Features
Anti-Terrorism Bill aimed at creating fascist dictatorship – III
By Kalyananda Tiranagama
(Continued from yesterday)
Declaration of Prohibited Places
On a recommendation made by the IGP, the President may publish a Gazette notification declaring any public place or any other location as a Prohibited Place, for the purposes of this Act. Prohibitions imposed may include entry without permission, taking photographs, video recording and making sketches of the place. – S. 85,
Wilful contravention of a Prohibition Order by entering or remaining in a prohibited place is an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding 3 years and fine not exceeding Rs. 300,000.Any police officer may seize any movable property used for or concerned in committing any offence under this section. On conviction of the offender the Magistrate may confiscate such property. – S. 86
Defence Secretary armed with arbitrary power overriding the Judiciary to detain suspects till the conclusion of the trial
A new provision which was not in the PTA or in the CTB, has been added to the ATB giving arbitrary powers to the Secretary of the Ministry of Defence enabling him to order detention of terrorist suspects belonging certain selected categories facing High Court trials till the conclusion of the trial. It appears to be a provision added with a view to achieve a political objective rather than a legal requirements.It is not the Law, AG or the Judiciary that decides whether a suspect is to be kept in detention till the conclusion of the Trial, but the Defence Secretary.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or any other law, the Secretary of the Ministry of Defence may, if he is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient to do so in the interest of national security and public order, make Order that an accused remanded by the High Court, be kept in the custody of any authority in such place and subject to such conditions as may be determined by him; his Order is only subjected to directions given by the High Court to ensure a fair trial; On the communication of his Order to the High Court and the Commissioner General of Prisons, it is the duty of the Commissioner General to deliver the custody of such person to the authority specified in such Order and the provisions in the Prisons Ordinance shall not apply to such person in custody. – S. 73
PTA did not contain this type of arbitrary, draconian provisions overriding the law, powers of the Court and the AG in respect of suspects indicted before the High Court.
Silencing Critics of Govt by Penalising them through Administrative Process without being charged in or convicted by a Court of LawUnder the PTA, the Attorney General has no option but to indict a person who has committed an offence under the PTA if evidence is available showing the commission of the offence.
Under ATB, the Attorney General can suspend or differ the institution of proceedings against a person alleged to have committed an offence under the Act for a period not exceeding 20 years if the suspect is agreeable to fulfil conditions laid down by the AG. – S. 71
It appears that this a ruse to be adopted to silence the persons engaging in struggles, agitations and campaigns against the Govt by compelling them to admit in public that they have done something that should not have been done and subjecting them to public humiliation and preventing them from participation in any future anti-govt political activities under the threat of being prosecuted years later with offences punishable with long term jail sentences running into 10 – 15 years if they fail to comply with the conditions imposed by the AG.
On application of the AG, High Court shall order the person alleged to have committed the offence to appear before Court, notify such person of the conditions imposed and provide him an opportunity to be heard and consent to the conditions imposed;
If such person fulfils the conditions imposed during the period given for fulfilling such conditions, the AG shall not institute criminal proceedings against the person alleged to have committed the offence. If the person fails to comply with the conditions without a valid excuse, AG may institute criminal proceedings against such person after the lapse of the period given to fulfil the conditions.
Conditions for suspension or deferment of institution of criminal proceedings
The following are the Conditions for consideration of suspension or deferment of institution of criminal proceedings against a suspect:
a. to publicly express remorse or apology before the High Court, using a text issued by the AG:
* In effect this will amount to pleading guilty, though the suspect is not yet charged;
b. paying reparation to the victims of the offence, as specified by the AG;
* This may not be applicable as in most of the cases, there will be no victims:
c. to participate in a specified program of rehabilitation;
d. to engage in specified community or social service;
* This will have a demoralising or humiliating effect on the suspects as most of them will be leading personal in trade unions, professional associations or social organizations when they are sent to a rehabilitation facility with other undesirable elements like drug offenders, or beggars; or required to engage in community or social service work like sweeping roads or cleaning public parks or other public places for 3 – 6 weeks;
e. to publicly undertake to refrain from committing an offence under the Act;
f. to refrain from committing any indictable offence, or act of breach of peace.
* Though breach of peace is not an indictable offence, every public protest, demonstration, agitational campaign with the participation of large group of people may result in acts of breach of peace.
* AG may impose a condition requiring the suspect to give an undertaking to refrain from committing an offence under the Act or any act involving breach of peace for 20 years, He may remain a virtual prisoner for life being unable to participate in any public protest campaign. This will operate like a binding order imposed by a Court of law on a criminal convicted of and sentenced for a criminal offence.
* This may result in subjecting the suspect to long time mental torture as he has to live in constant fear that he may be indicted under this Act any within that period of 20 years for the offence he is alleged to have committed punishable with long term jail sentence of 15 – 20 years.
* This Provision will have a deterrent effect on all social activists concerned with the welfare of the country and the people preventing them from participation in social struggles.
Violation of Fundamental Rights
Other than a few additions made further strengthening the existing provisions, the Anti-Terrorism Bill has reintroduced almost all the provisions in the Counter Terrorism Bill which appear to have the effect of curtailing fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution.
Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of engaging in trade union activities, freedom of movement within the country – are fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. In several fundamental rights cases our Supreme Court has held that people exercise their fundamental right of freedom of expression when they exercise their franchise at elections. At a time when elections are continuously being postponed, public protest against the harmful policies of the government is the only alternative avenue left to the people to express their disapproval in an effective manner.
Every organ of Government including the Judiciary is bound to respect, secure and advance the fundamental rights of the people. Fundamental Rights should not be abridged, restricted or denied except in the manner and to the extent provided in Article 15 of the Constitution. Many of the provisions in these Bills may inevitably result in the restriction, denial and infringement of fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by Articles 11, 12 (1), 13 and 14 (1) (a), (b), (c), (d) and (h) of the Constitution in their enforcement without adequate safeguards.
Most of the objectionable provisions in the Counter Terrorism Bill are found
in Sections 3 (1) (a), (b), (c); 3 (2) (c), (d) (f), (h); 4 (1) (c); 14; 62 and 67 of the Bill. Several of these provisions are liable to be abused without any safeguards to prevent such abuse, resulting in the violation the fundamental right to equality before the law and equal protection of the law, guaranteed by Article 12 (1) of the Constitution.
SC Determination on the Counter Terrorism Bill
Seven Determination Applications have been filed in the Supreme Court in respect of the Counter Terrorism Bill. Six of the Applications appear to have been filed by or on behalf of persons or groups seeking to review the PTA with a view to getting its provisions more relaxed and acceptable to NGO groups sympathetic to religious and racial extremists. Only one application has been filed by an opposition political party concerned with protecting people’s rights. It is sad to note that the Joint Opposition or Sri Lanka Podu Jana Peramuna, BASL or any other professional organizations concerned with erosion of human and democratic rights of the people have failed to come forward to challenge this objectionable Bill.
It appears from the Supreme Court decision on the Bill that the Court has not been invited to examine the objectionable provisions contained in Sections 3 (1) (a), (b), (c); 3 (2) (c), (d) (f), (h); 4 (1) (c); 14; 62 and 67 of the Bill.
In its Judgement running into 12 pages (in the Hansard), in 11 pages the Court has examined various other points raised by Counsels concerned with rights of terrorists arrested such as Sections 2 dealing with jurisdiction under the Act; S. 4 (1) (a), (b) – imposing life imprisonment instead of death penalty for murder; S. 5 – imposing jail sentence of 15 years instead of death penalty for abetment of murder; S. 24 (1), 27 (1) – dealing with period of police custody and medical examination of suspects arrested; S. 36 (6), 39 dealing with Magistrate’s power to remand or release a suspect; S. 68 (5) – dealing with Magistrate’s power to remand a suspect declining to make a statement to the Magistrate, and S. 93 (3) defining the term ‘law’ to include international instruments which recognize human rights and to which Sri Lanka is a signatory.
Without much elaboration, regarding S. 62 (1) and 81 (1) of the Bill the Court has held that under Article 15 (7) of the Constitution the Parliament can enact legislation in the interest of national security, placing restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution and enacting such legislation cannot violate the fundamental rights.
It is sad to note that the Court’s attention has not been adequately drawn to the serious impact of Sections 3 (1) (a), (b), (c); 3 (2) (c), (d) (f), (h); 4 (1) (c); 14; 62 and 67 of the Bill on the fundamental rights of the people on various grounds which have nothing to do with national security or terrorism.
The Court has held that other than S. 4 (a) and (b), 68 (5) and 93 (3), the Bill can be passed with a simple majority.
S, 4 (a) and (b) of the Bill – the penalty for murder and abetment to commit murder is life imprisonment. In the Penal Code, penalty for murder is death penalty. This violates Article 12 (1).
S. 68 (5) – When a suspect declines to make a statement to the Magistrate, such fact shall be communicated by the Magistrate to the relevant Police Officer and the suspect shall be kept in remand custody. This violates Article 12 (1).
S. 99 (3) – For the purpose of this section the expression ‘law’ includes international instruments which recognize human rights and to which Sri Lanka is a signatory. This is inconsistent with Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution. AG had suggested certain amendments to overcome these inconsistencies.
Features
The NPP Government is more than a JVP offspring:
It is also different from all past governments as it faces new and different challenges
No one knows whether the already broken ceasefire between the US and Iran, with Israel as a reluctant adjunct, will last the full 10 days, or what will come thereafter. The world’s economic woes are not over and the markets are yo-yoing in response to Trump’s twitches and Iran’s gate keeping at the Strait of Hormuz. The gloomy expert foretelling is that full economic normalcy will not return until the year is over even if the war were to end with the ceasefire. That means continuing challenges for Sri Lanka and more of the tough learning in the art of governing for the NPP.
The NPP government has been doing what most governments in Asia have been doing to cope with the current global crisis, which is also an Asian crisis insofar as oil supplies and other supply chains are concerned. What the government can and must do additionally is to be totally candid with the people and keep them informed of everything that it is doing – from monitoring import prices to the timely arranging of supplies, all the details of tender, the tracking of arrivals, and keeping the distribution flow through the market without bottlenecks. That way the government can eliminate upstream tender rackets and downstream hoarding swindles. People do not expect miracles from their government, only honest, sincere and serious effort in difficult circumstances. Backed up by clear communication and constant public engagement.
But nothing is going to stop the flow of criticisms against the NPP government. That is a fact of Sri Lankan politics. Even though the opposition forces are weak and have little traction and even less credibility, there has not been any drought in the criticisms levelled against the still fledgling government. These criticisms can be categorized as ideological, institutional and oppositional criticisms, with each category having its own constituency and/or commentators. The three categories invariably overlap and there are instances of criticisms that excite only the pundits but have no political resonance.
April 5 anniversary nostalgia
There is also a new line of criticism that might be inspired by the April 5 anniversary nostalgia for the 1971 JVP insurrection. This new line traces the NPP government to the distant roots of the JVP – its April 1965 founding “in a working-class home in Akmeemana, Galle” by a 22-year old Rohana Wijeweera and seven others; the short lived 1971 insurrection that was easily defeated; and the much longer and more devastating second (1987 to 1989) insurrection that led to the elimination of the JVP’s frontline leaders including Wijeweera, and brought about a change in the JVP’s political direction with commitment to parliamentary democracy. So far, so good, as history goes.
But where the nostalgic narrative starts to bend is in attempting a straight line connection from the 1965 Akmeemana origins of the JVP to the national electoral victories of the NPP in 2024. And the bend gets broken in trying to bridge the gap between the “founding anti-imperialist economics” of the JVP and the practical imperatives of the NPP government in “governing a debt-laden small open economy.” Yet this line of criticism differs from the other lines of criticism that I have alluded to, but more so for its moral purpose than for its analytical clarity. The search for clarity could begin with question – why is the NPP government more than a JVP offspring? The answer is not so simple, but it is also not too complicated.
For starters, the JVP was a political response to the national and global conditions of the 1960s and 1970s, piggybacking socialism on the bandwagon of ethno-nationalism in a bi-polar world that was ideologically split between status quo capitalism and the alternative of socialism. The NPP government, on the other hand, is not only a response to, but is also a product of the conditions of the 2010s and 2020s. The twain cannot be more different. Nothing is the same between then and now, locally and globally.
A pragmatic way to look at the differences between the origins of the JVP and the circumstances of the NPP government is to look at the very range of criticisms that are levelled against the NPP government. What I categorize as ideological criticisms include criticisms of the government’s pro-IMF and allegedly neo-liberal economic policies, as well as the government’s foreign policy stances – on Israel, on the current US-Israel war against Iran, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, and the apparent closeness to the Modi government in India. These criticisms emanate from the non-JVP left and Sinhala Buddhist nationalists.
Strands of nationalism
To digress briefly, there are several strands in the overall bundle of Sri Lankan nationalism. There is the liberal inclusive strand, the left-progressive strand, the exclusive Sinhala Buddhist Nationalist (SBN) strand, and the defensive strands of minority nationalisms. Given Sri Lanka’s historical political formations and alliances, much overlapping goes on between the different strands. The overlapping gets selective on an issue by issue basis, which in itself is not unwelcome insofar as it promotes plurality in place of exclusivity.
Historically as well, and certainly after 1956, the SBN strand has been the dominant strand of nationalism in Sri Lanka and has had the most influential say in every government until now. Past versions of the JVP frequently straddled the dominant SBN space. Currently, however, the dominant SBN strand is in one of its more dormant phases and the NPP government could be a reason for the current dormancy. This is an obvious difference between the old JVP and the new NPP.
A second set of criticisms, or institutional criticisms, emanate from political liberals and human rights activists and these are about the NPP government’s actions or non-actions in regard to constitutional changes, the future of the elected executive presidency, the status of provincial devolution and the timing of provincial council elections, progress on human rights issues, the resolution of unfinished postwar businesses including the amnesia over mass graves. These criticisms and the issues they represent are also in varying ways the primary concerns of the island’s Tamils, Muslims and the Malaiyaka (planntationn) Tamils. As with the overlapping between the left and the non-minority nationalists, there is also overlapping between the liberal activists and minority representatives.
A third category includes what might be called oppositional criticisms and they counterpose the JVP’s past against the NPP’s present, call into question the JVP’s commitment to multi-party democracy and raise alarms about a creeping constitutional dictatorship. This category also includes criticisms of the NPP government’s lack of governmental experience and competence; alleged instances of abuse of power, mismanagement and even corruption; alleged harassment of past politicians; and the failure to find the alleged mastermind behind the 2019 Easter bombings. At a policy and implementational level, there have been criticisms of the government’s educational reforms and electricity reforms, the responses to cyclone Ditwah, and the current global oil and economic crises. The purveyors of oppositional criticisms are drawn from the general political class which includes political parties, current and past parliamentarians, as well as media pundits.
Criticisms as expectations
What is common to all three categories of criticisms is that they collectively represent what were understood to be promises by the NPP before the elections, and have become expectations of the NPP government after the elections. It is the range and nature of these criticisms and the corresponding expectations that make the NPP government a lot more than a mere JVP offspring, and significantly differentiate it from every previous government.
The deliverables that are expected of the NPP government were never a part of the vocabulary of the original JVP platform and programs. The very mode of parliamentary politics was ideologically anathema to the JVP of Akmeemana. And there was no mention of or concern for minority rights, or constitutional reforms. On foreign policy, it was all India phobia without Anglo mania – a halfway variation of Sri Lanka’s mainstream foreign policy of Anglo mania and India phobia. For a party of the rural proletariat, the JVP was virulently opposed to the plantation proletariat. The JVP’s version of anti-imperialist economics would hardly have excited the Sri Lankan electorate at any time, and certainly not at the present time.
At the same time, the NPP government is also the only government that has genealogical antecedents to a political movement or organization like the JVP. That in itself makes the NPP government unique among Sri Lanka’s other governments. The formation of the NPP is the culmination of the evolution of the JVP that began after the second insurrection with the shedding of political violence, acceptance of political plurality and commitment to electoral democracy.
But the evolution was not entirely a process of internal transformation. It was also a response to a rapidly and radically changing circumstances both within Sri Lanka and beyond. This evolution has not been a rejection of the founding socialist purposes of the JVP in 1968, but their adaptation in the endless political search, under constantly changing conditions, for a non-violent, socialist and democratic framework that would facilitate the full development of the human potential of all Sri Lankans.
The burden of expectations is unmistakable, but what is also remarkable is their comprehensiveness and the NPP’s formal commitment to all of them at the same time. No previous government shouldered such an extensive burden or showed such a willing commitment to each and every one of the expectations. In the brewing global economic crisis, the criticisms, expectations and the priorities of the government will invariably be focussed on keeping the economy alive and alleviating the day-to-day difficulties of millions of Sri Lankan families. While what the NPP government can and must do may not differ much from what other Asian governments – from Pakistan to Vietnam – are doing, it could and should do better than what any and all past Sri Lankan governments did when facing economic challenges.
by Rajan Philips
Features
A Fragile Ceasefire: Pakistan’s Glory and Israel’s Sabotage
After threatening to annihilate one of the planet’s oldest civilizations, TACO* Trump chickened out again by grasping the ceasefire lifeline that Pakistan had assiduously prepared. Trump needed the ceasefire badly to stem the mounting opposition to the war in America. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu wanted the war to continue because he needed it badly for his political survival. So, he contrived a fiction and convinced Trump that Lebanon is not included in the ceasefire. Trump as usual may not have noticed that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Shariff had clearly indicated Lebanon’s inclusion in his announcement of the ceasefire at 7:50 PM, Tuesday, on X. Ten minutes before Donald Trump’s fake deadline.
True to form on Wednesday, Israel unleashed the heaviest assault by far on Lebanon, reportedly killing over 300 people, the highest single-day death toll in the current war. Iran responded by re-closing the Strait of Hormuz and questioning the need for talks in Islamabad over the weekend. There were other incidents as well, with an oil refinery attacked in Iran, and Iranian drones and missiles slamming oil and gas infrastructure in UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.
The US tried to insist that Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire, with the argumentative US Vice President JD Vance, who was in Budapest, Hungary, campaigning for Viktor Orban, calling the whole thing a matter of “bad faith negotiation” as well as “legitimate misunderstanding” on the part of Iran, and warning Iran that “it would be dumb to jeopardise its ceasefire with Washington over Israel’s attacks in Lebanon.”
But as the attack in Lebanon drew international condemnation – from Pope Leo to UN Secretary General António Guterres, and several world leaders, and amidst fears of Lebanon becoming another Gaza with 1,500 people including 130 children killed and more than a million people displaced, Washington got Israel to stop its “lawn mowing” in southern Lebanon.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to “open direct negotiations with Lebanon as soon as possible,”. Lebanese President Joeseph Aoun has also called for “a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, followed by direct negotiations between them.” Israel’s involvement in Lebanon remains a wild card that threatens the ceasefire and could scuttle the talks between the US and Iran scheduled for Saturday in Islamabad.
Losers and Winners
After the ceasefire, both the Trump Administration and Iran have claimed total victories while the Israeli government wants the war to continue. The truth is that after more than a month into nonstop bombing of Iran, America and Israel have won nothing. Only Iran has won something it did not have when Trump and Netanyahu started their war. Iran now has not only a say over but control of the Strait of Hormuz. The ceasefire acknowledges this. Both Trump and Netanyahu are under fire in their respective countries and have no allies in the world except one another.
The real diplomatic winner is Pakistan. Salman Rushdie’s palimpsest-country has emerged as a key player in global politics and an influential mediator in a volatile region. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Defence Field Marshal Asim Munir have both been praised by President Trump and credited for achieving the current ceasefire. The Iranian regime has also been effusive in its praise of Pakistan’s efforts.
It is Pakistan that persisted with the effort after initial attempts at backdoor diplomacy by Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye started floundering. Sharing a 900 km border and deep cultural history with Iran, and having a skirmish of its own on the eastern front with Afghanistan, Pakistan has all the reason to contain and potentially resolve the current conflict in Iran. Although a majority Sunni Muslim country, Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia Muslim population after Iran, and is the easterly terminus of the Shia Arc that stretches from Lebanon. The country also has a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia that includes Pakistan’s nuclear cover for the Kingdom. An open conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia would have put Pakistan in a dangerously awkward position.
It is now known and Trump has acknowledged that China had a hand in helping Iran get to the diplomatic table. Pakistan used its connections well to get Chinese diplomatic reinforcement. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar flew to Beijing to brief his Chinese counterpart and secured China’s public support for the diplomatic efforts. The visit produced a Five-Point Plan that became a sequel to America’s 15-point proposal and the eventual ten-point offer by Iran.
There is no consensus between parties as to which points are where and who is agreeing to what. The chaos is par for the course the way Donald Trumps conducts global affairs. So, all kudos to Pakistan for quietly persisting with old school toing and froing and producing a semblance of an agreement on a tweet without a parchment.
It is also noteworthy that Israel has been excluded from all the diplomatic efforts so far. And it is remarkable, but should not be surprising, the way Trump has sidelined Isreal from the talks. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been enjoying overwhelming support of Israelis for starting the war of his life against Iran and getting the US to spearhead it. But now the country is getting confused and is exposed to Iranian missiles and drones far more than ever before. The Israeli opposition is finally coming alive realizing what little has Netanyahu’s wars have achieved and at what cost. Israel has alienated a majority of Americans and has no ally anywhere else.
It will be a busy Saturday in Islamabad, where the US and Iranian delegations are set to meet. Iran would seem to have insisted and secured the assurance that the US delegation will be led by Vice President Vance, while including Trump’s personal diplomats – Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner. Iran has not announced its team but it is expected to be led, for protocol parity, by Iran’s Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and will likely include its suave Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Vice President Vance’s attendance will be the most senior US engagement with Iran since Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal under President Obama.
The physical arrangements for the talks are still not public although Islamabad has been turned into a security fortress given the stakes and risks involved. The talks are expected to be ‘indirect’, with the two delegations in separate rooms and Pakistani officials shuttling between them. The status of Iran’s enriched uranium and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz will be the major points of contention. After Netanyahu’s overreach on Wednesday, Lebanon is also on the short list
The 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan) took months of negotiations and involved multiple parties besides the US and Iran, including China, France, Germany, UK, Russia and the EU. That served the cause of regional and world peace well until Trump tore up the deal to spite Obama. It would be too much to expect anything similar after a weekend encounter in Islamabad. But if the talks could lead to at least a permanent ceasefire and the return to diplomacy that would be a huge achievement.
(*As of 2025–2026, Donald Trump is nicknamed “TACO Trump” by Wall Street traders and investors as an acronym for “”. This term highlights a perceived pattern of him making strong tariff threats that cause market panic, only to later retreat or weaken them, causing a rebound.)
by Rajan Philips
Features
CIA’s hidden weapon in Iran
We are passing through the ten-day interregnum called a ceasefire over the War on Iran. The world may breathe briefly, but this pause is not reassurance—it is a deliberate interlude, a vacuum in which every actor positions for the next escalation. Iran is far from secure. Behind the veneer of calm, external powers and local forces are preparing, arming, and coordinating. The United States is unlikely to deploy conventional ground troops; the next moves will be executed through proxies whose behaviour will defy expectation. These insurgents are shaped, guided, and amplified by intelligence and technology, capable of moving silently, striking precisely, and vanishing before retaliation. The ceasefire is not peace—it is the prelude to disruption.
The Kurds, historically instruments of Tehran against Baghdad, are now vectors for the next insurgency inside Iran. This movement is neither organic nor local. It is externally orchestrated, with the CIA as the principal architect. History provides the blueprint: under Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi, Kurdish uprisings were manipulated, never supported out of sympathy. They were instruments of leverage against Iraq, a way to weaken a rival while projecting influence beyond Iran’s borders. Colonel Isa Pejman, Iranian military intelligence officer who played a role in Kurdish affairs, recalled proposing support for a military insurgency in Iraq, only for the Shah to respond coldly: “[Mustafa] Barzani killed my Army soldiers… please forget it. The zeitgeist and regional context have been completely transformed.” The Kurds were pawns, but pawns with strategic weight. Pejman later noted: “When the Shah wrote on the back of the letter ‘Accepted’ to General Pakravan, I felt I was the true leader of the Kurdish movement.” The seeds planted then are now being activated under new, technologically empowered auspices.
Iran’s geographic vulnerabilities make this possible. The Shah understood the trap: a vast territory with porous borders, squeezed by Soviet pressure from the north and radical Arab states from the west. “We are in a really terrible situation since Moscow’s twin pincers coming down through Kabul and Baghdad surround us,” he warned Asadollah Alam. From Soviet support for the Mahabad Republic to Barzani’s dream of a unified Kurdistan, Tehran knew an autonomous Kurdish bloc could destabilize both Iraq and Iran. “Since the formation of the Soviet-backed Mahabad Republic, the Shah had been considerably worried about the Kurdish threat,” a US assessment concluded.
Today, the Kurds’ significance is operational, not symbolic. The CIA’s recent rescue of a downed F-15 airman using Ghost Murmur, a quantum magnetometry system, demonstrated the reach of technology in intelligence operations. The airman survived two days on Iranian soil before extraction. This was not a simple rescue; it was proof that highly mobile, technologically augmented operations can penetrate Iranian territory with surgical precision. The same logic applies to insurgency preparation: when individuals can be tracked through electromagnetic signatures, AI-enhanced surveillance, and drones, proxy forces can be armed, guided, and coordinated with unprecedented efficiency. The Kurds are no longer pawns—they are a living network capable of fracturing Iranian cohesion while providing deniability to foreign powers.
Iran’s engagement with Iraqi Kurds was always containment, not empowerment. The Shah’s goal was never Kurdish independence. “We do not approve an independent [Iraqi] Kurdistan,” he stated explicitly. Yet their utility as instruments of regional strategy was undeniable. The CIA’s revival of these networks continues a long-standing pattern: insurgent groups integrated into the wider calculus of international power. Israel, Iran, and the Kurds formed a triangular strategic relationship that terrified Baghdad. “For Baghdad, an Iranian-Israeli-Kurdish triangular alliance was an existential threat,” contemporary reports noted. This is the template for modern manipulation: a networked insurgency, externally supported, capable of destabilizing regimes from within while giving foreign powers plausible deniability.
Iran today faces fragility. Years of sanctions, repression, and targeted strikes have weakened educational and scientific hubs; Sharif University in Tehran, one of the country’s leading scientific centres, was bombed. Leaders, scholars, and innovators have been eliminated. Military readiness is compromised. Generations-long setbacks leave Iran exposed. Against this backdrop, a Kurdish insurgency armed with drones, AI-supported surveillance, and precision munitions could do more than disrupt—it could fracture the state internally. The current ten-day ceasefire is a mirage; the next wave of revolt is already being orchestrated.
CIA involvement is deliberate. Operations are coordinated with allied intelligence agencies, leveraging Kurdish grievances, mobility, and ethnolinguistic networks. The Kurds’ spread across Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria provides operational depth—allowing insurgents to strike, vanish, and regroup with impunity. Barzani understood leverage decades ago: “We could be useful to the United States… Look at our strategic location on the flank of any possible Soviet advance into the Middle East.” Today, the calculation is inverted: Kurds are no longer instruments against Baghdad; they are potential disruptors inside Tehran itself.
Technology is central. Ghost Murmur’s ability to detect a single heartbeat remotely exemplifies how intelligence can underpin insurgent networks. Drones, satellite communications, AI predictive modeling, and battlefield sensors create an infrastructure that can transform a dispersed Kurdish insurgency into a high-precision operation. Iran can no longer rely on fortifications or loyalty alone; the external environment has been recalibrated by technology.
History provides the roadmap. The Shah’s betrayal of Barzani after the 1975 Algiers Agreement demonstrated that external actors can manipulate both Iranian ambitions and Kurdish loyalties. “The Shah sold out the Kurds,” Yitzhak Rabin told Kissinger. “We could not station our troops there and keep fighting forever,” the Shah explained to Alam. The Kurds are a pivot, not a cause. Networks once acting under Tehran’s influence are now being repurposed against it.
The insurgency exploits societal fissures. Kurdish discontent in Iran, suppressed for decades, provides fertile ground. Historical betrayal fuels modern narratives: “Barzani claimed that ‘Isa Pejman sold us out to the Shah and the Shah sold us out to the US.’” Intelligence agencies weaponize these grievances, pairing them with training, technological augmentation, and covert support.
Geopolitically, the stakes are immense. The Shah’s defensive-offensive doctrine projected Iranian influence outward to neutralize threats. Today, the logic is inverted: the same networks used to contain Iraq are being readied to contain Iran. A technologically augmented Kurdish insurgency, covertly backed, could achieve in months what decades of sanctions, diplomacy, or repression have failed to accomplish.
The operation will be asymmetric, high-tech, and dispersed. UAVs, quantum-enhanced surveillance, encrypted communications, and AI-directed logistics will dominate. Conventional Iranian forces are vulnerable to this type of warfare. As Pejman reflected decades ago, “Our Army was fighting there, rather than the Kurds who were harshly defeated… How could we keep such a place?” Today, the challenge is magnified by intelligence superiority on the insurgents’ side.
This is not a temporary flare-up. The CIA and its allies are constructing a generational network of influence. Experience from Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon proves these networks endure once operationalised. The Shah recognized this: “Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign left a lasting legacy for the post-Revolution era.” Today, those instruments are being remade as vectors of foreign influence inside Iran.
The future is stark. Iran faces not simply external threats, but a carefully engineered insurgency exploiting historical grievances, technological superiority, and precise intelligence. The Kurds are central. History, technology, and geopolitical calculation converge to create a transformative threat. Tehran’s miscalculations, betrayals, and suppressed grievances now form the lattice for this insurgency. The Kurds are positioned not just as an ethnic minority, but as a vector of international strategy—Tehran may be powerless to stop it.
Iran’s containment strategies have been weaponized, fused with technology, and inverted against it. The ghosts of Barzani’s Peshmerga, the shadows of Algiers, and the Shah’s strategic vision now converge with Ghost Murmur, drones, and AI. Tehran faces a paradox: the instruments it once controlled are now calibrated to undermine its authority. The next Kurdish revolt will not only fight in the mountains but in the electromagnetic shadows where intelligence operates, consequences are lethal, and visibility is scarce.
by Nilantha Ilangamuwa
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News2 days agoCEB orders temporary shutdown of large rooftop solar systems
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News7 days agoLankan-origin actress Subashini found dead in India
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News5 days agoAG: Coal procurement full of irregularities
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Business4 days agoIsraeli attack on Lebanon triggers local stock market volatility
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Business5 days agoHayleys Mobility introduces Premium OMODA C9 PHEV
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News7 days agoUN Regional Director launches SL’s first Country Gender Equality Profile during official visit
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News7 days agoDialog Launches ‘GanuDenu QR’, Making Cashless Transfers Free for All with eZ Cash and Dialog Finance
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Business4 days agoHNB Assurance marks 25 years with strategic transformation to ‘HNB Life’
