Connect with us

Features

The SJB’s trust deficit and the JVP-NPP’s strategy

Published

on

By Uditha Devapriya

The aragalaya that lasted from February to somewhere in August showed two things: the people’s anger at the regime and the people’s rage against the system. The two are clean different. While a considerable section of the protesters wanted Gotabaya Rajapaksa out, a not inconsiderable second layer used these calls to campaign against the government: hence the interchangeable use of “regime change” and “system change.”

Given this, people should be forgiven for thinking the protests were confused, disjointed and unfocused, because they were exactly that. Laudable as their goals were, they soon deteriorated into a confused morass of rage, anger, and frustration.

The distinction between regime and State is one of the most profound in political science. Sri Lanka’s liberals and left-liberals, not to mention anarchists, tend to confuse and conflate the two. A State exists above, and beyond, a regime. A regime exists well below it, and is in fact subservient to it. If your call to displace a regime gets mixed up in calls to displace the State, then a regime, however unpopular, will find it very easy to make a comeback, on the pretext that protesters are seeking to overthrow an entire political system and with it the last vestiges of law and order. This is precisely what happened on July 13 and 14, when the FSP, followed by the JVP-NPP, asked people to walk into parliament. Their intention may or may not have been to overthrow the legislature, but people thought so.

This in turn activated the more liberal and conservative elements in the aragalaya. Almost immediately after the likes of Kumar Gunaratnam and Sunil Handunneti mobilised crowds at parliament, these groups sprang up on social media, urging people not to go and be hoodwinked by socialist parties. What these groups forgot, in their outcries, was that it had been these socialist elements – or those parading themselves as such – which had led and mobilised the protests since May. Prime among these groups, of course, was the FSP allied IUSF. The IUSF’s long march to Galle Face Green was cheered by a hitherto politically inert middle-class, in particular the youth. It is these same sections that are today castigating the IUSF and the FSP over allegations of ragging at universities.

In other words, the honeymoon is over, even if temporarily. The government has seen it fit to act against protesters and it sees the spate of arrests it has been unleashing since last month as a means of securing, if not the country, then at least Colombo. The same middle-class that hailed them as heroes are no longer bothered. This is natural, and it speaks more about the IUSF’s strategic error of relying on them than about the class preferences of these milieus. Related to this, I would say, is the IUSF’s, JVP-NPP’s, and of course FSP’s tendency to mix up State and regime, which has led these groups to commit two major blunders: to cast themselves as the only political choices in the country, and to alienate Opposition parties which can be made use of in a wider anti-government movement.

I think the November 2 protest showed these tendencies well. While the SJB, the de facto and de jure Opposition in the country, entered into an alliance of sorts with the FSP – and hence FSP allied groups – SJB MPs who entered the protests were not viewed favourably by many of the protesters themselves. Nuzly Hameem, who I believe is one of the more sincere protesters in that crowd, was blunt about Sajith Premadasa: “He simply ran away!” When an SJB official rose up to Premadasa’s defence – as he should – by arguing that Premadasa was afraid of the police attacking demonstrators, Hameem quickly countered: “Irony is such that Opposition leader run away leaving the protesters behind scared that oppression would take place where the main slogan of the protest is ‘Stop Oppression’.”

The protests caught much attention, here and abroad. The international media was much more sympathetic to their demands. The local media, by contrast, either ignored them or demonised them. One leading newspaper highlighted Premadasa’s desertion, in effect questioning his credibility. The protesters themselves, on social media, voiced their anger at Premadasa, more or less agreeing with the same media that marginalised their campaign. I think this shows the SJB’s trust deficit, a deficit compounded if not widened by Premadasa’s actions during the May 9 debacle, and his unwillingness – critiqued even by analysts like Dr Dayan Jayatilleka – to take on the premiership when it was offered to him.

At the same time, these developments have disenchanted sections of the Left opposition. What the FSP thought of Premadasa’s actions last Wednesday we may never know. But we know what the JVP-NPP thought. They refused to join the protests. Justifying his party’s line, MP Wasantha Samarasinghe contended that those taking part in them were more or less siding with the government. One of the demonstrators’ many calls was the abolition of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). MP Samarasinghe point-blank observed that such calls diverted attention from other issues, and that those taking up cudgels against the PTA were following the government’s agenda. By making this case for his party’s decision not to take part, Samarasinghe thus effectively distanced it from the FSP and the SJB.

I think I understand the JVP-NPP’s argument, whataboutist as it may be. At a time of a deepening economic and social crisis, the government is using the PTA to crack down on dissent. MP Samarasinghe and the JVP-NPP may be thinking that if the campaign against the government focuses solely, or mainly, on the PTA, it will embolden the government, or the State, to portray protesters as terrorists and fellow travellers. Over the last few weeks the government has instituted legal action against several aragalistas and this has enabled it to depict the latter as extremists. Samarasinghe’s argument is that by focusing on the PTA, instead of the gross incompetence that continues to wreak havoc on the economy, these protests will make it easier for the government to suppress dissent.

This is the more complex explanation. The simpler explanation, of course, is that the JVP-NPP does not want to take part in any campaign organised by not one, but two, of its bete noires. It does not like the FSP and it has so far resisted any attempt at forging an alliance with that outfit. It does not like Sajith Premadasa, if at all for his sin of being his father’s son. Lately it has badmouthed his party, calling it no better than the SLPP – invoking, of course, the late Mangala Samaraweera’s “two sides, same coin” argument. The JVP-NPP sees itself as the superior of these two formations and for that reason it does not wish to enter into any alliance with them. Though Premadasa himself has tried to invite them, and has made many overtures to this end during the last two years, he has failed.

In politics, it is perfectly possible to be correct and wrong at the same time. The JVP-NPP is correct in its characterisation of the SJB. Not because the SJB hasn’t tried, but because it hasn’t tried hard enough. Sajith Premadasa’s speech against the recent Budget showed that the SJB wants to be seen as following a different economic paradigm. Yet the blowback against the party by centre-right, right-wing, and neoliberal outfits and think-tanks based in Colombo has pushed the party’s stalwarts, like Harsha de Silva and Eran Wickramaratne, to make statements at odds with Premadasa’s speech: one of them has come out in support of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s policies. These elements are deeply conservative and neoliberal in their outlook. The JVP-NPP cannot be faulted for calling them out on this.

The JVP-NPP is wrong, in my view, in where it wants to go with this diagnosis. Any sensible political formation pitted against an overbearing regime must value what Mao characterised as the broadest possible alliance. In no revolution have revolutionary elements all come together with a consensus on every issue and problem. Latin America is seeing a resurgence of the Pink Tide precisely because the left and centre-left have chosen not to walk it alone. This has won these parties some censure from the dogmatist Left: the editors of the World Socialist Web Site, for instance, have poured scorn on the Workers’ Party in Brazil and its mobilisation of leftist forces by calling the latter elements “pseudo-left.” The WSWS calls the JVP-NPP “pseudo-left” too: a charge the party may not agree with.

But I digress here. My point is that the JVP-NPP cannot isolate itself from the mainstream Opposition. At the same time, it cannot allow itself to be co-opted by the mainstream. The Latin American Pink Tide analogy loses ground when you consider that elements within the SJB, or what I’d like to call the Ranilist faction, are much more to the right than the centre-left and liberal elements which sided with Lula da Silva’s party in Brazil. The WSWS may be wrong in terming these formations, and their supporters, “pseudo-left”, but this is a label that can be applied to the SJB’s recent attempts at shifting to the left. The recent protests, in that sense, showed both the strengths and the weaknesses of the Left elements in the aragalaya. Unless they come up with an alliance with other parties, and unless those other parties free themselves from their neoliberal past, the only time we’ll see a vibrant protest movement here is when the country runs out of fuel, gas, and electricity.

The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist who can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com


  • All News Advertisement





Features

Relief without recovery

Published

on

A US airstrike on an Iranian oil storage facility

The escalating conflict in the Middle East is of such magnitude, with loss of life, destruction of cities, and global energy shortages, that it is diverting attention worldwide and in Sri Lanka, from other serious problems. Barely four months ago Sri Lanka experienced a cyclone of epic proportions that caused torrential rains, accompanied by floods and landslides. The immediate displacement exceeded one million people, though the number of deaths was about 640, with around 200 others reported missing. The visual images of entire towns and villages being inundated, with some swept away by floodwaters, evoked an overwhelming humanitarian response from the general population.

When the crisis of displacement was at its height there was a concerted public response. People set up emergency kitchens and volunteer clean up teams fanned out to make flooded homes inhabitable again. Religious institutions, civil society organisations and local communities worked together to assist the displaced. For a brief period the country witnessed a powerful demonstration of social solidarity. The scale of the devastation prompted the government to offer generous aid packages. These included assistance for the rebuilding of damaged houses, support for building new houses, grants for clean up operations and rent payments to displaced families. Welfare centres were also set up for those unable to find temporary housing.

The government also appointed a Presidential Task Force to lead post-cyclone rebuilding efforts. The mandate of the Task Force is to coordinate post-disaster response mechanisms, streamline institutional efforts and ensure the effective implementation of rebuilding programmes in the aftermath of the cyclone. The body comprises a high-level team, led by the Prime Minister, and including cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, provincial-level officials, senior public servants, representing key state institutions, and civil society representatives. It was envisaged that the Task Force would function as the central coordinating authority, working with government agencies and other stakeholders to accelerate recovery initiatives and restore essential services in affected regions.

Demotivated Service

However, four months later a visit to one of the worst of the cyclone affected areas to meet with affected families from five villages revealed that they remained stranded and in a state of limbo. Most of these people had suffered terribly from the cyclone. Some had lost their homes. A few had lost family members. Many had been informed that the land on which they lived had become unsafe and that they would need to relocate. Most of them had received the promised money for clean up and some had received rent payments for two months. However, little had happened beyond this. The longer term process of rebuilding houses, securing land and restoring livelihoods has barely begun. As a result, families who had already endured the trauma of disaster, now face prolonged uncertainty about their future. It seems that once again the promises made by the political leadership has not reached the ground.

A government officer explained that the public service was highly demotivated. According to him, many officials felt that they had too much work piled upon them with too little resources to do much about it. They also believed that they were underpaid for the work they were expected to carry out. In fact, there had even been a call by public officials specially assigned to cyclone relief work to go on strike due to complaints about their conditions of work. This government official appreciated the government leadership’s commitment to non corruption. But he noted the irony that this had also contributed to a demotivation of the public service. This was on the unjustifiable basis that approving and implementing projects more quickly requires an incentive system.

Whether or not this explanation fully captures the situation, it points to an issue that the government needs to address. Disaster recovery requires a proactive public administration. Officials need to reach out to affected communities, provide clear information and help them navigate the complex procedures required to access assistance. At the consultation with cyclone victims this was precisely the concern that people raised. They said that government officers were not proactive in reaching out to them. Many felt they had little engagement with the state and that the government officers did not come to them. This suggests that the government system at the community level could be supported by non-governmental organisations that have the capacity and experience of working with communities at the grassroots.

In situations such as this the government needs to think about ways of motivating public officials to do more rather than less. It needs to identify legitimate incentives that reward initiative and performance. These could include special allowances for those working in disaster affected areas, recognition and promotion for officers who successfully complete relief and reconstruction work, and the provision of additional staff and logistical support so that the workload is manageable. Clear targets and deadlines, with support from the non-governmental sector, can also encourage officials to act more proactively. When government officers feel supported and recognised for the extra effort required, they are more likely to engage actively with affected communities and ensure that assistance reaches those who need it most.

Political Solutions

Under the prevailing circumstances, however, the cyclone victims do not know what to do. The government needs to act on this without further delay. Government policy states that families can receive financial assistance of up to Rs 5 million to build new houses if they have identified the land on which they wish to build. But there is little freehold land available in many of the affected areas. As a result, people cannot show government officials the land they plan to buy and, therefore, cannot access the government’s promised funds. The government needs to address this issue by providing a list of available places for resettlement, both within and outside the area they live in. However, another finding at the meeting was that many cyclone victims whose lands have been declared unsafe do not wish to leave them. Even those who have been told that their land is unstable feel more comfortable remaining where they have lived for many years. Relocating to an unfamiliar area is not an easy decision.

Another problem the victims face is the difficulty of obtaining the documents necessary to receive compensation. Families with missing members cannot prove that their loved ones are no longer alive. Without official confirmation they cannot access property rights or benefits that would normally pass to surviving family members. These are problems that Sri Lanka has faced before in the context of the three decade long internal war. It has set up new legal mechanisms such as the provision of certificates of absence validated by the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) in place of death certificates when individuals remain missing for long periods. The government also needs to be sensitive to the fact that people who are farmers cannot be settled anywhere. Farming is not possible in every location. Access to suitable land and water is essential if farmers are to rebuild their livelihoods. Relocation programmes that fail to take these realities into account risk creating new psychological and economic hardships.

The message from the consultation with cyclone victims is that the government needs to talk more and engage more directly with affected communities. At the same time the political leadership at the highest levels need to resolve the problems that government officers on the ground cannot solve. Issues relating to land availability, legal documentation and livelihood restoration require policy decisions at higher levels. The challenge to the government to address these issues in the context of the Iran war and possible global catastrophe will require a special commitment. Demonstrating that Sri Lanka is a society that considers the wellbeing of all its citizens to be a priority will require not only financial assistance but also a motivated public service and proactive political leadership that reaches out to those still waiting to rebuild their lives.

 

by Jehan Perera

Continue Reading

Features

Supporting Victims: The missing link in combating ragging

Published

on

A recent panel discussion at the University of Peradeniya examined the implications of the Supreme Court’s judgement on ragging, in which the Court recognised that preventing ragging requires not only criminal penalties imposed after an incident occurs but also systems and processes within universities that enable victims to speak up and receive support. Bringing together perspectives from law, university administration, psychology and students, the discussion sought to understand why ragging continues to persist in Sri Lankan universities despite the existence of legal prohibitions. While the discussion covered legal and institutional dimensions, one theme emerged clearly: addressing ragging requires more than laws and disciplinary rules. It requires institutions that are capable of supporting victims.

Sri Lanka enacted the Prohibition of Ragging and Other Forms of Violence in Educational Institutions Act No. 20 of 1998 following several tragic incidents in universities, during the 1990s. Among the most widely remembered is the death of engineering student S. Varapragash at the University of Peradeniya in 1997. Incidents such as this shocked the country and revealed the consequences of allowing violent forms of student hierarchy to persist. The 1998 Act marked an important legal intervention by recognising ragging as a criminal offence. The law introduced severe penalties for individuals found guilty of engaging in ragging or other forms of violence in educational institutions, including fines and imprisonment.

Despite the existence of this law for nearly three decades, prosecutions under the Act have been extremely rare. Incidents continue to surface across universities although most are not reported. The incidents that do reach university administrations are dealt with internally through disciplinary procedures rather than through the criminal justice system. This suggests that the problem does not lie solely in the absence of legal provisions but also in the ability of victims to come forward and pursue complaints.

The tragic reminders; the cases of Varapragash and Pasindu Hirushan

Varapragash, a first-year engineering student at the University of Peradeniya, was forced by senior students to perform extreme physical exercises as part of ragging, resulting in severe internal injuries and acute renal failure that ultimately led to his death. In 2022, the courts upheld the conviction of one of the perpetrators for abduction and murder. The case illustrates not only the brutality of ragging but also how long and difficult the path to justice can be for victims and their families. Even when victims speak about their experiences, they may not always disclose the full extent of what they have endured. In the case of Varapragash, the judgement records that the victim told his father that he was asked to do dips and sit-ups. Varapragash’s father had testified that it appeared his son was not revealing the exact details of what he had to endure due to shame.

More than two decades after the death of Varapragash, the tragedy of ragging continues. The 2025 Supreme Court judgement arose from the case of Pasindu Hirushan, a 21-year-old student of the University of Sri Jayewardenepura, who sustained devastating head injuries at a fresher’s party, in March 2020, after a tyre sent down the stairs by senior students struck him. He became immobile, was placed on life support, and returned home only months later. If the Varapragash case exposed the deadly consequences of ragging in the 1990s, the Pasindu Hirushan case demonstrates that universities are still failing to prevent serious violence, decades after the enactment of the 1998 Act. It was against this background of continuing institutional failure that the Supreme Court issued its Orders of Court in 2025. Among the key mechanisms emphasised by the judgement is the establishment of Victim Support Committees within universities.

Why do victims need support?

Ragging in universities can take many forms, including verbal humiliation, physical abuse, emotional intimidation and, in some instances, sexual harassment. While all forms of ragging can have serious consequences, incidents involving sexual harassment often present additional barriers for victims who wish to come forward. Victims may hesitate to complain due to weak institutional mechanisms, fear of retaliation, or uncertainty about whether their experiences will be taken seriously. In many cases, those who speak out are confronted with questions that shift attention away from the alleged misconduct and onto their own behaviour: why did s/he continue the conversation?; why did s/he not simply disengage, if the harassment occurred as claimed?; why did s/he remain in the environment?; or did his/her actions somehow encourage the accused’s behaviour? Such responses illustrate how easily victims can be subjected to a second layer of scrutiny when they attempt to report incidents. When individuals anticipate disbelief, minimisation or blame, silence may appear safer than disclosure. In such circumstances, the presence of a trusted institutional body, capable of providing guidance, protection and support, become critically important, highlighting the need for effective Victim Support Committees within universities.

What Victim Support Committees must do

As expected by the Supreme Court, an effective Victim Support Committee should function as a trusted institutional mechanism that places the safety and dignity of victims at the centre of its work. The committee must provide a safe and confidential point of contact through which victims can report incidents of ragging without fear of intimidation or retaliation. It should assist victims in understanding and pursuing available complaint procedures, while also ensuring their immediate protection where there is a risk of continued harassment. Recognising the psychological harm ragging may cause, the committee should facilitate access to counselling and emotional support services. At a practical level, it should also help victims document incidents, record statements, and preserve evidence that may be necessary for disciplinary or legal proceedings. The committee must coordinate with university authorities to ensure that complaints are addressed promptly and responsibly, while maintaining strict confidentiality to protect the identity and well-being of those who come forward. Beyond responding to individual cases, Victim Support Committees should also contribute to broader awareness and prevention efforts, within universities, helping to create an environment where ragging is actively discouraged and students feel safe to report incidents. Without such support, the process of pursuing justice can become overwhelming for individuals who are already dealing with the emotional impact of abuse.

Making Victim Support Committees work

According to the Orders of Court, these committees should include representatives from the academic and non-academic staff, a qualified counsellor and/or clinical psychologist, an independent person, from outside the institution, with experience in law enforcement, health, or social services, and not more than three final-year students, with unblemished academic and disciplinary records, appointed for fixed terms. Further, universities must ensure that committees consist of individuals who possess both expertise and genuine commitment in areas such as student welfare, psychology, gender studies, human rights and law enforcement, in line with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s directions, rather than consisting largely of ex officio positions. If treated as routine administrative positions, rather than responsibilities requiring specialised knowledge, sensitivity and empathy, these committees risk becoming symbolic rather than functional.

Greater transparency in the appointment process could strengthen the credibility of these committees. Universities could invite expressions of interest from individuals with relevant expertise and demonstrated commitment to supporting victims. Such an approach would help ensure that the committees benefit from the knowledge and dedication of those best equipped to fulfil this role.

The Supreme Court judgement also introduces an important safeguard by giving the University Grants Commission (UGC) the authority to appoint members to university-level Victim Support Committees. If exercised with integrity, this provision could help ensure that these committees operate with greater independence. It may also help address a challenge that sometimes arises within institutions, where individuals, with relevant expertise, or strong commitment to addressing issues, such as violence, harassment or student welfare, may not always be included in institutional mechanisms due to internal administrative preferences. External oversight by the UGC could, therefore, create opportunities for such individuals to contribute meaningfully to Victim Support Committees and strengthen their effectiveness.

Ultimately, the success of the recent judgement will depend not only on the directives it issued, the number of committees universities establish, or the number of meetings they convene, or other box-checking exercises, but on how sincerely those directives are implemented and the trust these committees inspire among students and staff. Laws can prohibit ragging, but they cannot by themselves create environments in which victims feel safe to speak. That responsibility lies with institutions. When universities create systems that listen to victims, support them and treat their experiences with seriousness, universities will become places where dignity and learning can coexist.

(Udari Abeyasinghe is attached to the Department of Oral Pathology at the University of Peradeniya)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

by Udari Abeyasinghe

Continue Reading

Features

Big scene … in the Seychelles

Published

on

Mirage: Off to the Seychelles for fifth time

Several of our artistes do venture out on foreign assignments but, I’m told, most of their performances are mainly for the Sri Lankans based abroad.

However, the group Mirage is doing it differently and they are now in great demand in the Seychelles.

Guests patronising the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, in the Seychelles, is made up of a wide variety of nationalities, including Russians, Chinese, French and Germans, and they all enjoy the music dished out by Mirage, and that is precisely why they are off to the Seychelles … for the fifth time!

The band is scheduled to leave this month and will be back after three weeks, but their journey to the Seychelles will continue, with two more assignments lined up for 2026.

In August it’s a four-week contract, and in December another four-week contract that will take in the festive celebrations … Christmas and the New Year.

Donald’s birthday
celebrations

According to reports coming my way, it is a happening scene at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, whenever Mirage is featured, and the band has even adjusted its repertoire to include local and African songs.

They work three hours per day and six days per week at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant.

Donald Pieries:
Leader, vocalist,
drummer

Led by vocalist and drummer Donald Pieries, many say it is his

musical talents and leadership that have contributed to the band’s success.

Donald, who celebrated his birthday on 07 March, at the Irish Pub, has been with the group through various lineup changes and is known for his strong vocals.

He leads a very talented and versatile line up, with Sudham (bass/vocals), Gayan (lead guitar/vocals), Danu (female vocalist) and Toosha (keyboards/vocals).

Mirage performs regularly at venues like the Irish Pub in Colombo and also at Food Harbour, Port City.

Continue Reading

Trending