Presidential election 2024 and new class dynamics

by Satyajith Andradi

As I write this piece, there are fewer than four weeks to go before the presidential election scheduled for 21 September 2024. Needless to say, the Sri Lankan polity is in a state of delirium due to high election fever. The inordinately large number of presidential contenders from many walks of life has no doubt contributed to this weird situation. The daily crossing over of members of parliament and other prominent politicians from one camp to another to pledge support to this or that contestant, for reasons best known to them, lends the presidential race a farcical twist. The endless stream of mind – boggling election promises such the raising of salaries and the granting of subsidies, leave the multitudes of impoverished voters in the state of bewilderment. All this has made the tasks of the Election Commission extremely daunting, to say the least. The formidable challenges faced by it include the presentation of a ballot paper accommodating close to forty contestants , and the monitoring of campaign finances set per candidate per voter, just to name a few. However, none of these theatrics, such as the somersaults of political turncoats and the dubious election promises of candidates, are likely to have a real impact on the outcome of the presidential election. In the larger scheme of Sri Lankan electoral politics, these are bound to be thrown apart as mere skin deep cosmetic issues. History teaches us that class dynamics driven by the material interests of diverse social classes are the ultimate arbiters of important political events such as presidential and general elections.

History of electoral politics and class dynamics

Sri Lanka has had a long and somewhat uninterrupted history of electoral politics, since the granting of universal suffrage by the British in 1931. Quite a number of general and presidential elections have been held since 1931 and 1982 respectively. Out of them, the general election held in the eve of independence in 1947 stands out as a unique political event, from the viewpoint of the oppressed classes. In that election, for the first and last time, the working class represented by the LSSP emerged as the main challenger of the capitalist class – the bourgeoisie, represented by the UNP. In this scenario, the two main antagonist of modern capitalist society, i.e. the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, directly confronted each other, face to face. However, this stand-off in electoral politics was destined to be short lived due to two main reasons. Firstly, fearing the militant anti-capitalist Marxist programme of the LSSP, the ruling UNP, deprived a large section of the plantation proletariat of its citizenship rights and franchise, thereby drastically reducing the former’s working-class vote base. Secondly, the UNP itself split with the setting up of the SLFP in 1951, in response to the growing pains of the nascent indigenous capitalist class – the national bourgeoisie. Henceforth, the UNP continued to represent the interests of the faction of the capitalist class subservient to western imperialist interest – the comprador bourgeoisie, whilst the SLFP (and since 2019, it’s offspring the SLPP) came to represent the interest of the national bourgeoisie. From 1956 onwards, the national bourgeoisie relegated the organised working class to an inferior position in electoral politics. Henceforth, right up to the great economic crisis of 2022, Sri Lankan electoral politics was essentially a contest between the national bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie. The crisis of 2022 was to change this class dynamic dramatically.

Economic crisis of 2022 and it’s political fall out

Due to numerous reasons ranging from the COVID 19 and the war in Ukraine to crass economic mismanagement by the SLPP government, the country’s usable foreign reserves, which stood at about 7 billion US dollars at the beginning at 2020 dwindled to a mere 20 million US dollars by April 2022. Needless to say, the country had no option but to default on its mountain of foreign debts. Further, it was unable to pay for vital imports – petroleum, cooking gas, food, and medicines. The economy had to be immediately taken to the ICU and put on life support to prevent it falling into the abyss. Life support came in the form of bridge finance from friendly countries such as India and Bangladesh.

The country’s greatest economic crisis since independence drove the ruling capitalist class into panic mode. Perhaps, for the first time in history, it sensed an existential threat to capitalist rule and capitalism itself. The capitalist class, which had been divided into national and comprador factions, promptly disregarded its inter-class rivalries and closed ranks to save the capitalist system. In the process, it had no qualms in shedding its chauvinistic and populist rhetoric and getting down to serious business. The SOS was sent to its imperialist overlords for urgent emergency assistance. Its prayer was answered. Willing assistance flowed in from IMF, World Bank, Paris Club et al. In return, the critically sick economy was placed under the suzerainty of foreign finance capital. Capitalism and capitalist rule in Sri Lanka were saved. The government which took shape in the aftermath of the great economic crisis was the outcome of these radical class dynamics.

MPs from all mainstream bourgeois parties represented in parliament, viz. the ruling SLPP, UNP, and the opposition SJB joined the post crisis government. However, the main opposition SJB, which represents the populist elements of the comprador bourgeoisie, opted to remain in the opposition, fearing that joining the government would spoil its chances of coming to power in the future. Further, very recently, the ruling SLPP, which represents the populist national bourgeoisie, decided not to endorse the candidature of the incumbent president, although most of its MPs have pledged their support to him in their private capacities.

A sick economy – from life support to stability

During the two years since the economic crisis, the Sri Lankan capitalist class has been able to take out the sick economy from life support and give it some form of stability. This was achieved in terms of the dictates of foreign finance capital, epitomised by the IMF Programme. Inflation has been brought down from the hyperinflationary level of 70% to 2 -3 %. Worker remittances and earnings from tourism have remarkably improved from crisis levels. Industrial and services outputs have seen a significant uptick. The average prime lending rate has dropped from an astronomical high of 30% to an affordable 9%. The chronic shortages of essential items such as food, petroleum products, cooking gas, and medicine have been overcome. Usable foreign reserves have improved from the dismal 20 million US dollars to about 4 billion US dollars (i.e. excluding the Chinese SWAP facility of 1.4 billion US dollars). The economy has come out of an acute recession which lasted for six consecutive quarters. The list goes on. However, it should be noted that the country has not come out of its bankrupt status as yet. Further, the international credit rating agencies have not upgraded their dismal sovereign credit ratings for Sri Lanka. The serving of debts to bilateral creditors and private creditors are still on hold.

Corruption vulnerabilities and the rise in poverty

Currently, the Sri Lankan economy seems to be working well for the rich and powerful, both local and foreign: The All Share Price Index (ASPI ) has risen from a crisis time low of 7000 points to present level of over 11,000 : Big business, including banks and giant conglomerates, have begun to make hefty profits. Bilateral lenders face better prospects in getting repaid with interest, albeit with ‘haircuts’: Intriguingly, many speculators in junk bonds would have already made hefty profits on their dealings in Sri Lanka’s International Sovereign bonds (ISBs), as a result of recent economic stabilisation. However, the economic outcomes of the crisis and the subsequent austerity measures continue to have a devastating impact on the masses – the common man, the man in the street. Numerous micro, small, and medium enterprises have been forced to shut down, resulting in widespread loss of livelihood. Cost of living has sky rocketed driving the national poverty line from about 7,000 rupees in 2019 to 17,000 rupees in 2024 – a 140% increase, whilst wages have hardly moved up. As a result, poverty has increased from 11% of the population in 2019 to 25% in 2024. Malnutrition – child malnutrition in particular, and disease have become commonplace in Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, as everyone knows, the nation continues to be plagued by high levels of corruption and wastage.

JVP / NPP – The new challenge from the petty bourgeoisie

The dramatic rise in poverty is most likely to strengthen the electoral challenge to the capitalist establishment from the petty bourgeoisie, represented by the JVP led NPP. The JVP was established in the mid – 1960s as a militant political party of Sinhala educated youth and unemployed young people. Its style was inspired by Argentine revolutionary Che Guevera. The armed insurrection of April 1971 was the JVP’s first major enterprise.

The well-known revolutionary Marxist Edmund Samarakkody, who knew the JVP, and defended it before and after the 1971 insurrection against the bourgeoisie, made several incisive observations. He noted that the JVP was a party based on the lower petty bourgeoisie – both urban and rural, and that it was not an anti-capitalist party in practice. He further observed that it was inclined towards Sinhala chauvinism and was not sensitive to the problems of estate workers and ethnic minorities. Samarakkody also noted that the JVP did not believe in mass action. He considered the JVP to be non – Marxist (T. Perera: revolutionary trails Edmund Samarakkody – A political profile).

After unsuccessfully attempted twice to seize state power by armed insurrection in 1971 and 1989 -90, the JVP has abandoned armed struggle and committed itself to electoral politics with limited success since 1994. It emerged as a significant force in electoral politics at the 2001 general elections. It joined the SLFP government as a junior coalition partner and held several ministries for a few years from 2004 to 2005. Needless to say, over the past two decades it has got quite accustomed to bourgeois parliamentary politics. Over the years, it has become a thorough main- stream petty bourgeois party, to say the least.

Presidential election 2024 and new class dynamics

The foregoing analysis of the class dynamics has identified the following four significant class actors: (1) the core of the capitalist class which fully subscribes to the IMF programme, represented by the incumbent government, ( 2) the populist wing of the comprador bourgeois faction represented by the opposition SJB, ( 3 ) the petty bourgeoisie represented by the JVP-led NPP, and ( 4 ) the populist wing of the national bourgeois faction represented by the ruling SLPP. It is most likely that the majority of voters, who have been at the receiving end of the economic crisis and the subsequent austerity measure prescribed by the IMF, would hold the incumbent government and the ruling SLPP responsible for their plight. The NPP and the SJB would stand to gain from this anti-incumbency feeling, at the expense of the incumbent president and the SLPP. The NPP and the SJB are likely to emerge as the front runners, mainly as a result of the huge protest vote. However, given the lack of fiscal space due the chronic structural weaknesses of the economy, neither the NPP nor the SJB are likely to live up to its campaign rhetoric, if it comes to power. The poor winner would simply lack wiggle room to do so.