Midweek Review

Elina wanted Premadasa to succeed JRJ

Published

5 years ago

2020/09/9

Ranil Wickremesinghe garlanding the DS Senanayake statue, at the UNP’s 72 anniversary, two years ago. The UNP celebrated its 74th anniversary over the weekend without a single elected MP in parliament. Over a month after the general election, the party is yet to decide on the single National List nominee, with a section backing Wickremesinghe for that slot.

– new biography

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The late Elina Jayewardene (EJ), nee Rupasinghe, had strongly pushed for Ranasinghe Premadasa as her husband first executive President JRJ’s successor in the run up to the second presidential poll, in the late 80s, according to ‘Elina Jayewardene’, authored by journalist Sagarika Dissanayake.

The then first lady had insisted that Premadasa should get the opportunity as he was the most suitable person to take over the party, following JRJ’s retirement. This discussion, on the party leadership, had taken place near the Kalutara temple, while they were on their way to Mirissa. JRJ assured EJ of his decision to accept her proposal, as they got down from the vehicle at Mirissa.

The author attributes the revelation to Pradeep Jayewardene, the eldest grandson of JRJ and Elina. The author dealt briefly with EJ taking a stand on two crucial matters, namely JRJ’s decision to sack Rukman Senanayake, and the UNP’s next leader. Though JRJ ignored EJ’s strong protest against Rukman’s sacking, her suggestion, as regards RP, was accepted. EJ had felt Premadasa was the most qualified and she also had opposed any other successor that might reinforce accusations of power being always monopolised by the elite.

Sagarika Dissanayake, who had served the Lake House publication, ‘Silumina’, before being moved to its daily ‘Dinamina’, couldn’t have launched ‘Elina Jayewardene’ at a better time as the UNP struggled to cope up with the worst ever defeat the party suffered in its over 70-year history. The 2020 general election reduced the UNP to a solitary National List slot whereas its parliamentary group, in the last parliament, comprised 106 members.

The failure on the part of the UNP to resolve the leadership issue, even over a month after the last general election, is evidence of the deterioration of once the most powerful political force in the country.

Elina chooses JRJ over SWRD

EJ, the only daughter of one of the richest families in Sri Lanka, at that time, lacked a formal education, though she attracted the attention of young lawyer Junius Richard Jayewardene, as well as S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, subsequently the leaders of the UNP and the SLFP, respectively. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike had been able to get to know EJ before JRJ. Dissanayake dealt with how S.W.R.D gave up his love for EJ, after seeing her with JRJ, at the former’s residence, saying: “My congratulations.”

EJ married JRJ on the evening of February 28, 1935 at ‘Breamar’, Ward Place. Winning EJ’s hand hadn’t been easy for Junius Richard Jayewardene (Dicky to his friends) as her family was not so excited about the proposal from his mother Agnes Helen Jayewardene, the wife of the late top lawyer E.W. Jayewardene. Agnes Helen Jayewardene was a sister of press baron D.R. Wijewardene, of Lake House fame.

‘Elina Jayewardene’ is based on interviews with several persons, including Pradeep Jayewardene, Rukshan Amal Jayewardene (the second grandchild JRJ and Elina), Sharmaine Mendis, first wife of late Ravi Jayewardene (their only son), close relatives, Professor Asvini Fernando and Lakshmi Suneetha Subasinghe, Dr. Sathis Jayasinhe and Nalini Mapitigama. In addition to them, the author had interviewed several female aides, who had been with EJ until the very end. Among them were Galahitiyage Lilawathie, Hettiarachchige Magilin and Lilani de Silva. Pradeep Jayewardene’s younger brother, Amrik, hadn’t been so excited about the brief biography about their late grandmother, hence the author not getting an opportunity to speak with him. The author also quoted from the work of the late senior government servant, Amara Hewamadduma.

The author’s failure to interview JRJ and EJ’s only son, Ravi Jayewardene, is a shortcoming. “RJ was no more when I started working on this,” Sagarika Dissanayake told the writer. RJ passed away on April 3, 2017, at the age of 80.

EJ passed away at a private hospital in Colombo, on Nov 17, 2007, at the age of 95. Her death occurred 11 years after that of JRJ. The author dealt with how EJ’s son, RJ, and his second wife, Penny, interfered with the food provided to the ailing EJ, much to the discomfort of other family members, as well as those looking after her. The author, quoted Hettiarachchige Magalin as having said Pradeep Jayewardene argued with his father after the latter ordered that fish or meat should not be given to the ailing lady. The removal of the nurses, assigned to look after EJ, and a number of other issues, were dealt with, though there is no explanation why Ravi Jayewardene and Penny interfered with the staff looking after EJ. Pradeep Jayewardene didn’t mince his words as he faulted his father for the rapid deterioration of EJ’s health. May be the son didn’t want to prolong his mother’s vegetative state as she was literally unconscious, even before his father’s death, in late 1996.

EJ hadn’t been aware of JRJ’s passing away, for 11 years, as she never really recovered from her illness and never uttered a word during the last five years of her life. EJ had been with JRJ throughout his volatile political career during which he faced the second bloody JVP inspired insurgency, in the 80s, in the wake of the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord.

JRJ’s entry into politics

Having served as a lawyer for seven years, after getting married, in February, 1935, 32-year-old JRJ had entered politics through the Ceylon National Congress (CNC), functioned therein in the capacity of joint Secretary, till 1946. JRJ had served as a lawyer for a period of three years, before his marriage to Elina, after breaking up with two or three early relationships.

His entry into the colonial legislature, the State Council, in 1943, was made possible by his triumph over E.W. Pereira at a by-election for the Kelaniya electorate, following a novel polls campaign where JRJ used relatives and friends to personally visit each and every household in the electorate. JRJ’s campaign headquarters had been at ‘Manelwatte’ property, situated at Bollagala, about three miles away from the Kelaniya temple.

JRJ, however, lost Kelaniya, at the 1956 general election, called by Sir John Kotelawela. Having experienced relentless political turmoil, JRJ led the party to a historic victory, at the 1977 general election, to pave the way for a parliamentary dictatorship that plunged the country into unprecedented crisis. Grandson Pradeep talked lovingly of the period he and his brother spent with their grandparents, between 1956 and 1977, as JRJ struggled as an Opposition member. There was reference to food shortages and the affluent people’s practice of buying rationed essential commodities from the poor, at a much higher price, than they bought at the market.

The author pays a glowing tribute to JRJ for quitting active politics, in 1989, at the zenith of his political power. The author discussed how EJ made available her inexhaustible wealth to assist her husband’s quest for political power and subsequently lavishly spent on those who sought her help. Perhaps, JRJ couldn’t have realized his political ambitions if not for his wife’s financial backing as he struggled to cope up with family commitments, in the wake of his father’s death, at the age of 58. JRJ had nine siblings. EJ, however, never played an active role in JRJ’s political career, whereas Sirimavo Ratwatte, who married S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, became Sri Lanka’s first woman Premier, after the assassination of her husband, in late Sept 1959. She served three terms.

The Jayewardenes had always lived at their private residence, ‘Breamar’, though they could have chosen to live at the President’s House. Incumbent President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, too, chooses not to move into the President’s House, or utilize Temple Trees. There had been instances of both the President’s House and Temple Trees being used by the same party, contrary to the accepted norms.

However, the author refrained from at least briefly discussing how JRJ caused political calamity by depriving the people of the parliamentary election, scheduled for 1983. Having won a second six-year presidential term, in Oct 1982, JRJ held a sham national referendum, in Dec 1982, to give an opportunity for the people to extend the life of parliament by six more years. JRJ’s move was meant to maintain a five- sixth steamroller majority in parliament, the UNP won, in 1977, at the expense of democracy. JRJ introduced the Proportional Representation (PR) system at the 1989 general election. Obviously, the UNP believed no party could secure two-thirds, or at least come close to the magical 150 mark, under the PR system, though both Mahinda Rajapaksa (April 2010) and Gotabaya Rajapaksa (August 2020) proved the UNP wrong. Mahinda Rajapaksa won 144 seats whereas Gotabaya secured 145.

Although the author maintains that EJ always intervened, on behalf of the people, and courageously expressed her views on matters of grave political interest, there is no indication of her stand on JRJ’s disastrous decision to put off the general election, scheduled for 1983, by six years. EJ knew of what interested JRJ as she used to read aloud, what she considered, important news items, from the daily newspapers, at the breakfast table.

Children move in to ‘Breamar’

Pradeep (1960) had been only 11 years when his mother left him and his younger brothers, Rukshan (1961) and Amrik (1962), following a long standing dispute with his father. Ravi J had been faulted for the break-up of his marriage to Sharmaine nee Vandakoon. They divorced, in 1969, after being separated for a year.

Among the issues discussed, in brief, in “Elina Jayewardene’ was the arrest of Ravi Jayewardene, over his alleged involvement in the first JVP-led insurgency, in 1971, and his release within 24 hours, after JRJ lambasted the government in parliament over his son’s arrest.

Both Ravi J and Sharmaine had been experts in rifle shooting, as well as trained pilots. The author passionately discusses the developments, leading to the breaking up of their marriage leading to both re-marrying. The children ended-up with their grandparents. The children had been also bothered by their father’s somewhat troubled relationship with their grandmother, whose love for dogs gladdened them.

Their grandfather following Canadian Air Force exercise regime, in the morning, having been a schoolboy boxer and rugby player, and grandmother, walking in the backyard of ‘Breamar’, as it was not safe to walk in public grounds due to threats posed by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, seemed fresh in the minds of the grandchildren. EJ never had female aides and always received no assistance in readying for official functions. The Jayewardenes never kept even the expensive gifts received from foreign leaders and officials.

The author dealt with elder Jayewardenes’ struggle with their three grandchildren. Rukshan recalled how his grandmother slapped him, on more than one occasion, for not being obedient, and grandfather once delivered a thundering slap after JRJ found him arguing with his grandmother. In the wake of the breaking up of Ravi Jayewardene’s marriage, JRJ had built a three-roomed house, next to ‘Breamar’, for the grandchildren. The author provided an excellent description of the life at ‘Breamar’, and its adjoining house, until the health of the former declined with them both hospitalized together, simultaneously. JRJ had prevented EJ visiting him at the hospital as he felt the sight of him being on a hospital bed would dishearten her.

The Chapter, based on what Ravi Jayewardene’s first wife, Sharmaine, said, was truly interesting. That Chapter dealt with Ravi Jayewardene proposing to Sharmaine, her parents rejecting the suggestion, Sharmaine learning Kandyan dancing from Heenbaba Dharmasiri and Niththawela Gunaya at the Sinhala Cultural Institute in Colombo, a chance encounter with EJ and rifle shooting practices at the Negombo Rifle Club, leading to their marriage, in 1959. In spite of the breaking up of their marriage, JRJ and EJ had maintained an extremely cordial relationship with Sharmaine who acknowledged her husband having several other relationships, leading to him leaving their Gregory Road home. The conversation between Sharmaine and JRJ, after the latter realised his son, was not with the family at their newly built house at the Gregory Road, Colombo 7 revealed how JRJ calmly received the breakup of their marriage, though it devastated both JRJ and EJ.

Premadasa assassinated

JRJ and EJ, along with several others, including Pradeep Jayewardene, had been in India, on the day the LTTE assassinated President Ranasinghe Premadasa on May Day 1993. Ironically, JRJ had been there to deliver the keynote address at Rajiv Gandhi’s commemoration. The LTTE assassinated Gandhi on May 21, 1991, in Sriperumbudur, India.

Premadasa had been blown to bits at the time JRJ, having delivered the speech, was returning to his seat. They returned home immediately, after the May Day blast, near Armour Street, claimed the life of JRJ’s successor along with several of his bodyguards. The assassin happened to be a person who had infiltrated President Premadasa’s inner circle for some time.

Premadasa’s assassination paved the way for Ranil Wickremesinghe’s emergence as the UNP leader, though Dingiri Banda Wijetunga took over the presidency in the wake of Premadasa’s assassination. Gamini Dissanayake, the remaining challenger, was assassinated by the LTTE, in Oct 1994 in the run-up to the presidential election, after having briefly got the UNP leadership, not without a struggle with Ranil. The author quoted Galahitiyage Leelawathie, an aide to EJ, as having alleged Wickremesinghe didn’t help even if EJ asked. Leelawathie alleged Wickremesinghe flatly refused to help her eldest son, receiving admission to D S Senanayake College, when her husband, Arnolis, Jayewardene family’s chief man servant, requested him to do so. Subsequently, Arnolis talked directly to the then DS Principal Alles and got their eldest son admitted. The family got all four boys admitted to DS, one with the help of Minister Nissanka Wijeratne.

Continuing UNP crisis

The UNP is in a deepening crisis, unprecedented in its history. The failure on the part of the party to resolve the leadership issue, over a month after the last general election, is testimony to what has been its indecisive plight, under Ranil, all these years. The UNP is still struggling to cope up with the catastrophic setback against the backdrop of the SLPP’s emergence as the most powerful political force in the country. Having been reduced to just one National List member, in the 225-member parliament, the UNP is in such a mess, with over a half a dozen defeated candidates, and former Speaker Karu Jayasuriya, seeking to succeed Wickremesinghe, whereas the latter wants to continue, till the Provincial Council polls. The once invincible UNP, to suffer such a humiliating setback, could be its death knell. JRJ’s eldest grandson, Pradeep, has ended up as a member of the Colombo Municipal Council, while Ranasinghe Premadasa’s son, Sajith, now commands the Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB), a political outfit, recognized under controversial circumstances, at the expense of the UNP. Premadasa made his move having failed to convince Wickremesinghe to give up the leadership, ahead of the last general election. Wickremesinghe, and those close to him, remained convinced UNPers would remain committed to the elephant symbol, though they exercised their franchise in support of Premadasa, who had the backing of the vast majority of the parliamentary group, in the last parliament. In the absence of proper leadership, the UNP moving directionless as the SJB takes the lead in opposing the controversial 20th Amendment to the Constitution proposed to replace the 19th enacted at the onset of the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration, in 2015. Will the 20th Amendment prove to be so controversial so as to make it a rallying point for the Opposition, under the SJB’s leadership?

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Midweek Review

Fonseka clears Rajapaksas of committing war crimes he himself once accused them of

Published

6 days ago

2026/02/25

Sahan Weerasooriya

With Sri Lanka’s 17th annual war victory over separatist Tamil terrorism just months away, warwinning Army Chief, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka (Dec. 06, 2005, to July 15, 2009) has significantly changed his war narrative pertaining to the final phase of the offensive that was brought to an end on May 18, 2009.

The armed forces declared the conclusion of ground operations on that day after the entire northern region was brought back under their control. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, hiding within the secured area, was killed on the following day. His body was recovered from the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

With the war a foregone conclusion, with nothing to save the increasingly hedged in Tigers taking refuge among hapless Tamil civilians, Fonseka left for Beijing on May 11, and returned to Colombo, around midnight, on May 17, 2009. The LTTE, in its last desperate bid to facilitate Prabhakatan’s escape, breached one flank of the 53 Division, around 2.30 am, on May 18. But they failed to bring the assault to a successful conclusion and by noon the following day those fanatical followers of Tiger Supremo, who had been trapped within the territory, under military control, died in confrontations.

During Fonseka’s absence, the celebrated 58 Division (formerly Task Force 1), commanded by the then Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva, advanced 31/2 to 4 kms and was appropriately positioned with Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne’s 53 Division. The LTTE never had an opportunity to save its leader by breaching several lines held by frontline troops on the Vanni east front. There couldn’t have been any other option than surrendering to the Army.

The Sinha Regiment veteran, who had repeatedly accused the Rajapaksas of war crimes, and betraying the war effort by providing USD 2 mn, ahead of the 2005 presidential election, to the LTTE, in return for ordering the polls boycott that enabled Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory, last week made noteworthy changes to his much disputed narrative.

GR’s call to Shavendra What did the former Army Commander say?

* The Rajapaksas wanted to sabotage the war effort, beginning January 2008.

* In January 2008, Mahinda Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Navy Commander VA Wasantha Karannagoda, proposed to the National Security Council that the Army should advance from Vavuniya to Mullithivu, on a straight line, to rapidly bring the war to a successful conclusion. They asserted that Fonseka’s strategy (fighting the enemy on multiple fronts) caused a lot of casualties.

* They tried to discourage the then Lt. Gen. Fonseka

* Fonseka produced purported video evidence to prove decisive intervention made by Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa on the afternoon of May 17. The ex-Army Chief’s assertion was based on a telephone call received by Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva from Gotabaya Rajapaksa. That conversation had been captured on video by Swarnavahini’s Shanaka de Silva who now resides in the US. He had been one of the few persons, from the media, authorised by the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry to be with the Army leadership on the battlefield. Fonseka claimed that the videographer fled the country to escape death in the hands of the Rajapaksas. It was somewhat reminiscent of Maithripala Sirisena’s claim that if Rajapaksas win the 2015 Presidential election against him he would be killed by them.

* Shanaka captured Shavendra Silva disclosing three conditions laid down by the LTTE to surrender namely (a) Their casualties should be evacuated to Colombo by road (b) They were ready to exchange six captured Army personnel with those in military custody and (c) and the rest were ready to surrender.

* Then Fonseka received a call from Gotabaya Rajapaksa, on a CDMA phone. The Defence Secretary issued specific instructions to the effect that if the LTTE was to surrender that should be to the military and definitely not to the ICRC or any other third party. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, one-time Commanding Officer of the 1st battalion of the Gajaba Regiment, ordered that irrespective of any new developments and talks with the international community, offensive action shouldn’t be halted. That declaration directly contradicted Fonseka’s claim that the Rajapaksas conspired to throw a lifeline to the LTTE.

Fonseka declared that the Rajapaksa brothers, in consultation with the ICRC, and Amnesty International, offered an opportunity for the LTTE leadership to surrender, whereas his order was to annihilate the LTTE. The overall plan was to eliminate all, Fonseka declared, alleging that the Rajapaksa initiated talks with the LTTE and other parties to save those who had been trapped by ground forces in a 400 m x 400 m area by the night of May 16, among a Tamil civilian human shield held by force.

If the LTTE had agreed to surrender to the Army, Mahinda Rajapaksa would have saved their lives. If that happened Velupillai Prabhakaran would have ended up as the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, he said. Fonseka shocked everyone when he declared that he never accused the 58 Division of executing prisoners of war (white flag killings) but the issue was created by those media people embedded with the military leadership. Fonseka declared that accusations regarding white flag killings never happened. That story, according to Fonseka, had been developed on the basis of the Rajapaksas’ failed bid to save the lives of the LTTE leaders.

Before we discuss the issues at hand, and various assertions, claims and allegations made by Fonseka, it would be pertinent to remind readers of wartime US Defence Advisor in Colombo Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith’s June 2011 denial of white flag killings. The US State Department promptly declared that the officer hadn’t spoken at the inaugural Colombo seminar on behalf of the US. Smith’s declaration, made two years after the end of the war, and within months after the release of the Darusman report, dealt a massive blow to false war crimes allegations.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in 2010, appointed a three-member Panel of Experts, more like a kangaroo court, consisting of Marzuki Darusman, Yasmin Sooka, and Steven Ratner, to investigate war crimes accusations.

Now Fonseka has confirmed what Smith revealed at the defence seminar in response to a query posed by Maj. General (retd.) Ashok Metha of the IPKF to Shavendra Silva, who had been No 02 in our UN mission, in New York, at that time.

White flag allegations

‘White flag’ allegations cannot be discussed in isolation. Fonseka made that claim as the common presidential candidate backed by the UNP-JVP-TNA combine. The shocking declaration was made in an interview with The Sunday Leader Editor Frederica Jansz published on Dec. 13, 2009 under ‘Gota ordered them to be shot – General Sarath Fonseka.’

The ‘white flag’ story had been sensationally figured in a leaked confidential US Embassy cable, during Patricia Butenis tenure as the US Ambassador here. Butenis had authored that cable at 1.50 pm on Dec. 13, 2009, the day after the now defunct The Sunday Leader exclusive. Butenis had lunch with Fonseka in the company of the then UNP Deputy Leader Karu Jayasuriya, according to the cable. But for the writer the most interesting part had been Butenis declaration that Fonseka’s advisors, namely the late Mangala Samaraweera, Anura Kumara Dissanayake (incumbent President) and Vijitha Herath (current Foreign Minister) wanted him to retract part of the story attributed to him.

Frederica Jansz fiercely stood by her explosive story. She reiterated the accuracy of the story, published on Dec. 13, 2009, during the ‘white flag’ hearing when the writer spoke to her. There is absolutely no reason to suspect Frederica Jansz misinterpreted Fonseka’s response to her queries.

Subsequently, Fonseka repeated the ‘white flag’ allegation at a public rally held in support of his candidature. Many an eyebrow was raised at The Sunday Leader’s almost blind support for Fonseka, against the backdrop of persistent allegations directed at the Army over Lasantha Wickrematunga’s killing. Wickrematunga, an Attorney-at-Law by profession and one-time Private Secretary to Opposition Leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was killed on the Attidiya Road, Ratmalana in early January 2009.

The Darusman report, too, dealt withthe ‘white flag’ killings and were central to unsubstantiated Western accusations directed at the Sri Lankan military. Regardless of the political environment in which the ‘white flag’ accusations were made, the issue received global attention for obvious reasons. The accuser had been the war-winning Army Commander who defeated the LTTE at its own game. But, Fonseka insisted, during his meeting with Butenis, as well as the recent public statement that the Rajapaksas had worked behind his back with some members of the international community.

Fresh inquiry needed

Fonseka’s latest declaration that the Rajapaksas wanted to save the LTTE leadership came close on the heels of Deputy British Prime Minister David Lammy’s whistle-stop visit here. The UK, as the leader of the Core Group on Sri Lanka at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council, spearheads the campaign targeting Sri Lanka.

Lammy was on his way to New Delhi for the AI Impact Summit. The Labour campaigner pushed for action against Sri Lanka during the last UK general election. In fact, taking punitive action against the Sri Lankan military had been a key campaign slogan meant to attract Tamil voters of Sri Lankan origin. His campaign contributed to the declaration of sanctions in March 2025 against Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda, General (retd) Shavendra Silva, General (retd) Jagath Jayasuriya and ex-LTTE commander Karuna, who rebelled against Prabhakaran. Defending Shavendra Silva, Fonseka, about a week after the imposition of the UK sanctions, declared that the British action was unfair.

But Fonseka’s declaration last week had cleared the Rajapaksas of war crimes. Instead, they had been portrayed as traitors. That declaration may undermine the continuous post-war propaganda campaign meant to demonise the Rajapaksas and top ground commanders.

Canada, then a part of the Western clique that blindly towed the US line, declared Sri Lanka perpetrated genocide and also sanctioned ex-Presidents Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Other countries resorted to action, though such measures weren’t formally announced. General (retd) Jagath Dias and Maj. Gen (retd) Chagie Gallage were two of those targeted.

Against the backdrop of Fonseka’s latest claims, in respect of accountability issues, the urgent need to review action taken against Sri Lanka cannot be delayed. Although the US denied visa when Fonseka was to accompany President Maithripala Sirisena to the UN, in Sept. 2016, he hadn’t been formally accused of war crimes by the western powers, obviously because he served their interests.

On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations that hadn’t been subjected to judicial proceedings, Geneva initiated actions. The US, Canada and UK acted on those accusations. The US sanctioned General Shavendra Silva in Feb. 2020 and Admiral Karannagoda in April 2023.

What compelled Fonseka to change his narrative, 18 years after his Army ended the war? Did Fonseka base his latest version solely on Shanaka de Silva video? Fonseka is on record as claiming that he got that video, via a third party, thereby Shanaka de Silva had nothing to do with his actions.

DNA and formation of DP

Having realised that he couldn’t, under any circumstances, reach a consensus with the UNP to pursue a political career with that party, Fonseka teamed up with the JVP, one of the parties in the coalition that backed his presidential bid in 2010. Fonseka’s current efforts to reach an understanding with the JVP/NPP (President Anura Kumara Dissanayake is the leader of both registered political parties) should be examined against the backdrop of their 2010 alliance.

Under Fonseka’s leadership, the JVP, and a couple of other parties/groups, contested, under the symbol of the Democratic National Alliance (DNA) that had been formed on 22 Nov. 2009. but the grouping pathetically failed to live up to their own expectations. The results of the parliamentary polls, conducted in April 2010, had been devastating and utterly demoralising. Fonseka, who polled about 40% of the national vote at the January 2010 presidential election, ended up with just over 5% of the vote, and the DNA only managed to secure seven seats, including two on the National List. The DNA group consisted of Fonseka, ex-national cricket captain Arjuna Ranatunga, businessman Tiran Alles and four JVPers. Anura Kumara Dissanayake was among the four.

Having been arrested on February 8, 2010, soon after the presidential election, Fonseka was in prison. He was court-martialed for committing “military offences”. He was convicted of corrupt military supply deals and sentenced to three years in prison. Fonseka vacated his seat on 7 Oct .2010. Following a failed legal battle to protect his MP status, Fonseka was replaced by DNA member Jayantha Ketagoda on 8 March 2011. But President Mahinda Rajapaksa released Fonseka in May 2012 following heavy US pressure. The US went to the extent of issuing a warning to the then SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena that unless President Rajapaksa freed Fonseka he would have to face the consequences (The then Health Minister Sirisena disclosed the US intervention when the writer met him at the Jealth Ministry, as advised by President Rajapaksa)

By then, Fonseka and the JVP had drifted apart and both parties were irrelevant. Somawansa Amarasinghe had been the leader at the time the party decided to join the UNP-led alliance that included the TNA, and the SLMC. The controversial 2010 project had the backing of the US as disclosed by leaked secret diplomatic cables during Patricia Butenis tenure as the US Ambassador here.

In spite of arranging the JVP-led coalition to bring an end to the Rajapaksa rule, Butenis, in a cable dated 15 January 2010, explained the crisis situation here. Butenis said: “There are no examples we know of a regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes while that regime or government remained in power. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country’s senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka.”

Then Fonseka scored a major victory when Election Commissioner Mahinda Deshapriya on 1 April, 2013, recognised his Democratic Party (DNA was registered as DP) with ‘burning flame’ as its symbol. There hadn’t been a previous instance of any service commander registering a political party. While Fonseka received the leadership, ex-Army officer Senaka de Silva, husband of Diana Gamage ((later SJB MP who lost her National List seat over citizenship issue) functioned as the Deputy Leader.

Having covered Fonseka’s political journey, beginning with the day he handed over command to Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, in July, 2009, at the old Army Headquarters that was later demolished to pave the way for the Shangri-La hotel complex, the writer covered the hastily arranged media briefing at the Solis reception hall, Pitakotte, on 2 April, 2023. Claiming that his DP was the only alternative to what he called corrupt Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government and bankrupt Ranil Wickremesinghe-led Opposition, a jubilant Fonseka declared himself as the only alternative (‘I am the only alternative,’ with strapline ‘SF alleges Opposition is as bad as govt’. The Island, April 3, 2013).

Fonseka had been overconfident to such an extent, he appealed to members of the government parliamentary group, as well as the Opposition (UNP), to switch allegiance to him. As usual Fonseka was cocky and never realised that 40% of the national vote he received, at the presidential election, belonged to the UNP, TNA and the JVP. Fonseka also disregarded the fact that he no longer had the JVP’s support. He was on his own. The DP never bothered to examine the devastating impact his 2010 relationship with the TNA had on the party. The 2015 general election results devastated Fonseka and underscored that there was absolutely no opportunity for a new party. The result also proved that his role in Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE hadn’t been a decisive factor.

RW comes to SF’s rescue

Fonseka’s DP suffered a humiliating defeat at the August 2015 parliamentary polls. The outcome had been so bad that the DP was left without at least a National List slot. Fonseka was back to square one. If not for UNP leader and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, Fonseka could have been left in the cold. Wickremesinghe accommodated Fonseka on their National List, in place of SLFPer M.K.D.S. Gunawardene, who played a critical role in an influential section of the party and the electorate shifting support to Maithripala Sirisena. Gunawardena passed away on 19 January, 2016. Wickremesinghe and Fonseka signed an agreement at Temple Trees on 3 February, 2016. Fonseka received appointment as National List MP on 9 February, 2016, and served as Minister of Regional Development and, thereafter, as Minister of Wildlife and Sustainable Development, till Oct. 2018. Fonseka lost his Ministry when President Sirisena treacherously sacked Wickremesinghe’s government to pave the way for a new partnership with the Rajapaksas. The Supreme Court discarded that arrangement and brought back the Yahapalana administration but Sirisena, who appointed Fonseka to the lifetime rank of Field Marshal, in recognition of his contribution to the defeat of terrorism, refused to accommodate him in Wickremesinghe’s Cabinet. The President also left out Wasantha Karannagoda and Roshan Goonetilleke. Sirisena appointed them Admiral of the Fleet and Marshal of Air Force, respectively, on 19, Sept. 2019, in the wake of him failing to secure the required backing to contest the Nov. 2019 presidential election.

Wickremesinghe’s UNP repeatedly appealed on behalf of Fonseka in vain to Sirisena. At the 2020 general election, Fonseka switched his allegiance to Sajith Premadasa and contested under the SJB’s ‘telephone’ symbol and was elected from the Gampaha district. Later, following a damaging row with Sajith Premadasa, he quit the SJB as its Chairman and, at the last presidential election, joined the fray as an independent candidate. Having secured just 22,407 votes, Fonseka was placed in distant 9th position. Obviously, Fonseka never received any benefits from support extended to the 2022 Aragalaya and his defeat at the last presidential election seems to have placed him in an extremely difficult position, politically.

Let’s end this piece by reminding that Fonseka gave up the party leadership in early 2024 ahead of the presidential election. Senaka de Silva succeeded Fonseka as DP leader, whereas Dr. Asosha Fernando received appointment as its Chairman. The DP has aligned itself with the NPP. The rest is history.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

Strengths and weaknesses of BRICS+: Implications for Global South

Published

6 days ago

2026/02/25

Sahan Weerasooriya

The 16th BRICS Summit, from 22 to 24 October 2024 in Kazan, was attended by 24 heads of state, including the five countries that officially became part of the group on 1 January: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia. Argentina finally withdrew from the forum after Javier Milei’s government took office in 2023.

In the end, it changed its strategy and instead of granting full membership made them associated countries adding a large group of 13 countries: two from Latin America (Bolivia and Cuba), three from Africa (Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda) and eight from Asia (Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Vietnam). This confirms the expansionary intent of the BRICS, initiated last year and driven above all by China, which seeks to turn the group into a relevant multilateral forum, with focus on political than economic interaction, designed to serve its interests in the geopolitical dispute with the United States. This dispute however is not the making of China but has arisen mainly due to the callous bungling of Donald Trump in his second term in office.

China has emerged as the power that could influence the membership within the larger group more than its rival in the region, India. Obviously, the latter is concerned about these developments but seems powerless to stop the trend as more countries realize the need for the development of capacity to resist Western dominance. India in this regard seems to be reluctant possibly due to its defence obligations to the US with Trump declaring war against countries that try to forge partnerships aiming to de-dollarize the global economic system.

The real weakness in BRICS therefore, is the seemingly intractable rivalry between China and India and the impact of this relationship on the other members who are keen to see the organisation grow its capacity to meet its stated goals. China is committed to developing an alternative to the Western dominated world order, particularly the weaponization of the dollar by the US. India does not want to be seen as anti-west and as a result India is often viewed as a reluctant or cautious member of BRICS. This problem seems to be perpetuated due to the ongoing border tensions with China. India therefore has a desire to maintain a level playing field within the group, rather than allowing it to be dominated by Beijing.

Though India seems to be committed to a multipolar world, it prefers focusing on economic cooperation over geopolitical alignment. India thinks the expansion of BRICS initiated by China may dilute its influence within the bloc to the advantage of China. India fears the bloc is shifting toward an anti-Western tilt driven by China and Russia, complicating its own strong ties with the West. India is wary of the new members who are also beneficiaries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While China aims to use BRICS for anti-Western geopolitical agendas, India favors focusing on South-South financial cooperation and reforming international institutions. Yet India seems to be not in favour of creating a new currency to replace the dollar which could obviously strengthen the South-South financial transactions bypassing the dollar.

Moreover, India has explicitly opposed the expansion of the bloc to include certain nations, such as Pakistan, indicating a desire to control the group’s agenda, especially during its presidency.

In this equation an important factor is the role that Russia could play. The opinion expressed by the Russian foreign minister in this regard may be significant. Referring to the new admissions the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said: “The weight, prominence and importance of the candidates and their international standing were the primary factors for us [BRICS members]. It is our shared view that we must recruit like-minded countries into our ranks that believe in a multipolar world order and the need for more democracy and justice in international relations. We need those who champion a bigger role for the Global South in global governance. The six countries whose accession was announced today fully meet these criteria.”

The admission of three major oil producing countries, Saudi Arabia, Iran and UAE is bound to have a significant impact on the future global economic system and consequently may have positive implications for the Global South. These countries would have the ability to decisively help in creating a new international trading system to replace the 5 centuries old system that the West created to transfer wealth from the South to the North. This is so because the petro-dollar is the pillar of the western banking system and is at the very core of the de-dollarizing process that the BRICS is aiming at. This cannot be done without taking on board Saudi Arabia, a staunch ally of the west. BRICS’ expansion, therefore, is its transformation into the most representative community in the world, whose members interact with each other bypassing Western pressure. Saudi Arabia and Iran are actively mending fences, driven by a 2023 China-brokered deal to restore diplomatic ties, reopen embassies, and de-escalate regional tensions. While this detente has brought high-level meetings and a decrease in direct hostility rapprochement is not complete yet and there is hope which also has implications, positive for the South and may not be so for the North.

Though the US may not like what is going on, Europe, which may not endorse all that the former does if one is to go by the speech delivered by the Canadian PM in Brazil recently, may not be displeased about the rapid growth of BRICS. The Guardian UK highlighted expert opinion that BRICS expansion is rather “a symbol of broad support from the global South for the recalibration of the world order.” A top official at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Caroline Kanter has told the daily, “It is obvious that we [Western countries] are no longer able to set our own conditions and standards. Proposals will be expected from us so that in the future we will be perceived as an attractive partner.” At the same time, the bottom line is that BRICS expansion is perceived in the West as a political victory for Russia and China which augurs well for the future of BRICS and the Global South.

Poor countries, relentlessly battered by the neo-liberal global economy, will greatly benefit if BRICS succeeds in forging a new world order and usher in an era of self-sufficiency and economic independence. There is no hope for them in the present system designed to exploit their natural resources and keep them in a perpetual state of dependency and increasing poverty. BRICS is bound to be further strengthened if more countries from the South join it. Poor countries must come together and with the help of BRICS work towards this goal.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga