Features
Are we slashing the nose to spite the face?

Amending 19th Amendment
By Austin Fernando (Former Secretary to the President)
Recently, the Cabinet of Ministers decided to amend/repeal (?) the 19th Amendment to the Constitution (hereinafter referred to as 19). The media divulged that the government would retain positive features of the 19 and remove the unwanted. Concurrently, to identify and recommend these a Committee of five was appointed
Background of 19
The 19 has a chronological evolution. For conceptual value, let us review one aspect – the public service. The 1947 Constitution enabled an independent Public Service Commission (PSC) for them.
In 1972, the Sirima Bandaranaike government placed the public service under a PSC but brought in the Cabinet control for operationalizing. Through the 1978 Constitution, the JR Jayewardene government also placed public servants under the control of the Cabinet. These were acts of continuous politicization.
The Chandrika Kumaratunga government, by the 17th Amendment (Article 54), depoliticized the public service and other democratic aspects by the appointment of a PSC nominated by a Constitutional Council (CC), consisting of politicians and civilians. Seven similar institutions (e.g., the Election Commission, National Police Commission) also were legislated on-demand.
The Mahinda Rajapaksa government passed the 18th Amendment to establish a government-biased “Parliamentary Council” (PC). The President snatched the depoliticization efforts under the 17th Amendment through Commissions.
By 2014, there were criticisms and deep dissatisfaction with politicization created by the actions of all political parties. This dissatisfaction created revitalized pressure for depoliticization. Ultimately, Mr. Maithripala Sirisena sought a mandate for the presidency on the depoliticization slogan. The 19 was the consequence. It is acknowledged that the passage of 19 would have inevitably failed, sans interventions of President Sirisena.
Are our politicians sticks in the mud?
The responses of parliamentarians for depoliticization, in general, had been ridiculous. They supported depoliticization by President Kumaratunga (17A); supported politicization (18A) of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. They helped depoliticization (19A) by President Sirisena. Parliamentarians will sponsor the 20th Amendment to empower President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Strengthening the hands of the already empowered seems a hobby of Parliamentarians!
Political reactions created humour when a Minister recently declared that support for 19A was due to a promise made to change the electoral system, which of course, is a sheer necessity. Humorously and unfortunately, politicians who agree to change the Constitution on verbal agreements are elected to Parliament.
The clamor reinstatement of powers removed by 19
There is heavy orchestration that security and development would collapse with 19A. From 1978 to 2009, Sinhala and Tamil youth, especially in the North and East, revolted and thousands of innocents were killed or made to disappear, and suspects were killed in Police cells when Executive powers revoked by the 19A were with incumbent Presidents. The Executive powers were inevitably linked to the onset of conflicts. Therefore, it is a wiser step to find alternative solutions for enhancing human security than to demand the return of powers withdrawn by 19.
The same applies to development. Investment attraction during the tenure of President Jayewardene and infrastructural development during President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s (although both face criticisms) were positive moments before the 19th Amendment removed powers. Despite these powers being intact, some Presidents did not undertake such compelling development. I will not mention names to protect their dignity. Thus, one may argue that development isn’t constitution-centric but leader-centric.
There are shortcomings in the 19A since it is a human product. Before the General Election, President Sirisena said that 19A had good aspects, but its flaws should be rectified. He singled out some drawbacks but did not suggest a Deputy Premier post in the 20th Amendment. But it is rumored so.
Meantime, some like Minister Wimal Weerawansa and parliamentarian Gevindu Kumaratunga, who wished immediate abolishing of 19A during the election campaign, now demand a new Constitution instead of patchworking 19 (e. g., dual citizenship issue). It is unknown why this change of heart. Guess is yours!
The President has made a firm statement on the 20th Amendment in his Throne Speech. Therefore, President Sirisena may have to support the abolishing of 19A. In politics, sacrificing principles for partisanship, hollow promises, and tribal branding are acceptable!
The significant changes in 19A are categorized under, change in the qualifications for presidency and powers of the President, enhancement of the capabilities of the Legislature (= Prime Minister), empowerment of Commissions by the Legislature, and the Right to Information.
Changing powers of the President
It is already stated that Articles 30 (2) and 31 (2) of 19, related to the five-year term of office of the President and the two terms in office and the Right to Information Act, would not be amended.
But the government would need the power to dissolve the Parliament without parliamentary consent or completing the four and half years mentioned in 70(1). While President Jayewadene has taught lessons on using alternative powers (i.e., Referendum) not to dissolve, the present government authorities otherwise learned negative lessons in October 2018.
Also, dual citizens are no longer allowed to be Parliamentarians. [Article 91 (d) (xiii)]. Critics who protest dual citizen Arjuna Mahendran appointed as Governor of the Central Bank do not mind a dual citizen becoming a parliamentarian, Minister, Prime Minister or President. Those who support Minister Namal Rajapaksa’s presidential aspirations (if any) seem not to understand that the change of dual citizenship could jeopardize this aspiration by introducing a competitor. Is the demand by some for a brandnew Constitution instead of amending 19 a response for this potential jeopardy?
When queried on these changes, Ministers GL Peiris and Wimal Weerawansa said that constitutional changes should not be person-centric. Based on Minister Peiris referring to Basil and Namal Rajapaksas by name, if the contention is that 19A was person-centric and has disadvantaged selected persons, then the 20th Amendment raises the question of awarding person-centric advantages to another.
Presidential and National Security
Under Article 43 (2) of 19, the Minister of Defense must be appointed from among the Members of Parliament. It is so in other countries that have more significant defence risks (e.g., India). Now the societal belief is that the President is the Minister of Defence. If true, the President has illegally “snatched” the subject of defence. Nevertheless, I passionately believe that the security function should constitutionally remain with the President.
I take this stance on constitutional grounds, quite impersonally. Article 4 (b) of our Constitution stipulates that the “executive power of the people, including the defence of Sri Lanka,” must be exercised by the President. The term defence’ is a specially chosen here. The President has the power and duty to “declare war and peace” [Article 33 (2) (g)]. The appointment of Military Commanders and the Police Chief is a presidential power (Article 61E), and, under Article 33A, the President is accountable to the Parliament on laws applicable to public security. Accountability to Parliament is about the President’s “own” powers, and not of another Defence Minister. The Ministry of Defence/relevant institutions must be under him to fulfil these functions.
When the President is held accountable for the duties performed by another Defence Minister, he is subjected to moral injustice, and the presidency is demeaned. The security/defence of the country is a constitutional responsibility of the President, and the 19th Amendment should be amended to strengthen his hands on defence and security. Technically “snatching security/defence” as purportedly done now is unacceptable. Also, he should not snatch other ministries on this basis, although he may prefer.
Increasing powers of the Legislature and PM
Sovereignty is “exercised and enjoyed” by the tripod Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary under Articles 4 (a), (b), and (c) of our Constitution. But what is heard, seen, and said now insinuates that all three functions should be left to the Executive. It seems to be the government’s political stance. It is not constitutional and decimates democracy.
When the Legislature is considered, the power of the President is weakened in several ways. Examples include the appointment of Ministers [(43(2)], non-Cabinet Ministers [[44(1)] ‘on the advice’ of the Prime Minister [43(2)] and remove any one of them on prime ministerial advice [Article 46 (3)(a)]. The power to remove the Prime Minister or any Minister was with the President [47(a)] in the 1978 Constitution.
The number of Ministers is decided by Article 46(1)(a) and (b). With 145 parliamentarians supporting the government President may opt to reward more portfolios and will require amending it.
Article 44(2) of the 1978 Constitution permits any subject or function unassigned to a Minister to be left with the President. This power was removed by 19, and the 20th Amendment may return this power to the President.
The sudden removal of the Prime Minister (as President Kumaratunga did in 2004 and President Sirisena in October 2018) [70(1)(a) of 1978 Constitutionn] is prohibited now. Such restriction is necessary for the stability of the Legislature and the country. Still, I think the 20th Amendment can be used to prevent the judiciary from rejecting such courses of action.
In this connection, the dissolution of the Cabinet and removal of the Prime Minister were issues. During the October 2018 constitutional crisis, it was argued that the President had this power over Article 48 (1) of the Constitution (Sinhala version), which is not in the English version. The judiciary rejected this. Any President will inevitably rush to regain that decisive power.
However, the extent to which these perfections are democratic is most questionable.
Duties of the CC
The CC plays a leading role in depoliticization in 19A. After abolishing 19A, the alternative to the CC could be the passage of an instrument closest to the 18th Amendment. Further provisions can be added as appropriate to concentrate power in the Executive. The 17th and 19th Amendments proposed a CC (including Members of Parliament and civilians). The 18th Amendment appointed a “Parliamentary Council” (PC) consisting of only Members of Parliament. It was total politicization. Although the PC could make nominations to the Commissions and Scheduled Offices in the 18, the President was allowed constitutionally to overrule them. The 19A allowed these appointments to be made only on recommendations of the CC [Article (41B (1)]. If the President did not appoint them within two weeks, they were considered “as deemed to have been appointed.” [Article [41B (4)] It prevented the President’s ‘monopoly’ of appointing. The President would like to use the 20th Amendment to remove these strictures on him.
Appointments under the 19A were mostly acceptable. The best evidence of the independence of the CC was observed when it (inclusive of Opposition membership) rejected two nominations made by President Sirisena to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. On a handful of occasions when the President did not agree to appoint some of the nominees to Commissions, they were successfully reconciled through dialogue. The CC should not be the cat’s paw of the President; nor should the CC be a dictator. Amendments to 19A for efficient and transparent operationalization of the CC could be undertaken now. But what the government needs is to win, at all costs, because of its two-thirds majority!
Critics of the CC highlight the failure to appoint a Police Chief and the conduct of a Member of the Election Commission. To correct these, they demand abolishing the Commissions! The former, I believe, is a result of public service disciplinary procedures that cannot be ignored by the National Police Commission. Critics could have sought legal redress if Article 41A (8) of the Constitution was insufficient to discipline this Member. Providing in 20th Amendment remedies for such will be more effective than crushing the CC. One should not slash the nose to spite the face!
Another complaint is that even the President cannot appoint a judge. The reason may be the failure of President Sirisena to appoint two persons nominated by him to the judiciary. There were Opposition members in the CC when those decisions were made. Yet, they do not accept these reasonable decisions. These are victories for democracy. Also, they are silent that the CC also considers Chief Justice’s recommendations.
If the monopoly on appointing judges is given to the President, there will be no space for objections in the CC. The President is a ‘political product.’ He is a human being. Therefore, the President can appoint his supporters to higher judicial posts from his professional organizations if he so wishes. The President must respect Lord Chief Justice Hewart’s maxim that justice should not only be done but should be seen to have been done.
Of course, one can criticise the CC for some questionable appointments. Again without slashing the nose to spite the face, the 20th Amendment could propose cleaner operational guidelines. In a country where judicial appointments were made (though rarely) based on personal consideration before the 19A, these critics should value the CC machinery as superior to pure presidential whim and fancy.
Information law and action
Some question whether the Right to Information Act is adequately implemented due to deliberated delays by the authorities. Although this is not changed, it is appropriate to strengthen operations through the 20th Amendment. I note that not only the RTI Act but also other Commissions may require similar legal changes.
The value of caution
It is not surprising that a two-thirds majority or a government capable of manipulating that superpower would somehow pursue achieving its goals. Everyone who came to power thought that power was eternal, though it is impermanent. It is also not surprising seeing leadership that utilized the 18th Amendment attempting to regain lost powers. Even the present Opposition may pray for rejuvenation of powers of the 1978 Constitution; because politicians are greedy for power. Therefore, it is not surprising that they are also fluid about 20A.
But it should be kept in mind that if a constitution that cannot be amended again without a 2/3 majority is promulgated today, it could endanger the constitutional complexity another day. The vision and aspirations of the incumbent President may be pure. He may not be entertaining dictatorial goals, as alleged. But we must not be blind, that one day someone like Robert Mugabe or Idi Amin will not emerge. Therefore, it would be better to fertilize democracy without cutting the nose to spite the face when dealing with 19A.
Features
Challenges to addressing allegations during Sri Lanka’s armed conflict

A political commentator has attributed the UK sanctions against four individuals, three of whom were top ranking Army and Navy Officers associated with Sri Lanka’s armed conflict, to the failure of successive governments to address human rights allegations, which he describes as a self-inflicted crisis. The reason for such international action is the consistent failure of governments to conduct independent and credible inquiries into allegations of war crimes; no ‘effective investigative mechanism’ has been established to examine the conduct of either the Sri Lankan military or the LTTE.
He has not elaborated on what constitutes an “effective investigative mechanism. He has an obligation and responsibility to present the framework of such a mechanism. The hard reality however is that no country, not even South Africa, has crafted an effective investigative mechanism to address post conflict issues.
INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISMS
The hallmark of a credible investigative mechanism should be unravelling the TRUTH. No country has ventured to propose how such a Mechanism should be structured and what its mandate should be. Furthermore, despite the fact that no country has succeeded in setting up a credible truth-seeking mechanism, the incumbent government continues to be committed to explore “the contours of a strong truth and reconciliation framework” undaunted by the failed experiences of others, the most prominent being South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is often cited as the gold standard for post conflict Mechanisms. Consequently, most titles incorporate the word “Truth” notwithstanding the fact that establishing the “Truth” was a failure not only in South Africa but also in most countries that attempted such exercises.
Citing the South African experience, Prof. G. L. Peiris states: “pride of place was given to sincere truth-telling which would overcome hatred and the primordial instinct for revenge. The vehicle for this was amnesty…… Despite the personal intervention of Mandela, former State President P. W. Botha was adamant in his refusal to appear before the Commission, which he deemed as ‘a fierce unforgiving assault’ on Afrikaaners” (The Island, 01 April, 2025). In the case of Sri Lanka too, disclosures to find the “Truth” would be all about the other party to the conflict, thus making Truth seeking an accusatory process, instead of a commitment to finding the Truth. The reluctance to engage in frank disclosure is compounded by the fear of recrimination by those affected by the Truth.
Continuing Prof. Peiris cites experiences in other countries. “Argentina, the power to grant amnesty was withheld from the Commission. In Columbia, disclosure resulted not in total exoneration, but in mitigating sentences. In Chile, prosecutions were feasible only after a prolonged interval since the dismantling of Augusta Pinochet’s dictatorship ….” (Ibid).
The mechanisms adopted by the countries cited above reflect their own social and cultural values. Therefore, Sri Lanka too has to craft mechanisms in keeping with its own civilisational values of restorative and not retributive justice for true reconciliation, as declared by President J. R, Jayewardene in San Francisco as to what the global attitude should be towards Japan at the conclusion of World War II. Since the several Presidential Commissions appointed under governments already embody records of alleged violations committed, the information in these commission reports should be the foundation of the archival records on which the edifice of reconciliation should be built.
ESTABLISHING DUE CONTEXT
The suggestion that an independent and credible inquiry be conducted into allegations of war crimes reflects a skewed understanding of the actual context in which the armed conflict in Sri Lanka occurred. Even the UNHRC has acknowledged that the provisions of “Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions relating to conflicts not of an international character is applicable to the situation in Sri Lanka, as stated in para. 182 of the OISL Report by the UNHRC Office. Therefore, the correct context is International Humanitarian Law with appropriate derogations of Human Rights law during an officially declared Emergency as per the ICCPR.; a fact acknowledged in the OISL report.
Consequently, the armed conflict has to conform to provisions of Additional Protocol II of 1977, because “This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions is the due context. There is no provision for “alleged war crimes” in the Additional Protocol. Although Sri Lanka has not formally ratified Additional Protocol II, the Protocol is today accepted by the Community of Nations as Customary Law. On the other hand, “war crimes” are listed in the Rome Statute; a Statute that Sri Lanka has NOT ratified and not recognized as part of Customary Law.
Therefore, any “investigative mechanism” has to be conducted within the context cited above, which is Additional Protocol II of 1977.
SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE
On the other hand, why would there be a need for Sri Lanka to engage in an independent and credible inquiry into allegations, considering the following comment in Paragraph 9.4 and other Paragraphs of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)?
“In evaluating the Sri Lankan experience in the context of allegations of violations of IHL (International Humanitarian Law), the Commission is satisfied that the military strategy that was adopted to secure the LTTE held areas was one that was carefully conceived in which the protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority”
9.7 “Having reached the above conclusion, it is also incumbent on the Commission to consider the question, while there is no deliberate targeting of civilians by the Security Forces, whether the action of the Security Forces of returning fire into the NFZs was excessive in the context of the Principle of Proportionality…” (Ibid)
The single most significant factor that contributed to violations was the taking of Civilians in the N Fire Zone hostage (NFZ) by the LTTE. This deliberate act where distinction between civilian and combatant was deliberately abandoned, exposed and compromised the security of the Civilians. The consequences of this single act prevent addressing whether military responses were proportionate or excessive, or whether the impact of firing at make-shift hospitals were deliberate or not, and whether limiting humanitarian aid was intentional or not. These issues are recorded and addressed in the Presidential Commission Reports such as LLRC and Paranagama. This material should be treated as archival material on which to build an effective framework to foster reconciliation.
UK SANCTIONS
Sanctions imposed by the UK government as part of an election pledge for Human Rights violations during the armed conflict is a direct act of intervention according to Article 3 of the Additional Protocol of 1977 that is the acknowledged context in which actions should be judged.
Article 3 Non-intervention states:
1 “Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government by all legislative means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State”.
2 “Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory on which the conflict occurs”.
Targeting specific individuals associated with the armed conflict in Sri Lanka is a direct assault of intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. The UK government should be ashamed for resorting to violating International Law for the sake of fulfilling an election pledge. If Sri Lanka had issued strictures on the UK government for not taking action against any military officers responsible for the Bloody Sunday massacre where 26 unarmed civilians participating in a protest march were shot in broad daylight, Sri Lanka would, in fact be intervening in UK’s internal affairs.
CONCLUSION
The UK’s action reflects the common practice of making election pledges to garner targeted votes of ethnic diasporas. The influence of ethnic diasporas affecting the conduct of mainstream politics is becoming increasingly visible, the most recent being the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act of Ontario that was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada on grounds the Provincial Legislations have no jurisdiction over Federal and International Laws.
However, what should not be overlooked is that the armed conflict occurred under provisions of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This Article is developed and supplemented by Additional Protocol II of 1977. Therefore, since all Geneva Conventions are recognised as Customary Law, so should the Additional Protocol II be, because it is a development of common Article 3.
Imposing sanctions under provisions of Additional Protocol II amounts to Intervention in internal affairs of a State as stated in Article 3 of the Protocol; II cited above. Such interventions are prohibited under provisions of international law.
The need to revive independent and credible inquiries after the lapse of 16 years is unrealistic because those who were perpetrators and victims alike cannot be identified and/or located. Furthermore, the cost of disclosure because of the possibility of retribution would compromise their security. A realistic approach is to use the material recorded in the Presidential Commission Reports and treat them as archival records and use the lessons learnt from them to forge a workable framework that would foster unity and reconciliation with the survivors in all communities This is not to live in the past but to live in the here and now – the present, which incidentally, is the bedrock of Sri Lanka’s civilisational values.
by Neville Ladduwahetty
Features
The Silent Invasion: Unchecked spread of oil palm in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka’s agricultural landscape is witnessing a silent yet profound transformation with the rapid expansion of oil palm plantations. Once introduced as a commercial crop, the oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) is now at the center of a heated debate, with environmentalists and scientists warning of its devastating ecological consequences.
Speaking to The Island research scientist Rajika Gamage, said: “The spread of oil palm in Sri Lanka is not just a concern for biodiversity, but also for water resources, soil stability, and even local economies that rely on traditional crops.”
A Brief History of Oil Palm Cultivation
Oil palm, originally from West and Central Africa, was first cultivated for commercial purposes in Java in 1948 by Dutch colonists. It reached Malaysia and Indonesia by 1910, where its lucrative potential drove large-scale plantations.
According to Gamage, in Sri Lanka, the first significant oil palm plantation was established in 1968 at Nakiyadeniya Estate by European planters, initially covering a mere 0.5 hectares. Today, oil palm cultivation is predominantly concentrated in Galle, Matara, and Kalutara districts, with smaller plantations in Colombo, Rathnapura, and Kegalle.
Over the decades, he says the commercial viability of oil palm has prompted its expansion, often at the cost of native forests and traditional agricultural lands. Government incentives and private investments have further accelerated the spread of plantations, despite growing concerns over their environmental and social impacts.
Economic Boon or Environmental Curse?
Supporters of oil palm industry argue that it is the most efficient crop for vegetable oil production, yielding more oil per hectare than any other alternative. Sri Lanka currently imports a significant amount of palm oil, and expanding local production is seen as a way to reduce dependence on imports and boost local industries. However, Gamage highlights the hidden costs: “Oil palm plantations deplete water sources, contribute to soil erosion, and threaten native flora and fauna. These are long-term damages that far outweigh the short-term economic benefits.”
One of the primary environmental concerns is the aggressive water consumption of oil palm, which leads to the depletion of underground aquifers. This is particularly evident in areas such as Kalu River and Kelani River wetlands, where native ecosystems are being severely affected. Additionally, soil degradation caused by extensive monoculture farming results in loss of fertility and increased vulnerability to landslides in hilly regions.
Furthermore, studies show that oil palm plantations disrupt the natural habitats of endemic species. “Unlike rubber and coconut, oil palm does not support Sri Lanka’s rich biodiversity. It alters the soil composition and prevents the regeneration of native plant species,” Gamage explains. The loss of forest cover also exacerbates human-wildlife conflicts, as displaced animals venture into human settlements in search of food and shelter.
A Threat to Indigenous Agriculture and Culture
Beyond environmental concerns, oil palm is also threatening traditional crops like kitul (Caryota urens) and palmyrah (Borassus flabellifer), both of which hold economic and cultural significance. “These native palms have sustained rural livelihoods for centuries,” says Gamage. “Their gradual replacement by oil palm could lead to economic instability for small-scale farmers.”
Kitul tapping, an age-old tradition in Sri Lanka, provides a source of income for thousands of families, particularly in rural areas. The syrup extracted from kitul is used in local cuisine and traditional medicine. Similarly, palmyrah has deep roots in Sri Lankan culture, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where its products contribute to food security and local industries.
The rise of oil palm plantations has led to the clearing of lands that once supported the traditional crops. With large-scale commercial investments driving oil palm expansion, small-scale farmers are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their livelihoods. Gamage warns, “If we allow oil palm to replace our native palms, we risk losing not just biodiversity, but also a vital part of our cultural heritage.”
The Global Perspective: Lessons from Other Nations
Sri Lanka is not the first country to grapple with the consequences of oil palm expansion. Malaysia and Indonesia, the world’s leading producers of palm oil, have faced severe deforestation, biodiversity loss, and socio-economic conflicts due to unchecked plantation growth.
In Indonesia, for example, vast tracts of rainforest have been cleared for palm oil production, leading to habitat destruction for endangered species such as orangutans and Sumatran tigers. Additionally, indigenous communities have been displaced, sparking legal battles over land rights.
Malaysia has attempted to address some of these issues by introducing sustainability certifications, such as the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) standard. However, implementation challenges remain, and deforestation continues at an alarming rate.
Sri Lanka can learn valuable lessons from these experiences. Implementing strict land-use policies, promoting agroforestry practices, and ensuring transparency in plantation expansion are crucial steps in mitigating environmental damage while supporting economic development.
The Urgent Need for Action
Despite these concerns, Sri Lanka has yet to enforce strict regulations on oil palm expansion. Gamage urges authorities to intervene: “It is imperative that we implement policies to control its spread before it is too late. The unchecked expansion of oil palm will lead to irreversible environmental damage.”
To address this issue, experts suggest a multi-pronged approach:
Stronger Land-Use Policies
– The government must enforce restrictions on oil palm cultivation in ecologically sensitive areas, such as wetlands and forest reserves.
Reforestation and Rehabilitation
– Efforts should be made to restore degraded lands by reintroducing native tree species and promoting sustainable agroforestry.
Supporting Traditional Agriculture
– Incentives should be provided to farmers growing traditional crops like kitul and palmyrah, ensuring that these industries remain viable.
Public Awareness and Education
– Raising awareness among local communities about the environmental and social impacts of oil palm can empower them to make informed decisions about land use.
Sustainable Alternatives
– Encouraging research into alternative vegetable oil sources, such as coconut oil, which has long been a staple in Sri Lankan agriculture, could reduce reliance on palm oil.
As Sri Lanka stands at a crossroads, the decisions made today will determine the country’s ecological and agricultural future. While the economic benefits of oil palm are undeniable, its long-term environmental and social costs cannot be ignored. The challenge now is to strike a balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability before the damage becomes irreversible.
In conclusion Gamage said, “We must act now. If we allow oil palm to spread unchecked, future generations will bear the cost of our inaction.”
Sri Lanka has the opportunity to take a different path—one that prioritises biodiversity conservation, sustainable agriculture, and the well-being of local communities. The time for decisive action is now.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
A plea for establishing a transboundary Blue-Green Biosphere Reserve in Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay

Blue-green land and waterscapes act as ecological corridors across land and water in creating an ecological continuity in order to protect and restore the habitats of native and naturalised species.
In addition, these ecological corridors also help to conserve and improve the habitats of migratory species, as well. One of the main objectives of establishing blue-green land-waterscapes is to reconcile increasing local/regional development and human livelihood challenges in a sustainable manner while, at the same time, safeguard biodiversity and their habitats/ecosystems, as far as possible.
While green landscapes are natural and semi-natural terrestrial vegetation types like natural forests and grasslands, blue waterscapes are aquatic or semi-aquatic vegetation types such as seagrass meadows, mangroves and coastal and other wetlands. These vegetated coastal ecosystems known as ‘blue carbon’ ecosystems are some of the most productive on Earth and located at the interfaces among terrestrial, freshwater and marine environments. They provide us with essential ecosystem services, such as serving as a buffer in coastal protection from storms and erosion, spawning grounds for fish, filtering pollutants and contaminants from coastal waters thus improving coastal water quality and contributing to all important food security.
In addition, they capture and store “blue” carbon from the atmosphere and oceans at significantly higher rates per unit area than tropical forests (Figure 1) and hence act as effective carbon sinks. By storing carbon, these ecosystems help to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, thus contributing significantly to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Figure 1: Carbon storage in different vegetation types (Source – What Is Blue Carbon and Why Does It Matter? – Sustainable Travel International)
.Blue-green Carbon Markets
The recognition of blue carbon (BC) ecosystems (primarily mangroves, seagrasses and tidal marshes) as an effective natural climate solution paved the way for their inclusion within carbon markets. Blue carbon is the marine analog of green carbon, which refers to carbon captured by terrestrial (i.e., land-based) plants. The blue-green carbon market involves buying and selling carbon credits from projects that protect and restore coastal and marine ecosystems (blue carbon) and terrestrial ecosystems (green carbon). Since Blue Carbon ecosystems have higher carbon sequestration (capture and store) potential compared to their terrestrial counterparts, blue Carbon credits are worth over two times more than green carbon credits. They offer opportunities for commercial enterprises to offset carbon emissions and in turn support climate action.
Blue Carbon projects are expected to grow twofold in the near future. With the recent surge in international partnerships and funding, there is immense growth potential for the blue carbon market. However, it is critically important to look beyond the value of the carbon sequestered to ensure the rights and needs of local communities that are central to any attempt to mitigate climate change using a blue and green carbon project.
Blue Carbon projects can serve as grassroot hubs for sustainable development by developing nature-based solutions in these ecosystems thus contributing to both climate change mitigation and adaptation. Globally, numerous policies, coastal management strategies, and tools designed for conserving and restoring coastal ecosystems have been developed and implemented. Policies and finance mechanisms being developed for climate change mitigation may offer an additional route for effective coastal management. The International Blue Carbon Initiative, for example, is a coordinated, global program focused on conserving and restoring coastal ecosystems for the climate, biodiversity and human wellbeing.
Until recently, most of these opportunities focus on carbon found in the above ground vegetative biomass and do not account for the carbon in the soil. On the other hand, blue carbon, in particular has the potential for immense growth in carbon capture economics in the near future and can provide significant socioeconomic and environmental benefits. Consequently, blue -green carbon habitats in the Gulf of Mannar – Palk Bay region represent invaluable assets in climate change mitigation and coastal ecosystem conservation and sustainable development.
Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay Trans-boundary Region
The Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay region form a transboundary area within the waters of southeastern India and northwestern Sri Lanka. This region supports dense seagrass meadows having a high level of marine biodiversity including marine mammals such as dugong. Sea turtles are frequent visitors to the gulf while sharks, dolphins, sperm and baleen whales too, have been reported from this area. The Mannar region is recognized as an Important Marine Mammal Area (IMMA) of the world by IUCN (Figure 2) and also an Important Bird Area by Birdlife International. This region as a whole is a store house of unique biological wealth of global significance and as such is considered as one of the world’s richest regions from a marine biodiversity perspective.

Figure 2. Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay IMMA (Source – IUCN Joint SSC/WCPA Marine Mammal Protected Areas Task Force, 2022 IUCN-MMPATF (2022)
Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve – India
India has already declared a part of this region as the UNESCO Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve covering an area of 10,500 km2 of ocean with 21 islands and the adjoining coastline. The islets and coastal buffer zone include beaches, estuaries, and tropical dry broadleaf forests, while the surrounding seascape of the Marine National Park (established in 1986) and a 10 km strip of the coastal landscape that include seaweed communities, seagrass communities, coral reefs, salt marshes and mangrove forests form the coastal and marine component of the biosphere reserve on the Indian side of the Gulf of Mannar.
Sri Lankan ‘Proposed’ Biosphere Reserve
On the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay there is a semi-enclosed shallow water body between the southeast coast of India and Sri Lanka, with a water depth maximum of 13 m. To the south, a chain of low islands and reefs known as Adam’s Bridge or Rama Setu (Rama’s Bridge), separates Palk Bay from the Gulf of Mannar. The Palk Bay leads to Palk Strait (Figure 3). Palk Bay is one of the major sinks for sediments along with the Gulf of Mannar. Sediments discharged by rivers and transported by the surf currents as littoral drift settle in this sink.
On the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay, studies are being conducted by the Dugong and Seagrass Conservation Project to establish an additional 10,000 hectares of Marine Protected Area to support the conservation of dugongs and their seagrass habitat in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay. This project will involve the preparation of a multiple-community-based management plan in conjunction with government, fishing communities and the tourism industry.
With this valuable information emerging from projects of this nature, Sri Lanka has real opportunities to create a large marine protected area in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay region and eventually merging them together with the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve of India to form a trans-boundary biosphere Reserve.
Terrestrial cum Marine Spatial Plan for the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay Region
Therefore, an excellent opportunity awaits both the Governments of Sri Lanka and India to collaborate in preparing of a terrestrial and marine spatial plan for this region, a prerequisite before going further on designing and implementing large scale development plans in establishing wind energy farms, mineral sand extraction, fishing industry, oil exploration and tourism development.
Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning (CMSP) is an integrated, place-based approach for allocating coastal and marine resources and space, while protecting the ecosystems that provide these vital resources.
On the Indian side, the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere reserve is well established and functional. On the Sri Lankan side, already there are three DWLC managed protected areas i) Adam’s Bridge Marine National Park (# 29 in the map – 18,990 ha declared in 2015), ii) Vedithalathiv Nature Reserve (# 35 -29,180 ha declared in 2016) and iii) Vankalai Sanctuary ( # 97 -4839 ha declared in 2008) (Figure 4) which can serve as the core zone of the Sri Lankan counterpart of a trans-boundary biosphere reserve. Due to the integrated nature of shallow wetland and terrestrial coastal habitats, Vankalai Sanctuary, in particular is highly productive, supporting high ecosystem and species diversity.

Figure 4: Protected Areas in Norther Sri Lanka Managed by the Department of Wildlife Conservation Source: DWLC
This site provides excellent feeding and living habitats for a large number of water bird species, including annual migrants, which also use this area on arrival and during their exit from Sri Lanka.
Having several coastal and marine protected areas already within the Sri Lankan territory provide an excellent opportunity to establish the Gulf of Mannar – Palk Bay blue-green Biosphere Reserve (Sri Lanka) initially and eventually to join up seamlessly with the already established Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve on the Indian side to create a trans-boundary blue-green biosphere reserve.
This makes perfect sense because unlike sedentary plant species, mobile animal and plant groups (phytoplankton, in particular) do not respect human demarcated territorial boundaries. The provision of a common and unhindered protected coastal and marine passage for their customary movement for food and raising young is therefore of crucial importance in conservation management. Scientific evidence-based selection of additional areas, if necessary and their respective boundaries are best be determined in consultation with expert groups on marine mammals and reptiles, birds, fish, coastal vegetation conservation, sociology and industrial development from both sides of the divide.
Proper spatial planning needs to be done before large-scale development plans are designed and implemented in order to avoid conflicts of interest leading to inordinate delays and teething problems in project initiation. As a priority, the protected blue-green core and buffer regions need to be demarcated for their conservation. This could best be done in this narrow passage of land and water between Sri Lanka and India
( Palk Strait & Gulf of Mannar) by preparing a marine and terrestrial spatial plan along the UNESCO Man and Biosphere conceptual guidelines differentiating core, buffer and transition zones. While the protected areas in the core and buffer zone provide all important ecosystem services that would also serve as breeding ground for fish, crustaceans, marine reptiles, birds and mammals thereby provisioning sustainable industries to be developed in the surrounding transition areas demarcated in the joint spatial plan.
In addition, the Satoyama Global Initiative established by the Japanese at UNESCO as a global effort in 2009 to realise ‘societies in harmony with nature’ in which – Satoumi – specifically referring to the management of socio-ecological production landscapes in marine and coastal regions, is also a good model to be considered for conservation of biodiversity and co-existence between humans and nature.
Final Plea
In order to take this proposal forward from the Sri Lankan side, a number of useful baseline reports are already available including, but not limited to, the following: i. Biodiversity Profile of the Mannar District (CEJ & USAID 2022), ii. The Gulf of Mannar and its surroundings (IUCN 2012), iii) Atlas of Mangroves, Salt Marshes and Sand Dunes of the Coastal Area from Malwathu Oya to Pooneryn in the Northwestern Coastal Region, Sri Lanka (Ecological Association of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, 2020). iv. Integrated Strategic Environment Assessment of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka (CEA 2014).
If this proposal to establish a Trans-boundary Blue-Green Biosphere Reserve in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay is acceptable in principle to the Governments of Sri Lanka and India, it would be ideal if the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) program UNESCO which is an intergovernmental scientific program whose mission is to establish a scientific basis for enhancing the relationship between people and their environments to partner with the relevant Government and non-governmental agencies in both countries in making it a reality. This proposed concept has all the necessary elements for developing a unique sustainable conservation cum industrial development strategy via nature-based solutions while at the same time contributing to both climate change mitigation and adaptation.
by Emeritus Professor Nimal Gunatilleke,
University of Peradeniya
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