Features
Is the so called ‘Moragoda Doctrine’ of 2002-2004 on International Cooperation still valid?
by a special correspondent
From time to time, organizations and individuals have attempted to examine measures taken by Sri Lanka relating to international relations and national security through the social media. The current hype about the role played by former minister Milinda Moragoda in relation to foreign relations and national security is one such example. Those who are trying to dissect what took place decades ago in the sphere of international relations and security could very well mean well. However, it is debatable whether the knowledge of events, at least some of them possess, match the interest they have on the topic of discussion.
With the advent of the Internet and social media in the 20th century, such as the ‘You Tube’, ‘Face Book’, Twitter etc., those who have access to smart phones with Subscriber Identity Modules, popularly known as SIM cards, desktops or laptops with access to the Internet, suddenly found themselves empowered, which provided them with platforms to comment on any subject, irrespective of their knowledge, expertise or experience. The end result of this phenomenon is that the general public is being subjected to relentless bombardment of news, points of view, solutions to issues of national importance, as well as mundane matters. In this process, the public is also being supplied with ‘fake news’ or manufactured news by interested parties. This is an entirely a new phenomenon that surfaced during the latter part of the last century and seems to be thriving in the 21st century.
One of the issues that has recently surfaced is the Sri Lanka – US agreement signed in November 2002 relating to the International Criminal Court (ICC). ICC is a permanent judicial body established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in1998 to prosecute and adjudicate individuals, not states, accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. On July 1, 2002, after ratification by the requisite number of countries (60), it entered in to force .
There are two avenues for prosecution by the ICC. One, a State Party may invite the Court to prosecute an offender, and the other is for the UN Security Council to initiates a case. However, it is also possible for Office of the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation. In doing so, there is a need to satisfy whether the offender/s are being prosecuted by the national government. Only if there are shortcomings on the part of such national processes that the ICC has the authority to extend its jurisdiction.
On May 6, 2002, the Bush Administration announced that the United States does not intend to become a Party to the Rome Statute of ICC and informed the UN of its decision, despite the fact Washington had signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000. Meanwhile, Sri Lanka too decided against becoming a Party to the Rome Statute.
ICC Statute is not a legal instrument adopted and implemented by the United Nations. Instead, it is a legal instrument that has been negotiated by individual states, who later signed and ratified it. The treaty has neither enforcement powers, nor a police force to implement its judgements. Such responsibilities are entirely in the hands of the signatories. This may be the reason why one of its judges (Italian) described the ICC as a “giant without hands and legs”. Consequently, Sri Lanka was within its rights to decide not to become Party to the Rome Statute.
Following bilateral consultation Sri Lanka had with the United States, both sides signed the Agreement by which they agreed not to transfer a person of the other Party to a third country, when each country decides to extradite, surrender or otherwise transfer a person, without the expressed consent of the government of the United States or Sri Lanka.
It may be recalled that this bilateral agreement was signed in November 2002, at a time when Sri Lanka was having robust political, security and economic relations with the US. Signing of Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was one of the important developments that took place around that time, which gave rise to the expectation that the US would look favourably at concluding a Free Trade Agreement with Sri Lanka. It is a well-known fact that Moragoda played a pivotal role in concluding the TIFA. That was also the time when Colombo was trying to free itself from restrictions imposed by the US Congress against sale of military hardware, including spare parts to service SLAF aircraft.
Cascading effects of the improved relations between Washington and Colombo resulted in the decision taken by the Bush administration to gift Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) ‘USS Courageous’ in early 2005, a coastguard cutter that was once part of the US 7th Fleet. It is no secret that that warship became a useful asset during the final confrontations the SLN had with LTTE several years later, thousands of nautical miles away from the Sri Lankan shores. Congressional restrictions against sale of military hardware to Sri Lanka were also lifted soon thereafter, which facilitated Sri Lanka Navy to acquire 30 mm Bushmaster cannons to be mounted on Navy platforms, which provided an advantage over the LTTE firepower at sea. Finally, intelligence provided by the US and India enabled SLN to locate and destroy LTTE vessels that were used for storage and transport of military hardware.
These developments were taking place at a time when the LTTE was taking steps to move away from the peace process alleging that the government was casting an international safety net designed by Minister Moragoda to restrict freedom of operation by that organization. It is therefore clear that the government in Colombo, realizing the machinations of LTTE, recognized the need to improve political, military and economic relations with Washington. One step in that direction was to build a like-minded group of countries that would take steps to assist each other, when cooperative action was required to safeguard their national interests. Credit of establishing that likeminded group has also been rightly assigned to Moragoda.
It may be against such a backdrop, when Sri Lanka was accused of alleged human rights violations, Minister Moragoda, who was closely associated with the peace process, saw the merits of signing an agreement with the US refusing to extradite alleged offenders to be tried by the ICC, based on biased and spurious allegations brought out by outfits such as Diaspora groups that supported LTTE. However, since the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration suffered an electoral setback at the general election held in 2004, the kind of coalition his administration was trying to build up with a group of likeminded countries failed to materialise. The idea behind the thinking could have been not to counter the policies of the Non-aligned Movement, but to build a new coalition that would give priority to national interests of the nascent group.
Is the so called…
At the time of signing the bilateral agreement, Colombo may not have expected the UN system to bring members of the armed forces etc. before international tribunals or engage services of international prosecutors etc., to try them as demanded by the Human Rights Council years later. If the policy of building a ‘like-minded group’ pursued by Colombo had succeeded, Sri Lanka would have stood a good chance in signing bilateral agreements with several other countries, such as the one it signed with the US on surrender of persons to the ICC. All that is now long forgotten, as the adage says, ‘water under the bridge’.
It may be recalled that from time to time the US administration assisted Sri Lankan armed forces in a number of ways. Way back in 1994, the Office of Anti-terrorism Assistance of the US Department of State undertook a ‘Survey and Evaluation of Dignitary Protective Security’. Years’ later, in 2002 the US Department of Defence undertook a study on SL’s military preparedness and submitted a report to the government. However, it was looked at seriously only during the tenure of Gotabaya Rajapaksa then Secretary of the Ministry of Defence. It was the time when Sri Lanka depended on the intelligence provided by the West, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US. Small wonder then, why the US intelligence personnel sat down and conferred with their local counterparts. Their support and cooperation were sought by the government and in providing such cooperation, the US intelligence officials developed a close working relationship with their local counterparts. Such close cooperation with the US intelligence services continued during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa. Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, coming as he did from a military background, would have understood the importance of military to military relationship with the US. Signing of the Acquisition and Cross Service Agreement (ACSA) in 2007 by Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa was the result of the close rapport Sri Lanka enjoyed with the security apparatus of the US.
Sri Lanka is indeed a ‘land like no other’. Velupillai Prabhakaran, Thamil Chelvam and Anton Balasingham who took Sri Lanka on a three-decade long roller coaster ride are no more. Karuna Amman, the chief Lieutenant of the LTTE leader, ended up as a Junior Minister in the Parliament. Prof. G. L. Peiris, who led the Sri Lanka delegations to the peace talks with the LTTE left the UNP, rejoined the SLFP and later helped establish SLPP, which won the 2020 general election handsomely, is a minister in the current parliament. Milinda Moragoda, once credited with creating a standoff between LTTE supremo and Balasingham and many other developments associated with the peace process will be Sri Lanka’s next envoy to New Delhi. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who fought the war to a conclusion and defeated the LTTE, has once again become the Prime Minister of the island and his brother and former Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa has become president of the country with wide popularity. Strangest of all is, after a lapse of 45 years since the assassination of Alfred Duraiappah, a SLFP member has been elected by the voters in Jaffna, the former bastion of the LTTE, as their member of parliament. Much has definitely changed. However, those who made a living by disseminating scurrilous and frivolous news and fake stories, continue to ply their trade with gay abandon.
Sri Lankans are no better. Myopia is something that they all seem to have been afflicted with. One decade after defeat of the LTTE, they appear to have forgotten the wretched three-decade long war the country had to face and the endless sacrifices the people of Sri Lanka and members of the armed forces had to endure. The cease-fire agreement Ranil Wickremesinghe administration signed with the LTTE may not have been the smartest move of that administration. However, Sri Lankans seems to have forgotten that that agreement was the first nail on the coffin of the LTTE, which turned the tide against that organisation. The second was Karuna Amman’s estrangement with V. Prabhakaran and his defection, which made the LTE held Eastern Province vulnerable to the extent it fell into the hands of the government forces lead by Rajapaksa brothers. The rest is history. Not surprisingly, Sri Lankans seem to have forgotten the root causes of the armed conflict as well. They suffer from short memory as well, as amply demonstrated by the forgetfulness of the critical support Sri Lankan military received from India and the US, during the closing phase of the Eelam war.
Features
The NPP Government is more than a JVP offspring:
It is also different from all past governments as it faces new and different challenges
No one knows whether the already broken ceasefire between the US and Iran, with Israel as a reluctant adjunct, will last the full 10 days, or what will come thereafter. The world’s economic woes are not over and the markets are yo-yoing in response to Trump’s twitches and Iran’s gate keeping at the Strait of Hormuz. The gloomy expert foretelling is that full economic normalcy will not return until the year is over even if the war were to end with the ceasefire. That means continuing challenges for Sri Lanka and more of the tough learning in the art of governing for the NPP.
The NPP government has been doing what most governments in Asia have been doing to cope with the current global crisis, which is also an Asian crisis insofar as oil supplies and other supply chains are concerned. What the government can and must do additionally is to be totally candid with the people and keep them informed of everything that it is doing – from monitoring import prices to the timely arranging of supplies, all the details of tender, the tracking of arrivals, and keeping the distribution flow through the market without bottlenecks. That way the government can eliminate upstream tender rackets and downstream hoarding swindles. People do not expect miracles from their government, only honest, sincere and serious effort in difficult circumstances. Backed up by clear communication and constant public engagement.
But nothing is going to stop the flow of criticisms against the NPP government. That is a fact of Sri Lankan politics. Even though the opposition forces are weak and have little traction and even less credibility, there has not been any drought in the criticisms levelled against the still fledgling government. These criticisms can be categorized as ideological, institutional and oppositional criticisms, with each category having its own constituency and/or commentators. The three categories invariably overlap and there are instances of criticisms that excite only the pundits but have no political resonance.
April 5 anniversary nostalgia
There is also a new line of criticism that might be inspired by the April 5 anniversary nostalgia for the 1971 JVP insurrection. This new line traces the NPP government to the distant roots of the JVP – its April 1965 founding “in a working-class home in Akmeemana, Galle” by a 22-year old Rohana Wijeweera and seven others; the short lived 1971 insurrection that was easily defeated; and the much longer and more devastating second (1987 to 1989) insurrection that led to the elimination of the JVP’s frontline leaders including Wijeweera, and brought about a change in the JVP’s political direction with commitment to parliamentary democracy. So far, so good, as history goes.
But where the nostalgic narrative starts to bend is in attempting a straight line connection from the 1965 Akmeemana origins of the JVP to the national electoral victories of the NPP in 2024. And the bend gets broken in trying to bridge the gap between the “founding anti-imperialist economics” of the JVP and the practical imperatives of the NPP government in “governing a debt-laden small open economy.” Yet this line of criticism differs from the other lines of criticism that I have alluded to, but more so for its moral purpose than for its analytical clarity. The search for clarity could begin with question – why is the NPP government more than a JVP offspring? The answer is not so simple, but it is also not too complicated.
For starters, the JVP was a political response to the national and global conditions of the 1960s and 1970s, piggybacking socialism on the bandwagon of ethno-nationalism in a bi-polar world that was ideologically split between status quo capitalism and the alternative of socialism. The NPP government, on the other hand, is not only a response to, but is also a product of the conditions of the 2010s and 2020s. The twain cannot be more different. Nothing is the same between then and now, locally and globally.
A pragmatic way to look at the differences between the origins of the JVP and the circumstances of the NPP government is to look at the very range of criticisms that are levelled against the NPP government. What I categorize as ideological criticisms include criticisms of the government’s pro-IMF and allegedly neo-liberal economic policies, as well as the government’s foreign policy stances – on Israel, on the current US-Israel war against Iran, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, and the apparent closeness to the Modi government in India. These criticisms emanate from the non-JVP left and Sinhala Buddhist nationalists.
Strands of nationalism
To digress briefly, there are several strands in the overall bundle of Sri Lankan nationalism. There is the liberal inclusive strand, the left-progressive strand, the exclusive Sinhala Buddhist Nationalist (SBN) strand, and the defensive strands of minority nationalisms. Given Sri Lanka’s historical political formations and alliances, much overlapping goes on between the different strands. The overlapping gets selective on an issue by issue basis, which in itself is not unwelcome insofar as it promotes plurality in place of exclusivity.
Historically as well, and certainly after 1956, the SBN strand has been the dominant strand of nationalism in Sri Lanka and has had the most influential say in every government until now. Past versions of the JVP frequently straddled the dominant SBN space. Currently, however, the dominant SBN strand is in one of its more dormant phases and the NPP government could be a reason for the current dormancy. This is an obvious difference between the old JVP and the new NPP.
A second set of criticisms, or institutional criticisms, emanate from political liberals and human rights activists and these are about the NPP government’s actions or non-actions in regard to constitutional changes, the future of the elected executive presidency, the status of provincial devolution and the timing of provincial council elections, progress on human rights issues, the resolution of unfinished postwar businesses including the amnesia over mass graves. These criticisms and the issues they represent are also in varying ways the primary concerns of the island’s Tamils, Muslims and the Malaiyaka (planntationn) Tamils. As with the overlapping between the left and the non-minority nationalists, there is also overlapping between the liberal activists and minority representatives.
A third category includes what might be called oppositional criticisms and they counterpose the JVP’s past against the NPP’s present, call into question the JVP’s commitment to multi-party democracy and raise alarms about a creeping constitutional dictatorship. This category also includes criticisms of the NPP government’s lack of governmental experience and competence; alleged instances of abuse of power, mismanagement and even corruption; alleged harassment of past politicians; and the failure to find the alleged mastermind behind the 2019 Easter bombings. At a policy and implementational level, there have been criticisms of the government’s educational reforms and electricity reforms, the responses to cyclone Ditwah, and the current global oil and economic crises. The purveyors of oppositional criticisms are drawn from the general political class which includes political parties, current and past parliamentarians, as well as media pundits.
Criticisms as expectations
What is common to all three categories of criticisms is that they collectively represent what were understood to be promises by the NPP before the elections, and have become expectations of the NPP government after the elections. It is the range and nature of these criticisms and the corresponding expectations that make the NPP government a lot more than a mere JVP offspring, and significantly differentiate it from every previous government.
The deliverables that are expected of the NPP government were never a part of the vocabulary of the original JVP platform and programs. The very mode of parliamentary politics was ideologically anathema to the JVP of Akmeemana. And there was no mention of or concern for minority rights, or constitutional reforms. On foreign policy, it was all India phobia without Anglo mania – a halfway variation of Sri Lanka’s mainstream foreign policy of Anglo mania and India phobia. For a party of the rural proletariat, the JVP was virulently opposed to the plantation proletariat. The JVP’s version of anti-imperialist economics would hardly have excited the Sri Lankan electorate at any time, and certainly not at the present time.
At the same time, the NPP government is also the only government that has genealogical antecedents to a political movement or organization like the JVP. That in itself makes the NPP government unique among Sri Lanka’s other governments. The formation of the NPP is the culmination of the evolution of the JVP that began after the second insurrection with the shedding of political violence, acceptance of political plurality and commitment to electoral democracy.
But the evolution was not entirely a process of internal transformation. It was also a response to a rapidly and radically changing circumstances both within Sri Lanka and beyond. This evolution has not been a rejection of the founding socialist purposes of the JVP in 1968, but their adaptation in the endless political search, under constantly changing conditions, for a non-violent, socialist and democratic framework that would facilitate the full development of the human potential of all Sri Lankans.
The burden of expectations is unmistakable, but what is also remarkable is their comprehensiveness and the NPP’s formal commitment to all of them at the same time. No previous government shouldered such an extensive burden or showed such a willing commitment to each and every one of the expectations. In the brewing global economic crisis, the criticisms, expectations and the priorities of the government will invariably be focussed on keeping the economy alive and alleviating the day-to-day difficulties of millions of Sri Lankan families. While what the NPP government can and must do may not differ much from what other Asian governments – from Pakistan to Vietnam – are doing, it could and should do better than what any and all past Sri Lankan governments did when facing economic challenges.
by Rajan Philips
Features
A Fragile Ceasefire: Pakistan’s Glory and Israel’s Sabotage
After threatening to annihilate one of the planet’s oldest civilizations, TACO* Trump chickened out again by grasping the ceasefire lifeline that Pakistan had assiduously prepared. Trump needed the ceasefire badly to stem the mounting opposition to the war in America. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu wanted the war to continue because he needed it badly for his political survival. So, he contrived a fiction and convinced Trump that Lebanon is not included in the ceasefire. Trump as usual may not have noticed that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Shariff had clearly indicated Lebanon’s inclusion in his announcement of the ceasefire at 7:50 PM, Tuesday, on X. Ten minutes before Donald Trump’s fake deadline.
True to form on Wednesday, Israel unleashed the heaviest assault by far on Lebanon, reportedly killing over 300 people, the highest single-day death toll in the current war. Iran responded by re-closing the Strait of Hormuz and questioning the need for talks in Islamabad over the weekend. There were other incidents as well, with an oil refinery attacked in Iran, and Iranian drones and missiles slamming oil and gas infrastructure in UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.
The US tried to insist that Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire, with the argumentative US Vice President JD Vance, who was in Budapest, Hungary, campaigning for Viktor Orban, calling the whole thing a matter of “bad faith negotiation” as well as “legitimate misunderstanding” on the part of Iran, and warning Iran that “it would be dumb to jeopardise its ceasefire with Washington over Israel’s attacks in Lebanon.”
But as the attack in Lebanon drew international condemnation – from Pope Leo to UN Secretary General António Guterres, and several world leaders, and amidst fears of Lebanon becoming another Gaza with 1,500 people including 130 children killed and more than a million people displaced, Washington got Israel to stop its “lawn mowing” in southern Lebanon.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to “open direct negotiations with Lebanon as soon as possible,”. Lebanese President Joeseph Aoun has also called for “a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, followed by direct negotiations between them.” Israel’s involvement in Lebanon remains a wild card that threatens the ceasefire and could scuttle the talks between the US and Iran scheduled for Saturday in Islamabad.
Losers and Winners
After the ceasefire, both the Trump Administration and Iran have claimed total victories while the Israeli government wants the war to continue. The truth is that after more than a month into nonstop bombing of Iran, America and Israel have won nothing. Only Iran has won something it did not have when Trump and Netanyahu started their war. Iran now has not only a say over but control of the Strait of Hormuz. The ceasefire acknowledges this. Both Trump and Netanyahu are under fire in their respective countries and have no allies in the world except one another.
The real diplomatic winner is Pakistan. Salman Rushdie’s palimpsest-country has emerged as a key player in global politics and an influential mediator in a volatile region. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Defence Field Marshal Asim Munir have both been praised by President Trump and credited for achieving the current ceasefire. The Iranian regime has also been effusive in its praise of Pakistan’s efforts.
It is Pakistan that persisted with the effort after initial attempts at backdoor diplomacy by Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye started floundering. Sharing a 900 km border and deep cultural history with Iran, and having a skirmish of its own on the eastern front with Afghanistan, Pakistan has all the reason to contain and potentially resolve the current conflict in Iran. Although a majority Sunni Muslim country, Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia Muslim population after Iran, and is the easterly terminus of the Shia Arc that stretches from Lebanon. The country also has a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia that includes Pakistan’s nuclear cover for the Kingdom. An open conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia would have put Pakistan in a dangerously awkward position.
It is now known and Trump has acknowledged that China had a hand in helping Iran get to the diplomatic table. Pakistan used its connections well to get Chinese diplomatic reinforcement. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar flew to Beijing to brief his Chinese counterpart and secured China’s public support for the diplomatic efforts. The visit produced a Five-Point Plan that became a sequel to America’s 15-point proposal and the eventual ten-point offer by Iran.
There is no consensus between parties as to which points are where and who is agreeing to what. The chaos is par for the course the way Donald Trumps conducts global affairs. So, all kudos to Pakistan for quietly persisting with old school toing and froing and producing a semblance of an agreement on a tweet without a parchment.
It is also noteworthy that Israel has been excluded from all the diplomatic efforts so far. And it is remarkable, but should not be surprising, the way Trump has sidelined Isreal from the talks. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been enjoying overwhelming support of Israelis for starting the war of his life against Iran and getting the US to spearhead it. But now the country is getting confused and is exposed to Iranian missiles and drones far more than ever before. The Israeli opposition is finally coming alive realizing what little has Netanyahu’s wars have achieved and at what cost. Israel has alienated a majority of Americans and has no ally anywhere else.
It will be a busy Saturday in Islamabad, where the US and Iranian delegations are set to meet. Iran would seem to have insisted and secured the assurance that the US delegation will be led by Vice President Vance, while including Trump’s personal diplomats – Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner. Iran has not announced its team but it is expected to be led, for protocol parity, by Iran’s Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and will likely include its suave Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Vice President Vance’s attendance will be the most senior US engagement with Iran since Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal under President Obama.
The physical arrangements for the talks are still not public although Islamabad has been turned into a security fortress given the stakes and risks involved. The talks are expected to be ‘indirect’, with the two delegations in separate rooms and Pakistani officials shuttling between them. The status of Iran’s enriched uranium and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz will be the major points of contention. After Netanyahu’s overreach on Wednesday, Lebanon is also on the short list
The 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan) took months of negotiations and involved multiple parties besides the US and Iran, including China, France, Germany, UK, Russia and the EU. That served the cause of regional and world peace well until Trump tore up the deal to spite Obama. It would be too much to expect anything similar after a weekend encounter in Islamabad. But if the talks could lead to at least a permanent ceasefire and the return to diplomacy that would be a huge achievement.
(*As of 2025–2026, Donald Trump is nicknamed “TACO Trump” by Wall Street traders and investors as an acronym for “”. This term highlights a perceived pattern of him making strong tariff threats that cause market panic, only to later retreat or weaken them, causing a rebound.)
by Rajan Philips
Features
CIA’s hidden weapon in Iran
We are passing through the ten-day interregnum called a ceasefire over the War on Iran. The world may breathe briefly, but this pause is not reassurance—it is a deliberate interlude, a vacuum in which every actor positions for the next escalation. Iran is far from secure. Behind the veneer of calm, external powers and local forces are preparing, arming, and coordinating. The United States is unlikely to deploy conventional ground troops; the next moves will be executed through proxies whose behaviour will defy expectation. These insurgents are shaped, guided, and amplified by intelligence and technology, capable of moving silently, striking precisely, and vanishing before retaliation. The ceasefire is not peace—it is the prelude to disruption.
The Kurds, historically instruments of Tehran against Baghdad, are now vectors for the next insurgency inside Iran. This movement is neither organic nor local. It is externally orchestrated, with the CIA as the principal architect. History provides the blueprint: under Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi, Kurdish uprisings were manipulated, never supported out of sympathy. They were instruments of leverage against Iraq, a way to weaken a rival while projecting influence beyond Iran’s borders. Colonel Isa Pejman, Iranian military intelligence officer who played a role in Kurdish affairs, recalled proposing support for a military insurgency in Iraq, only for the Shah to respond coldly: “[Mustafa] Barzani killed my Army soldiers… please forget it. The zeitgeist and regional context have been completely transformed.” The Kurds were pawns, but pawns with strategic weight. Pejman later noted: “When the Shah wrote on the back of the letter ‘Accepted’ to General Pakravan, I felt I was the true leader of the Kurdish movement.” The seeds planted then are now being activated under new, technologically empowered auspices.
Iran’s geographic vulnerabilities make this possible. The Shah understood the trap: a vast territory with porous borders, squeezed by Soviet pressure from the north and radical Arab states from the west. “We are in a really terrible situation since Moscow’s twin pincers coming down through Kabul and Baghdad surround us,” he warned Asadollah Alam. From Soviet support for the Mahabad Republic to Barzani’s dream of a unified Kurdistan, Tehran knew an autonomous Kurdish bloc could destabilize both Iraq and Iran. “Since the formation of the Soviet-backed Mahabad Republic, the Shah had been considerably worried about the Kurdish threat,” a US assessment concluded.
Today, the Kurds’ significance is operational, not symbolic. The CIA’s recent rescue of a downed F-15 airman using Ghost Murmur, a quantum magnetometry system, demonstrated the reach of technology in intelligence operations. The airman survived two days on Iranian soil before extraction. This was not a simple rescue; it was proof that highly mobile, technologically augmented operations can penetrate Iranian territory with surgical precision. The same logic applies to insurgency preparation: when individuals can be tracked through electromagnetic signatures, AI-enhanced surveillance, and drones, proxy forces can be armed, guided, and coordinated with unprecedented efficiency. The Kurds are no longer pawns—they are a living network capable of fracturing Iranian cohesion while providing deniability to foreign powers.
Iran’s engagement with Iraqi Kurds was always containment, not empowerment. The Shah’s goal was never Kurdish independence. “We do not approve an independent [Iraqi] Kurdistan,” he stated explicitly. Yet their utility as instruments of regional strategy was undeniable. The CIA’s revival of these networks continues a long-standing pattern: insurgent groups integrated into the wider calculus of international power. Israel, Iran, and the Kurds formed a triangular strategic relationship that terrified Baghdad. “For Baghdad, an Iranian-Israeli-Kurdish triangular alliance was an existential threat,” contemporary reports noted. This is the template for modern manipulation: a networked insurgency, externally supported, capable of destabilizing regimes from within while giving foreign powers plausible deniability.
Iran today faces fragility. Years of sanctions, repression, and targeted strikes have weakened educational and scientific hubs; Sharif University in Tehran, one of the country’s leading scientific centres, was bombed. Leaders, scholars, and innovators have been eliminated. Military readiness is compromised. Generations-long setbacks leave Iran exposed. Against this backdrop, a Kurdish insurgency armed with drones, AI-supported surveillance, and precision munitions could do more than disrupt—it could fracture the state internally. The current ten-day ceasefire is a mirage; the next wave of revolt is already being orchestrated.
CIA involvement is deliberate. Operations are coordinated with allied intelligence agencies, leveraging Kurdish grievances, mobility, and ethnolinguistic networks. The Kurds’ spread across Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria provides operational depth—allowing insurgents to strike, vanish, and regroup with impunity. Barzani understood leverage decades ago: “We could be useful to the United States… Look at our strategic location on the flank of any possible Soviet advance into the Middle East.” Today, the calculation is inverted: Kurds are no longer instruments against Baghdad; they are potential disruptors inside Tehran itself.
Technology is central. Ghost Murmur’s ability to detect a single heartbeat remotely exemplifies how intelligence can underpin insurgent networks. Drones, satellite communications, AI predictive modeling, and battlefield sensors create an infrastructure that can transform a dispersed Kurdish insurgency into a high-precision operation. Iran can no longer rely on fortifications or loyalty alone; the external environment has been recalibrated by technology.
History provides the roadmap. The Shah’s betrayal of Barzani after the 1975 Algiers Agreement demonstrated that external actors can manipulate both Iranian ambitions and Kurdish loyalties. “The Shah sold out the Kurds,” Yitzhak Rabin told Kissinger. “We could not station our troops there and keep fighting forever,” the Shah explained to Alam. The Kurds are a pivot, not a cause. Networks once acting under Tehran’s influence are now being repurposed against it.
The insurgency exploits societal fissures. Kurdish discontent in Iran, suppressed for decades, provides fertile ground. Historical betrayal fuels modern narratives: “Barzani claimed that ‘Isa Pejman sold us out to the Shah and the Shah sold us out to the US.’” Intelligence agencies weaponize these grievances, pairing them with training, technological augmentation, and covert support.
Geopolitically, the stakes are immense. The Shah’s defensive-offensive doctrine projected Iranian influence outward to neutralize threats. Today, the logic is inverted: the same networks used to contain Iraq are being readied to contain Iran. A technologically augmented Kurdish insurgency, covertly backed, could achieve in months what decades of sanctions, diplomacy, or repression have failed to accomplish.
The operation will be asymmetric, high-tech, and dispersed. UAVs, quantum-enhanced surveillance, encrypted communications, and AI-directed logistics will dominate. Conventional Iranian forces are vulnerable to this type of warfare. As Pejman reflected decades ago, “Our Army was fighting there, rather than the Kurds who were harshly defeated… How could we keep such a place?” Today, the challenge is magnified by intelligence superiority on the insurgents’ side.
This is not a temporary flare-up. The CIA and its allies are constructing a generational network of influence. Experience from Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon proves these networks endure once operationalised. The Shah recognized this: “Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign left a lasting legacy for the post-Revolution era.” Today, those instruments are being remade as vectors of foreign influence inside Iran.
The future is stark. Iran faces not simply external threats, but a carefully engineered insurgency exploiting historical grievances, technological superiority, and precise intelligence. The Kurds are central. History, technology, and geopolitical calculation converge to create a transformative threat. Tehran’s miscalculations, betrayals, and suppressed grievances now form the lattice for this insurgency. The Kurds are positioned not just as an ethnic minority, but as a vector of international strategy—Tehran may be powerless to stop it.
Iran’s containment strategies have been weaponized, fused with technology, and inverted against it. The ghosts of Barzani’s Peshmerga, the shadows of Algiers, and the Shah’s strategic vision now converge with Ghost Murmur, drones, and AI. Tehran faces a paradox: the instruments it once controlled are now calibrated to undermine its authority. The next Kurdish revolt will not only fight in the mountains but in the electromagnetic shadows where intelligence operates, consequences are lethal, and visibility is scarce.
by Nilantha Ilangamuwa
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