NPP govt., a patchwork of ideological differences, bound to suffer splits – FSP

by Saman Indrajith

Education Secretary of the Frontline Socialist Party, Pubudu Jagoda, has expressed skepticism about the government’s ability to overcome the country’s pressing economic challenges.

In an interview with The Island, Jagoda highlights the inherent divisions within the JVP/NPP coalition, which, he believes, are bound to hinder its ability to provide meaningful relief to the public.

“The government is a patchwork of ideological contradictions,” Jagoda says. “It includes remnants of the old JVP cadre who advocate socialist solutions for economic problems. Alongside them are newer social democrats whose views often clash with the socialist stance. Adding to this complexity are neoliberals who align with Ranil Wickremesinghe’s policies but reject him personally, and a faction of nationalists—many of whom were part of Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s Viyath Maga initiative before joining the NPP.”

Jagoda says that this diversity of perspectives has resulted in an inability to present a cohesive strategy for addressing the country’s economic woes. “This collection of divergent views struggles to formulate practical solutions for the people’s problems.”

Jagoda is of the view that the government’s current approach relies heavily on rhetoric around anti-corruption initiatives and promises of reforming the political culture. While these efforts may garner short-term support, they lack the capacity to address the more immediate issues faced by the population. “There are limits to how far you can go with slogans about changing the political culture. These initiatives cannot put food on people’s tables,” he said.

Excerpts of the interview:

Q: What is your assessment of the current situation in Sri Lanka?

A: The global economy has faced numerous crises over the years, from time to time. In the late 19th century, the 1920s, and 1973, significant economic downturns came into being. Historically, these crises have been characterised by fluctuating trends, often described using the shapes of English letters—V-shaped, U-shaped, and W-shaped—to denote the pattern of economic recovery and recession. For example, the 1973 crisis was V-shaped, while the 1927 crisis exhibited a W-shaped recovery. However, the global economic crisis of 2008 defied such conventional classifications. Initially described as L-shaped due to a sharp decline followed by prolonged stagnation, it later evolved into a pattern resembling a staircase cross-section. Economists now predict a further decline in 2025 and 2026, signifying a fast-collapsing global economy.

Economists argue that addressing the economic crisis requires a comprehensive strategy to manage external interventions by superpowers and to protect national interests. However, opposition parties, including the NPP and SJB, have failed to articulate clear economic policies. Their manifestos are technocratic and lack detailed strategies for addressing issues such as the debt crisis, state revenue challenges, foreign currency shortages, and a coherent development plan.

The government’s mandate, though significant in the parliamentary election, lacks a unified vision.

Sri Lanka faces three key economic policy challenges: the first one is continuation of IMF-driven policies. Will the NPP Government continue with the IMF’s structural adjustment programmes? The second is about managing superpower interventions: Can this government leverage its mandate to negotiate more favourable terms with global powers? The third is about addressing public welfare: Will the government prioritise economic relief for citizens or continue to favour corporate elites under the guise of political reform?

Sri Lanka’s economic crisis manifests starkly in rising poverty and malnutrition. Statistics reveal that 25% of families rely on financial support from neighbors and relatives, while 61% have reduced their food consumption. Child malnutrition rates have soared to 26%, levels previously associated with countries like Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1990s.

The government’s inability to articulate a clear economic vision and its reliance on neoliberal reforms risk deepening the crisis.

Q: What is the FSP going to do about it?

A: We advocate for an economic plan that provides an alternative to the IMF programme. We emphasise the importance of a foreign policy that protects Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and shields its people from the geostrategic invasions of powers like the US and India. Furthermore, we want the inequities created by a top corporate elite that benefited disproportionately from the previous regime’s economic policies addressed. Our position has consistently been that this elite should bear a fair share of the tax burden to provide relief to the people. These three pillars formed the foundation of our political campaign.

Looking ahead, we believe the most critical aspects will continue to revolve around these priorities, the first of them is opposition to the IMF programme. We challenge its long-term implications on Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and economy. Then the issue of geostrategic independence. We advocate for a foreign policy that avoids subjugation to major powers. Third aspect is about equitable Taxation. We demand ensuring that economic policies benefit the majority rather than a privileged few.

As public frustration with the government grows, there is a real danger that people may revert to supporting extreme-right factions responsible for Sri Lanka’s economic turmoil. This could include figures like Ranil Wickremesinghe, members of the SJB, the Mahinda Rajapaksa camp, or even more regressive alternatives. History teaches us that severe economic crises often lead to two potential outcomes: revolutions/military coups or the rise of far-right fascist governments. Sri Lanka is no exception to this historical pattern.

If the current trajectory continues, new leaders could emerge from outside the existing political framework, replacing figures such as Ranil Wickremesinghe, Sajith Premadasa, or Namal Rajapaksa. Alternatively, the country could face a revolution or even a military coup. Superpowers are unlikely to oppose such outcomes, as these scenarios could align with their strategic interests and facilitate their agendas.

Recognising these risks, we are focused on preventing a sudden collapse of the government. While criticising the IMF programme and the restructuring of International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs), we have taken proactive steps to offer alternatives. For instance, we submitted a detailed 13-page document outlining the dangers of the IMF programme and proposing alternative solutions. Recently, we provided 22 proposals for the national budget, reaffirming our commitment to constructive engagement rather than mere criticism.

Despite our efforts, the government has ignored these suggestions, offering no response or acknowledgment. Nevertheless, we see it as our responsibility to propose solutions and advocate for change. If the government continues on its current path, failure seems inevitable, leading to heightened public frustration.

In such a context, our primary focus is to create a political space that prevents the public from being pushed toward far-right factions or fascist military-style governance. To achieve this, we are engaging with leftist and progressive elements within the democratic framework. In the meantime, we are utilising platforms like the People’s Struggle to unite individuals and organisations against the potential rise of far-right authoritarianism.

This initiative seeks to build a broad coalition capable of resisting such a shift while advocating for a just and equitable alternative. We understand that this cannot be achieved by our party alone, so we are collaborating with other progressive forces to strengthen this movement.

Our efforts are directed toward preventing a political and economic regression in Sri Lanka. By uniting progressive forces and presenting clear alternatives, we aim to address the root causes of the crisis while protecting the nation from the threats of authoritarianism and economic subjugation.

Q: How would you interpret the Joint Statement issued by India and Sri Lanka following President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s visit?

A: We must acknowledge the geopolitical reality that India is both Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour and the regional superpower. It is inevitable that Sri Lanka must work with India while being mindful of her strategic and economic interests. However, this does not mean that we must relinquish our sovereignty, independence, or national dignity. A balance is both possible and necessary.

For instance, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s assurance that Sri Lanka would not allow its territory to be used against India’s security interests was, while prudent in principle, perhaps an over-commitment in execution. Safeguarding India’s security concerns is one thing but providing explicit commitments risks undermining our flexibility and sovereignty. It is a self-imposed limitation that could have been avoided.

Similarly, the joint statement’s commitments to land connectivity, an integrated oil pipeline, and a shared electricity grid raise serious concerns. These projects are not without precedent in the region, and the experiences of other nations connected to India offer cautionary lessons. Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh all face significant challenges arising from their direct land links with India. Sri Lanka’s geographical separation by sea has so far shielded it from similar vulnerabilities, and it would be unwise to jeopardise this advantage without thorough deliberation.

The proposed electricity grid integration is another contentious issue. Nations like Bangladesh, which are already connected to India’s electricity grid, are formulating exit strategies due to reliability and sovereignty concerns. For instance, Bangladesh faced prolonged power cuts when it failed to settle bills with India. Similarly, Nepal has been unable to fully exploit its hydropower potential because of obligations under agreements with India. Sri Lanka, with over a century of independent electricity production and potential for future self-sufficiency, has no engineering necessity to integrate its grid with India. Such a move appears driven more by political than practical considerations.

The oil pipeline and refinery agreements also warrant scrutiny. Historically, Sri Lanka has imported crude oil for domestic refining, with plans to upgrade facilities like the Sapugaskanda refinery to produce and export diesel and petrol, emulating Singapore. However, recent agreements have seen the handover of strategic assets, including Trincomalee’s oil tanks and the operation of local petrol stations, to Indian entities. Furthermore, the proposed monopoly on LNG supply by an Indian company undermines Sri Lanka’s ability to procure competitively priced LNG from global markets.

These agreements are reportedly still at the “in-principle” stage, but the government’s failure to consult parliament or public forums before committing to such significant undertakings raises serious concerns. Instead of deferring to agreements made by former President Ranil Wickremesinghe, whose policies were widely rejected in elections, the current administration should assert its mandate and demand reconsideration of these commitments.

The issue of awarding the digital national ID project to an Indian company further highlights the erosion of sovereignty. In an era where data is as critical as military assets, granting access to the biometric and personal data of 22 million Sri Lankans to a foreign entity is a grave risk. The tender process itself has been controversial, with conditions favoring only Indian companies and the tender notice published exclusively in Indian newspapers. This lack of transparency and favoritism raises alarms about national security and accountability.

Examples from other nations further underline the dangers of such agreements. In Kenya, the same Indian company involved in Sri Lanka’s digital ID project was banned after allegations of data fraud. Despite this, the Sri Lankan government has persisted with plans that effectively outsource national security data to a foreign entity, undermining the country’s sovereignty.

While Sri Lanka’s size and economic vulnerability necessitate diplomatic tact, these factors do not justify subservience to any foreign power. The President’s visit to India and the commitments made during the visit failed to uphold the dignity and independence of Sri Lanka. It is imperative that our leaders adopt a more balanced approach that safeguards national sovereignty while engaging constructively with India.

Q: How would you comment on the President’s scheduled visit to China?

A: The geopolitical scene has evolved significantly since the Cold War era, transforming international relations into a complex interplay of economic, political, and military interests. Unlike the binary divisions of the past, where nations were clearly aligned with one of two superpowers, today’s global politics involves multifaceted alliances that often overlap and conflict.

For instance, India, which historically aligned with the USSR, now pursues multiple roles. Economically, India collaborates with China and Russia within BRICS, promoting de-dollarization. However, militarily, India partners with the U.S. and other QUAD nations, positioning itself against Chinese regional dominance. Similarly, China has shifted its foreign policy from rigid ideological stances to pragmatic engagement, often accommodating regional superpowers’ roles in their respective spheres of influence.

In this context, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s upcoming visit to China is unlikely to yield significant pushback against the commitments made to India. China is more likely to seek reciprocal agreements, such as securing concessions in Hambantota or other strategic locations, rather than urging Sri Lanka to reject Indian interests outright. This reflects a broader Chinese strategy of coexistence with other regional powers while pursuing its own strategic and economic goals.

A case in point is China’s stance on Sri Lanka’s IMF programme. Unlike during the Cold War, when China might have opposed Western-led financial restructuring, it now focuses on securing a foothold within those frameworks. For example, if Sri Lanka privatizes state-owned entities like the CEB, China’s concern would not be with the principle of privatization but with acquiring a significant stake in those assets.

The lifting of the moratorium on research vessels in Sri Lankan waters exemplifies the government’s precarious balancing act. Allowing both Indian and Chinese vessels to conduct ocean floor mapping may appear to appease both powers, but it risks antagonizing one or the other, depending on the strategic implications of the research findings. The government might view this as a strategy to placate China following the President’s visit to India, but such concessions only deepen the geopolitical entanglement.

Instead of succumbing to these pressures, Sri Lanka should revisit and reaffirm its historical commitment to neutrality in the Indian Ocean, as embodied in the 1972 UN resolution declaring the region a Zone of Peace. This resolution, co-sponsored by Sri Lanka and India, explicitly seeks to prevent military and economically motivated agreements with indirect military implications among Indian Ocean littoral states. By invoking this resolution, Sri Lanka could resist external pressures without directly antagonizing powerful nations.

The government’s current approach, of attempting to “give a little to everyone,” is fraught with risk. It creates the perception of a nation willing to compromise its sovereignty for short-term diplomatic gains. Such policies can lead to long-term strategic vulnerabilities, as seen with the lifting of the research vessel moratorium and the transactional diplomacy of balancing Chinese and Indian interests.

The broader concern is that Sri Lanka’s vulnerability, compounded by economic challenges, could make it a flashpoint in escalating global tensions. Any future conflict, potentially involving advanced ballistic missile systems, AI-driven warfare, and nuclear capabilities, would have catastrophic consequences for small nations like Sri Lanka.

While the government justifies its actions as necessary for an economically bankrupt nation, we believe that there remains space to assert Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and protect its long-term interests. Diplomacy should not equate to submission, and economic hardship must not justify policies that undermine national security and dignity. Instead, the leadership must tread carefully, adopting a principled approach that balances strategic interests while preserving the country’s independence.

Q: How do you view the Aragalaya protests now after years of their end?

A: The Aragalaya emerged as a powerful expression of public frustration, driven predominantly by economic pressures. For many Sri Lankans, the tipping point was the failure of Gotabaya Rajapaksa to provide relief during a devastating economic crisis. The sense of betrayal was especially acute among those who had voted for him in 2019, such as in Kaduwela, where Gotabaya secured 76% of the vote. This sense of disillusionment was evident when thousands from areas like Malabe, Athurugiriya, and Pelawatte—a stronghold of Rajapaksa supporters—joined daily protests for months and ultimately marched 26 kilometers to Colombo on May 9, 2022, to demand his resignation.

This mass movement was not confined to one demographic; it brought together people from all sectors of society, each with their own grievances and aspirations. For the general public, it was primarily about economic hardship and a betrayal of trust. For others, like leftist and progressive groups, it was an opportunity to promote the idea of a revolutionary mass movement aimed at empowering people.

However, the Aragalaya was also marked by significant political and diplomatic interference. Representatives from various political factions—including UNPers sponsored by Ashu Marasinghe, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s allies, Basil Rajapaksa’s agents, Sarath Fonseka’s supporters, and Champika Ranawaka’s supporters were present, each attempting to advance their own agendas. Diplomats from major powers, such as the U.S., India, and China, as well as government intelligence agents, were also actively monitoring and engaging with the movement.

Despite its grassroots energy, the real political shifts occurred in Parliament, not in the streets. The appointment of an interim president was a key moment that divided the movement and eroded its momentum. Opposition parties like the NPP and SJB had the option to reject Ranil Wickremesinghe’s election by refusing to participate in the parliamentary process, aligning with the Aragalaya’s demand for a complete overhaul of the system. Instead, they chose to field their own candidates—Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Dullas Alahapperuma—only to concede and congratulate Wickremesinghe after his victory. These actions were televised, demoralizing many activists who viewed them as a betrayal by the opposition.

An alternative approach, proposed by representatives of the Aragalaya, called for the establishment of an interim government with a six-month mandate, followed by elections. This proposal included forming a cabinet representing all political parties but excluded the concept of an interim president. It was well-received at a meeting at the Public Library Auditorium in Colombo on May 5, 2022, just days before Gotabaya was ousted. However, it failed to gain traction in Parliament, where the ultimate decisions were made.

The Aragalaya, while unprecedented in its scope and inclusivity, was ultimately undermined by political fragmentation, external influences, and the lack of a unified strategy among its leaders and participants. It highlighted the deep disconnection between parliamentary politics and the will of the people, leaving many to question whether meaningful change is possible within the current system.