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Midweek Review

How various marriages of convenience eventually transformed the JVP

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Smiling Anura Kumara Dissanayake with President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and PM Mahinda Rajapaksa at an event arranged by the Agriculture, Lands and Irrigation Ministry. Dissanayake served as Agriculture, Lands and Irrigation Minister in Kumaratunga's Cabinet. The assassination of her husband, Vijaya, by a JVP assassin, in February 1988, didn't discourage Chandrika from reaching consensus with the JVP. Among those pictured are Bimal Rathnayake and Ananda Wijepala, both Ministers in the current governmentm as well as S.M. Chandrasena who is now serving a jail term for corruption.

Anura Kumara Dissanayake received the JVP leadership on 02 February, 2014, at the 7th national convention of the party held at the Sugathadasa Indoor Stadium. He was 46 years old at that time. Dissanayake succeeded Somawansa Amarasinghe, who led the party, following Rohana Wijeweera’s cold blooded execution, while in custody, by the Premadasa regime. The JVP also adopted its new constitution with amendments at the 7th national convention. At the time of the change of the JVP leadership, the party had been a constituent of the Democratic National Alliance (DNA). The change of leadership took place over two years before Amarasinghe’s death, at the age of 73.

The DNA was formed under retired General Sarath Fonseka’s leadership to contest the 2010 parliamentary election. Except the JVP, all other constituents had no following. Dissanayake was a National List MP of the DNA. The seven-member DNA parliamentary group included Fonseka, Arjuna Ranatunga and businessman Tiran Alles (National List).

Before the JVP became a constituent of the National People’s Power (NPP) the party had been in coalitions with the PA/SLFP and the UNP since 2001. The NPP adopted its constitution on 20 December, 2021, at its Delegates Conference held at Monarch Imperial, Sri Jayewardenepura, where JVP leader Dissanayake was elected as its leader.

There hasn’t been a previous instance of one person heading two recognised political parties. With the JVP-led NPP government marking its first year in office this month, let me discuss the alliances the JVP had been involved in, since 2001. The JVP reached an agreement with President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s People’s Alliance (PA) in early September, 2001, in the wake of over a dozen PA lawmakers switching allegiance to the UNP. The JVP-PA/SLFP agreement was meant to help Kumaratunga to stabilise the government and to thwart a UNP-led move to impeach Kumaratunga over abuse of power, violation of constitution and financial irregularities. The UNP had been fully confident of securing the JVP’s support after copies of an impeachment motion, drafted by a four-member team, led by the late K. N. Choksy, PC, was made available to chosen political parties, including the JVP represented in Parliament at that time.

At the time of the JVP-PA/SLFP agreement of September 2001, the former had 10 members in Parliament. The JVP parliamentary group leader at that time had been Wimal Weerawansa, who, along with General Secretary of the party Tilvin Silva, spearheaded talks with the PA. Anura Kumara Dissanayake, too, had been in that parliamentary group.

Somawansa Amarasinghe, who fled the country, in the nick of time, to escape certain elimination at the hands of UNP death squads, involved in a fight to a finish with equally brutal JVP, in the late ’80s, returned in late November, 2001, ahead of the December 2001 parliamentary elections. At the first public meeting the JVP leader addressed, in Kalutara, he thanked India for saving his life. The UNP-led United National Front (UNF) won the parliamentary election, though it couldn’t muster a simple majority. The JVP increased the strength of its parliamentary group, from 10 to 16, including three NL slots.

The UNF’s victory created an unprecedented political environment. With the executive power under one political party, in this case the SLFP and the UNP in command of the legislature, fighting erupted. The political crisis caused uncontrollable turmoil with the SLFP and the UNP pulling in different directions, and with the JVP taking advantage of the situation to push for dissolution of Parliament.

Another CBK-JVP alliance

While the 2001 JVP-PA/SLFP deal had been primarily influenced by President Kumaratunga’s bid to stabilise her government and also to thwart the now forgotten UNP bid to impeach her with the help of a group of MPs who had betrayed her, the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), signed by Wickremesinghe with Velupillai Prabhakaran of the LTTE in late February 2002, created an environment conducive for the 2004 JVP-PA/SLFP agreement.

The LTTE contributed to Wickremesinghe’s misery and ultimate downfall of his government by repeatedly violating the CFA that had been arranged by Norway, with the backing of the US, Japan and the EU. Finally, the LTTE quit the negotiating table, in late April 2003, alleging the delay in doing away with the Jaffna High Security Zones. A couple of weeks before the LTTE suspended its participation in the Oslo-led negotiating process, the JVP-PA/SLFP entered into a dialogue for the formation of a broader alliance against Wickremesinghe.

President Kumaratunga hadn’t been supportive of the initiative, spearheaded by the late Anura Bandaranaike and the late Mangala Samaraweera, who relentlessly pushed the party to reach an early consensus on a common strategy with the JVP. Once former President Maithripala Sirisena told this writer that President Kumaratunga hadn’t been interested at all in toppling Wickremesinghe, though they didn’t see eye to eye on many issues. Sirisena said so during the time he served as the General Secretary of the SLFP when asked about the negotiations with the JVP. Anura Kumara Dissanayake had been among the JVP delegation that included Tilvin Silva, Wimal Weerawansa and Lal Kantha. The PA/SLFP delegation consisted of Maithripala Sirisena, Mangala Samaraweera, Nimal Siripala de Silva, Susil Premjayantha and Dr. Sarath Amunugama.

Following 11 months of tough negotiations, the JVP and PA/SLFP entered into an agreement in January 2004. However, they hadn’t been able to reach a consensus on the national question. They refrained from dealing with contentious issues but advanced a strategy that was aimed at toppling Wickremesinghe’s government. Consequent to the JVP-PA/SLFP agreement, they decided to name the new coalition Eksath Janatha Nidahas Sandhanaya (United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA).

Regardless of forming the UPFA, President Kumaratunga hadn’t been in a hurry to regain control of Parliament. The President believed Wickremesinghe should be allowed to continue till January 2005 before calling for fresh parliamentary election. But, Anura Bandaranaike and Mangala Samaraweerea, who had worked so hard for the formation of UPFA, along with the JVP, brought President Kumaratunga under pressure. In the end, President Kumaratunga succumbed to their pressure. She brought the Defence, Interior and Media Ministries under her, using presidential powers, and dissolved Parliament in February 2004 to pave the way for a general election in April 2004.

In line with the understanding between the two parties, the JVP decided to contest the 2004 April parliamentary election on the UPFA ticket with the ‘Betel Leaf’ as its symbol. The JVP fielded 39 contestants, whereas the party was to receive five NL slots, regardless of the outcome of the parliamentary election result. The JVP campaigned furiously with the aim of securing as many parliamentary seats as possible. But, the Marxist party never expected 36 out of its 39 contestants to enter Parliament. The result was beyond all their expectations. In fact, the JVP’s accomplishment sort of stunned the SLFP. The UPFA obtained 105 seats, including 13 NL seats. The top SLFP leadership felt uncomfortable and to make matters far worse the SLFP had to accommodate five JVPers in their NL. Of the 13 NL slots that had been granted to the UPFA, five places were to be allocated to the JVP. When the SLFP explained the difficulties experienced by the party in meeting the demand for NL slots, the JVP swiftly agreed to contend with three slots. At the end of the day, the JVP parliamentary group consisted of 39 lawmakers (36 elected and three on NL) with some of their candidates polling best results in several electoral districts.

AKD receives ministerial portfolio

There had been a broad understanding among the UPFA constituents that the number of ministers would be restricted to 35 and an equal number of deputies. The SLFP had been taken off guard when the JVP declared that its parliamentary group leader Wimal Weerawansa and Nandana Gunatilake, who had been their candidate at the 1999 presidential election, wouldn’t accept ministerial portfolios. The JVP made the announcement at a time the SLFP had been in severe turmoil over the allocation of ministerial portfolios as well as NL slots. In terms of the agreement, four JVPers were to receive ministerial portfolios.

Instead, the party named Kurunegala District MP Anura Kumara Dissanayake as the Agriculture, Lands and Irrigation Minister. Bimal Rathnayake was named AKD’s deputy. Gampaha District lawmaker Vijitha Herath received the Cultural Affairs portfolio, whereas Badulla district MP Samantha Vidyaratne was Herath’s deputy. Anuradhapura district MP Lal Kantha received the Rural Economy portfolio. Sunil Handunetti was JVP frontliner’s deputy. Fisheries and Aquatic resources portfolio went to Galle District MP Chandrasena Wijesinghe. Hambantota district MP Nihal Galappaththy was Wijesinghe’s deputy.

An appalling JVP bid to block Mahinda Rajapaksa’s appointment as Prime Minister, following the UPFA triumph, caused quite a crisis among the SLFP parliamentary group. President Kumaratunga backed the JVP on the basis they couldn’t be antagonised due to their new status within the UPFA. Maithripala Sirisena is widely believed to have been the only senior lawmaker who stoutly backed Mahinda Rajapaksa, whereas President Kumaratunga declared her readiness to go along with the JVP.

The JVP declared Lakshman Kadirgamar as the most suitable person to receive the premiership. In case, the President couldn’t make that happen due to him not being a Sinhala Buddhist, the JVP suggested Anura Bandaranaike or Maithripala Sirisena.

Obviously the JVP and Kadirgamar had reached an understanding regarding the post at the 2004 parliamentary election and they seemed to have really believed in bringing that operation to a successful conclusion. Perhaps, the abortive JVP bid to secure premiership for Kadirgamar may have influenced the LTTE decision to assassinate the much respected lawmaker. The LTTE sniper took out Kadirgamar, at his Colombo residence, from a nearby building, in August 2005, in the run-up to the presidential election .

Several weeks before Kadirgamar’s assassination, the JVP quit the UPFA over the finalisation of the controversial agreement on the Tsunami Relief Council (TRC) between the government and the LTTE. The JVP insisted that it couldn’t continue with the UPFA as the TRC undermined the country’s sovereignty.

JVP alliance with MR

At the 2005 presidential election, the JVP threw its full weight behind Mahinda Rajapaksa. Having failed to deprive Mahinda Rajapaksa of premiership, the JVP declared support for his presidential candidature. In the absence of genuine SLFP backing for Mahinda Rajapaksa, he heavily depended on the JVP campaign that helped him to defeat Ranil Wickremesinghe. If not for the JVP’s support, the SLFP candidate couldn’t have succeeded, specially against the backdrop of the Bandaranaikes extending tacit, behind the scene, support to Wickremesinghe.

The JVP entered into an agreement with Mahinda Rajapaksa though they couldn’t secure President Kumaratunga’s backing for it. In terms of the agreement signed by Mahinda Rajapaksa, and Tilvin Silva, on behalf of the JVP, they agreed to protect, defend and preserve the unitary nature of the Sri Lankan state under any solution to be presented, formed or formulated for the purpose of the resolution of the national question.

But once elected, President Mahinda Rajapaksa, too, like his predecessors, bent backwards to appease the LTTE. By late 2005, the LTTE had been in a formidable position in the northern theatre of operations. In the East, the LTTE operated freely outside main towns. Most importantly, the group had an undisputed sea supply route to bring in arms, ammunition and equipment.

In spite of the JVP urging the President to take a tough stand in negotiations with the LTTE, he sought to reach some sort of consensus with the LTTE. Obviously, the President had no option but to negotiate with the LTTE, especially with overwhelming international pressure, including countries like Japan, with overwhelming financial clout, to accommodate the Tigers for the sake of achieving peace, which however was farthest from the LTTE thinking. Contrary to an understanding with the JVP, the President went ahead with talks overseas. The President also accepted Norwegian mediation.

Talks were held in February and October 2006 in spite of the LTTE’s failed assassination attempts on Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka in late April 2006 and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa in early October 2006.

President Rajapaksa and the JVP ended the partnership at quite an early stage in the former’s first term and withdrew support to the war effort as the armed forces gradually pushed back the LTTE from entrenched positions. Amidst warring with President Rajapaksa, the JVP split, leading to an influential section of the party, led by Wimal Weerawansa and Nandana Gunatilake, switching allegiance to President Rajapaksa.

The JVP repeatedly questioned the UPFA’s war strategy, with its leader Somawansa Amarasinghe attacking the government. Once the writer challenged Amarasinghe at a packed media briefing when he claimed that the government had suspended air strikes on the LTTE. When pointed out that a major SLAF operation was underway as the JVP leader made such unsubstantiated allegations, Somawansa Amarasinghe admitted his blunder.

The armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion in May 2009. The UNP and JVP leaders caused their parties immense harm by failing to extend unconditional support for the war effort.

JVP in UNP-led coalition

Then the JVP, under Somawansa Amarasinghe’s leadership, joined an alliance led by the UNP. There hadn’t been such a previous political alliance. Under the direct intervention of the US, Wickremesinghe formed that alliance to back retired General Sarath Fonseka’s candidature at the 2010 presidential poll. The JVP had no qualms in having the LTTE proxy Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in that alliance.

The JVP conveniently forgot how the UNP executed its leader within 48 hours after taking him into custody in November 1989, as well as wiping out virtually its entire known leadership, barring Somawansa Amarasinghe. That single act of betrayal caused the JVP irreparable harm and destroyed its revolutionary identity.

The JVP continued its alliance with the UNP for nearly a decade, till 2019, when Anura Kumara Dissanayake contested the 2019 presidential election. The JVP leader was placed a distant third. He couldn’t even secure half a million votes at that election.

At the 2015 presidential election, the JVP teamed up with the UNP and TNA to back Maithripala Sirisena. The 2015 parliamentary election reduced the JVP to six MPs while at the 2020 general election it was down to three. NPP bigwig Dr. Harini Amarasuriya entered Parliament on the NPP’s NL that really set the stage for the emergence of that party as the clear leader at the 2024 parliamentary election against the backdrop of the US backed the violent Aragalaya.

The JVP/NPP has totally changed its posture and the clandestine signing of seven MoUs with India, still to be made public, including the one on defence, in April this year, resulted in an irrevocable partnership with India. The current relations between the NPP and the US seemed poised to further improve. The JVP, has, in no uncertain terms, proved that it can adapt, depending on whatever ground situation. The 1989 Indian rescue of Somawansa Amarasinghe is a grim reminder that alliances can be formed at most unexpected moments.

By Shamindra Ferdinando



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Midweek Review

At the edge of a world war

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In September 1939, as Europe descended once more into catastrophe, E. H. Carr published The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Twenty years had separated the two great wars—twenty years to reflect, to reconstruct, to restrain. Yet reflection proved fragile. Carr wrote with unsentimental clarity: once the enemy is crushed, the “thereafter” rarely arrives. The illusion that power can come first and morality will follow is as dangerous as the belief that morality alone can command power. Between those illusions, nations lose themselves.

His warning hovers over the present war in Iran.

The “thereafter” has long haunted American interventions—after Afghanistan, after Iraq, after Libya. The enemy can be dismantled with precision; the aftermath resists precision. Iran is not a small theater. It is a civilization-state with a geography three times larger than Iraq. At its southern edge lies the Strait of Hormuz, narrow in width yet immense in consequence. Geography does not argue; it compels.

Long before Carr, in the quiet anxiety of the eighteenth century, James Madison, principal architect of the Constitution, warned that war was the “true nurse of executive aggrandizement.” War concentrates authority in the name of urgency. Madison insisted that the power to declare war must rest with Congress, not the president—so that deliberation might restrain impulse. Republics persuade themselves that emergency powers are temporary. History rarely agrees.

Then, at 2:30 a.m., the abstraction becomes decision.

Donald Trump declares war on Iran. The announcement crosses continents before markets open in Asia. Within twenty-four hours, Ali Khamenei, who ruled for thirty-seven years, is killed. The President calls him one of history’s most evil figures and presents his death as an opening for the Iranian people.

In exile, Reza Pahlavi hails the moment as liberation. In less than forty-eight hours, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps collapses under overwhelming air power. A regime that endured decades falls swiftly. Military efficiency appears absolute. Yet efficiency does not resolve legitimacy.

The joint strike with Israel is framed as necessary and pre-emptive. Retaliation follows across the Gulf. The architecture of energy trade becomes fragile. Shipping routes are recalculated. Markets respond before diplomacy finds its language.

It is measured in the price of petrol in Colombo. In the bus fare in Karachi. In the rising cost of cooking gas in Dhaka. It is heard in the anxious voice of a migrant worker in Doha calling home to Kandy, asking whether contracts will be renewed, whether flights will continue, whether wages will be delayed. It is calculated in foreign reserves already strained, in currencies that tremble at rumor, in budgets forced to choose between subsidy and solvency.

Zaara was the breadwinner of her house in Sri Lanka. Her husband had been unemployed for years. At last, he secured an opportunity to travel to Israel as a foreign worker—like many Sri Lankans who depend on employment in the Middle East. It was to be their turning point: a small house repaired, debts reduced, dignity restored.

Now she lowers her eyes when she speaks. For Zaara, geopolitics is not theory. It is fear measured in distance—between a construction site abroad and a village waiting at home.

The war in Iran has shattered calculations that once felt practical. Nations like Sri Lanka now require strategic foresight to navigate unfolding realities. Reactive responses—whether to natural disasters or external shocks like this conflict—can cripple economies far faster than gradual pressures. Disruptions to energy imports, migrant remittances, and foreign reserves show how distant wars ripple into daily lives.

War among great powers is debated in think tanks. Its consequences are lived in markets—and in quiet kitchens where uncertainty sits heavier than hunger.

The conflict does not unfold in isolation. It enters the strategic calculus of China and Russia, both attentive to precedent. Power projected beyond the Western hemisphere reshapes perceptions in the Eastern theater. Iran’s transformation intersects directly with broader alignments. In 2021, Beijing and Tehran signed a twenty-five-year strategic agreement. By 2025, China was purchasing the majority of Iran’s exported oil at discounted rates. Energy underwrote strategy. That continuity has been disrupted. Yet strategic relationships do not vanish; they adjust.

In Winds of Change, my new book, I reproduce Nicholas Spykman’s 1944 two-theater confrontation map—Europe and the Pacific during the Second World War. Spykman distinguished maritime power from amphibian projection. Control of the Rimland determined balance. Then, the United States fought across two vast theaters. Today, Europe remains unsettled through Ukraine, the Pacific simmers over Taiwan and the South China Sea, Latin America remains sensitive, and the Middle East has been abruptly transformed. The architecture of multi-theater tension reappears.

At this juncture, the reflections of Marwan Bishara acquire weight. America’s ultimate power, he argues, resides in deterrence, not in the habitual use of force. Power, especially when shared, stabilizes. Force, when used with disregard for international law, breeds instability and humiliation. Arrogance creates enemies and narrows judgment. It is no surprise that many Americans themselves believe the United States should not act alone.

America’s strength does not rest solely in its military reach. Its economy constitutes roughly one-third of global output and generates close to 40 percent of the world’s research and development. Structural power—economic, technological, institutional—has historically underwritten deterrence. When force becomes the primary instrument, influence risks becoming coercion.

The United States now confronts simultaneous pressures across continents. The Second World War demonstrated the capacity to sustain multi-theater engagement; the post-9/11 wars revealed the exhaustion that follows prolonged intervention. Iran, larger and geopolitically deeper, presents a scale that cannot be resolved by air power alone.

Carr’s “thereafter” waits patiently. Military victory may be swift; political reconstruction is slow. Bishara reminds us that deterrence sustains stability, while force risks unraveling it.

At the edge of a potential world war, the decisive question is not who strikes first, but who restrains longest.

History watches. And in places far from the battlefield, mothers wait for phone calls that may not come.

Asanga Abeyagoonasekera is a Senior Research Fellow at the Millennium Project, Washington, D.C., and the author of Winds of Change: Geopolitics at the Crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, published by World Scientific

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Midweek Review

Live Coals Burst Aflame

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Live coals of decades-long hate,

Are bursting into all-consuming flames,

In lands where ‘Black Gold’ is abundant,

And it’s a matter to be thought about,

If humans anywhere would be safe now,

Unless these enmities dying hard,

With roots in imperialist exploits,

And identity-based, tribal violence,

Are set aside and laid finally to rest,

By an enthronement of the principle,

Of the Equal Dignity of Humans.

By Lynn Ockersz

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Midweek Review

Saga of the arrest of retired intelligence chief

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Retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay’s recent arrest attracted internatiattention. His long-expected arrest took place ahead of the seventh anniversary of the bombings. Multiple blasts claimed the lives of nearly 280 people, including 45 foreigners. State-owned international news television network, based in Paris, France 24, declared that arrest was made on the basis of information provided by a whistleblower. The French channel was referring to Hanzeer Azad Moulana, who earlier sought political asylum in the West and one-time close associate of State Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan aka Pilleyan. May be the fiction he wove against Pilleyan and others may have been to strengthen his asylum claim there. Moulana is on record as having told the British Channel 4 that Sallay allowed the attack to proceed with the intention of influencing the 2019 presidential election. The French news agency quoted an investigating officer as having said: “He was arrested for conspiracy and aiding and abetting the Easter Sunday attacks. He has been in touch with people involved in the attacks, even recently.”

****

Suresh Sallay of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) received the wrath of Yahapalana Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, in 2016, over the reportage of what the media called the Chavakachcheri explosives detection made on March 30, 2016. Premier Wickremesinghe found fault with Sallay for the coverage, particularly in The Island. Police arrested ex-LTTE child combatant Edward Julian, alias Ramesh, after the detection of one suicide jacket, four claymore mines, three parcels containing about 12 kilos of explosives, to battery packs and several rounds of 9mm ammunition, from his house, situated at Vallakulam Pillaiyar Kovil Street. Chavakachcheri police made the detection, thanks to information provided by the second wife of Ramesh. Investigations revealed that the deadly cache had been brought by Ramesh from Mannar (Detection of LTTE suicide jacket, mines jolts government: Fleeing Tiger apprehended at checkpoint, The Island, March 31, 2016).

The then Jaffna Security Forces Commander, Maj. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake, told the writer that a thorough inquiry was required to ascertain the apprehended LTTE cadre’s intention. The Chavakachcheri detection received the DMI’s attention. The country’s premier intelligence organisation meticulously dealt with the issue against the backdrop of an alleged aborted bid to revive the LTTE in April 2014. Of those who had been involved in the fresh terror project, three were killed in the Nedunkerny jungles. There hadn’t been any other incidents since the Nedunkerny skirmish, until the Chavakachcheri detection.

Piqued by the media coverage of the Chavakachcheri detection, the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration tried to silence the genuine Opposition. As the SLFP had, contrary to the expectations of those who voted for the party at the August 2015 parliamentary elections, formed a treacherous coalition with the UNP, the Joint Opposition (JO) spearheaded the parliamentary opposition.

The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) questioned former External Affairs Minister and top JO spokesman, Prof. G.L. Peiris, over a statement made by him regarding the Chavakachcheri detection. The former law professor questioned the legality of the CID’s move against the backdrop of police declining to furnish him a certified copy of the then acting IGP S.M. Wickremesinghe’s directive that he be summoned to record a statement as regards the Chavakachcheri lethal detection.

One-time LTTE propagandist Velayutham Dayanidhi, a.k.a. Daya Master, raised with President Maithripala Sirisena the spate of arrests made by law enforcement authorities, in the wake of the Chavakachcheri detection. Daya Master took advantage of a meeting called by Sirisena, on 28 April, 2016, at the President’s House, with the proprietors of media organisations and journalists, to raise the issue. The writer having been among the journalists present on that occasion, inquired from the ex-LETTer whom he represented there. Daya Master had been there on behalf of DAN TV, Tamil language satellite TV, based in Jaffna. Among those who had been detained was Subramaniam Sivakaran, at that time Youth Wing leader of the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), the main constituent of the now defunct Tamil National Alliance. In addition to Sivakaran, the police apprehended several hardcore ex-LTTE cadres (LTTE revival bid confirmed: TNA youth leader arrested, The Island April 20, 2016).

Ranil hits out at media

Subsequent inquiries revealed the role played by Sivakaran in some of those wanted in connection with the Chavakachcheri detection taking refuge in India. When the writer sought an explanation from the then TNA lawmaker, M.A. Sumanthiran, regarding Sivakaran’s arrest, the lawyer disowned the Youth Wing leader. Sumanthiran emphasised that the party suspended Sivakumaran and Northern Provincial Council member Ananthi Sasitharan for publicly condemning the TNA’s decision to endorse Maithripala Sirisena’s candidature at the 2015 presidential election (Chava explosives: Key suspects flee to India, The Island, May 2, 2016).

Premier Wickremesinghe went ballistic on May 30, 2016. Addressing the 20th anniversary event of the Sri Lanka Muslim Media Forum, at the Sports Ministry auditorium, the UNP leader castigated the DMI. Alleging that the DMI had been pursuing an agenda meant to undermine the Yahapalana administration, Wickremesinghe, in order to make his bogus claim look genuine, repeatedly named the writer as part of that plot. Only Wickremesinghe knows the identity of the idiot who influenced him to make such unsubstantiated allegations. The top UNPer went on to allege that The Island, and its sister paper Divaina, were working overtime to bring back Dutugemunu, a reference to war-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa. A few days later, sleuths from the Colombo Crime Detection Bureau (CCD) visited The Island editorial to question the writer where lengthy statements were recorded. The police were acting on the instructions of the then Premier, who earlier publicly threatened to send police to question the writer.

In response to police queries about Sallay passing information to the media regarding the Chavakachcheri detection and subsequent related articles, the writer pointed out that the reportage was based on response of the then ASP Ruwan Gunasekera, AAL and Sumanthiran, as had been reported.

Wickremesinghe alleged, at the Muslim media event, that a section of the media manipulated coverage of certain incidents, ahead of the May Day celebrations.

In early May 2016 Wickremesinghe disclosed that he received assurances from the police, and the DMI, that as the LTTE had been wiped out the group couldn’t stage a comeback. The declaration was made at the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies (LKIIRIS) on 3 May 2016. Wickremesinghe said that he sought clarifications from the police and the DMI in the wake of the reportage of the Chavakachcheri detection and related developments (PM: LTTE threat no longer exists, The Island, May 5, 2016).

The LTTE couldn’t stage a comeback as a result of measures taken by the then government. It would be a grave mistake, on our part, to believe that the eradication of the LTTE’s conventional military capacity automatically influenced them to give up arms. The successful rehabilitation project, that had been undertaken by the Rajapaksa government and continued by successive governments, ensured that those who once took up arms weren’t interested in returning to the same deadly path.

In spite of the TNA and others shedding crocodile tears for the defeated Tigers, while making a desperate effort to mobilise public opinion against the government, the public never wanted the violence to return. Some interested parties propagated the lie that regardless of the crushing defeat suffered in the hands of the military, the LTTE could resume guerilla-type operations, paving the way for a new conflict. But by the end of 2014, and in the run-up to the presidential election in January following year, the situation seemed under control, especially with Western countries not wanting to upset things here with a pliant administration in the immediate horizon. Soon after the presidential election, the government targeted the armed forces. Remember Sumanthiran’s declaration that the ITAK Youth Wing leader Sivakaran had been opposed to the TNA backing Sirisena at the presidential poll.

The US-led accountability resolution had been co-sponsored by the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo to appease the TNA and Tamil Diaspora. The Oct. 01, 2016, resolution delivered a knockout blow to the war-winning armed forces. The UNP pursued an agenda severely inimical to national interests. It would be pertinent to mention that those who now represent the main Opposition, Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), were part of the treacherous UNP.

Suresh moved to Malaysia

The Yahapalana leadership resented Sallay’s work. They wanted him out of the country at a time a new threat was emerging. The government attacked the then Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, PC, who warned of the emerging threat from foreign-manipulated local Islamic fanatics on 11 Nov. 2016, in Parliament. Rajapakshe didn’t mince his words when he underscored the threat posed by some Sri Lanka Muslim families taking refuge in Syria where ISIS was running the show. The then government, of which he was part o,f ridiculed their own Justice Minister. Both Sirisena and Wickremesinghe feared action against extremism may cause erosion of Muslim support. By then Sallay, who had been investigating the deadly plot, was out of the country. The Yahapalana government believed that the best way to deal with Sallay was to grant him a diplomatic posting. Sally ended up in Malaysia, a country where the DMI played a significant role in the repatriation of Kumaran Pathmanathan, alias KP, after his arrest there.

Having served the military for over three cadres, Sallay retired in 2024 in the rank of Major General. Against the backdrop of his recent arrest, in connection with the ongoing investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, The Island felt the need to examine the circumstances Sallay ended up in Malaysia at the time. Now, remanded in terms of the Prevention of terrorism Act (PTA), he is being accused of directing the Easter Sunday operation from Malaysia.

Pivithuru Hela Urumaya leader and former Minister Udaya Gammanpila has alleged that Sallay was apprehended in a bid to divert attention away from the deepening coal scam. Having campaigned on an anti-corruption platformm in the run up to the previous presidential election, in September 2024, the Parliament election, in November of the same year, and local government polls last year, the incumbent dispensation is struggling to cope up with massive corruption issues, particularly the coal scam, which has not only implicated the Energy Minister but the entire Cabinet of Ministers as well.

The crux of the matter is whether Sallay actually met would-be suicide bombers, in February 2018, in an estate, in the Puttalam district, as alleged by the UK’s Channel 4 television, like the BBC is, quite famous for doing hatchet jobs for the West. This is the primary issue at hand. Did Sallay clandestinely leave Malaysia to meet suicide bombers in the presence of Hanzeer Azad Moulana, one-time close associate of State Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, aka Pilleyan, former LTTE member?

The British channel raised this issue with Sallay, in 2023, at the time he served as Director, State Intelligence (SIS). Sallay is on record as having told Channel 4 Television that he was not in Sri Lanka the whole of 2018 as he was in Malaysia serving in the Sri Lankan Embassy there as Minister Counsellor.

Therefore, the accusation that he met several members of the National Thowheeth Jamaath (NTJ), including Mohamed Hashim Mohamed Zahran, in Karadipuval, Puttalam, in Feb. 2018, was baseless, he has said.

The intelligence officer has asked the British television station to verify his claim with the Malaysian authorities.

Responding to another query, Sallay had told Channel 4 that on April 21, 2019, the day of the Easter Sunday blasts, he was in India, where he was accommodated at the National Defence College (NDC). That could be verified with the Indian authorities, Sallay has said, strongly denying Channel 4’s claim that he contacted one of Pilleyan’s cadres, over, the phone and directed him to pick a person outside Hotel Taj Samudra.

According to Sallay, during his entire assignment in Malaysia, from Dec. 2016 to Dec. 2018, he had been to Colombo only once, for one week, in Dec. 2017, to assist in an official inquiry.

Having returned to Colombo, Sallay had left for NDC, in late Dec. 2018, and returned only after the conclusion of the course, in November 2019.

Sallay has said so in response to questions posed by Ben de Pear, founder, Basement Films, tasked with producing a film for Channel 4 on the Easter Sunday bombings.

The producer has offered Sallay an opportunity to address the issues in terms of Broadcasting Code while inquiring into fresh evidence regarding the officer’s alleged involvement in the Easter Sunday conspiracy.

The producer sought Sallay’s response, in August 2023, in the wake of political upheaval following the ouster of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, elected at the November 2019 presidential election.

At the time, the Yahapalana government granted a diplomatic appointment to Sallay, he had been head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). After the 2019 presidential election, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa named him the Head of SIS.

The Basement Films has posed several questions to Sallay on the basis of accusations made by Hanzeer Azad Moulana.

In response to the film producer’s query regarding Sallay’s alleged secret meeting with six NTJ cadres who blasted themselves a year later, Sallay has questioned the very basis of the so called new evidence as he was not even in the country during the period the clandestine meeting is alleged to have taken place.

Contradictory stands

Following Sajith Premadasa’s anticipated defeat at the 2019 presidential election, Harin Fernando accused the Catholic Church of facilitating Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory. Fernando, who is also on record as having disclosed that his father knew of the impending Easter Sunday attacks, pointed finger at the Archbishop of Colombo, Rt. Rev Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, for ensuring Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory.

Former President Maithripala Sirisena, as well as JVP frontliner Dr. Nalinda Jayathissa, accused India of masterminding the Easter Sunday bombings. Then there were claims of Sara Jasmin, wife of Katuwapitiya suicide bomber Mohammed Hastun, being an Indian agent who was secretly removed after the Army assaulted extremists’ hideout at Sainthamaruthu in the East. What really had happened to Sara Jasmin who, some believe, is key to the Easter Sunday puzzle.

Then there was huge controversy over the arrest of Attorney-at-Law Hejaaz Hizbullah over his alleged links with the Easter Sunday bombers. Hizbullah, who had been arrested in April 2020, served as lawyer to the extremely wealthy spice trader Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim’s family that had been deeply involved in the Easter Sunday plot. Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim had been on the JVP’s National List at the 2015 parliamentary elections. The lawyer received bail after two years. Two of the spice trader’s sons launched suicide attacks, whereas his daughter-in-law triggered a suicide blast when police raided their Dematagoda mansion, several hours after the Easter Sunday blasts.

Investigations also revealed that the suicide vests had been assembled at a factory owned by the family and the project was funded by them. It would be pertinent to mention that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government never really bothered to conduct a comprehensive investigation to identify the Easter Sunday terror project. Perhaps, their biggest failure had been to act on the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) recommendations. Instead, President Rajapaksa appointed a six-member committee, headed by his elder brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, to examine the recommendations, probably in a foolish attempt to improve estranged relations with the influential Muslim community. That move caused irreparable damage and influenced the Church to initiate a campaign against the government. The Catholic Church played quite a significant role in the India- and US-backed 2022 Aragalaya that forced President Rajapaksa to flee the country.

Interested parties exploited the deterioration of the national economy, leading to unprecedented declaration of the bankruptcy of the country in April 2022, to mobilie public anger that was used to achieve political change.

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