Features
Minister Athulathmudali’s skill and application at the Ministry of Agriculture
The Department of Agriculture was one of the few government departments that functioned away from Colombo. It was located in Peradeniya. It was one of the largest departments of government with a staff of something like 15,000. The Department of Minor Export Crops was also located in Peradeniya. So was the Department of Animal Production and Health. We were perhaps the Ministry with the largest number of departments located out of Colombo. Minister Athulathmudali was keen to visit these departments. He was also deeply interested in personally inspecting and spending time in the large agricultural infrastructure situated at Gannoruwa, Peradeniya.
These included the department’s test fields, on which various crops were being tried out on a field trial basis; The Soya Bean Research Centre; the Food Technology Centre; the Central Agricultural Research Institute; the Plant Genetic Resource Centre and others. Close by were the Veterinary Research Centre and the University of Peradeniya’s Faculty of Agriculture and the Faculty of Veterinary Science. The whole area was a very large, and almost contiguous agricultural and veterinary science complex.
Catching a week-end, we spent three days at meetings and briefings at these complexes, and visits to the Departments of Agriculture and Minor Exports. The Minister was unhappy at the appellation “Minor Exports.” His view was that this name was somewhat demoralizing and had connotations of activities that were unimportant. He thought that crops such as coffee, cocoa, cardamoms, cloves, etc., should be developed as major exports. Later he legislated to change the name to the Department of Export Agriculture.
In the course of our inspections we also visited the Peradeniya Botanical Gardens, the maintenance and running of which came under the Department of Agriculture. These meetings and field visits with Scientists, Researchers, Trainers and Administrators were most useful. It formed part of the on going dialogue that the Minister had initiated. It was for us a very enriching extended seminar during which we learned rapidly, as well as making a contribution by now, from our own accumulated stock of experience.
I wish to provide just one example to demonstrate the kind of questions that were discussed at our regular meetings with scientists and researchers. For instance, one question posed to them was why Sri Lanka’s productivity in paddy had plateaued and stagnated at around 3.6 tons per hectare. The Minister had figures of a number of Asian countries, some of whom had obtained much higher yields. The scientists were challenged, and a lively discussion ensued. Reasons given by them such as climatic and soil conditions were in turn challenged or questioned, and so the discussions went on.
One could feel that the scientists in turn enjoyed the challenge. Some of them undertook to take a fresh look at their research positions. Everyone knew that the ultimate objective was not lively debate or intellectual exercise, but discovering ways and means of obtaining greater yields from the same existing extents of land.
Agricultural Productivity Villages
During the course of these discussions many valuable ideas surfaced. These led to much thought on some of the important aspects pertaining to the field of agriculture. From this process arose the Minister’s initiative to organize Agricultural Productivity Villages. This idea was very close to the Minister’s concept of Export Production Villages which he organized when he was the Minister of Trade and Shipping. Through an integrated package of services and skills development, people of these villages were put to work producing various hand-made, and where appropriate, machine made articles of high quality for export. Boxes, cartons, and other types of objects were produced in these villages, which increased employment and income.
Based on the experience gained from many discussions as well, the Minister slightly modified this idea in its application to agriculture. He first wanted to try out things on a pilot basis. He personally inspected a number of villages and selected one in Kotmale for the production of treacle from the Kitul tree. He first ensured there was a market. He discussed with and selected a reputable private sector organization who would purchase the entire salable production. Quality standards were laid down, not only in relation to the product itself, but also in relation to bottling, labeling and so on.
The Minister had only one standard or benchmark. The product had to meet international standards and be marketable anywhere in the world. The product may be from a remote village. But its overall quality standard had to be international. There was no settling for less. The Minister believed that our villagers, with experience and if necessary, a little training Could meet those standards. The private sector purchaser was to also provide any necessary training or skills upgrading.
This was not all. The Minister’s concept had also a compulsory village development component. These included soil conservation; the planting of various types of trees in a scientific manner; looking after water resources; basic hygiene; home gardens; and investment advice and saving. It was a total integrated package to uplift that village. The resources, material, human and intellectual of the Ministry and it’s departments as well as the private sector were to be used for this purpose.
A few months later, we saw the first products of this enterprise. They were stunning. When you looked at a bottle of treacle produced under the scheme, you would have thought that it was imported from some supermarket in a developed country. The bottle, the label, and the eye-catching contents inside, vindicated the confidence the Minister had placed in the intelligence and ability of the villagers of Sri Lanka. This success led to the selection of a few more villages to produce different products. The Minister was keen to get some Japanese volunteers to work in these villages. He thought that this would inculcate more discipline and improve the work ethic. The Minister himself was up before 5 a.m. and worked very hard till he went to bed.
He saw no other way for Sri Lanka to progress except through hard work. Unfortunately, his tenure as Minister of Agriculture, Food and Co-operatives was to be a brief one of 13 months. Five years would have made a big difference. It was not to be, and many of his initiatives were not later followed up.
In the meantime, my own work and responsibilities were expanding. As usually is the case, I had to handle many other responsibilities, in addition to being Secretary to the Ministry.
They Included such things as being Chairman of the Board of the Agriculture Research and Training Institute (ARTI); the Chairman of the Council on Agriculture Research Policy; and being a member of a Secretaries Sub Committee on vetting overall public expenditure. Sitting on or chairing Cabinet appointed tender boards was often an unpleasant duty, in a climate where many tenderers who had quoted were convinced or pretended to be convinced that the tender should be awarded to them. Some of them attempted to exert pressure by going to the politically powerful.
There was even an occasion where Minister Athulathmudali disagreed with me and the Tender Board on a fertilizer tender, where we had ruled out a party, who may have stood a chance of winning the tender. The Minister being a lawyer interpreted certain conditions and responses differently to us. But we who had had long experience of sitting on scores of different tender boards found ourselves unable to agree with him. In the end, the Minister recommended our decision to Cabinet with certain caveats.
The Cabinet whilst drawing our attention to the Minister’s comments, approved our decision. It was not pleasant to have a major disagreement with your Minister, and then to find that the Cabinet had agreed with your views and not the Minister’s. But if you felt strongly enough that you were right, you had to go through with it. Mr. Athulathmudali was big enough not to let this kind of thing spoil good working relationships.
Presidential Mobile Service – Ampara
On July 14, 1989, we flew to Ampara by Air Force aircraft to attend the Presidential Mobile Service. Before departure from Ratmalana, all of us had to sign a form indemnifying the Air Force in case of death, injury, etc. We called it signing the “Death warrant.” Sometimes when the weather got bumpy and we tossed around, we wondered whether the time for the execution of the “warrant” had arrived.
At Ampara, I was put up at the Hingurana Sugar Corporation bungalow. Since sugar was also a subject under our Ministry, and Hingurana came under us, I was treated very well. They had taken trouble to make the bungalow habitable and the food palatable. Although this area was considered safe enough, we were still apprehensive of “Tigers.” In the end we had to be preoccupied with some mosquitoes, which was much the preferable alternative.
For two full days we attended to public representations, questions, appeals and even some criticisms. So did Ministers, Secretaries and officials of other Ministries. I personally had the satisfaction of attending to a number of matters, important to people who were poor. Some of them were unaware of existing government benefits, whilst others who were aware did not quite know how to access these benefits.
Some problems clearly needed addressing by more than one Ministry. There were instances, where I personally accompanied the party concerned to where the other relevant Ministry was located on the grounds, spoke to the Secretary and resolved that part of the problem. An instance I recall vividly was accompanying an obviously malnourished pregnant mother trailing along a malnourished child to where the Ministry of Health was situated, speaking to the Secretary Dr. Joe Fernando, who was instantly concerned, and arranging for them to get nutritious food supplements and other benefits on a regular basis. The Presidential Mobile Service widened our experience of the problems faced by people in rural Sri Lanka in particular. We saw and tried to grapple with problems we never saw in Colombo.
Meetings with Provincial Ministers of Agriculture
As part of the Minister’s policy of ensuring effective communication throughout the entire system and his desire to share information, discuss issues and reach conclusions, he initiated the practice of holding regular meetings with the Provincial Ministers of Agriculture. These meetings were based on a carefully thought out agenda. It so happened that many of the Agriculture Ministers were also Chief Ministers of their Province. Therefore, the meeting turned out almost to be a Chief Ministers’ meeting.
We usually met at 9 a.m. and went on till about 1 p.m. after which the Minister hosted everybody to lunch. On many occasions these meetings were held in a Committee room in Parliament, which enabled us to walk across to the Parliament restaurant for lunch. These arrangements enabled the Ministry to concentrate on the many important items on the agenda, instead of diluting its attention with social activities such as arranging lunch or tea. We also made use of the efficient arrangements Parliament had, of serving tea whilst the meeting was going on.
The meetings themselves were very useful. They led to better understanding and co-ordination. They enabled us in the Ministry to obtain a provincial perspective, whilst providing an opportunity for the Provincial Ministers to better understand what the Ministry was doing, and to discuss national policy. The meetings also provided a forum for dispute settlement. Sometimes matters became heated. On one particular occasion a Provincial Minister lost his cool, although he came from a cooler region than Colombo.
Adopting a haughty tone, he harshly criticized some of the officials of the Ministry. Even the other Ministers were somewhat embarrassed. There was really no co-relation between the weight and importance of the matters referred to by the irate Minister, and the extent of the heat generated by him. Mr. Athulathmudali deftly handled the matter, and calm was restored. After the meeting was over, the Minister walked up to the embarrassed officials and said, “Don’t worry, the man has an altitude problem,” and chuckled. Everyone who heard this did not miss the double meaning of this crack. The “altitude problem” referred to related both to the geographical altitude of the Minister’s area as well as the assumed geographical altitude lurking in a somewhat haughty, and over self conscious personality.
As this episode showed, dealing with Provincial Ministers was not always easy. A few of them thought that the Cabinet Ministry had no real role to play in a devolved area of activity, and still was at a time when the Provincial Ministers belonged to the same party as the government. A person who took this view to an extreme, was Mr. Mahindasoma, Chief Minister and Agriculture Minister of the North-Central Province. On one occasion when Minister Athulathmudali wished to take some of us along and have a meeting with the Provincial authorities, Mr. Mahindasoma said that this was not necessary and that he would attend to the problems in his own area!
Mr. Athulathmudali was not a person to be put off so lightly. He had legal and constitutional rights as Cabinet Minister, and was not prepared to surrender those rights on the advancement of some spurious argument. He was going to have his meeting in Anuradhapura, whether the Chief Minister attended or not. In the end, Mr. Mahindasoma attended the meeting and harmony prevailed. There is a point here which exceeds the importance or otherwise of a single episode. It pertains to issues arising out of devolution. I have had personal experiences of some of these issues in several Ministries.
The essence of all these comes down to the question of power and its exercise. I have had the experience of a Cabinet Minister from a Province and the Chief Minister of the Province, both belonging to the same party speaking abusively of each other to me, and each one asking me not to carry out the instructions of the other, or to listen to the other. From my not inconsiderable practical experience of working within the framework of devolution as prescribed by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, I could say that decisions on the nature and extent of devolution is not an exercise to be undertaken lightly or without an in-depth assessment of their possible course.
Any form of devolution based on ethnic, religious or any sectarian basis would have to be most carefully crafted, with a thorough understanding of important possible implications, and an unambiguous and precise definition and delineation of powers. There is also the central point that things which look elegant in legal documents and on paper sometimes become a contentious and nightmarish mess in implementation on the ground.
(Excerpted from In Pursuit of Governance, autobiography of MDD Peiris)
Features
Why Sri Lanka Still Has No Doppler Radar – and Who Should Be Held Accountable
Eighteen Years of Delay:
Cyclone Ditwah has come and gone, leaving a trail of extensive damage to the country’s infrastructure, including buildings, roads, bridges, and 70% of the railway network. Thousands of hectares of farming land have been destroyed. Last but not least, nearly 1,000 people have lost their lives, and more than two million people have been displaced. The visuals uploaded to social media platforms graphically convey the widespread destruction Cyclone Ditwah has caused in our country.
The purpose of my article is to highlight, for the benefit of readers and the general public, how a project to establish a Doppler Weather Radar system, conceived in 2007, remains incomplete after 18 years. Despite multiple governments, shifting national priorities, and repeated natural disasters, the project remains incomplete.
Over the years, the National Audit Office, the Committee on Public Accounts (COPA), and several print and electronic media outlets have highlighted this failure. The last was an excellent five-minute broadcast by Maharaja Television Network on their News First broadcast in October 2024 under a series “What Happened to Sri Lanka”
The Agreement Between the Government of Sri Lanka and the World Meteorological Organisation in 2007.
The first formal attempt to establish a Doppler Radar system dates back to a Trust Fund agreement signed on 24 May 2007 between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). This agreement intended to modernize Sri Lanka’s meteorological infrastructure and bring the country on par with global early-warning standards.
The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations established on March 23, 1950. There are 193 member countries of the WMO, including Sri Lanka. Its primary role is to promote the establishment of a worldwide meteorological observation system and to serve as the authoritative voice on the state and behaviour of the Earth’s atmosphere, its interaction with the oceans, and the resulting climate and water resources.
According to the 2018 Performance Audit Report compiled by the National Audit Office, the GoSL entered into a trust fund agreement with the WMO to install a Doppler Radar System. The report states that USD 2,884,274 was deposited into the WMO bank account in Geneva, from which the Department of Metrology received USD 95,108 and an additional USD 113,046 in deposit interest. There is no mention as to who actually provided the funds. Based on available information, WMO does not fund projects of this magnitude.
The WMO was responsible for procuring the radar equipment, which it awarded on 18th June 2009 to an American company for USD 1,681,017. According to the audit report, a copy of the purchase contract was not available.
Monitoring the agreement’s implementation was assigned to the Ministry of Disaster Management, a signatory to the trust fund agreement. The audit report details the members of the steering committee appointed by designation to oversee the project. It consisted of personnel from the Ministry of Disaster Management, the Departments of Metrology, National Budget, External Resources and the Disaster Management Centre.
The Audit Report highlights failures in the core responsibilities that can be summarized as follows:
· Procurement irregularities—including flawed tender processes and inadequate technical evaluations.
· Poor site selection
—proposed radar sites did not meet elevation or clearance requirements.
· Civil works delays
—towers were incomplete or structurally unsuitable.
· Equipment left unused
—in some cases for years, exposing sensitive components to deterioration.
· Lack of inter-agency coordination
—between the Meteorology Department, Disaster Management Centre, and line ministries.
Some of the mistakes highlighted are incomprehensible. There is a mention that no soil test was carried out before the commencement of the construction of the tower. This led to construction halting after poor soil conditions were identified, requiring a shift of 10 to 15 meters from the original site. This resulted in further delays and cost overruns.
The equipment supplier had identified that construction work undertaken by a local contractor was not of acceptable quality for housing sensitive electronic equipment. No action had been taken to rectify these deficiencies. The audit report states, “It was observed that the delay in constructing the tower and the lack of proper quality were one of the main reasons for the failure of the project”.
In October 2012, when the supplier commenced installation, the work was soon abandoned after the vehicle carrying the heavy crane required to lift the radar equipment crashed down the mountain. The next attempt was made in October 2013, one year later. Although the equipment was installed, the system could not be operationalised because electronic connectivity was not provided (as stated in the audit report).
In 2015, following a UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services) inspection, it was determined that the equipment needed to be returned to the supplier because some sensitive electronic devices had been damaged due to long-term disuse, and a further 1.5 years had elapsed by 2017, when the equipment was finally returned to the supplier. In March 2018, the estimated repair cost was USD 1,095,935, which was deemed excessive, and the project was abandoned.
COPA proceedings
The Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) discussed the radar project on August 10, 2023, and several press reports state that the GOSL incurred a loss of Rs. 78 million due to the project’s failure. This, I believe, is the cost of constructing the Tower. It is mentioned that Rs. 402 million had been spent on the radar system, of which Rs. 323 million was drawn from the trust fund established with WMO. It was also highlighted that approximately Rs. 8 million worth of equipment had been stolen and that the Police and the Bribery and Corruption Commission were investigating the matter.
JICA support and project stagnation
Despite the project’s failure with WMO, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) entered into an agreement with GOSL on June 30, 2017 to install two Doppler Radar Systems in Puttalam and Pottuvil. JICA has pledged 2.5 billion Japanese yen (LKR 3.4 billion at the time) as a grant. It was envisaged that the project would be completed in 2021.
Once again, the perennial delays that afflict the GOSL and bureaucracy have resulted in the groundbreaking ceremony being held only in December 2024. The delay is attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic and Sri Lanka’s economic crisis.
The seven-year delay between the signing of the agreement and project commencement has led to significant cost increases, forcing JICA to limit the project to installing only one Doppler Radar system in Puttalam.
Impact of the missing radar during Ditwah
As I am not a meteorologist and do not wish to make a judgment on this, I have decided to include the statement issued by JICA after the groundbreaking ceremony on December 24, 2024.
“In partnership with the Department of Meteorology (DoM), JICA is spearheading the establishment of the Doppler Weather Radar Network in the Puttalam district, which can realize accurate weather observation and weather prediction based on the collected data by the radar. This initiative is a significant step in strengthening Sri Lanka’s improving its climate resilience including not only reducing risks of floods, landslides, and drought but also agriculture and fishery“.
Based on online research, a Doppler Weather Radar system is designed to observe weather systems in real time. While the technical details are complex, the system essentially provides localized, uptotheminute information on rainfall patterns, storm movements, and approaching severe weather. Countries worldwide rely on such systems to issue timely alerts for monsoons, tropical depressions, and cyclones. It is reported that India has invested in 30 Doppler radar systems, which have helped minimize the loss of life.
Without radar, Sri Lanka must rely primarily on satellite imagery and foreign meteorological centres, which cannot capture the finescale, rapidly changing weather patterns that often cause localized disasters here.
The general consensus is that, while no single system can prevent natural disasters, an operational Doppler Radar almost certainly would have strengthened Sri Lanka’s preparedness and reduced the extent of damage and loss.
Conclusion
Sri Lanka’s inability to commission a Doppler Radar system, despite nearly two decades of attempts, represents one of the most significant governance failures in the country’s disastermanagement history.
Audit findings, parliamentary oversight proceedings, and donor records all confirm the same troubling truth: Sri Lanka has spent public money, signed international agreements, received foreign assistance, and still has no operational radar. This raises a critical question: should those responsible for this prolonged failure be held legally accountable?
Now may not be the time to determine the extent to which the current government and bureaucrats failed the people. I believe an independent commission comprising foreign experts in disaster management from India and Japan should be appointed, maybe in six months, to identify failures in managing Cyclone Ditwah.
However, those who governed the country from 2007 to 2024 should be held accountable for their failures, and legal action should be pursued against the politicians and bureaucrats responsible for disaster management for their failure to implement the 2007 project with the WMO successfully.
Sri Lanka cannot afford another 18 years of delay. The time for action, transparency, and responsibility has arrived.
(The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of any organization or institution with which the author is affiliated).
By Sanjeewa Jayaweera
Features
Ramifications of Trump Corollary
President Trump is expected to close the deal on the Ukraine crisis, as he may wish to concentrate his full strength on two issues: ongoing operations in Venezuela and the bolstering of Japan’s military capabilities as tensions between China and Japan over Taiwan rise. Trump can easily concede Ukraine to Putin and refocus on the Asia–Pacific and Latin America. This week, he once again spilled the beans in an interview with Politico, one of the most significant conversations ever conducted with him. When asked which country currently holds the stronger negotiating position, Trump bluntly asserted that there could be no question: it is Russia. “It’s a much bigger country. It’s a war that should’ve never happened,” he said, followed by his usual rhetoric.
Meanwhile, US allies that fail to adequately fund defence and shirk contributions to collective security will face repercussions, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth declared at the 2025 Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California. Hegseth singled out nations such as South Korea, Israel, Poland, and Germany as “model allies” for increasing their commitments, contrasting them with those perceived as “free riders”. The message was unmistakably Trumpian: partnerships are conditional, favourable only to countries that “help themselves” before asking anything of Washington.
It is in this context that it becomes essential to examine the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, issued last week, in order to consider how it differs from previous strategies and where it may intersect with current US military practice.
Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy is not merely another iteration of the familiar doctrine of American primacy; it is a radical reorientation of how the United States understands itself, its sphere of influence, and its role in the world. The document begins uncompromisingly: “The purpose of foreign policy is the protection of core national interests; that is the sole focus of this strategy.” It is the bluntest opening in any American NSS since the document became a formal requirement in 1987. Whereas previous strategies—from Obama to Biden—wrapped security in the language of democracy promotion and multilateralism, Trump’s dispenses entirely with the pretence of universality. What matters are American interests, defined narrowly, almost corporately, as though the United States were a shareholder entity rather than a global hegemon.
It is here that the ghost of Senator William Fulbright quietly enters, warning in 1966 that “The arrogance of power… the belief that we are uniquely qualified to bring order to the world, is a dangerous illusion.” Fulbright’s admonition was directed at the hubris of Vietnam-era expansionism, yet it resonates with uncanny force in relation to Trump’s revived hemispheric ambitions. For despite Trump’s anti-globalist posture, his strategy asserts a unique American role in determining events across two oceans and within an entire hemisphere. The arrogance may simply be wearing a new mask.
Nowhere is this revisionist spirit more vivid than in the so-called “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine”, perhaps the most controversial American hemispheric declaration since Theodore Roosevelt’s time. The 2025 NSS states without hesitation that “The United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.” Yet unlike Roosevelt, who justified intervention as a form of pre-emptive stabilisation, Trump wraps his corollary in the language of sovereignty and anti-globalism. The hemispheric message is not simply that outside powers must stay out; it is that the United States will decide what constitutes legitimate governance in the region and deny “non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities… in our Hemisphere”.
This wording alone has far-reaching implications for Venezuela, where US forces recently seized a sanctioned supertanker as part of an escalating confrontation with the Maduro government. Maduro, emboldened by support from Russia, Iran, and China’s so-called shadow fleet, frames Trump’s enforcement actions as piracy. But for Trump, this is precisely the point: a demonstration of restored hemispheric authority. In that sense, the 2025 NSS may be the first strategic document in decades to explicitly set the stage for sustained coercive operations in Latin America. The NSS promises “a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere.” “Urgent threats” is vague, but in practical military planning, vagueness functions as a permission slip. It is not difficult to see how a state accused of “narco-terrorism” or “crimes against humanity” could be fitted into the category.
The return to hemispheric dominance is paired with a targeted shift in alliance politics. Trump makes it clear that the United States is finished subsidising alliances that do not directly strengthen American security. The NSS lays out the philosophy succinctly: “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” This is a direct repudiation of the language found in Obama’s 2015 NSS, which emphasised that American leadership was indispensable to global stability. Trump rejects that premise outright. Leadership, in his framing, is merely leverage. Allies who fail to meet burden expectations will lose access, influence, and potentially even protection. Nowhere is this more evident than in the push for extraordinary defence spending among NATO allies: “President Trump has set a new global standard with the Hague Commitment… pledging NATO countries to spend 5 percent of GDP on defence.”
In turn, US disengagement from Europe becomes easier to justify. While Trump speaks of “negotiating an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine”, it requires little sophistication to decode this as a form of managed abandonment—an informal concession that Russia’s negotiating position is stronger, as Trump told Politico. Ukraine may well become a bargaining chip in the trade-off between strategic theatres: Europe shrinks, Asia and Latin America expand. The NSS’s emphasis on Japan, Taiwan, and China is markedly sharper than in 2017.
China looms over the 2025 NSS like an obsession, mentioned over twenty times, not merely as a competitor but as a driving force shaping American policy. Every discussion of technology, alliances, or regional security is filtered through Beijing’s shadow, as if US strategy exists solely to counter China. The strategy’s relentless focus risks turning global priorities into a theatre of paranoia, where the United States reacts constantly, defined less by its own interests than by fear of what China might do next.
It is equally striking that, just nine days after Cyclone Ditwah, the US Indo-Pacific Command deployed two C130 aircraft—capable of landing at only three locations in Sri Lanka, well away from the hardest-hit areas—and orchestrated a highly choreographed media performance, enlisting local outlets and social media influencers seemingly more concerned with flaunting American boots on the ground than delivering “urgent” humanitarian aid. History shows this is not unprecedented: US forces have repeatedly arrived under the banner of humanitarian assistance—Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992) later escalated into full security and combat operations; interventions in Haiti during the 1990s extended into long-term peacekeeping and training missions; and Operation United Assistance in Liberia (2014) built a lasting US operational presence beyond the Ebola response.
Trump’s NSS, meanwhile, states that deterring conflict in East Asia is a “priority”, and that the United States seeks to ensure that “US technology and US standards—particularly in AI, biotech, and quantum computing—drive the world forward.” Combined with heightened expectations of Japan, which is rapidly rearming, Trump’s strategic map shows a clear preference: if Europe cannot or will not defend itself, Asia might.
What makes the 2025 NSS uniquely combustible, however, is the combination of ideological framing and operational signalling. Trump explicitly links non-interventionism, long a theme of his political base, to the Founders’ moral worldview. He writes that “Rigid adherence to non-interventionism is not possible… yet this predisposition should set a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention.”
The Trump NSS is both a blueprint and a warning. It signals a United States abandoning the liberal internationalist project and embracing a transactional, hemispherically focussed, sovereignty-first model. It rewrites the Monroe Doctrine for an age of great-power contest, but in doing so resurrects the very logics of intervention that past presidents have regretted. And in the background, as Trump weighs the cost of Ukraine against the allure of a decisive posture in Asia and the Western Hemisphere, the world is left to wonder whether this new corollary is merely rhetorical theatre or the prelude to a new era of American coercive power. The ambiguity is deliberate, but the direction of travel is unmistakable.
[Correction: In my column last week, I incorrectly stated that India–Russia trade in FY 2024 25 was USD 18 billion; the correct figure is USD 68.7 billion, with a trade deficit of about USD 59 billion. Similarly, India recorded a goods trade surplus of around USD 41.18 billion with the US, not a deficit of USD 42 billion, with exports of USD 86.51 billion and imports of USD 45.33 billion. Total remittances to India in FY 2024 25 were roughly USD 135.46 billion, including USD 25–30 billion from the US. Apologies for the error.]
by Nilantha Ilangamuwa
Features
MEEZAN HADJIAR
selfmade businessman who became one of the richest men in the Central Province
I am happy that a book about the life and contribution of Sathkorale Muhamdiramlagedara Segu Abdul Cader Hajiar Mohamed Mohideen better known as Meezan Hadjiar or Meezan Mudalali of Matale [1911—1964] written by Mohammed Fuaji -a former Principal of Zahira College Matale, has now been published by a group of his admirers and relatives. It is a timely addition to the history of Matale district and the Kandyan region which is yet to be described fully as forming a part of the modern history of our country. Coincidentally this book also marks the centenary of Meezan Hadjiars beginning of employment in Matale town which began in 1925.
Matale which was an outlier in the Kandyan Kingdom came into prominence with the growth of plantations for coffee and, after the collapse of the coffee plantations due to the ‘coffee blight’ , for other tree crops . Coffee was followed by the introduction of tea by the early British investors who faced bankruptcy and ruin if they could not quickly find a substitute beverage for coffee.They turned to tea.
The rapid opening of tea plantations in the hill country demanded a large and hardworking labour force which could not be found domestically. This led to the indenturing of Tamil labour from South India on a large scale. These helpless workers were virtually kidnapped from their native villages in India through the Kangani system and they were compelled to migrate to our hill country by the British administration .
The route of these indentured workers to the higher elevations of the hill country lay through Matale and the new plantation industry developed in that region thereby dragging it into a new commercial culture and a cash economy. New opportunities were opened up for internal migration particularly for the more adventurous members of the Muslim community who had played a significant role in the Kandyan kingdom particularly as traders,transporters,medical specialists and military advisors.
Diaries of British officials like John D’oyly also show that the Kandyan Muslims were interlocutors between the Kandyan King and British officials of the Low Country as they had to move about across boundaries as traders of scarce commodities like salt, medicines and consumer articles for the Kandyans and arecanuts, gems and spices for the British. Even today there are physical traces of the ‘’Battal’’or caravans of oxen which were used by the Muslims to transport the above mentioned commodities to and from the Kandyan villages to the Low country. Another important facet was that Kandyan Muslims were located in villages close to the entrances to the hill country attesting to their mobility unlike the Kandyan villagers.
Thus Akurana, Galagedera, Kadugannawa, Hataraliyadde and Mawanella which lay in the pathways to enter the inner territory of the Kings domain were populated by ‘Kandyan Muslims’ who had the ear of the King and his high officials. The’’ Ge’’ names and the honorifics given by the King were a testament to their integration with the Sinhala polity. Meezan Hadjiars’’ Ge ‘‘name of Sathkorale Mohandiramlage denotes the mobility of the family from Sathkorale, an outlier division in the Kandyan Kingdom, and Mohandiramlage attests to the higher status in the social hierarchy which probably indicated that his forebears were honoured servants of the king.
Meezan Hadjiar [SM Mohideen] was born and bred in Kurugoda which is a small village in Akurana in Kandy district. He belonged to the family of Abdul Cader who was a patriarch and a well known religious scholar. Cader’s children began their education in the village school but at the age of 12 young Mohideen left his native village to apprentice under a relative who had a business establishment in the heart of Matale town which was growing fast due to the economic boom. It must be stated here that this form of ‘learning the ropes’ as an apprentice’was a common path to business undertaken by many of the later Sri Lankan tycoons of the pre-independence era.
But he did not remain in that position for long .When his mentor failed in his business of trading in cocoa, cardamoms, cloves and arecanuts and wanted to close up his shop young Mohideen took over and eventually made a great success of it. His enterprise succeeded because he was able to earn the trust of both his buyers and sellers. He befriended Sinhalese and Tamil producers and the business he improved beyond measure took on the name of Meezan Estates Ltd [The scales] and Mohideen soon became famous as Meezan Mudalali – perhaps the most successful businessman of his time in Matale. He expanded his business interests to urban real estate as well as tea and rubber estates. Soon he owned over 3,000 acres of tea estates making him one of the richest men in the Central Province.
With his growing influence Meezan spent generously on charitable activities including funding a water scheme for his native village of Kurugoda also serving adjoining villages like Pangollamada located in Akurana. He also gave generously to Buddhist causes in Matale together with other emerging low country businessmen like Gunasena and John Mudalali.
Matale was well known as a town in which all communities lived in harmony and tended to help each other. As a generous public figure he became strong supporter of the UNP and a personal friend of its leaders like Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawela. UNP candidates for public office-both in the Municipality and Parliament were selected in consultation with Meezan who also bankrolled them during election time. He himself became a Municipal councillor. The Aluvihares of several generations had close links with him. it was Meezan who mentored ACS Hameed – a fellow villager from Kurugoda – and took him to the highest echelons of Sri Lankan politics as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was a supporter and financier of the UNP through thick and thin.
Though his premature death at the age 53 in 1965 saved him from the worst political witch hunts under SWRD Bandaranaike who was his personal friend it was after 1970 and the Coalition regime that Meezan’s large family were deprived of their livelihood by the taking over of all their estates. Fortunately many of his children were well educated and could hold on till relief was given by President Premadasa despite the objections of their father’s erstwhile protégé ACS Hameed who surprisingly let them down badly.
It is only fitting that we, even a hundred years later, now commemorate a great self made Sri Lankan business magnate and generous contributor to all religious and social causes of his time. His name became synonymous with enterprise in Matale – a district in which I was privileged to serve as Government Agent in the late sixties.He was a model entrepreneur and his large family have also made outstanding contributions to this country which also attest to the late Meezan Hadjiars foresight and vision of a united and prosperous Srilanka.
by SARATH AMUNUGAMA.
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