By Austin Fernando
(Former Secretary to the President)

About ten months ago, among other things, I informally discussed the devolution of power with Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who was an MP at the time. The consequences of his low-priority approach to devolution, as predicted then, were reflected in the presidential election results in the North and the East. Perhaps, there were other reasons also for the low level of popular support for him over there. Now that he is the President of 23 million Sri Lankans, he must consider the presidential election results in the North and the East as a guide. Probably, the Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has already reminded him of that.

Sri Lankan politicians’ mood changes

The policies of Sri Lankan politicians on power sharing are characterized by inconsistencies. Former Ministers Basil Rajapaksa and Prof. G.L. Peiris promised Indians the implementation of the 13th Amendment (13A). Though Namal Rajapaksa has specifically rejected the devolution of Land and Police powers, President Mahinda Rajapaksa promised “13A+,” including those. In Delhi, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa said 13A could not be implemented “against the wishes and feelings of the majority (Sinhala) community.” But he had solemnly declared that he would uphold and defend the Constitution, of which 13A is an integral part! The Indian political leaders’ policy on the devolution here has remained consistent.

We have conveniently forgotten that during the Oslo Peace Talks on 05 December 2002, the Sri Lankan delegation led by G. L. Peiris and the LTTE delegation led by Anton Balasingham agreed to “explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure, within a united Sri Lanka.”

“Federal,” “areas of historical habitation,” and “internal self-determination” are anathema to many Southern politicians and not understood by civilians. Today, Ranil Wickremesinghe and Pieris will certainly dissociate themselves from the Oslo Declaration.

Wickremesinghe, who supported the passage of 13A and appurtenant legislations, was Prime.

Minister (PM) when the Oslo Declaration was made. But now he is unwilling to devolve police powers to Provincial Councils (PCs). Gotabhaya Rajapaksa informed Indians that he must “look at weaknesses and strengths of 13A.” Had he said so as an inexperienced President in 2019, it would have been tolerable, but he said so after 22 months in office. It reflected a lack of knowledge of governance systems on his part or something up his sleeve.

Evolution of 13A

In this background, it is appropriate, to reflect the evolution of 13A to evaluate it as against what was demanded in the name of devolution.

Sri Lanka came under pressure to devolve power following Black July (1983) and the beginning of the armed conflict. The contention that the Indians wished for Sri Lanka’s division through devolution is not true. India has always respected our sovereignty and territorial integrity owing to its experience with conflicts in Mizoram, Nagaland, etc.

On 01 March 1985, President J. R. Jayewardene personally sought Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s intervention to prevent the movement of armed terrorists from India and Sri Lankans seeking refuge in India. On 01 December 1985, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) presented its proposals for devolution to Gandhi in a bid to pressure Sri Lanka to agree to power-sharing.

The salient features of the proposal were as follows:

• Sri Lanka—”Ilankai” be a union of states,

• Amalgamated Northern and Eastern Provinces, a ‘Tamil Linguistic State’, which cannot be altered without their consent,

• Parliament reflecting ethnic proportion shall be empowered to make laws under “List 1″ for Defense, Foreign Affairs, Currency, Posts / Telecommunications, Immigration/Emigration, Foreign trade/Commerce, Railways, Airports /Aviation, Broadcasting/Television, Customs, Elections, and Census only, • List 2” had all other subjects, inclusive of Law and Order, Land, etc., with the State Assembly possessing law-making powers, • Any person resident in Sri Lanka, on 1st November 1981, who is not a foreigner shall be a Sri ankan citizen, • No Resolution or Bill affecting any “nationality” should be passed by Parliament without the agreement of that “nationality,” (The term ‘nationality’ is misleading.)

• The State Assembly to be empowered to levy taxes, cess/fees, and mobilize loans/grants,

• Special provisions for Indian Tamils,

• The elected members are to be given enhanced powers, • Upgrading the judicial system, e.g. Provincial High Court to Appeal Court, and, • Muslim rights to be cared for.

The Jayewardene Government rejected the proposal out of hand. The TULF again addressed Gandhi (17-1-1986), incorporating more sensitive issues such as ‘traditional homelands,’ demographic imbalance, etc. Jayewardene steadfastly advocated a military solution and the war was dubbed as “genocide” by former Indian Minister B.R. Bhagat and several Lok Sabha members. The latter demanded punitive interventions such as ‘crushing Sri Lanka in 24 hours” (Sri Kolandaivelu on 29-4-1985), and Sri Gopalaswamy on 13-5-1985, asking India “to undertake every possible means, including military interventions.”

Gandhi would have been satisfied with the Sri Lankan proposals of 09 July 1986, prepared after consulting Minister P. Chidambaram, which fitted the Sri Lankan constitutional basics. There were ‘Notes’ incorporated into the proposals on PCs, law and order, and land settlements inclusive of land alienation under the Mahaweli Project, with allottees identified based on ethnicity. On 30 Sept.,

1986, the TULF responded to India in detail to the government’s proposals, adding more propositions.

Gandhi was mindful of Lok Sabha’s demands. He vented frustration in Lok Sabha and abroad (e.g. Harare). Efforts to project him and India as weak exasperated him and drove him to get tough. On 02 June 1987, he threatened to send a flotilla with ‘humanitarian assistance’, and on 04 June 1987, Indian Aircraft violated Sri Lanka’s airspace and carried out aid drops in the North. No superpower stood with us on this blatant violation. No wonder Jayewardene agreed to sign an Accord and follow up by introducing 13A.

After the signing of the Accord, the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) were deployed in Sri Lanka.

Lt. General A. S. Kalkat, in an interview with Nithin Ghokle, has admitted that the deployment of the Indian army here was a mistake. Jaishankar (one-time political adviser to the IPKF- 1988-1990), has said in his ‘The India Way,’ that it was a ‘misadventure.’ We are aware of the IPKF’s ‘mistakes’ and ‘misadventures’ like the Valvettithurai Massacre of 64 persons on 02 August 1989, and more, best known to Kalkat and Jaishankar. Importantly, the IPKF operations instilled fear, especially conditioning Tamil people’s minds to search for whatever possible solution.

Concurrently, as explained by then-Indian Foreign Secretary A. P. Venkateswaran, Jayewardene met Gandhi in mid-November 1986 in Bangalore, along with Ministers Natwar Singh, Chidambaram, and himself, and Jayewardene allegedly ‘pleaded’ with Gandhi to send the Indian Army to prevent his government from collapsing, due to the JVP attacks in the South, and LTTE in the North. It was his sheer desperation that drove Jayewardene to opt for the Accord and 13A. After this meeting, Gandhi sent Chidambaram and Natwar Singh to Colombo knowing our vulnerability.

On 19 December 1986, they submitted the “emerged” proposals. The salient points were as follows:

* The Eastern Province to be demarcated minus Sinhala majority Ampara Electorate.

* A PC was to be established for the new Eastern Province.

* Earlier discussed institutional linkages to be refined for Northern and Eastern PCs. The

intention would have been to merge later under a second-stage constitutional development.

* Sri Lanka was willing to create a Vice Presidency for a specified term.

* The five Muslim parliamentarians from the Eastern Province may be invited to India to discuss matters of mutual concern.

The foregoing demands show how India tried to match the Tamils’ interest, vis-a-vis the wishes of the majority community.

Military operations continued provoking India, which threatened to abandon its intervenor role on 09 February 1987, unless Colombo pursued a political solution. Jayewardene responded on 12 February 1987, insinuating calming down on military actions, promoting negotiation and administration, and paving the release of persons in custody. This was how India reacted when rubbed wrongly.

Under successive governments, PCs were weakened by the withdrawal of powers and lacked cooperation. This may have led Jaishankar to address President Dissanayake, whose party is considered averse to 13A. This is the perception of the Tamil MPs, who have recently sought US Ambassador Julie Chung’s intervention for correction. Such aversion to PCs is hard to overcome as evident from an NPP’s public statement that devolution will not include Land and Police powers. It said so close on the heels of Jaishankar’s request that 13A be fully implemented.

Flashback to 1986

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stalwart, Jaswant Singh posed seven questions in Lok Sabha on 13 May 1986, based on the situation in Sri Lanka. They are relevant even today.

* What is the Indian stand in the debate on devolution and delegation?

* Where do India and Sri Lanka stand on the Northern and Eastern Provinces merger?

* What is the stand on land use by the Indian Government, the Government of Sri Lanka, and

the Tamil groups?

* What is the status of the language?

* What is the stand on Law and Order?

* What is the time frame for reaching a solution?

* What is the Indian Government’s stand on the foreign threats emerging in the context of the Sri Lankan issues?

If Jaswant Singh were alive today, he would either join the critical Lok Sabha Members or question PM Modi and Jaishankar why the Accord has not been implemented. Jaishankar’s reminder to President Dissanayake would have been due to his frustration stemming from:

* 13A being “paralyzed” by partial implementation, and delayed elections.

* The demerger of the North and the East legally

* The delay in devolving land and police powers

* The language issue has not been fully resolved despite constitutional guarantees

* Absence of a timeframe for a solution, even after crushing the Tigers in 2009, and,

* Increasing threat to India, especially from China.

Parallelly, the field situations have changed. Military operations have ceased. Public attention has been shifted from conflict to human rights and humanitarian concerns, returning refugees, and reconciliation. 13A has been internationalized owing to the incorporation thereof into UNHRC Resolutions by Mahinda Rajapaksa and Wickremesinghe in 2009 and 2015 respectively. Intense lobbying by Diaspora groups has also contributed to this situation. These are daunting challenges before President Dissanayake. 13A is only one of them.

What is in store?

As seen above, the 13A has trudged a rough path to be accepted domestically or in India. Parliamentarians resigned, opposition politicians and Bhikkus protested on roads against it and violence was experienced. If the rejected proposals had been accepted the consequences would have been disastrous. However, devolution has come to stay and is viewed as a ‘Made-in-India’ solution.

President Dissanayake must be prepared for negotiations with relevant parties on devolution and hence needs to study India’s experience with devolution. For instance, on the devolution of land powers, Dissanayake can refer to how the Indian government changed Jammu Kashmir rules allowing the center to release lands to Indians to attract development/investment. They permitted even non-residents to own immovable property in Jammu and Kashmir and transfer agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. India considered changes as her “internal affairs”, which may not be acceptable to them if we say so on 13A!

PM Modi has declared that such abrogation brought about security, dignity, and opportunity for all communities that had been deprived of development, and helped eliminate corruption. If he wishes, President Dissanayake can make similar reasoning to bolster his arguments concerning devolution.

Indians also have asymmetrical administration in the Himachal and Uttarakhand States but do not apply that to Jammu-Kashmir, which we also could duplicate. However, asymmetrical devolution is extremely complex and warrants serious legal attention.

It is now up to President Dissanayake’s legal and administrative experts to propose how to

incorporate propositions concerning devolution into the proposed new Constitution. India might compromise on devolution and concentrate more on economic and humanitarian rights interventions. Such attitudinal change is the need of the hour.

Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, a respected negotiator/strategist, recognised even by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazan, has advised Tamil politicians to negotiate with a winnable candidate and secure Tamil aspirations through negotiations. His wise counsel was not heeded by some Tamil politicians, who, while rejecting 13A, demanded a federal system with self-determination powers for Tamils, which is a non-starter. By reminding President Dissanayake of the need to implement 13A after Doval’s visit, New Delhi sent a clear message concerning Sri Lanka: that it does not consider self-determination or a federal system as a solution.

Hence, Tamil politicians also must revise their approach in light of the aforesaid message. Based on Jaswant Singh’s queries and current political trends, if Tamil groups reject 13A, a new power-sharing mechanism sans federalism must be proposed. Perhaps, the new Constitution promised by Dissanayake may offer an alternative to bring about nation-building, with equality, dignity, justice, self-respect, and inclusivity, through a political process. They are the crux of Tamil demands.

Some believe that devolution can be achieved through Local Government Authorities in contravention of international norms of devolution and the Principle of Subsidiarity. Additionally, making all political parties think out of the box is a formidable challenge. Yet, consensual decision-making is needed to ensure the sustainability of any mechanism.

Meera Srinivasan of The Hindu has said:

“Despite India’s known support to the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration in defeating the LTTE in 2009, sections among the Sri Lankan southern population remain India-sceptics, wary of the big neighbour, who ‘interfered’ in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, ‘sided with Tamils’. They resist India’s commenting on power devolution or conduct of elections to PCs and oppose any Indian role in developing national assets.”

India and the Tamil political establishment may adapt to this Sinhala mindset. The upcoming parliamentary election is expected to enable the NPP to form a government. If so, it will be timely to change narratives, without risking the redirection of the government’s political allegiances elsewhere. India should be cautious. Change should be achieved through wider consultations and agreements.

From Bhandari to Vikram Mistri, and Rajeev Gandhi to Narendra Modi, Indians also have acted like their Sri Lankan counterparts in managing the national question here, as evident from Sri Lanka’s failure to implement the 13A fully for 37 years, and India’s failure to convince Sri Lanka of the need to use 13A to solve the national question.

Today India has to deal with a Sri Lankan leader, who is different from predecessors. It is hoped that Jaishankar and others will be able to persuade him to get to the genuine track to explore a solution for the national question. Good luck to Ministers Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Vijitha Herath, Secretaries Vikram Mistri and Aruni Wijewardane, and High Commissioners Santhosh Jha and Kshenuka Senevirathe!

By Dr Upul Wijayawardhana

When I wrote “Will SL govt. do better than the UK Labour administration?” (The Island, 18 October), I never imagined that there would be the need for a follow-up anytime soon but, as it happens, a downward spiral seems to have started already and cracks are appearing in the new administration of Sri Lanka. On top of the fracas about the Easter Sunday bomb attack probes, the pretty mask of the NPP, which won votes from even those sceptical about the JVP, seems to be coming off revealing the real JVP underneath.

Many who supported Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) to win the presidency, in the belief that he was a true democrat committed to changing the political culture of Sri Lanka, would have been surprised and felt let down when AKD said at a public rally that there was no need for an Opposition and Parliament should be filled with only NPP members. For sceptics, that call came as no surprise at all, as the JVP is showing its true colours as a Marxist party. Afterall, they believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat!

Worse still is the fracas about the two committees set up by the then President Ranil Wickremesinghe to investigate two aspects of the Easter Sunday bomb attacks. The reports have cast doubts about the judgement of the president and his two ministers responsible for appointing to high positions two retired senior police officers, who are found to have neglected their duties by one of the committees. These two police officers—one arrested last October after crashing his jeep on to a tourist bus and a car, presumably due to inebriation and the other exposed by Ranjan Ramanayake’s audio recordings of telephone conversations—actively campaigned for the NPP.

We do not know what motivated them to play such a prominent role in the AKD presidential campaign; maybe it was because they were convinced by the policies of AKD or maybe they joined the winning side to get into positions of power or may be even avoid being charged with dereliction of duty while they were in the CID. Whatever it is, they got more than adequately rewarded and seem well protected as Minister Vijitha Herath has declared that they would not be removed under any circumstances. His skewed logic is well exposed and heavily criticized in the editorial “Probe reports, skewed logic and emerging threats” (The Island, 24 October)

Salvos fired by the veteran politician, Udaya Gammanpila, and the awkward responses, not only from the government but also from the Catholic Church are well analysed in two previous Island editorials; ‘Mastermind at large; Udaya in crosshairs’ on 21st October and ‘Of that damning report’ on 22nd October. Gammanpila claimed that he was in possession of two reports; one headed by former Justice S. A. Imam, who was tasked with probing some allegations UK Channel-4 levelled against Sri Lanka’s military intelligence in respect of the Easter Sunday carnage and the other, chaired by former judge A. N. J. de Alwis, whose purview was to inquire into intelligence coordination and investigative processes related to the Easter Sunday bombings. Gammanpila challenged the government to release these reports and Minister Herath threw a counter-challenge and issued a veiled threat of legal action.

When Gammanpila released the Alwis committee report, as he said he would, on 21 October, Minister Herath’s response was that they rejected the report, which is puzzling. What one would have expected a government that came to power on the promises of transparency and elimination of corruption to publish the report in keeping with their demand whilst being in the Opposition. Interestingly, initially it was the spokesman of the Catholic church, Father C G Fernando, who gave the reason: that Justice Alwis had conflict of interest as her brother had been disciplined by the two police officers concerned and, subsequently Minister Herath carried out a personal attack on her. Why weren’t those objections raised, if valid, when she was appointed? And, why did her critics wait until they found the committee report was critical of their two favourite ex-cops! Is this good governance that was promised?

Gammanpila released the Imam report 28 October, and one wonders what Father Fernando, who lamented about the loss of that report at a book launch on 01 October, has got to say? Meanwhile, JVP supporters have mounted a massive social media campaign ridiculing Gammanpila. Perhaps, it is the shape of things to come!

Interestingly, at a ceremony held at one of the affected sites, St. Sebastian’s church in Katuwapitiya, conducted by Cardinal Ranjith, President AKD was questioned emotionally by a bereaved mother/wife what action the government was planning to take. His response was that as he was not a judicial officer, he would leave it to the judiciary to take action. As there is an element of doubt, for the sake of the promised transparency and eradication of corruption, he should get the Attorney General to file action against these two officers, as recommended in the Alwis report. If they are cleared by the judiciary, then they can resume their jobs. This would help prevent embarrassment for the government. It looks as if the new government is unaware of the dictum “Justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done”.

Then came the sudden issue of the US travel advisory. The government’s response that it had been aware of the threat and had already taken action, seemed an excuse. Had the government liaised with the foreign diplomats, a less damaging advisory could have been issued as the way they had been issued is likely to damage the tourist sector which is reviving. Of course, it is quite possible that this was done purposely, as it was issued the day after the government announced that it had signed the resolution, spearheaded by Chile, supporting the UN Secretary General who had been declared a persona non grata by Israel. If so, the government is heading for a very turbulent period engineered by foreign viceroys!

The credibility of the government is falling fast as they seem to be doing just the opposite of what its leaders preached while they were in the opposition.

by Rev. Fr. Leopold Ratnasekera
OMI.
Oblate Seminary, Ampitiya.

The 37th anniversary of the death of Fr. Michael Paul Rodrigo is being celebrated on 10th November this year. He was a Catholic Priest belonging to the Oblate Congregation (OMI) working in the village hamlet of Alukalavita-Buttala in the Monerāgala district located at the 12th Mile-post on the Kataragama road, where he had founded a Christian-Buddhist Fellowship and Dialogue Centre since 1980. He was brutally gunned down at point-blank range on that fateful evening in the middle of a Holy Mass he was celebrating with two of his co-workers. The assassination finally came following a series of death-threats against his presence and work in Buttala. To this day those responsible for this dastardly crime remain unknown. It is indeed a tragedy continuing to be a mystery surrounding the death of an innocent man who paid the price for bravely facing challenges that came from the powers-that-be who cast spells of suspicion and questioned his work among the poor farmers and peasants of this historic Ūva-Wellassa province.

Once an agriculturally thriving area with soil rich for farming and paddy cultivation, about eighty-thousand acres of its land had been taken over for a sugar-cane project by a multi-national corporation: “Booker-Tate Agriculture International establishing a factory in Pelawatte, making the local farmers and peasants lose their land as well as means of employment and traditional farming livelihoods. Fr. Michael Rodrigo had taken issue with the government and even writing to the President about the injustice that was crippling the lives of the poor of Wellassa and asking for redress. The Wellassa episode of the erosion of local enterprise is one of the tragic instances of the open-economy unleashed at that time. There was serious concern over the environmental impact caused by deforestation and the use of chemical fertiliser. The priest in solidarity with the monks and the people of Buttala had raised a strong voice against this oppression of the poor and demanded social justice to the peasants of Ūva. Fr Rodrigo often clashed with the authorities on behalf of the youth in Buttala. The Centre for Buddhist-Christian dialogue named “Suba Seth Gedara” was a humble house of wattle and daub which later transformed itself into a clinic, a school, and small library to address the community’s health and educational needs and a garden for indigenous medicinal plants to match. The Centre also facilitated collaboration between the farming youth and university students which helped improve the skills and techniques of their trade.

Fr. Michael Rodrigo was born on 30th June 1927 at Dehiwela and had his secondary education at St. Peter’s College, Bambalapitiiya. He was trained for priesthood in Rome where he was ordained as a priest on 4th April 1954. On his return to the country, he was posted to the staff of the newly inaugurated National Seminary of Ampitiya and eventually proceeded to Rome again for a Ph.D. (1957) at the prestigious Jesuit-run Gregorian University. After a spell of teaching in Ampitiya he embarked on a sabbatical to Paris where at the Catholic Institute of Paris he earned a doctorate in Theology (1973). Though equipped with two doctorates with research in Buddhist-Christian comparative studies, he declined a professorship in Paris and chose instead active social involvement with rural poor. Always interested in Buddhism as a vehicle of dialogue with the Buddhists of his motherland, his doctoral thesis in Rome was on: “Some Aspects of Enlightenment of the Buddha” making an in-depth psychological and metaphysical analysis of the enlightenment and was awarded first-class honours. The second doctorate in Paris was entitled: “The Moral Passover from selfishness to selflessness in Christianity and other Religions in Sri Lanka”. On his return from Paris, he assisted Bishop Leo Nanayakkara OSB of Badulla diocese in inaugurating a new style of a seminary where priestly training was more contextual and including exposure programs. This experimental seminary was named “Sēvaka Sevana” at Bandārawela. From here Fr. Michael Rodrigo extended his interest to live out an option for the poor and chose Buttala, one of the poorest villages in the Monerāgala district thus directing his knowledge and experience for the care and liberation of the poor who had lost their land and livelihood. He decided to do it in an entirely Buddhist milieu (99%). In due course winning over the monks, he was able to work together with the people in many projects that affected the living standards of the people, education and religious formation of the youth.

It was the time when winds of change came over the Catholic Church which opened up to the world and its joys and hopes, to the various religious traditions and cultural diversities of humanity as well as identifying with struggles of the world poor and the oppressed. Fr. Michael Rodrigo brimming with this spirit of reform plunged himself into action in his own home-country, the motherland of Sri Lanka venturing right into a Buddhist village (99%), where poverty was widespread. The situation proved ideal to begin his work of dialoguing with the Buddhists and working for their liberation, confronting the oppressive forces that were dehumanizing the poor of Buttala. They needed to be empowered with knowledge and skills, trained to utilise their natural resources, and live with dignity. When structures and systems get entrenched, liberation is needed to neutralise them to harmonize the liberation process. He also wished to be an agent of reconciliation healing the aching memory linked to Christianity in the aftermath of the Ūva-Wellassa rebellion of 1818 that led to the massacre of people by the colonial British. He had a thorough knowledge of Buddhism including texts in Pāli and could even give an “anusāsanā” on a Pōya day in the temple when requested. The monks and the Buddhist laity marveled at his knowledge of Buddhism. He was able to present the Buddhist radical teachings of the ten pāramithās and four brahma-vihāras such as mettā and karunā (mercy and loving kindness) aligning them with Christian moral values of mercy and compassion convinced that Buddhism and Christianity could co-exist. Mettā comes from the Pāli word “mejjati” ie melting in loving kindness to all paralleled with Christianity’s “compassion” from the Greek meaning ‘welling from the bowels’. Both have kindred roots. What Fr. Michael Rodrigo did was no mere social work but bringing the religious teachings to bear on his work and people’s struggles. Oppression is both anti-Buddhist and anti-Christian. Working together the religions could release the power needed to usher in liberation.

He was against new-liberal economic policies embedded in the immoral agenda of the multi-national economic procedures and especially the subcultures of the governments in office. He followed the “pedagogy of the Oppressed” proposed by the Brazilian author Paolo Frêre who promulgated conscientisation as needed to unleash the forces of liberation which came alive at the village level at Ūva-Wellassa. Fr. Michael used to say that he is a Buddhist by culture and a Christian by religion. Dialogue was at the core of all his endeavours. While to Christians he posed the challenge of God’s preference of the poor, he invited the Buddhists to look closely at anatta (impermanence) and sangha to see their relevance in social life. His true message lay in his life-style and spirituality, posing a challenge to people of all faiths. His dream was to see Buddhists live genuinely according to the tenets of their religion and help one another attain a fuller humanity: one of contentment, peace, fraternity and justice: the so-called Sāradharma virtues. He was sensitive to the environment and decried deforestation and use of chemical fertilisers that poison the land, the home of the people. Instead, to overcome poverty, he improved rural agriculture and ecological mechanisms tapping local labor and resources. His rejection of the mega profit-maximising projects of the TNC’s was one of the factors that ignited suspicion and hostility from the powers-that-be. Added to this unfortunately was the completely false accusation that he was a sympathiser of the JVP youth. The youth to whom Suba-Seth Gedara was open came there seeking education, skill-learning and spiritual empowerment.

Father Michael was endowed with a sparkling sense of humour as well, adding lustre to his conversations and talks with gems of wit. He was surely the most educated man in the Ūva province, a true prophet and the only stalwart who came forward to fight for the dignity of the peasantry of Buttala and forever to be remembered as a saint living and journeying with them. There is recent news of him being declared a martyr-saint in the Catholic Church but people overwhelmingly affirm that he became a saint at the very moment of his death, having lived a life of love and self-emptying for the poor and taking part in their struggles. An immortal oft-repeated saying of Fr. Michael Rodrigo to be gratefully remembered at his anniversary is: “We must be ready to die for our people, if the hour comes, and in the moment it comes”. His last words have been in reference to Archbishop Saint Oscar Romero of San Salvador who was also gunned down at his altar in March 1980: “If they kill me, I shall rise up in the hearts of the people… Let my blood be the seed of freedom and a sign that hope may soon be a reality to them”. Fr. Michael Rodrigo OMI, our Sri Lankan prophet and martyr for justice continues to be alive in the memory of the people of Buttala. Celebrating his glorious death provides an occasion to renew our commitment to keeping his dream alive and be energized in our work of inter-religious dialogue and action for social justice.