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Forthcoming general election and its aftermath

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by Neville Ladduwahetty

Sri Lankans would be going to the polls on August fifth to elect a new parliament. However, what is to follow depends on which party secures the majority to form a stable government. The prevailing prediction is that the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) is most likely to secure at least a sufficient majority to form a government.

Such an outcome would mean that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as the Executive and a legislature headed by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa would be jointly responsible for the governance of Sri Lanka. If the SLPP secures only a simple majority the processes of governance would be constrained by the limitations and contradictions inherent in the 1978 Constitution and in the Nineteenth Amendment (19A). This would hamper post COVID-19 recovery. Therefore, it is imperative that without a two-thirds (2/3) majority to amend 1978 Constitution and 19A to bring clarity to its provisions or even introduce a new Constitution, it would not be possible for Sri Lanka to emerge from the unprecedented challenges presented by the COVID-19 disaster.

If, on the other hand, the SLPP secures only a simple majority, a national government with a 2/3 majority could be formed by means of provisions of Article 46 (4) similar to the dubious precedent crafted by the Yahapalana government. Such an approach would compel a SLPP government to accommodate the interests of coalition partners at considerable cost both financially as well as having to compromise its agenda. Therefore, if Sri Lanka is to recover from the COVID-19 crisis it is best that the government has a 2/3 majority sufficient to give it the freedom to act free of constraints of coalition demands and fetters of the 1978 Constitution and19 A.

THE NEED to REVISITING 19A

The need to revisit the 1978 Constitution and 19A is because the ambiguities and contradictions in their provisions have caused constitutional experts and academics to arrive at vastly divergent interpretations and conclusions. For instance, some interpret that 19A has transformed what was essentially a Presidential system based on separation of power into a Parliamentary system where separation of power is blurred to such an extent that they describe the present system as a Parliamentary Democracy. Others on the other hand, maintain that what 19A achieved was to prevent arbitrariness of Executive action that had existed under the 1978 Constitution, and not to transfer power from the Executive to Parliament. This is confirmed by the Supreme Court ruling on 19A that stated: “that the transfer, relinquishment or removal of a power attributed to one organ of government to another organ or body would be inconsistent with Article 3 read with Article 4 of the Constitution”. Therefore, it could be concluded that the intended transformation from a Presidential system to a Parliamentary system did not materialize notwithstanding such claims.

The 1972 Constitution is unambiguously based on a Parliamentary system while the 1978 Constitution is based on a Presidential system. However, the incorporation of certain provisions from the 1972 Constitution into to the 1978 Constitution, followed by 19A, has caused divergent interpretations. Hence, a few key issues are presented below to illustrate the need to revisit the 1978 Constitution and 19A in order to bring clarity to the current Constitutional provisions to ensure that the system of governance is either clearly Parliamentary or Presidential and not a mix of both.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS of the 1972 CONSTITUTION

The relevant Articles in the 1972 Constitution are:

Article 91: “The President shall be responsible to the National State Assembly (Parliament) for the execution and performances of the powers and functions of his office under the Constitution…”.

Article 92 (1) states: “There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers charged with the direction and control of the government of the Republic which shall be collectively responsible to the National State Assembly and answerable to the National State Assembly on all matters for which they are responsible”.

Article 92 (2) states: “Of the Ministers, one who shall be the Head of the Cabinet of Ministers shall be the Prime Minister”.

Article 94 (1) states: “The Prime Minister shall determine the number of Ministers and Ministries and the assignment of subjects and functions to Ministers”.

Article 94 (2) states: “The President shall appoint from among the members of the National State Assembly Ministers to be in charge of the Ministries so determined”.

Article 94 (3): “The Prime Minister may at any time change the assignment of subjects and functions and recommend to the President changes to the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers…”.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS of the 1978 CONSTITUTION

Article 42 states: “The President shall be responsible to Parliament for the due exercise, performance and discharge of the powers, duties and functions under the Constitution…’.

Article 43 (1) states: “There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers charged with the direction and control of the Government of the Republic which shall be collectively responsible and answerable to Parliament”.

Article 43 (2) states: “The President shall be a member of the Cabinet of ministers and shall be the Head of the Cabinet of Ministers”.

Article 44 (1) states: “The President from time to time, in consultation with the Prime Minister, where he considers such consultation to be necessary –

(a) “determine the number of Ministers of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministries and the assignment of subjects and functions to such Ministers” and

(b) “appoint from among the members of Parliament Ministers to be in charge of the Ministries so determined”.

Article 44 (3) states: “The President may at any time, change the assignment of subjects and functions and the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers…”.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS of 19A

Article 42 (1) states: “There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers charged with the direction and control of the Government of the Republic”.

Article 42 (2) states: “The Cabinet of Ministers shall be collectively responsible and answerable to Parliament”.

Article 43 (1) states: “The President shall in consultation with the Prime Minister, where he considers such consultation to be necessary, determine the number of Ministers of the Cabinet of ministers and the Ministries and the assignment of subjects and functions to such Ministers”.

Article 43 (2) states: “The President shall on the advice of the Prime Minister appoint from among Members of Parliament, Ministers, to be in charge of the Ministries so determined”.

Article 43 (3) states: “The President may at any time change the assignment of subjects and functions and the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers…”.

IMPACT of CONTRADICTORY PROVISIONS

The constitutional provisions of the 1972 Constitution presented above are consistent with a Parliamentary system. Notwithstanding this fact, such provisions that are appropriate for a Parliamentary system have been incorporated into the 1978 Constitution and 19A that are essentially Presidential. This has caused both the 1978 Constitution and 19A to be seriously compromised. It is therefore imperative that amendments are introduced to ensure that the system of governance is either Parliamentary or Presidential in all respects.

For instance, commenting on Article 43 of the 1978 Constitution (presented above), the Supreme Court in S.D. No. 04/2015 stated: “This important Article underscores that the Cabinet collectively is charged with the exercise of Executive power, which is expressed as the direction and control of the Government of the Republic and the collective responsibility of Cabinet of which the President is the Head. It establishes conclusively that the President is not the sole repository of Executive power under the Constitution. It is the Cabinet of Ministers collectively, and not the President alone, which is charged with the direction and control of the Government. This Cabinet is answerable to Parliament. Therefore, the Constitution itself recognizes that Executive power is exercised by the President and by the Cabinet of Ministers, and that the President shall be responsible to Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers, collectively responsible and answerable to Parliament with regard to the exercise of such powers…”.

On the other hand, the Courts have accepted that Article 3 that deals with the sovereignty of the People should be read with Article 4. Therefore, the guiding principle in the exercise of Executive power in the 1978 Constitution should be Article 4 (b). Article 4 (b) states: “the executive power of the People, including the defence of Sri Lanka, shall be exercised by the President of the Republic elected by the People”. This Article specifically reposes Executive power of the People ONLY in the President. Therefore, Executive power must necessarily be exercised solely by the President and not jointly shared with the Cabinet of Ministers. This means that anyone else exercising executive power must derive its authority from the President.

The comments of the Supreme Court in S.D. No. 04/2015 also stated: “It is in this background that the Court in the Nineteenth Amendment Determination came to a conclusion that the transfer, relinquishment or removal of the power attributed to one organ of government to another organ or body would be inconsistent with Article 3 read with Article 4 of the Constitution. Though Article 4 provides the form and manner of the sovereignty of the people, the ultimate act or decision of the executive functions must be retained by the President. So long as the President remains the Head of the Executive, the exercise of his powers remain supreme or sovereign in the executive field and to others to whom such power is given must derive the authority from the President or exercise the Executive power vested in the President as a delegate of the President”.

If, as stated above by the Court, the President as the Head of the Executive is “sovereign in the executive field”, the President who represents one of the three branches of the Government – the Executive, is co-equal with the Legislature and the Judiciary under provisions of separation of power. Therefore, the President cannot be responsible to another organ of government – the Parliament. Furthermore, since the Cabinet of Ministers derive their authority from the President, the Cabinet cannot be responsible and answerable to Parliament either. Under the circumstances, Article 33A that calls for the President to be responsible to Parliament “for the due exercise performance and discharge of his powers, duties and functions” is a violation of the principle of separation of power.

Another important issue that arises from the fact that the President is sovereign in the executive field is the constitutional provision that his executive powers include the defence of Sri Lanka. Therefore, the President has a right granted by the Constitution to be the Minister of Defence regardless of whether the President is a Member of Parliament or not. The prerogative of such a decision should be left to the President, instead of having to delegate it to someone else, invariably less competent in issues relating to security. Since the provision to select Cabinet Members from among members of Parliament is a carry-over from the defunct 1972 Constitution this constraint should be repealed since it has no relevance in a Presidential system.

ARTICLE 46 – UNIQUE ONLY TO 19A.

Article 46 (1) (a) and (b) limits the number of Cabinet of Ministers to thirty and sets an aggregate limit of forty on the number of Ministers who are not members of the Cabinet of Ministers and Deputy Ministers.

Having sets limits, the framers of 19A provided a device by means of Article 46 (4) and (5) to enable Parliament by Resolution to exceed the very limits they themselves stipulated above. In fact, this device is so crafty that it enables even a minority government with the largest majority to form a National Government with even a 2/3 majority by forming a coalition with other recognized political parties. Had the Article stated “the political party with the largest majority together with ALL other political parties” the task of forming a National Government would in all likelihood been unrealistic. This device was exploited to the fullest advantage by the former Yahapalana government. The net effect of the current provisions in 19A is to ridicule their own attempts to appear well intentioned by proposing a leaner Cabinet and make a mockery of the “will of the people” by introducing a corrupted way out of the limits set by themselves.

19A – THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL

Article 41 B (1) states: “No person shall be appointed by the President as the Chairman or the member of any of the Commissions specified in the Schedule to this Article, except on a recommendation of the Council”.

Article 41 C (1) states: “No person shall be appointed by the President to any of the Officers specified in the Schedule to this Article…unless such appointment has been approved by the Council”.

The Court ruled that the transfer, relinquishment or removal of power attributed to one organ to another violates Article 3 when read with Article 4 of the Constitution. If this is so, would not the transfer of power that the President had, to appoint Commissions and Officers prior to 19A, to another body that is not even another organ of Government as recognized by Article 3 read with Article 4, amount to a violation of the sovereignty of the People? Furthermore, the operation of the Council has become so dysfunctional that the country today does not have a functioning Inspector General of Police. The reason for this is a system failure because the President who makes the appointment could keep on rejecting nominations by the Council causing posts being vacant as in the case of the IGP. Therefore, this provision too needs to be seriously amended. An alternative would be to restore the powers the President had under Articles 54, 55 and 107 of the 1978 Constitution and for him to make appointments subject to the approval of the appropriate Oversight Committees of Parliament and repeal Chapter VIIA of 19A.

19A – DISSOLUTION of PARLIAMENT

According to 19A Article 70 (1) states: “The President may by Proclamation, summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament. Provided that the President shall not dissolve until the expiration of a period of not less than four years and six months…unless Parliament requests the President to do so by a resolution passed by not less than two-third of the whole number of Members voting in favour”.

This Article presents two serious issues. One, it places the President at a disadvantage in relation to Parliament since Parliament is not constrained by a time bar whereas the President is. Therefore, Parliament could request the President to dissolve Parliament at any time with a 2/3 majority whereas the President is compelled to wait four and half years to dissolve Parliament. Such drastic disadvantages are not in keeping with principles of separation of power among co-equals. Such inequality is unacceptable for two separate organs of government elected separately by the People. The second serious issue is that securing a 2/3 majority for a political party under provisions of proportional representation is bound to be a rarity. This compels Parliament to continue however dysfunctional it is.

Therefore, the net effect of Article 70 (1) as currently presented is for the country to be governed by a government even if the situation is so dire that it warrants dissolution of Parliament because of the constitutional straightjacket of this Article. Consequently, as always, it is the People who have to endure.

CONCLUSION

The outcome of the forthcoming General Election to elect a new Parliament would have a serious impact on how effectively Sri Lanka recovers from the challenges imposed by the unprecedented COVID -19 crisis. The most significant single factor that would influence the recovery process is the current Constitution. The 1978 Constitution and 19A contain constitutional provisions that are a mix appropriate to both Parliamentary and Presidential systems. This has made governing processes convoluted. Therefore, it is imperative that the current provisions are amended, so that the Constitution is Presidential in all respects and not a mix of both Parliamentary and Presidential as currently exists, with the appropriate checks and balances by the Parliament and the Judiciary, in a way that would not hamper effective Executive action.

The reason for the existence of Parliamentary and Presidential systems in the present Constitution is because the operation of a Presidential system based on separation of power, is not commonly understood despite it being in existence for over four decades. A glaring example of the lack of appreciation of what separation of power means is selection of the Cabinet of Ministers from among Members of Parliament. This results in the same individual serving two separate organs of government resulting in conflict of interest. This practice should cease. If Members of Parliament are to be Members of the Cabinet, they should relinquish their association with Parliament as practiced by other countries with Presidential systems.

Under the circumstances, a government with a simple majority would not be in a position to introduce the needed amendments without which the recovery process would be hampered by the existing constitutional ambiguities and contradictions. Therefore, it is only a 2/3 Parliamentary majority that would facilitate the introduction of the needed amendments without which it would not be possible for Sri Lanka to emerge from the unprecedented challenges presented by COVID-19 pandemic.



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The call for review of reforms in education: discussion continues …

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PM Harini Amarasuriya

The hype around educational reforms has abated slightly, but the scandal of the reforms persists. And in saying scandal, I don’t mean the error of judgement surrounding a misprinted link of an online dating site in a Grade 6 English language text book. While that fiasco took on a nasty, undeserved attack on the Minister of Education and Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya, fundamental concerns with the reforms have surfaced since then and need urgent discussion and a mechanism for further analysis and action. Members of Kuppi have been writing on the reforms the past few months, drawing attention to the deeply troubling aspects of the reforms. Just last week, a statement, initiated by Kuppi, and signed by 94 state university teachers, was released to the public, drawing attention to the fundamental problems underlining the reforms https://island.lk/general-educational-reforms-to-what-purpose-a-statement-by-state-university-teachers/. While the furore over the misspelled and misplaced reference and online link raged in the public domain, there were also many who welcomed the reforms, seeing in the package, a way out of the bottle neck that exists today in our educational system, as regards how achievement is measured and the way the highly competitive system has not helped to serve a population divided by social class, gendered functions and diversities in talent and inclinations. However, the reforms need to be scrutinised as to whether they truly address these concerns or move education in a progressive direction aimed at access and equity, as claimed by the state machinery and the Minister… And the answer is a resounding No.

The statement by 94 university teachers deplores the high handed manner in which the reforms were hastily formulated, and without public consultation. It underlines the problems with the substance of the reforms, particularly in the areas of the structure of education, and the content of the text books. The problem lies at the very outset of the reforms, with the conceptual framework. While the stated conceptualisation sounds fancifully democratic, inclusive, grounded and, simultaneously, sensitive, the detail of the reforms-structure itself shows up a scandalous disconnect between the concept and the structural features of the reforms. This disconnect is most glaring in the way the secondary school programme, in the main, the junior and senior secondary school Phase I, is structured; secondly, the disconnect is also apparent in the pedagogic areas, particularly in the content of the text books. The key players of the “Reforms” have weaponised certain seemingly progressive catch phrases like learner- or student-centred education, digital learning systems, and ideas like moving away from exams and text-heavy education, in popularising it in a bid to win the consent of the public. Launching the reforms at a school recently, Dr. Amarasuriya says, and I cite the state-owned broadside Daily News here, “The reforms focus on a student-centered, practical learning approach to replace the current heavily exam-oriented system, beginning with Grade One in 2026 (https://www.facebook.com/reel/1866339250940490). In an address to the public on September 29, 2025, Dr. Amarasuriya sings the praises of digital transformation and the use of AI-platforms in facilitating education (https://www.facebook.com/share/v/14UvTrkbkwW/), and more recently in a slightly modified tone (https://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking-news/PM-pledges-safe-tech-driven-digital-education-for-Sri-Lankan-children/108-331699).

The idea of learner- or student-centric education has been there for long. It comes from the thinking of Paulo Freire, Ivan Illyich and many other educational reformers, globally. Freire, in particular, talks of learner-centred education (he does not use the term), as transformative, transformative of the learner’s and teacher’s thinking: an active and situated learning process that transforms the relations inhering in the situation itself. Lev Vygotsky, the well-known linguist and educator, is a fore runner in promoting collaborative work. But in his thought, collaborative work, which he termed the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) is processual and not goal-oriented, the way teamwork is understood in our pedagogical frameworks; marks, assignments and projects. In his pedagogy, a well-trained teacher, who has substantial knowledge of the subject, is a must. Good text books are important. But I have seen Vygotsky’s idea of ZPD being appropriated to mean teamwork where students sit around and carry out a task already determined for them in quantifying terms. For Vygotsky, the classroom is a transformative, collaborative place.

But in our neo liberal times, learner-centredness has become quick fix to address the ills of a (still existing) hierarchical classroom. What it has actually achieved is reduce teachers to the status of being mere cogs in a machine designed elsewhere: imitative, non-thinking followers of some empty words and guide lines. Over the years, this learner-centred approach has served to destroy teachers’ independence and agency in designing and trying out different pedagogical methods for themselves and their classrooms, make input in the formulation of the curriculum, and create a space for critical thinking in the classroom.

Thus, when Dr. Amarasuriya says that our system should not be over reliant on text books, I have to disagree with her (https://www.newsfirst.lk/2026/01/29/education-reform-to-end-textbook-tyranny ). The issue is not with over reliance, but with the inability to produce well formulated text books. And we are now privy to what this easy dismissal of text books has led us into – the rabbit hole of badly formulated, misinformed content. I quote from the statement of the 94 university teachers to illustrate my point.

“The textbooks for the Grade 6 modules . . . . contain rampant typographical errors and include (some undeclared) AI-generated content, including images that seem distant from the student experience. Some textbooks contain incorrect or misleading information. The Global Studies textbook associates specific facial features, hair colour, and skin colour, with particular countries and regions, and refers to Indigenous peoples in offensive terms long rejected by these communities (e.g. “Pygmies”, “Eskimos”). Nigerians are portrayed as poor/agricultural and with no electricity. The Entrepreneurship and Financial Literacy textbook introduces students to “world famous entrepreneurs”, mostly men, and equates success with business acumen. Such content contradicts the policy’s stated commitment to “values of equity, inclusivity and social justice” (p. 9). Is this the kind of content we want in our textbooks?”

Where structure is concerned, it is astounding to note that the number of subjects has increased from the previous number, while the duration of a single period has considerably reduced. This is markedly noticeable in the fact that only 30 hours are allocated for mathematics and first language at the junior secondary level, per term. The reduced emphasis on social sciences and humanities is another matter of grave concern. We have seen how TV channels and YouTube videos are churning out questionable and unsubstantiated material on the humanities. In my experience, when humanities and social sciences are not properly taught, and not taught by trained teachers, students, who will have no other recourse for related knowledge, will rely on material from controversial and substandard outlets. These will be their only source. So, instruction in history will be increasingly turned over to questionable YouTube channels and other internet sites. Popular media have an enormous influence on the public and shapes thinking, but a well formulated policy in humanities and social science teaching could counter that with researched material and critical thought. Another deplorable feature of the reforms lies in provisions encouraging students to move toward a career path too early in their student life.

The National Institute of Education has received quite a lot of flak in the fall out of the uproar over the controversial Grade 6 module. This is highlighted in a statement, different from the one already mentioned, released by influential members of the academic and activist public, which delivered a sharp critique of the NIE, even while welcoming the reforms (https://ceylontoday.lk/2026/01/16/academics-urge-govt-safeguard-integrity-of-education-reforms). The government itself suspended key players of the NIE in the reform process, following the mishap. The critique of NIE has been more or less uniform in our own discussions with interested members of the university community. It is interesting to note that both statements mentioned here have called for a review of the NIE and the setting up of a mechanism that will guide it in its activities at least in the interim period. The NIE is an educational arm of the state, and it is, ultimately, the responsibility of the government to oversee its function. It has to be equipped with qualified staff, provided with the capacity to initiate consultative mechanisms and involve panels of educators from various different fields and disciplines in policy and curriculum making.

In conclusion, I call upon the government to have courage and patience and to rethink some of the fundamental features of the reform. I reiterate the call for postponing the implementation of the reforms and, in the words of the statement of the 94 university teachers, “holistically review the new curriculum, including at primary level.”

(Sivamohan Sumathy was formerly attached to the University of Peradeniya)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

By Sivamohan Sumathy

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Constitutional Council and the President’s Mandate

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A file photo of a Constitutional Council meeting

The Constitutional Council stands out as one of Sri Lanka’s most important governance mechanisms particularly at a time when even long‑established democracies are struggling with the dangers of executive overreach. Sri Lanka’s attempt to balance democratic mandate with independent oversight places it within a small but important group of constitutional arrangements that seek to protect the integrity of key state institutions without paralysing elected governments.  Democratic power must be exercised, but it must also be restrained by institutions that command broad confidence. In each case, performance has been uneven, but the underlying principle is shared.

 Comparable mechanisms exist in a number of democracies. In the United Kingdom, independent appointments commissions for the judiciary and civil service operate alongside ministerial authority, constraining but not eliminating political discretion. In Canada, parliamentary committees scrutinise appointments to oversight institutions such as the Auditor General, whose independence is regarded as essential to democratic accountability. In India, the collegium system for judicial appointments, in which senior judges of the Supreme Court play the decisive role in recommending appointments, emerged from a similar concern to insulate the judiciary from excessive political influence.

 The Constitutional Council in Sri Lanka  was developed to ensure that the highest level appointments to the most important institutions of the state would be the best possible under the circumstances. The objective was not to deny the executive its authority, but to ensure that those appointed would be independent, suitably qualified and not politically partisan. The Council is entrusted with oversight of appointments in seven critical areas of governance. These include the judiciary, through appointments to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, the independent commissions overseeing elections, public service, police, human rights, bribery and corruption, and the office of the Auditor General.

JVP Advocacy

 The most outstanding feature of the Constitutional Council is its composition. Its ten members are drawn from the ranks of the government, the main opposition party, smaller parties and civil society. This plural composition was designed to reflect the diversity of political opinion in Parliament while also bringing in voices that are not directly tied to electoral competition. It reflects a belief that legitimacy in sensitive appointments comes not only from legal authority but also from inclusion and balance.

 The idea of the Constitutional Council was strongly promoted around the year 2000, during a period of intense debate about the concentration of power in the executive presidency. Civil society organisations, professional bodies and sections of the legal community championed the position that unchecked executive authority had led to abuse of power and declining public trust. The JVP, which is today the core part of the NPP government, was among the political advocates in making the argument and joined the government of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga on this platform.

 The first version of the Constitutional Council came into being in 2001 with the 17th Amendment to the Constitution during the presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The Constitutional Council functioned with varying degrees of effectiveness. There were moments of cooperation and also moments of tension. On several occasions President Kumaratunga disagreed with the views of the Constitutional Council, leading to deadlock and delays in appointments. These experiences revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of the model.

 Since its inception in 2001, the Constitutional Council has had its ups and downs. Successive constitutional amendments have alternately weakened and strengthened it. The 18th Amendment significantly reduced its authority, restoring much of the appointment power to the executive. The 19th Amendment reversed this trend and re-established the Council with enhanced powers. The 20th Amendment again curtailed its role, while the 21st Amendment restored a measure of balance. At present, the Constitutional Council operates under the framework of the 21st Amendment, which reflects a renewed commitment to shared decision making in key appointments.

 Undermining Confidence

 The particular issue that has now come to the fore concerns the appointment of the Auditor General. This is a constitutionally protected position, reflecting the central role played by the Auditor General’s Department in monitoring public spending and safeguarding public resources. Without a credible and fearless audit institution, parliamentary oversight can become superficial and corruption flourishes unchecked. The role of the Auditor General’s Department is especially important in the present circumstances, when rooting out corruption is a stated priority of the government and a central element of the mandate it received from the electorate at the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2024.

 So far, the government has taken hitherto unprecedented actions to investigate past corruption involving former government leaders. These actions have caused considerable discomfort among politicians now in the opposition and out of power.  However, a serious lacuna in the government’s anti-corruption arsenal is that the post of Auditor General has been vacant for over six months. No agreement has been reached between the government and the Constitutional Council on the nominations made by the President. On each of the four previous occasions, the nominees of the President have failed to obtain its concurrence.

 The President has once again nominated a senior officer of the Auditor General’s Department whose appointment was earlier declined by the Constitutional Council. The key difference on this occasion is that the composition of the Constitutional Council has changed. The three representatives from civil society are new appointees and may take a different view from their predecessors. The person appointed needs to be someone who is not compromised by long years of association with entrenched interests in the public service and politics. The task ahead for the new Auditor General is formidable. What is required is professional competence combined with moral courage and institutional independence.

 New Opportunity

 By submitting the same nominee to the Constitutional Council, the President is signaling a clear preference and calling it to reconsider its earlier decision in the light of changed circumstances. If the President’s nominee possesses the required professional qualifications, relevant experience, and no substantiated allegations against her, the presumption should lean toward approving the appointment. The Constitutional Council is intended to moderate the President’s authority and not nullify it.

 A consensual, collegial decision would be the best outcome. Confrontational postures may yield temporary political advantage, but they harm public institutions and erode trust. The President and the government carry the democratic mandate of the people; this mandate brings both authority and responsibility. The Constitutional Council plays a vital oversight role, but it does not possess an independent democratic mandate of its own and its legitimacy lies in balanced, principled decision making.

 Sri Lanka’s experience, like that of many democracies, shows that institutions function best when guided by restraint, mutual respect, and a shared commitment to the public good. The erosion of these values elsewhere in the world demonstrates their importance. At this critical moment, reaching a consensus that respects both the President’s mandate and the Constitutional Council’s oversight role would send a powerful message that constitutional governance in Sri Lanka can work as intended.

by Jehan Perera

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Gypsies … flying high

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The present setup

The scene has certainly changed for the Gypsies and today one could consider them as awesome crowd-pullers, with plenty of foreign tours, making up their itinerary.

With the demise of Sunil Perera, music lovers believed that the Gypsies would find the going tough in the music scene as he was their star, and, in fact, Sri Lanka’s number one entertainer/singer,

Even his brother Piyal Perera, who is now in charge of the Gypsies, admitted that after Sunil’s death he was in two minds about continuing with the band.

However, the scene started improving for the Gypsies, and then stepped in Shenal Nishshanka, in December 2022, and that was the turning point,

With Shenal in their lineup, Piyal then decided to continue with the Gypsies, but, he added, “I believe I should check out our progress in the scene…one year at a time.”

The original Gypsies: The five brothers Lal, Nimal, Sunil, Nihal and Piyal

They had success the following year, 2023, and then decided that they continue in 2024, as well, and more success followed.

The year 2025 opened up with plenty of action for the band, including several foreign assignments, and 2026 has already started on an awesome note, with a tour of Australia and New Zealand, which will keep the Gypsies in that part of the world, from February to March.

Shenal has already turned out to be a great crowd puller, and music lovers in Australia and New Zealand can look forward to some top class entertainment from both Shenal and Piyal.

Piyal, who was not much in the spotlight when Sunil was in the scene, is now very much upfront, supporting Shenal, and they do an awesome job on stage … keeping the audience entertained.

Shenal is, in fact, a rocker, who plays the guitar, and is extremely creative on stage with his baila.

‘Api Denna’ Piyal and Shenal

Piyal and Shenal also move into action as a duo ‘Api Denna’ and have even done their duo scene abroad.

Piyal mentioned that the Gypsies will feature a female vocalist during their tour of New Zealand.

“With Monique Wille’s departure from the band, we now operate without a female vocalist, but if a female vocalist is required for certain events, we get a solo female singer involved, as a guest artiste. She does her own thing and we back her, and New Zealand requested for a female vocalist and Dilmi will be doing the needful for us,” said Piyal.

According to Piyal, he originally had plans to end the Gypsies in the year 2027 but with the demand for the Gypsies at a very high level now those plans may not work out, he says.

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