing available complaint procedures, while also ensuring their immediate protection where there is a risk of continued harassment. Recognising the psychological harm ragging may cause, the committee should facilitate access to counselling and emotional support services. At a practical level, it should also help victims document incidents, record statements, and preserve evidence that may be necessary for disciplinary or legal proceedings. The committee must coordinate with university authorities to ensure that complaints are addressed promptly and responsibly, while maintaining strict confidentiality to protect the identity and well-being of those who come forward. Beyond responding to individual cases, Victim Support Committees should also contribute to broader awareness and prevention efforts, within universities, helping to create an environment where ragging is actively discouraged and students feel safe to report incidents. Without such support, the process of pursuing justice can become overwhelming for individuals who are already dealing with the emotional impact of abuse.

Making Victim Support Committees work

According to the Orders of Court, these committees should include representatives from the academic and non-academic staff, a qualified counsellor and/or clinical psychologist, an independent person, from outside the institution, with experience in law enforcement, health, or social services, and not more than three final-year students, with unblemished academic and disciplinary records, appointed for fixed terms. Further, universities must ensure that committees consist of individuals who possess both expertise and genuine commitment in areas such as student welfare, psychology, gender studies, human rights and law enforcement, in line with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s directions, rather than consisting largely of ex officio positions. If treated as routine administrative positions, rather than responsibilities requiring specialised knowledge, sensitivity and empathy, these committees risk becoming symbolic rather than functional.

Greater transparency in the appointment process could strengthen the credibility of these committees. Universities could invite expressions of interest from individuals with relevant expertise and demonstrated commitment to supporting victims. Such an approach would help ensure that the committees benefit from the knowledge and dedication of those best equipped to fulfil this role.

The Supreme Court judgement also introduces an important safeguard by giving the University Grants Commission (UGC) the authority to appoint members to university-level Victim Support Committees. If exercised with integrity, this provision could help ensure that these committees operate with greater independence. It may also help address a challenge that sometimes arises within institutions, where individuals, with relevant expertise, or strong commitment to addressing issues, such as violence, harassment or student welfare, may not always be included in institutional mechanisms due to internal administrative preferences. External oversight by the UGC could, therefore, create opportunities for such individuals to contribute meaningfully to Victim Support Committees and strengthen their effectiveness.

Ultimately, the success of the recent judgement will depend not only on the directives it issued, the number of committees universities establish, or the number of meetings they convene, or other box-checking exercises, but on how sincerely those directives are implemented and the trust these committees inspire among students and staff. Laws can prohibit ragging, but they cannot by themselves create environments in which victims feel safe to speak. That responsibility lies with institutions. When universities create systems that listen to victims, support them and treat their experiences with seriousness, universities will become places where dignity and learning can coexist.

(Udari Abeyasinghe is attached to the Department of Oral Pathology at the University of Peradeniya)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

by Udari Abeyasinghe

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Features

Big scene … in the Seychelles

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Mirage: Off to the Seychelles for fifth time

Several of our artistes do venture out on foreign assignments but, I’m told, most of their performances are mainly for the Sri Lankans based abroad.

However, the group Mirage is doing it differently and they are now in great demand in the Seychelles.

Guests patronising the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, in the Seychelles, is made up of a wide variety of nationalities, including Russians, Chinese, French and Germans, and they all enjoy the music dished out by Mirage, and that is precisely why they are off to the Seychelles … for the fifth time!

The band is scheduled to leave this month and will be back after three weeks, but their journey to the Seychelles will continue, with two more assignments lined up for 2026.

In August it’s a four-week contract, and in December another four-week contract that will take in the festive celebrations … Christmas and the New Year.

Donald’s birthday
celebrations

According to reports coming my way, it is a happening scene at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, whenever Mirage is featured, and the band has even adjusted its repertoire to include local and African songs.

They work three hours per day and six days per week at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant.

Donald Pieries:
Leader, vocalist,
drummer

Led by vocalist and drummer Donald Pieries, many say it is his

musical talents and leadership that have contributed to the band’s success.

Donald, who celebrated his birthday on 07 March, at the Irish Pub, has been with the group through various lineup changes and is known for his strong vocals.

He leads a very talented and versatile line up, with Sudham (bass/vocals), Gayan (lead guitar/vocals), Danu (female vocalist) and Toosha (keyboards/vocals).

Mirage performs regularly at venues like the Irish Pub in Colombo and also at Food Harbour, Port City.

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