Connect with us

Features

Discussing Palestine in Sri Lanka

Published

on

By Uditha Devapriya

“She vigorously defended apartheid as a necessary bulwark against black domination and the communism that engulfed her native Yugoslavia. [She]… thought Africans inferior to other human beings and not entitled to be treated as equals. I asked if Hitler hadn’t said the same thing about her as a Jew. She called a halt to the conversation.”
Chris McGreal, The Guardian, February 7, 2006

Last Wednesday, January 31, the Centre for Progressive Politics & Policy held its inaugural webinar on Sri Lanka’s response to South Africa’s case against Israel. Moderated by Saroj Pathirana, it featured two women’s rights activists, Shreen Saroor and Piyumi Wattuhewa, alongside Kalana Senaratne, Hejaaz Hizbullah, and Dayan Jayatilleka. The latter’s inclusion was particularly refreshing; he should be one of the main voices in discussions like this, even if for some reason he never seems to get featured in them.

The participants brought out some interesting perspectives on the ruling situation. While Senaratne reflected on how the Global South has taken over the moral high ground on human rights issues, Hizbullah, a victim of anti-terror legislation in Sri Lanka, dwelt on how the war in Gaza sheds light on the West’s racist attitudes against Muslims and the Israeli model’s acceptance by Sinhala nationalists in Sri Lanka and abroad. Saroor dwelt on the parallels between the Gaza conflict and the separatist conflict in Sri Lanka, while Wattuhewa brought out a feminist youth angle, emphasising the need for broad solidarity on Gaza.

Jayatilleka began his intervention by recalling Palestine’s bid for membership at UNESCO, where he served as Sri Lanka’s Permanent Delegate, in Paris, from 2011 to 2013. The vote came up for discussion at the 193rd UN General Conference. As expected, Western countries led by the US tried to stall it.

Hillary Clinton – who recently took to Twitter to lament Margot Robbie’s exclusion from the Oscars, but has yet to tweet about or share images of what Palestinian women are going through in Gaza – asked UNESCO to rethink its decision, while a Republican Senator threatened to cut US funding to that agency.

In hindsight, the latter threat seems to have been prescient, with a Democratic government now cutting funding to the UN agency for refugees, on largely unsubstantiated allegations of UN staff collaborating with Hamas. Back then, however, sanity prevailed, and in a broad show of Global Southern unity, Palestine’s bid succeeded, with a majority (107-14) which surprised if not shocked the West. Coming 12 years before the current war, it was an early example of the possibilities of Global Southernism, of the sort that, as Senaratne implied in his presentation, appears to be emanating from Africa.

Africa’s recent interventions on these fronts have not been examined properly, especially by Western analysts who dismiss it as a passive participant in global politics. South Africa’s case and Gambia’s interventions in the conflict are, in that sense, not just commendable; they are also indicative of a broader shift in the Global South. In Asia, countries like India have been ambivalent, at best, with their stance on Israel, and the Sri Lankan government seems to be of two minds when it comes to Gaza. Africa, by contrast, has been much more steadfast and consistent in their support of the Palestinians.

When considering Sri Lanka’s response to the South Africa ruling, a distinction must be drawn between the people and the government. The latter, for all intents and purposes, is trying an intriguing balancing act, supporting the Global South’s push for a humanitarian ceasefire while sending our youth to work in Israel. While it remains to be seen how the regime will achieve this balance, Sri Lankans, particularly the youth, are calling for a more ethical stance. Moreover, as one participant noted, the Palestinian Ambassador called on and commended the likes of Mahinda Rajapaksa, but had nothing to say to, or about, the President, even though the latter is amplifying calls for a ceasefire abroad.

Sri Lankan youth are overwhelmingly siding with Palestine because they identify Palestine, and the African countries that have called for an end to Israeli atrocities in Gaza, as the marginalised. Yet much of the Global North has framed Israel as the smaller, defenceless power that is being encircled by stronger states and needs protection by the West. Though Joe Biden has imposed sanctions on Israeli settlers, and David Cameron speaks about a Palestinian State, risking backlash from their party colleagues, the US and UK have done very little to prevent the bloodbath unfolding in the region.

In that context, Hizbullah’s point about Islamophobia and its bearing on Israel and Sri Lanka is very pertinent. He noted, correctly, that many Sinhala nationalists have sided with Israel, seeing Hamas as an extension of the kind of Islamic fundamentalism they associate with almost all Muslims in Sri Lanka. In other words, they have accepted Israel’s response. The parallels Saroor brought up between the conflict there and the conflict shed light on this further, though, as Hizbullah acknowledged, the figurehead of Sinhala nationalist politics in Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa, is seen as a hero by Palestine.

Both Saroor and Hizbullah are brave, courageous critics of all forms of chauvinism; Saroor in particular noted her defiance of the LTTE. In that sense, and adding to what they said, I think we need to note that, inasmuch as Sinhala nationalists sought common ground with Israel’s “response” to Muslim “terrorists”, Tamil nationalists once identified with the Israeli model as well. Though Tamil nationalist outfits set up links with Palestinian resistance leaders like George Habash, the rise of the LTTE put an end to hopes of a rapprochement between these groups. In Sri Lanka, hence, Palestine became a lost cause.

This dovetails with another issue. Historically, Sinhala and Tamil nationalist groups in Sri Lanka both identified themselves as victims: of British colonialism in the case of Sinhala nationalists, of Sinhala chauvinism in the case of Tamil nationalists. Yet they adopted the viewpoint of the groups that brutalised them when they rose to power. Seeing themselves as the oppressed, they turned oppressor the minute they got the chance.

In a way, that parallels the tragedy of the Jewish people as well. Following the Second World War, the Jewish diaspora had the unprecedented chance of turning into a voice for the voiceless, of championing causes like decolonisation and anti-racism. Yet its leaders ended up hobnobbing with pariah, authoritarian, and racist regimes: the Israeli government, for instance, supported apartheid South Africa, while Jewish migrants and Holocaust survivors who settled there – with the exception of progressive liberals like Helen Suzman, a secular Jew who associated with Nelson Mandela – sided with the White regime.

For a while, marginalised communities in the West, like African Americans during the Civil Rights Movement in the US, expressed some sympathy for Zionism and identified the Jewish people as kindred spirits. But that was another world. Following the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and its support for the West’s forever wars, including in Vietnam, began draining the country of whatever support it had got from these groups. This dovetailed with its fading support within the Global South: while S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike could champion the Palestinian cause and defend Israel’s right to exist in the 1950s, by the 1970s and 1980s such attitudes had faded away.

The Israeli government has only itself to blame for this, and that applies to all parties and politicians there. Those who argue that it became racist and genocidal after the rise of Likud, the right-wing party that nurtured Benjamin Netanyahu, forget that the Labour Party was in power in the 1950s. However more progressive the Party may have been on domestic and economic issues, it was hardly less complicit in the marginalisation and brutalisation of the Palestinians. Though promoting democracy at home, it stifled dissent abroad, turning any criticism of the country into a cover for anti-Semitism. In the end it lost credibility in the very regions which would have been in its interest to have been allied with.

It is in light of these historical developments that Sri Lanka’s response to the ICJ ruling must be viewed, considered, and debated. For some the ruling does not go far enough – it does not, for instance, call for an immediate ceasefire – while for others it remains a landmark. However one may view the ruling, in Sri Lanka there is a clear and broad show of support for Palestine and the people of Gaza. The vast majority of Sri Lankans, particularly its youth, do not consider Palestine negotiable. In Sri Lanka, simply put, it is not up for debate, but for discussion. And as the CPPP webinar made it clear, there are many perspectives that must be factored in, and incorporated, when discussing it.

Note: The Centre for Progressive Politics & Policy is a research collective that focuses on Governance, Political Institutions, Freedom of Expression, Youth and Gender, Reconciliation, and Poverty. It can be accessed at . www.muragala.lk.

Uditha Devapriya is a writer, researcher, and analyst based in Sri Lanka who contributes to a number of publications on topics such as history, art and culture, politics, and foreign policy. He can be reached at .udakdev1@gmail.com.



Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Features

A plural society requires plural governance

Published

on

The local government elections that took place last week saw a consolidation of the democratic system in the country.  The government followed the rules of elections to a greater extent than its recent predecessors some of whom continue to be active on the political stage.  Particularly noteworthy was the absence of the large-scale abuse of state resources, both media and financial, which had become normalised under successive governments in the past four decades.  Reports by independent election monitoring organisations made mention of this improvement in the country’s democratic culture.

In a world where democracy is under siege even in long-established democracies, Sri Lanka’s improvement in electoral integrity is cause for optimism. It also offers a reminder that democracy is always a work in progress, ever vulnerable to erosion and needs to be constantly fought for. The strengthening of faith in democracy as a result of these elections is encouraging.  The satisfaction expressed by the political parties that contested the elections is a sign that democracy in Sri Lanka is strong.  Most of them saw some improvement in their positions from which they took reassurance about their respective futures.

The local government elections also confirmed that the NPP and its core comprising the JVP are no longer at the fringes of the polity.  The NPP has established itself as a mainstream party with an all-island presence, and remarkably so to a greater extent than any other political party.  This was seen at the general elections, where the NPP won a majority of seats in 21 of the country’s 22 electoral districts. This was a feat no other political party has ever done. This is also a success that is challenging to replicate. At the present local government elections, the NPP was successful in retaining its all-island presence although not to the same degree.

Consolidating Support

Much attention has been given to the relative decline in the ruling party’s vote share from the 61 percent it secured in December’s general election to 43 percent in the local elections. This slippage has been interpreted by some as a sign of waning popularity. However, such a reading overlooks the broader trajectory of political change. Just three years ago, the NPP and its allied parties polled less than five percent nationally. That they now command over 40 percent of the vote represents a profound transformation in voter preferences and political culture. What is even more significant is the stability of this support base, which now surpasses that of any rival. The votes obtained by the NPP at these elections were double those of its nearest rival.

The electoral outcomes in the north and east, which were largely won by parties representing the Tamil and Muslim communities, is a warning signal that ethnic conflict lurks beneath the surface. The success of the minority parties signals the different needs and aspirations of the ethnic and religious minority electorates, and the need for the government to engage more fully with them.  Apart from the problems of poverty, lack of development, inadequate access to economic resources and antipathy to excessive corruption that people of the north and east share in common with those in other parts of the country, they also have special problems that other sections of the population do not have. These would include problems of military takeover of their lands, missing persons and persons incarcerated for long periods either without trial or convictions under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (which permits confessions made to security forces to be made admissible for purposes of conviction) and the long time quest for self-rule in the areas of their predominance

The government’s failure to address these longstanding issues with urgency appears to have caused disaffection in electorate in the north and east. While structural change is necessarily complex and slow, delays can be misinterpreted as disinterest or disregard, especially by minorities already accustomed to marginalisation. The lack of visible progress on issues central to minority communities fosters a sense of exclusion and deepens political divides. Even so, it is worth noting that the NPP’s vote in the north and east was not insignificant. It came despite the NPP not tailoring its message to ethnic grievances. The NPP has presented a vision of national reform grounded in shared values of justice, accountability, development, and equality.

Translating electoral gains into meaningful governance will require more than slogans. The failure to swiftly address matters deemed to be important by the people of those areas appears to have cost the NPP votes amongst the ethnic and religious minorities, but even here it is necessary to keep matters in perspective.  The NPP came first in terms of seats won in two of the seven electoral districts of the north and east.  They came second in five others. The fact that the NPP continued to win significant support indicates that its approach of equity in development and equal rights for all has resonance. This was despite the Tamil and Muslim parties making appeals to the electorate on nationalist or ethnic grounds.

Slow Change

Whether in the north and east or outside it, the government is perceived to be slow in delivering on its promises.  In the context of the promise of system change, it can be appreciated that such a change will be resisted tooth and nail by those with vested interests in the continuation of the old system.  System change will invariably be resisted at multiple levels.  The problem is that the slow pace of change may be seen by ethnic and religious minorities as being due to the disregard of their interests.  However, the system change is coming slow not only in the north and east, but also in the entire country.

At the general election in December last year, the NPP won an unprecedented number of parliamentary seats in both the country as well as in the north and east.  But it has still to make use of its 2/3 majority to make the changes that its super majority permits it to do.  With control of 267 out of 339 local councils, but without outright majorities in most, it must now engage in coalition-building and consensus-seeking if it wishes to govern at the local level. This will be a challenge for a party whose identity has long been built on principled opposition to elite patronage, corruption and abuse of power rather than to governance. General Secretary of the JVP, Tilvin Silva, has signaled a reluctance to form alliances with discredited parties but has expressed openness to working with independent candidates who share the party’s values. This position can and should be extended, especially in the north and east, to include political formations that represent minority communities and have remained outside the tainted mainstream.

In a plural and multi-ethnic society like Sri Lanka, democratic legitimacy and effective governance requires coalition-building. By engaging with locally legitimate minority parties, especially in the north and east, the NPP can engage in principled governance without compromising its core values. This needs to be extended to the local government authorities in the rest of the country as well. As the 19th century English political philosopher John Stuart Mill observed, “The worth of a state in the long run is the worth of the individuals composing it,” and in plural societies, that worth can only be realised through inclusive decision-making.

by Jehan Perera

Continue Reading

Features

Commercialising research in Sri Lanka – not really the healthiest thing for research

Published

on

Image credit University of Sydney

In the early 2000s, a colleague, returning to Sri Lanka after a decade in a research-heavy first world university, complained to me that ‘there is no research culture in Sri Lanka’. But what exactly does having a ‘research culture’ mean? Is a lot of funding enough? What else has stopped us from working towards a productive and meaningful research culture? A concerted effort has been made to improve the research culture of state universities, though there are debates about how healthy such practices are (there is not much consideration of the same in private ‘universities’ in Sri Lanka but that is a discussion for another time). So, in the 25 years since my colleague bemoaned our situation, what has been happening?

What is a ‘research culture’?

A good research culture would be one where we – academics and students – have the resources to engage productively in research. This would mean infrastructure, training, wholesome mentoring, and that abstract thing called headspace. In a previous Kuppi column, I explained at length some of the issues we face as researchers in Sri Lankan universities, including outdated administrative regulations, poor financial resources, and such aspects. My perspective is from the social sciences, and might be different to other disciplines. Still, I feel that there are at least a few major problems that we all face.

Number one: Money is important.

Take the example American universities. Harvard University, according to Harvard Magazine, “received $686.5 million in federally sponsored research grants” for the fiscal year of 2024 but suddenly find themselves in a bind because of such funds being held back. Research funds in these universities typically goes towards building and maintenance of research labs and institutions, costs of equipment, material and other resources and stipends for graduate and other research assistants, conferences, etc. Without such an infusion of money towards research, the USA would not have been able to attracts (and keeps) the talent and brains of other countries. Without a large amount of money dedicated for research, Sri Lankan state universities, too, will not have the research culture it yearns for. Given the country’s austere economic situation, in the last several years, research funds have come mainly from self-generated funds and treasury funds. Yet, even when research funds are available (they are usually inadequate), we still have some additional problems.

Number two: Unending spools of red tape

In Sri Lankan universities red tape is endless. An MoU with a foreign research institution takes at least a year. Financial regulations surrounding the award and spending of research grants is frustrating.

Here’s a personal anecdote. In 2018, I applied for a small research grant from my university. Several months later, I was told I had been awarded it. It comes to me in installments of not more than Rs 100,000. To receive this installment, I must submit a voucher and wait a few weeks until it passes through various offices and gains various approvals. For mysterious financial reasons, asking for reimbursements is discouraged. Obviously then, if I were working on a time-sensitive study or if I needed a larger amount of money for equipment or research material, I would not be able to use this grant. MY research assistants, transcribers, etc., must be willing to wait for their payments until I receive this advance. In 2022, when I received a second advance, the red tape was even tighter. I was asked to spend the funds and settle accounts – within three weeks. ‘Should I ask my research assistants to do the work and wait a few weeks or months for payment? Or should I ask them not to do work until I get the advance and then finish it within three weeks so I can settle this advance?’ I asked in frustration.

Colleagues, who regularly use university grants, frustratedly go along with it; others may opt to work with organisations outside the university. At a university meeting, a few years ago, set up specifically to discuss how young researchers could be encouraged to do research, a group of senior researchers ended the meeting with a list of administrative and financial problems that need to be resolved if we want to foster ‘a research culture’. These are still unresolved. Here is where academic unions can intervene, though they seem to be more focused on salaries, permits and school quotas. If research is part of an academic’s role and responsibility, a research-friendly academic environment is not a privilege, but a labour issue and also impinges on academic freedom to generate new knowledge.

Number three: Instrumentalist research – a global epidemic

The quality of research is a growing concern, in Sri Lanka and globally. The competitiveness of the global research environment has produced seriously problematic phenomena, such as siphoning funding to ‘trendy’ topics, the predatory publications, predatory conferences, journal paper mills, publications with fake data, etc. Plagiarism, ghost writing and the unethical use of AI products are additional contemporary problems. In Sri Lanka, too, we can observe researchers publishing very fast – doing short studies, trying to publish quickly by sending articles to predatory journals, sending the same article to multiple journals at the same time, etc. Universities want more conferences rather than better conferences. Many universities in Sri Lanka have mandated that their doctoral candidates must publish journal articles before their thesis submission. As a consequence, novice researchers frequently fall prey to predatory journals. Universities have also encouraged faculties or departments to establish journals, which frequently have sub-par peer review.

Alongside this are short-sighted institutional changes. University Business Liankage cells, for instance, were established as part of the last World Bank loan cycle to universities. They are expected to help ‘commercialise’ research and focuses on research that can produce patents, and things that can be sold. Such narrow vision means that the broad swathe of research that is undertaken in universities are unseen and ignored, especially in the humanities and social sciences. A much larger vision could have undertaken the promotion of research rather than commercialisation of it, which can then extend to other types of research.

This brings us to the issue of what types of research is seen as ‘relevant’ or ‘useful’. This is a question that has significant repercussions. In one sense, research is an elitist endeavour. We assume that the public should trust us that public funds assigned for research will be spent on worth-while projects. Yet, not all research has an outcome that shows its worth or timeliness in the short term. Some research may not be understood other than by specialists. Therefore, funds, or time spent on some research projects, are not valued, and might seem a waste, or a privilege, until and unless a need for that knowledge suddenly arises.

A short example suffices. Since the 1970s, research on the structures of Sinhala and Sri Lankan Tamil languages (sound patterns, sentence structures of the spoken versions, etc.) have been nearly at a standstill. The interest in these topics are less, and expertise in these areas were not prioritised in the last 30 years. After all, it is not an area that can produce lucrative patents or obvious contributions to the nation’s development. But with digital technology and AI upon us, the need for systematic knowledge of these languages is sorely evident – digital technologies must be able to work in local languages to become useful to whole populations. Without a knowledge of the structures and sounds of local languages – especially the spoken varieties – people who cannot use English cannot use those devices and platforms. While providing impetus to research such structures, this need also validates utilitarian research.

This then is the problem with espousing instrumental ideologies of research. World Bank policies encourage a tying up between research and the country’s development goals. However, in a country like ours, where state policies are tied to election manifestos, the result is a set of research outputs that are tied to election cycles. If in 2019, the priority was national security, in 2025, it can be ‘Clean Sri Lanka’. Prioritising research linked to short-sighted visions of national development gains us little in the longer-term. At the same time, applying for competitive research grants internationally, which may have research agendas that are not nationally relevant, is problematic. These are issues of research ethics as well.

Concluding thoughts

In moving towards a ‘good research culture’, Sri Lankan state universities have fallen into the trap of adopting some of the problematic trends that have swept through the first world. Yet, since we are behind the times anyway, it is possible for us to see the damaging consequences of those issues, and to adopt the more fruitful processes. A slower, considerate approach to research priorities would be useful for Sri Lanka at this point. It is also a time for collective action to build a better research environment, looking at new relationships and collaborations, and mentoring in caring ways.

(Dr. Kaushalya Perera teaches at the Department of English, University of Colombo)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

By Kaushalya Perera

Continue Reading

Features

Melantha …in the spotlight

Published

on

Fun mode for Melantha Perera and Allwyn H. Stephen

Melantha Perera, who has been associated with many top bands in the past, due to his versatility as a musician, is now enjoying his solo career, as well … as a singer.

He was invited to perform at the first ever ‘Noon2Moon’ event, held in Dubai, at The Huddle, CityMax Hotel, on Saturday, 3rd May.

It was 15 hours of non-stop music, featuring several artistes, with Melantha (the only Sri Lankan on the show), doing two sets.

According to reports coming my way, ‘Noon2Moon’ turned out to be the party of the year, with guests staying back till well past 3.00 am, although it was a 12.00 noon to 3.00 am event.

Having Arabic food

Melantha says he enjoyed every minute he spent on stage as the crowd, made up mostly of Indians, loved the setup.

“I included a few Sinhala songs as there were some Sri Lankans, as well, in the scene.”

Allwyn H. Stephen, who is based in the UAE, was overjoyed with the success of ‘Noon2Moon’.

Says Allwyn: “The 1st ever Noon2Moon event in Dubai … yes, we delivered as promised. Thank you to the artistes for the fab entertainment, the staff of The Huddle UAE , the sound engineers, our sponsors, my supporters for sharing and supporting and, most importantly, all those who attended and stayed back till way past 3.00 am.”

Melantha:
Dubai and
then Oman

Allwyn, by the way, came into the showbiz scene, in a big way, when he featured artistes, live on social media, in a programme called TNGlive, during the Covid-19 pandemic.

After his performance in Dubai, Melantha went over to Oman and was involved in a workshop – ‘Workshop with Melantha Perera’, organised by Clifford De Silva, CEO of Music Connection.

The Workshop included guitar, keyboard and singing/vocal training, with hands-on guidance from the legendary Melantha Perera, as stated by the sponsors, Music Connection.

Back in Colombo, Melantha will team up with his band Black Jackets for their regular dates at the Hilton, on Fridays and Sundays, and on Tuesdays and Thursdays at Warehouse, Vauxhall Street.

Melantha also mentioned that Bright Light, Sri Lanka’s first musical band formed entirely by visually impaired youngsters, will give their maiden public performance on 7th June at the MJF Centre Auditorium in Katubadda, Moratuwa.

Continue Reading

Trending