Features
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THE KILLING OF A PRIME MINISTER
by Sanjiva Senanayake
PART IV
(continued from last week)
SOMARAMA’S ‘CONFESSION’
In addition to the evidence of the three eye-witnesses, a statement made by Somarama to the Chief Magistrate of Colombo on November 14, 1959 was used by the prosecution to convince the jury that he was the assassin. Somarama retracted the statement long before the SC trial started, and its admissibility as evidence was contested in the SC.
Somarama had been moved to the prison hospital within a few days of the shooting and was then questioned in prison many times by police teams. The most senior police officer in the team was Superintendent of Police B.W. Perera.
Finally, on November 7, Somarama gave a statement to the police but it was short, vague and only mentioned Jayawardena. Then, a week later, he made the following statement to the Chief Magistrate of Colombo –
“One day in August 1959, when I was in the dispensary of the Ayurvedic Hospital in Borella, Reverend Buddharakkitha, the high priest of the Kelaniya temple, and H. P. Jayawardena came by car to see me. Inviting me into the car, Buddharakkitha began to complain bitterly about the general situation in the country. He said that vast sums of money were being lost at the port through strikes and mismanagement. He expressed grave fears that, if the current trends were not arrested, there would be no place for us in the land, nor would there be a future for the Sinhalese people, their religion or their language.
“He suggested that we take steps to do away with the Prime Minister, as we would then be free to fashion things as we wished. I asked him what would befall us if we were to do such a thing. “Nothing will happen to us”, he replied. ‘I have made all the arrangements with those whose assistance we need’. Jayawardena said, “If you should only do this job, we shall ensure that you are out of remand in two or three weeks’ time”.
“Buddharakkitha in turn reassured me that everything would be alright – that I had nothing to fear. I acceded to their request, explaining that I was consenting to do such a thing to one who had done me no wrong only for the sake of my country, my religion and my race. I told them that I had two pupils and also my temple to look after, but they promised to see to all that. They then said that in a day or two they would bring me a revolver, after which all details could be discussed.
“Two or three days later, Buddharakkitha brought me a revolver about a foot in length. It was a six-chambered one and was loaded. We then went to Ragama, met Dickie de Zoysa and proceeded along with him to Muthurajawela. There I fired several times at the fruits of a ‘kaduru’ tree. When I struck a fruit and felled it, someone in the party exclaimed, ‘Bravo, well done!’ After the firing we returned to my temple, having dropped Dickie de Zoysa at Ragama.
Thereafter Rev. Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena visited me often. One day, Amarasinghe, the Chairman of the Kolonnawa Urban Council, also came along with Buddharakkitha.
“Buddharakkitha, Jayawardena and I had agreed that the job be done on September 25. That morning, in order to pluck up courage, I drank a mixture which I had prepared myself and went to the Prime Minister’s residence at Rosmead Place. When the Prime Minister was talking to another monk on the verandah, I started trembling through fear. But the mixture I had taken sustained my courage. On the verandah I shot at the Prime Minister once. That shot struck him. While he was running into the house, I ran behind him and fired three more shots. Then I was overpowered. Someone shot me too and I was rendered unconscious. I do not know what happened next.”
There are several interesting features. There was no mention of visiting Amarasinghe’s house, just a discussion in a car in August, and no mention of Newton Perera either. Dickie de Zoysa had tagged along for the ride to Muthurajawela but, one month later, when hearings commenced at the magistrate’s court, the police withdrew the case against him for lack of evidence. There’s no mention of training but Somarama says he aimed at some fruits at Muthurajawela and succeeded in hitting them, establishing that he was somehow handy with a revolver. He states that he ran behind the PM and shot him but all the entry wounds on the PM were in the front or side of his body.
Somarama retracted this ‘confession’ at the end of the magisterial inquiry (on July 15, 1960), seven months before the SC trial began. In the retraction he stated –
“When I expressed reluctance to make a false statement as required by the police, I was shown a newspaper which said that the death penalty had been re-introduced and was told that, in view of this development, there could be no doubt that I would be sentenced to death and hanged. If, however, I were to make a statement to a magistrate professing that I was doing so voluntarily, the police promised to have me released and made a crown witness. To me, who now lived in the shadow of death, the offer of freedom was irresistible. Therefore, I made a statement to the Magistrate as required by the police, asserting that I was making it of my own free will. In it I implicated the persons whom the police wanted me to implicate. I now state that statement was absolutely untrue.”
The first visit to Somarama in prison by the police team was on October 2, the date on which the government had issued an extraordinary Gazette repealing the suspension of capital punishment. Somarama in a statement from the Dock, made on April 6, 1961, went further and said that B.W. Perera showed him the front page of the newspaper, explained that the death penalty had been reintroduced and he would certainly be hanged. Perera had then asked him to give a statement that he had shot the PM on the instructions of Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena and in exchange he would be made a Crown Witness and escape death. Somarama also said that Perera had mentioned the pardon given to Rupananda, one of the accused in the Turf Club robbery and murder case, as an example. Perera had been on the police team that handled that famous case ten years earlier. It should be noted that Amarasinghe had already been made a Crown Witness six months before Somarama’s retraction. Somarama also said that he had developed an addiction to opium after being medically treated earlier for haemorrhoids, and that he was offered some opium by Perera.
Incidentally, B.W. Perera subsequently committed suicide, in early 1960, when it came to light that he had provided some ammunition to an intermediary, ostensibly acting on behalf of Buddharakkitha. There was no evidence of those bullets being used to assassinate the PM.
Visiting prisoners in remand to question them regarding cases in which they themselves were involved was considered irregular. During the SC trial, the Chief Magistrate of Colombo and some senior Prisons officers stated that it had never happened before in their experience. However, despite objections by Somarama’s counsel, the Judge ruled that it was acceptable since Somarama had been jailed before the police had an opportunity to question him adequately.
Somarama’s counsel also argued that, according to the law, the retracted ‘confession’ should not be admissible as evidence since there were circumstances that showed that it had been made as a result of inducement, threat or promise. He emphasized that in accordance with the prevailing Evidence Ordinance, even the ‘appearance’ of such influence would render it inadmissible, but Justice T.S. Fernando ruled that there should be clear evidence of influence.
The judgement of the Court of Criminal Appeal (https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/the-queen-v-mapitigama-buddharakkita-thera-and-2-others/) contains a rather ambiguous comment on this matter. It states –
“Held, (i) that the admission in evidence of a confession made by the 4th accused to the Magistrate, even assuming that the confession was not voluntary and was obnoxious to section 24 of the Evidence Ordinance or was otherwise inadmissible, could not vitiate the conviction of the 4th accused, because the fact that the 4th accused killed the deceased was established beyond any manner of doubt by the direct evidence of some of those present at the deceased’s house at the time when he was shot there.”
Interestingly, that court had a different view on the value of the ‘confession’ as well. Another passage in the judgement reads –
“Even if any or all of these submissions are entitled to succeed, that would make no difference in the instant case, because the fact that the 4th accused killed the deceased was established beyond any manner of doubt by the direct evidence. Indeed, it is surprising that with that evidence available the prosecution thought it necessary to lengthen the proceedings so much by seeking to prove the confession.”
The prosecution appears to have had a different assessment of the adequacy of the ‘direct evidence’ at their disposal.
MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS
The PM knew Somarama well and had interacted with him on matters relating to the College of Indigenous Medicine even a few weeks before the shooting. Somarama had been involved in campaigning for the MEP and had chaired meetings where Bandaranaike had spoken. Yet, in his ‘Address to the Nation’ written for broadcast by radio, he did not say the assailant was Somarama. He didn’t even say it was a genuine monk – just “a foolish man” wearing robes. The PM was known to be very precise in his use of words, especially in English. He had been joking with doctors and nurses at the hospital despite his injuries, fully expecting to survive, so he was in control of his mental faculties. It’s hard to believe that the PM could not recognize Somarama at such close quarters.
Somarama’s behaviour that fateful morning also raises doubts about his guilt. When he set out that morning in a taxi, which is easily traceable, he offered a lift to two people for part of the way – hardly the behaviour of an assassin primed for action within a couple of hours. Then, while sitting on the verandah of the PM’s house, he had quite normal conversations with others minutes before he allegedly became homicidal. Ananda even asked Somarama for an appointment for a friend with an eye ailment, and was requested to send him the following Thursday.
Somarama’s movements on the eve of the shooting (September 24, 1959) were quite normal too. In fact, when Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena visited Somarama’s temple that evening (for last minute consultations and instructions, according to the prosecution), they found him missing. Somarama was relaxing at a temple in Kotahena, having a chat with his friend, Colamba Saranankara. Is it likely that the master-mind and his chosen instrument of death didn’t know each other’s whereabouts, or even that they were due to meet, on the day before the long-planned assassination of the Prime Minister?
The police recovered three outer robes and an inner jacket worn by Buddhist monks lying discarded in the premises after the shooting. Somarama’s outer robe and inner jacket were pulled off in the struggle and that accounted for one robe. Even if Somarama wore two robes that day, as the prosecution argued, one more robe remained a mystery. The prosecution suggested, rather facetiously, that they had probably been kept in the house to be gifted to monks.
A woman who was cooking in a house across the road had come out on hearing the shots and saw a man vault over the perimeter wall of the PM’s house. He shouted “Hari machang” to someone in one of two cars parked on the road outside, jumped into the other one and both cars sped off towards Borella. The prosecution did not call her to give evidence, but Weeramantry did. When the prosecution could not shake her evidence, they suggested that the escapee was probably a ‘look-out’ working in league with the conspirators, and even argued that it bolstered the ‘fact’ that there was a conspiracy. It seems far-fetched that a ‘look-out’ would have had two private cars at his disposal whereas the alleged assassin, Somarama, arrived alone in a taxi that could be easily traced.
Several other common-sense questions come to mind re Buddharakkitha’s motivations and actions.
= why would a young, powerful and street-smart monk like Buddharakkitha, with his life before him, risk losing everything by killing the PM, without even having a replacement ‘sponsor’ in place?
= was he the type to wait for over one year, as the indictment indicated, before taking his revenge?
= why did he not use his close links with underworld characters to kill the PM in some remote location, perhaps as he campaigned?
= why would he draw attention to himself by sending another Buddhist monk to murder the PM in public and in broad daylight?
= why would the ‘plan’ be for Somarama to go into the house after the shooting, where he was sure to be captured, rather than escape in the ensuing chaos?
In addition to the bullet-points above, is it conceivable that Somarama could have expected to be believed when he pleaded innocence, after shooting the PM in front of so many people? On the day, he did not proudly exult that he did it for country, religion and race, as he did in his ‘confession’.
CONCLUSION
As stated earlier, the jury operated in a politically charged, pressure-cooker atmosphere, with limited technical facilities and under tremendous time pressure. On top of that, there was quite a lot of evidence presented that appeared to have little relevance to the assassination per se, which they still had to take note of and assess. The judge’s summing up alone was spread over six days. They didn’t have the luxury, that we now do, of being able to refer to documents and contemplate at leisure.
In the end, the members of the Special Jury were convinced that the prosecution’s case was proved beyond reasonable doubt, and that is what finally mattered. As Justice Fernando mentioned in his charge to the Jury, they were the sole judges of fact and therefore the real judges in the case. Besides, their opinion was in consonance with that of the experienced judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal.
In that Court, the focus was mainly on legalistic aspects, such as whether the Judge misinterpreted or misguided the jury in matters of law. It was not a full re-assessment of the evidence, but specific submissions made by the defence counsel were considered and addressed. Deliberations were concluded on January 15, 1962.
The main focus of this series of articles is on the testimony in the SC of the witnesses, especially the ‘eye-witnesses’, and the forensic evidence as they relate very specifically to the case against Somarama. His culpability is at the core of the case.
Obviously, there are many other aspects of the alleged conspiracy – in and out of court, legal and political – that could not be covered in an article of this length. There were also many colourful characters who played their parts in this long drama that held the entire nation spellbound all those years ago. Adding even some of them on, would have diverted attention from the main actor – Talduwe Somarama.
It all boils down to a key question.
Can we be reasonably sure of anything beyond the fact that the assassin was a man – foolish or fiendish – “dressed in the robes of a monk”? That is all we know for certain from the only 100% reliable eye-witness …. the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike himself.
And, if the murderer was not Somarama, who was it, and why did he come dressed as a Buddhist monk?
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The writer can be contacted on this subject at skgsenanayake@gmail.com
Features
Treasury Fraud turns into Personal Tragedy
The apparent suicide of an Assistant Director of the External Resources Department (ERD) of the Ministry of Finance, who was among the four officials suspended over the alleged USD 2.5 million cyber fraud, adds personal tragedy to a growing public concern about the overall competence of the NPP government and its stubborn inability to come clean and explain not infrequent infringements of government protocols and procedures. Indeed, there have been too many of them one after another and they cannot all be ‘disappeared’ by claims of inexperience, suggestions of innocence, or assertions of honesty. April 1971 was called Sri Lanka’s politically cruellest month. April 2026 has been quite a cruel month for the NPP government.
That four suspended senior officials, two Directors, an Assistant Director and Additional Director, over cyber fraud is symptomatic of the rot at the head of the civil service. Besides the USD 2.5 million (Rs 800 million) the cyber fraud at the Treasury, there was a bank fraud at the National Development Bank to the tune of Rs. 13.2 billion, the largest by far in the country. While the cyber fraud shows Sri Lanka is fast maturing in cyber crimes as in other increasingly wired economies, the NDB is fraud has been described as yet another instance of turmoil that Sri Lanka’s financial sector regularly goes through.
To wit, the 2002 collapse of the Pramuka Savings and Development Bank and the 2006 bankruptcy of the Golden Key Credit Card Company. Except the NDB has a substantial government role in it, and despite the assurances by the Central Bank that the NDB’s total assets, customer accounts and capital adequacy are safe and well regulated, the shock of the scandal cannot be minimized. Five bank officials, including a manager, an executive assistant and a bank assistant, are involved in the racket and in custody.
A fraud of a different kind involving coal importation has rocked the power industry triggering belated resignations of the Energy Minister and the Ministry Secretary. The former is an Electrical Engineer and the latter an Electrical Engineering Professor. The two should have known better and done better. A Commission of Inquiry has been set up to probe the entire coal saga from its beginning to now.
Previous to these, there was the furtive release last year of 323 containers from the safe harbour of the customs. The containers had been red-flagged by computer for inspection, but was released through human intervention. Unlike the other three scams, the container release had direct government involvement in it and the ostensible reason was to relieve the port of congestion. But no one has provided any explanation as to why a specific set of 323 red-flagged containers were picked for free passage.
Cumulatively the four scandals scream about the rot that permeates the whole continuum of the economy from the private sector to government departments. It seems quite acceptable nowadays to judge bureaucrats by the shade of the government that appointed them. The NPP has been taken to task for blaming Rajapaksa officials and Wickremesinghe officials for the faults of the NPP government. By that token, when this government gets its turn to go out of office, its successors will be blaming NPP officials for the new government’s difficulties.
Already, the government’s pick for the Treasury Secretary, Harshana Sooriyapperuma, is under fire from all fronts for all reasons. This appointment is straight out of the playbook for Central Bank Governor appointment that started with Chandrika Kumaratunga and later vigorously acted out by Mahinda Rajapaksa and Ranil Wickremesinghe. This new Secretary appears to be among a quite few professional beneficiaries out of the JVP-NPP fusion, but they could be assigned to contribute to and benefit from positions where they have prior experience and cause least harm. Not for high-level apprenticing at the Treasury or the Central Bank. The country has seen enough of the Cabraals and the Mahendrans. Now there is a Sooriyapperuma, perhaps with a more nationalistic flavour but not necessarily with the requisite competence. Where is the JVP/NPP difference – at least in style, even if not in substance?
Whose Responsibility?
Legacy blaming of government officials is certainly new, and it might be a stretch but it is also not far fetched. Blaming government officials is the upside version of the old school of taking political responsibility. That is when ministers take responsibility for serious government failures even if officials are the ones who really screwed it up. Now ministers blame officials and the previous governments who appointed them. Political resignation of ministers is a time honoured British and Commonwealth traditions. This tradition is being upended by the insistence on the resignation of everyone except the minister. Only lying to parliament is serious enough for a minister to resign; for everything else it is the officials who take the blame and with it the sack.
In Britain, ministers resign for a host of reasons. Policy and political differences account for most. The hapless current British Prime Minister has already suffered resignations of 13 ministers in less than two years. The clownish Boris Johnson had nearly 50 of them bolt from his stables, while Margaret Thatcher had the fewest of them, but one of them – that of the very, very mild mannered Sir Geoffrey Howe – forced Thatcher herself to resign.
Australia has a strong tradition of ministerial resignations. Of the 99 resignations since 1901, 37 have been over differences with the Prime Minister, 20 over policy, and 18 for unsavoury reasons: pecuniary interest, abuse of financial privileges, and misleading parliament. Serious train accidents trigger resignations by railway ministers, and India has had a number of them, including the 1956 resignation of Lal Bahadur Shastri who resigned from the Nehru Cabinet in 1956 after two bridge collapsing accidents in the present Telangana and then then State of Madras, now Tamil Nadu. Quiet and competent, Shastri became India’s Prime Minister after Nehru’s death in 1964 and served until his untimely death two years later. Such resignations were symbolic acts of taking moral responsibility, over and above fiduciary accountability.
There have not been many, rather any, principled resignations in Sri Lanka. SWRD Bandaranaike threatened resignation during the State Council days, but did not follow through. He later resigned very dramatically from the first UNP government, but for a very political reason – that of forming his own party and to form his own government – which he did, in 1956, but not quite the way he would have – to the manner born – liked to. But SWRD and Dudley Senanayake, like his father DS, were men of honour and honesty. It was SWRD’s refusal to favour licensing of vested interests in the shipping business and sugar production that allegedly led to his assassination. We are in qualitatively in different times now. And not just in Sri Lanka.
Whither NPP?
The recent high-level NPP resignations were neither spontaneous nor morally persuasive. And the fiduciary part, if at all, is yet to come. The only retribution so far is the unfortunate suicide of a former Assistant Director of the External Resources Department. That is a personal tragedy but it does not answer any of the public questions. The President’s May Day speech in Nuwara Eliya, going by its first reports, is full of fighting past misdoings, but nary a word about the current ongoings. Holding a May Day rally in Nuwara Eliya as opposed to Colombo is in itself revealing.
The President and the NPP have a strong rapport with the Malaiayaka Tamils. That is positive for the latter, but if only the President would also help them by holding the Provincial Council elections without delay. The point being, the Malaiayaka Tamils are the biggest unintended beneficiaries of the Provincial Councils. They have been able to use their restored citizenship and voting rights to directly represent themselves in the Provincial Council and the local bodies of the Central Province where they have the most numbers. The continued shutting down of the Provincial Council is depriving them again of their democratic rights. Be that as it may.
In his May Day speech President Anura Kumara Dissanayake spoke about “intensifying legal action against corruption and organized crime,” and claimed that “a series of high-profile cases are moving through the courts under strengthened state institutions.” But he made no mention of the daylight robbery going on in the economic departments of the state, and how his administration is planning to tackle that.
Digital financial fraud is a fast growing business with multiple manifestations, including information stealing and hijacking, accessing accounts, faking identities, compromising emails, and all manner of commercial scams. Even advanced countries are having their hands full in dealing with smart digital thieves. Inasmuch as the NPP government is gung ho about digitizing Sri Lanka, it should also demonstrate how it plans to measure up to emerging digital thieves in the country. Are the sleuths who seem very adept in chasing the alleged abuses like that of Ranil Wickremasinghe, as capable in tackling the more artful digital fraudsters? That is the question.
What is worrisome is the recent reported incident involving a ‘home protest’ by a political provocateur targeting the residence of the Treasury Secretary and the “shit attack” retaliation against him allegedly by government supporters. Both actions are bad and it is pointless arguing which is worse. But it is up to the government to preserve public order and decorum without provocations and retaliations. Clean Sri Lanka should have no place for public dissemination of human waste.
Whither NPP? – is a timely question and the answer to it depends on how the NPP government handles itself going forward. It is still a young government, but it also showing signs of old age that emerge when a government promises too much and delivers too little. All the scams that are now preoccupying public commentaries may not be traceable to any or all of the cabinet ministers. That has been a feature of all previous governments this century. But the NPP’s fault has been its stubbornness not to acknowledge misdoings no matter who caused them, to come clean with all the information, and to give the public the comfort that the government knows what it is doing. This has to change, but whether it will is the question.
by Rajan Philips
Features
Presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010
My role in drumming up aid and investment flows following war victory
Up to now MR’s tenure had marked a commendable level of economic growth. Most countries that come out of long wars enter a period of growth since outlays on the military can be curtailed and capital and manpower can be invested in development projects. Lending agencies and investors too are more inclined to cooperate with a government that had restored peace to the land. Accordingly several highway projects, work on ports and airports, transport and power were undertaken adding to a rapid growth of GDP. At his stage there was little interference in decision making by kinsmen and political favourites which became the bane of MR’s second term leading finally to his defeat in 2015.
While my formal appointment was as the Minister of Public Administration and Home Affairs, PB Jayasundera and Lalith Weeratunga suggested to MR that my services as an interlocutor with international agencies had become necessary. Accordingly I was appointed the Deputy Minister of Finance in addition to the portfolio of Public Administration. MR summoned me to Kandy where he was holding a political meeting and administered the oath of office as his deputy. He then dispatched me the following day to Washington to act on his behalf at IMF meetings.
As de facto Minister of International Monetary Cooperation, I worked with the Secretary to the Treasury PB Jayasundera and Governer of the Central Bank Ajit Nivard Cabraal in interacting with the IMF, the World Bank and the ADB. At the same time I joined MR’s delegations on his official trips abroad which were basically attempts to draw much needed funding into the country. Among all these attempts the most important was our request to the IMF for a standby arrangement to the tune of US dollars 2.6 billion.
This called for very close interaction with the staffers of the IMF going all the way up to the Director General who at that time was Dominique Strauss Kahn, one-time Minister of Finance of France and a towering personality with strong progressive views. Unfortunately he later got embroiled in a sex scandal and had to retire. We were lucky to have a DG who could stand up to the US which still was hung up with our ethnic war issues. However I must say that the US Treasury officials we negotiated with were professionals who reported favourably about our case.
Indeed our economy was not as problematic as that of several other developing countries that they examined. In my regular visits to the US Treasury in Washington I was received with much goodwill. Even Mrs. Yellen, the powerful Treasury Secretary, was always available to meet with us and warn us about the emerging problems with interest rates. I was even given entry to their Treasury printing division where dollars are printed and packaged every day. A quaint custom there is that all Treasury employees are paid every month with newly printed dollar notes.
Why was an IMF programme so important to us at this juncture? In the first place the terms and conditions attached to repayment of the loan were concessionary. It also was a signal to the financial community that our economy was under surveillance in terms of the charter of the IMF and that investments could be made with confidence. It was also a signal to the private financial sector that it could confidently lend to us under the umbrella of the IMF.
The approval of an IMF loan which is given in tranches takes time unless political considerations, particularly of the US, leads to quick decision making. The specialist group appointed by the IMF as the study team preparing a presentation to the Board made several visits to Sri Lanka and had an office in the Central Bank. The Governor and I interacted closely with them and the IMF representative in Colombo. The first of these representatives was Anup Singh who was a great friend of mine. He later went on to head an important division of the IMF. Subsequent appointees also worked with us in a positive way and the Ministry of Finance and the IMF had excellent relations at the staff level.
The best depiction of that collaboration was the approval of the USD 2.6 billion stand by arrangement and the disbursements which began immediately. Nivard Cabraal and I had several discussions in Washington to facilitate this decision particularly with Dr. Kato the Japanese head of the Asia division. We also had the strong support of Kalpana Kochar, the head of the South Asia division. The IMF deal coming soon after ending the northern war constituted a strong signal from the global community that we were back in their good books. When I informed MR of the IMF decision he was delighted. He added however that he knew it would turn out that way all along. I was flabbergasted when he told me that he had a “mole” who was a minor employee in Strauss Kahn’s cabinet who was from “down south” in Sri Lanka. She had kept him informed of the progress of our application.
Presidential election 2010
The presidential election was due to be held in late 2011. However on November 23, 2009 MR announced that the election will be held on January 26, 2010. He decided to go to the polls before the expiry of his full term to capitalize on his popularity. At the same time he did not want to give his opponent time to find his feet in the new political environment.
The two main contenders were incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his former Army Commander Sarath Fonseka. Fonseka who believed that he had been willfully sidelined by the Rajapaksas accepted the offer of the Opposition parties to be their “common candidate”. He resigned from his post of CDS and entered the fray under the “swan” symbol which then received the endorsement of the UNP, JVP and the minority parties. It is significant that even the Tamil parties preferred him to MR.
It was a bitterly fought election though MR had the benefit of incumbency, heavy financing and a reputation as a leader who had ended the fratricidal war. Both parties undertook a publicity contest which was unique in our electoral history. MR and his party had the advantage of emerging victorious in a local council election which was held soon after the war was won. This gave him the confidence that the party machinery was well oiled. He was contesting an election in which he was the firm favourite notwithstanding the fact that SF was the best possible choice for the Opposition under the prevailing circumstances.
Election campaign
This election campaign saw the most vicious contest between two antagonists who had been close to each other earlier. Both had a sense of betrayal by the other after collaborating to achieve a victory over the LTTE which many had thought impossible. Mahinda had tried to woo SF but when he failed he unleashed a “no holds barred” attack on his former commander. Even at the start of the campaign an attempt was made to deny SF a large building in the heart of Colombo for his headquarters. A relative of SF’s wife who had a hotel and a conference hall came to his rescue. The benefactor was earmarked for retribution by the Rajapaksa juggernaut which was being managed by MRs children who were now overseeing the fathers election campaign.
I was invited to be present when several advertising companies were asked to make a pitch for the well funded effort of the MR camp. Decisions taken by family members could not be challenged even though Namal tried his best to balance the discussion and prevent the professional advertising personnel from walking out. SFs campaign was underpinned by the UNP but half way through they lost the initiative because it appeared that their leader Ranil was afraid of promoting a new leader who would take the limelight away from him. Minority parties and the JVP on the other hand worked hard for SF and carried the brunt of the campaign. But they were no match for the well oiled political machine of the Rajapaksas who were riding a wave of popularity after winning the Northern war.
The animus that prevailed in this campaign was best seen in the manner of the physical violence unleashed on SF and his top staff after the results were announced. They had taken refuge in a hotel after the announcement of the results to avoid revenge attacks. It did not succeed. An army officer who had a personal grudge against SF was detailed to harass his former chief in a shameful manner. The UNP did not fight back and it was left to Hakeem the Muslim Congress leader, to protest this behaviour which was unprecedented in our political history.
This was clearly not MRs initiative since he had always taken the ups and downs of politics in his stride. But this episode created such a bad impression that Maithripala Sirisena who contested MR in the next Presidential election said publicly that he was afraid that if he lost the election he would have been six feet under. He was in hiding in Kurunegala when the election result in which he was declared the winner was announced. SF was charged in court soon after and sentenced to hard labour. This was the first time that a political rival of national stature had been subjected to such a savage act of revenge.
The result
The final result was a comfortable victory for MR though his challenger had performed better than anticipated by many observers. The final turnout was of 10,495,451 voters or 74.5 percent of the 14,088,500 registered voters. This was a high percentage testifying to the keen interest that was evoked by this Presidential election which was first held after the Northern victory. The result was as follows;
Mahinda Rajapaksa [SLFP] 6,015,934 [57.88 percent] Sarath Fonseka [NDF] 4,173,185 [40.15 percent]
MR had cleared the 50 percent barrier very comfortably unlike in 2005 when he barely managed to avoid a second count. What was seen very clearly from the results was that MR had swept the polls in all the districts save in the Northern and Eastern provinces which went solidly to SF The only exception was the district of Nuwara Eliya which though in the Central Province has a multi-ethnic composition. It is also to be noted that SF fared well in Colombo and other urbanized areas which were won with a comparatively smaller majority by MR.
Parliamentary election 2010
MR has always been unafraid of elections. This time around he was keen to go to the Parliamentary polls early as he was sure of a resounding victory. I had earlier decided that I would not contest because I would be reaching the age of 71 at the time of election and 76 by the close of that Parliament. Another important consideration was that my nephew Dilum was the SLFP organizer for Senkadagala and would contest that seat at the forthcoming election. It would be unwise and unseemly for two Amunugamas to contest from the same party in the same district.
I had planned to retire and campaign for Dilum who would have a longer tenure. If by my entering the fray Dilum was left out it would be a pity in terms of the long time plans of the party and of my nephew. I had therefore informed MR that had no intention of contesting the elections of 2010. MR had however told my friend Nimal Siripala de Silva that he would like to have me as a nominated MP. This was mainly because three of his closest advisors – PB Jayasundera, Lalith Weeratunga and especially Sunimal Fernando – had prevailed upon him to allocate the post of Minister of Education in his forthcoming Cabinet to me. They had a blueprint for educational reform and wanted me to steer it in the coming years. Such was the understanding when one evening I received a telephone call from MR asking me to come immediately to Temple Trees. I went there to find him in earnest conversation with DM Jayaratne and Anuruddha Ratwatte. All three asked me to change my mind and lead the SLFP team in the forthcoming election.
MR said that earlier he had agreed to Jayaratne’s request to contest the election as the district leader of the SLFP. But he had later backed out of this arrangement as his children had pleaded with him not to enter the fray. He had said that his daughter had fallen at his feet and prayed that he should withdraw. MR had then consulted Anuruddha who also had declined saying that his son Lohan wished to contest in his stead. I replied that I too had a similar problem since my nephew Dilum was contesting the Senkadagala seat.
However they all unanimously said that this problem could be overlooked in view of the fact that the Mahanayakas had specifically requested that I should be made the Kandy leader. They all piously assured the President that they would canvass for me and said that I should not let down the party at this juncture. MR added that the Rajapaksas – Chamal and Namal – were contesting from Hambantota district and that too was an uncle-nephew combination. So I agreed to this request from the three senior most members of the party and went back home to plan an election campaign which I had not envisaged even a day before. I had to rewind my electoral machine and plan a campaign in which my main concern was to ensure that Dilum will not be left behind in the rat race.
Notwithstanding MRs assurances it was not easy for two members from the same family to win an election in which the party could win only seven or eight seats from the district. This was especially so because the minorities tend to vote with the UNP in Kandy. Only a few families could boast of having their members elected simultaneously to Parliament. To the best of my knowledge only TB Ilangaratne and his wife Tamara were elected together in Kandy district [in 1970] In 1977 they were both defeated.
Furthermore Kandy had a reputation for rejecting its leaders who had a national profile. Thus George E de Silva A. Ratnayake, Illangaratne and Kobbekaduwa had tasted defeat at varying times. Both Anuruddha and Jayaratne had opted out when their progeny – Lohan and Anuradha insisted on contesting the 2010 election. In Ratnapura district when Pavithra Wanniarachchi and her father contested the latter fared badly in the polls and could not enter Parliament. I was aware of the risk that I was taking especially when I found that both seniors who were keen to have me contest suddenly turned lukewarm as they were eyeing a seat as nominated MPs.
My victory and entry Into the cabinet would reduce their chances. In fact after my victory to which Anuruddha contributed little, he was dropped by MR from the national list which in effect meant the end of his political career. Jayaratne was nominated instead and he held cabinet office till he fell badly ill and was incapacitated.
The contest in Kandy
It was a difficult contest because one candidate who had not done well in earlier elections played the caste card in a disgraceful manner. He also used goon squads to intimidate voters, particularly the large number of estate workers who would usually have voted as dictated by their party – the CWC. Mano Ganesan – MP from Colombo, who attempted to establish a base of voters among the Tamil community, was not allowed to campaign in this electorate due to thuggery and he had to get back to his Colombo constituency. Violence was directed also at other candidates who however had enough to do in other electorates and tended to avoid their tormentor. But his violent behaviour reached its peak on election day when goons invaded the booths that did not favour him and began stuffing ballot boxes. Since he had ensured that subservient police officers were attached to his electorate they looked on while the mayhem continued.
Not only the agents of other candidates but also the public servants who manned the booths complained to me as the district party leader about such unlawful behaviour. I therefore contacted the Elections Commissioner Dissanayake and requested him to annul the result in the booths where the Returning Officers had indicated that there was foul play. Dissanayake immediately held an inquiry and withheld the results of about twelve booths in that electorate which had been tampered with. This decision sent shock waves in the country.
MR was furious with this errant candidate as he had taken the shine off a splendid victory that he and his party had achieved. The Elections Commissioner had fixed a new date for a poll in those contested voting centres and we had to get back to electioneering. This cancellation of a poll was unprecedented and drew national attention to the misdemeanours of that candidate who had up to then got away with his violent tactics. Several editorials and cartoons appeared in the press which severely embarrassed the party.
After I informed MR and Gotabaya of this situation they authorized the army to set up a camp in the heart of the town to ensure a peacefull poll. I was allocated a squad of armed soldiers as there was a threat to my life. I took up residence in an estate bungalow belonging to my friend Irvin Weerakkody and directed operations from there. A large number of people who had been intimidated by this candidate came to me, some in the secrecy of the night, to pledge support. I was particularly touched when “Tambi” Thondaman telephoned me to say that MR had spoken to him and that he was instructing his local organization to back me in the forthcoming poll.
All this was helpful for me to gather a sufficient number of votes from the Nawalapitiya electorate which ensured that both Dilum and I would enter Parliament. Special mention must be made of my supporters from Galagedera, Kandy and Senkadagala who came to Nawalpitiya by bus, car, motor cycle and train to go house to house canvassing and thwart the efforts of the local candidate to keep us out of the winners list. He was crestfallen and later apologized to me in Parliament in the presence of several party leaders. Needless to say MR was not pleased at these developments which detracted from his outstanding Parliamentary victory.
(The Sarath Amunugama autobiography is available at the Vijitha Yapa Bookshop)
(Excerpted from volume 3 of the Sarath Amunugama autobiography)
Features
Twenty-Five Years of Not Looking Away
As the Centre for Poverty Analysis marks a quarter century of work, Sri Lanka has cause to reflect on what independent research has meant for the country’s most vulnerable communities.
In May 2001, nine professionals working on poverty-related issues in Sri Lanka came together around a shared conviction: that this country needed an institution willing to look at poverty honestly, to gather evidence that policymakers need but rarely seek, and to make sure the people most affected by poverty were never reduced to abstractions in a government report. That conviction became the Centre for Poverty Analysis, known as CEPA.
Twenty-five years later, CEPA stands as Sri Lanka’s leading independent think tank on poverty and development, with a team of thirty researchers and a portfolio that spans six thematic areas. The country it works in looks very different from the one it was founded in. Sri Lanka has lived through the end of a decades-long civil war, a tsunami that reshaped entire coastlines, a global pandemic, and the worst economic crisis since independence. Each of these upheavals changed the face of poverty in Sri Lanka. None of them changed the need to understand it.
A think tank with a point of view
CEPA is an independent, not-for-profit organisation. It does not represent any government or political interest, and from the beginning it has operated on the principle that its research must be honest regardless of who funds it.
At the heart of everything CEPA does is a belief that most people in public life share but rarely say plainly: poverty is not inevitable. It is the result of failures in policy, in systems, and in the choices made by those with the power to make different ones. It is the conviction that determines what CEPA studies, how it communicates what it finds, and who it considers its ultimate audience.
What the research has shown
When CEPA began, poverty in Sri Lanka was understood largely as a development challenge: a story of individuals and households left behind by the mainstream. Over two and a half decades, that picture has become considerably more complex. Poverty is woven into failures of policy, infrastructure, social norms, and economic systems, and addressing any one of them requires understanding all the others.
CEPA’s research spans six areas: social protection and basic services; natural resources and climate change; livelihoods, employment and migration; social cohesion and reconciliation; gender and development; and, added more recently in response to the economic crisis, growth and economic transformation. The work within each of these areas has consistently brought to light realities that were being overlooked entirely.
Research on period poverty in estate communities found that girls were losing weeks of schooling every year because of stigma and a lack of basic facilities. What looked like an individual problem turned out to be a structural one, and one with a direct cost to educational outcomes. Research on the care economy made visible the vast unpaid labour that sustains Sri Lankan households, work that never appears in economic planning because it is never counted. Work on post-war communities gave voice to people in Trincomalee, in the North and East, whose experiences of recovery looked nothing like the national narrative.
On the international stage, CEPA has worked with the Asian Development Bank, UN Women, the International Labour Organization, UNDP, the World Bank, and ODI Global, among others. It has contributed to national biodiversity and climate plans, supported the evaluation of major development programmes, and provided technical expertise across a wide range of policy areas. All of its research is published in Sinhala, Tamil, and English, a commitment to ensuring the work reaches the communities it is about.
When the crisis forced a rethink
The 2022 economic collapse changed the nature of the problem. What had long been a development story, about communities left behind by the mainstream, had become a macroeconomic one. Debt default, spiralling inflation, a collapsing currency, and economic contraction were not pushing people gradually toward poverty. They were pulling millions across the poverty line at once.
In response, CEPA deepened its focus on economic transformation and growth. In partnership with ODI Global, the organisation convened an independent growth study group whose findings were published as Sustaining Transformative Growth in Sri Lanka, 2025 to 2030, a policy roadmap for sustainable and inclusive recovery. Seminars were held at the University of Peradeniya and the University of Ruhuna to take the research to academic communities directly. The work put into sharper focus something CEPA had argued for years: that poverty cannot be addressed without addressing the economic conditions that produce it.
The conversation at twenty-five
To mark its anniversary, CEPA is hosting an International Conference on Poverty and Development in Times of Crisis on 7 and 8 May 2026 at Cinnamon Grand Colombo, in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank. Researchers, policymakers, practitioners, and scholars from Sri Lanka and the wider region will gather to ask the questions this moment demands: what does poverty mean in a world of compounding crises? What does development require when economic shocks, climate change, and geopolitical uncertainty arrive at the same time? And who bears the cost when policy fails?
Sri Lanka in 2026 is a country in recovery, but the recovery is uneven. Millions who fell into poverty during the crisis years have not yet regained their footing. The decisions being made now, on trade, social protection, investment, and climate, will determine who benefits and who continues to be left behind. These are the questions CEPA was founded to engage, and twenty-five years on, they remain as pressing as ever.
CEPA was founded in 2001 on the belief that independent, honest research is one of the most valuable contributions an institution can make to a country. Thirty people carry that work forward today. Sri Lanka has changed beyond recognition over the past quarter century, and poverty has shifted with it. The founding belief, that poverty is a failure and not a fate, has carried through every crisis, every study, and every generation of the team.
by Rebecca Jayatissa, Communications Professional – CEPA
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