Features
Prison riots and politics: NPP’s biggest challenge and Sri Lanka’s biggest opportunity
The riots that broke out in the Negombo prison over two days (July 5th & 6th) are a worrying measure of the challenge the NPP government faces in fighting organized crime and its paymasters in drug business. The political fallout has been predictable. On behalf of the government, Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara has taken responsibility, visited the Negombo jailhouse, met with officials a number of times, and has made a comprehensive statement before parliament within two days of the riots. The main opposition party has been equally responsible while GL Peiris, a former Minister of Justice for the Rajapaksas, has called for the current minister’s resignation. To what end? Mr. Peiris is in no position to call for anyone’s resignation given his rather pathetic record as a politician and a cabinet minister. There have also been calls for the resignation of the whole government.
But there is no surprise in all this. Even the riots in Negombo can be seen as an unsurprising explosion of a ticking timebomb – a viciously wired triangle of the drug economy, organized crime and overcrowded and under-supervised prisons. The surprise is that there are not more of them occurring more frequently. There are over 40,000 inmates in the country’s 26 prisons that can accommodate a total maximum of about 10,000 inmates. 2,600 prisoners were in the Negombo prison at the time of the riots, well over the prison’s capacity to accommodate 650 inmates. Over 700 inmates were reportedly involved in the rioting.
Overcrowded and underserviced prisons are a natural breeding place for bullying, rowdiness and violence. The mixing of remand prisoners facing trial and convicted criminals after trials aggravates the situation with convicts ever ready to gang up on remandees. These shortcomings are exploited by the criminal world of narcotics and its delegates among the prison inmates. All of the above ingredients were in the mix when matters came to a boil in the Negombo jailhouse, killing seven officers and 20 inmates while injuring more than 100 others. There was even a mastermind in the mix, conveying messages from bosses outside to drug peddlers inside and ordering them to attack the inmates who were opposed drug trafficking and may have been providing information to prison officials.
According to the Justice Minister’s statement in parliament, a group of rioters went so far as to dismantle the prison’s security infrastructure. The minister suggested that an organized group of inmates was behind this, smashing closed circuit television cameras and destroying a body scanner, which may have been part of an attempt “to disable the mechanisms used to stop drugs and other illegal items from entering the prison.” In his statement, Mr. Nanayakkara also announced the immediate measures the government would be taking to address overcrowding and expand supervisory capacity. These include streamlining bail requirements and bail hearings as well introducing ‘house arrest’ with electronic monitoring as an alternative to remanding everyone.
NPP’s Uniqueness
As The Island (8th July) editorially reminded its readers, Sri Lanka has a sad history of prison riots – the ghastly massacre of 53 unarmed Tamil prisoners in the Welikada Prison in 1983, a wholly different riot at the same prison and its brutal putdown by security forces in 2012, and the 2020 prison clashes in Mahara. The vicious triangle of drugs, crime and prisons is a relatively new phenomenon and breaking up that triangle will require simultaneous state response on all three fronts – targeting drug trafficking, containing violent crimes, and undertaking prison reform. Each one of them is a major task in itself and will require enormous resources, along with consistent and co-ordinated effort.
At the same time, I find something politically unique and even encouraging about the present situation. For the first time, in a long time, Sri Lanka has a government that has no truck with the world of drugs and organized crime. I believe I am not wrong in making this assertion, because there have been many criticisms of the NPP government – for its inexperience and its ineptitude, as a one man (AKD) show with L-board ministers, as well as for the ethical lapses and unexplained riches of some of the government members and ministers – but I have not come across anything that accuses the NPP government or its members of having links to the underworlds of drugs and crime.
Equally, I have not come across any previous Sri Lankan Head of State or Head of Government making a statement on the connections between the upperworld of politics and the underworld of crime, as President Anura Kumara Dissanayake did while addressing parliament on Wednesday, 24 June, hours after the arrests of Rakitha Rajapakshe and his cohorts.
The President spoke of the growing practices of forex fraud, money laundering, and bribe transactions that link the world of crime and drugs to the world of banking and the universe of politics. Quite revealingly, the President mentioned a certain politician who had had 92 telephone calls with prisoners remanded or convicted for drug trafficking. Fifty-four of those calls, the President said, were initiated by the politician while 38 of them were received by him from the prisons.
The President then challenged the political parties to inform parliament and the country of the actions they had taken, or will take in future, against such criminally compromised individuals who are their members. Indeed! Hence my thesis, this week, that the NPP government is the best and perhaps offers a singular opportunity for Sri Lanka to fight the interconnected menace of drug economy and organized crime. I am not vouching that the government will win this fight. Only that for the sake of the country it must win it. If the NPP fails, there is no one else in today’s politics in Sri Lanka, honest enough, sincere enough and able enough, to pick up the pieces and resume the fight. Those who have gotten into the habit of caviling at the NPP government over anything and everything must give it some slack and appreciate its unique position in the fight against crime and drugs.
Crime and Politics
In singling out the current president for daring to taken on well-connected criminals and their political patrons, I must point out in fairness to state and government leaders who came before 1977, that there was no need for them to do this in their time. For the nexus between crime and politics really came about after 1977. Of course, there were thugs and IRCs before 1977, plenty of them and they were buddies with individual politicians especially in the fringes of urban politics. Recall the name Ossie Corea from the 1950s, whose gun was the murder weapon that killed Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranaike, and Mr. Corea, a retired Excise Inspector, was the bodyguard of SWRD’s Finance Minister Stanley de Zoysa.
But there were no widespread connections between political parties and the criminal underworld. Those connections started coming after 1977 and have grown increasingly systemic in the 21st century under the auspices of the Rajapaksas. There is a publicly available list of over 25 ‘mobsters’, all of whom have been active criminally and politically in the years since 1977. Leading the list are the infamous Gonawala Sunil (Sunil Perera) and Sothi Upali (Upali Ranjith). The former was convicted and jailed for raping an 18-year old girl and was alleged to have been the inside mastermind of the 1983 dastardly massacre of Tamil political prisoners in the Welikada jail.
He was later honoured with a presidential pardon and appointment as an all-island Justice of the Peace. He was even bodyguard for then Minister of Education Ranil Wickremesinghe. Sothi Upali was implicated in the killing of Lalith Athulathmudali and was believed to have been close to the UNP’s political mastermind Sirisena Cooray. Mr. Cooray himself was believed by some to have been not without underworld connections and credentials. The list goes on.
It would be fantastic and absurd, perhaps simply nuts, for anyone to suggest that the crime-politics nexus after 1977 was a consequence of the open economy and neoliberal globalism. It would be analytically more defensible to contextualize the crime-politics nexus in the local political developments. The authoritarianism of the new presidential system and the abuse of the referendum devise to postpone parliamentary elections were certainly major factors. JRJ did everything quite instinctively, and academics now call it the phenomenon of “competitive authoritarianism” exemplified by leaders like India’s Modi and Turkey’s Erdogan.
State sponsored ethnic riots, the monopoly of political violence among the Tamils, and the violent second coming of the JVP were all catalytic mediums for the cohabitation of politics and crime. Tamil criminals and drug lords were implicated in the LTTE’s failed assassination attempt against President Kumaratunga in 1999. Criminal enterprises and drug trafficking were given a more convenient and safer passage to connect with the political upperworld by the growth of political security business, providing protection for MPs and officials, and involving both state security personnel and private strongmen. The notorious Beddagana Sanjeewa (Danuska Perera) was allegedly close to President Kumaratunga’s security detail and enjoyed easy access to Temple Trees. The Rajapaksa security details were also allegedly compromised by similar infiltrations and there have been suggestions that those in the security details of Rajapaksa VIPs may have been involved in some of the yet unsolved emblematic killings in Colombo.
As I wrote last week, the new line of investigating and litigating the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks to look for potential collusion between state security officials and perpetrators of the attacks would suggest that a different passage may have been opened up between the state security domain and the universe of local Islamic extremism. There is considerable anecdotal discussion supporting this contention, including the alleged role of Isreal. A precursor to this was in already in place after the LTTE renegades in the eastern province came into alliance with the state security forces. The big difference between the two, is that domestic Islamic extremism had its independent connections to its global counterpart and that may have provided the inspiration and the encouragement for the planning and execution of the Easter Sunday suicide bombings.
Against this backdrop of high level politicians connecting with low life criminals, the NPP government certainly stands apart. That is my whole point. That gives the NPP an uncompromising head start in the fight against crime. Every other government this century has been far too compromised even to make a head start for starters. But a great deal more than sincerity and inflexibility is needed to carry through the gamut of investigations and successful litigation. One positive development is the subtle responsiveness of the judiciary to the political climate that facilitated the election of the NPP government and is now willing its success especially in the fight against corruption and crime. The government should let the courts do their part without causing even so much as the appearance of interference.
by Rajan Philips
Features
Export diversification: Missing the wood for the trees – Part I
Export of Jackfruit
by Gomi Senadhira
A few recent news items prompted me to write this article. The first was in the Sinhala newspaper Divaina on jackfruits, which said that out of the 280 million jackfruits produced in Sri Lanka, only 80 million were consumed. Does this mean the rest, 200 million fruits, are just wasted every year? However, other available reports estimate that about 70% of the production is consumed and only 30 percent is wasted. Whatever the exact number, we know a substantially large number of jackfruits go to waste. The second was a more recent article in an English paper on cinnamon exports: it states that Sri Lanka is targeting US$ 300 million in cinnamon export earnings this year and aiming for annual export earnings of US$ 500 million by 2030!
Good sense
These news items reminded me of another article I read in The Island a few years ago. It was by Dr. Upatissa Pethiyagoda, a well-known Sri Lankan scientist, diplomat, and writer, about a chance encounter he had with former Prime Minister Wijayananda Dahanayake (WD) in the early 1970s at a Perera & Sons outlet in Kollupitiya, where both had stopped for iced coffee, In those days, politicians, even former prime ministers, walked around without bodyguards and could be spotted at coffee shops, like P&S, in CTB buses or on trains. After learning that Dr. Pethiyagoda was a senior researcher at the Tea Research Institute, Dahanayake quipped that Sri Lanka should focus on five key crops: paddy, sugarcane, pasture grass, coconut, and jack (kos). Dr Pethiyagoda further adds “The unsophisticated wisdom of WD still haunts. Being self-reliant in basic foodstuffs is very respectable and a base for true national pride. A Canadian slogan in support of their (salmon) fishery was “We eat what we can and can what we can’t” or the Thai advertisement line, accompanying a tantalising picture of a fruit basket was “We have got it, come and get it”. Capturing tourism and horticulture simultaneously!”
I do not know why WD advocated promoting jack instead of tea. Yet, 50 years later, while we are trying to expand cinnamon exports into an already saturated market, the global market for jackfruit has become larger than the market for Ceylon cinnamon. Hence, the slogans quoted by Dr Pethiyagada are more than appropriate to promote jackfruit exports.
“We eat what we can and can what we can’t”
Globally, the demand for jackfruit has rapidly increased in recent years due to its appeal to vegan, vegetarian, and health-conscious consumers. However, it is difficult to grasp the size of the global market for jackfruit through import/export statistics, as jackfruit doesn’t have a specific standalone customs code. Customs data, even at the HS eight-digit level, groups jackfruit along with several other tropical fruits. Hence, the numbers given in this article are from various reports available on the Internet. Although the numbers presented in those reports vary, trade dynamics point to a multi-billion-dollar global market for jackfruit which has already reached USD 2.8 billion in 2025 and is likely to reach USD 5.2 billion by 2034. This market is largely dominated by jackfruit processed products (including canned, frozen, and dried items). The market for fresh jackfruit hovers around USD 500 million a year.
“We have got it, come and get it”
With around 300,000 tons of exports annually, Thailand is the leading exporter of jackfruits, closely followed by Vietnam. Interestingly, the value of jackfruit exports from Vietnam has increased remarkably from “… just $3 million in 2015 to an impressive $236.8 million in 2023. ” The South Asian countries are also emerging as leading jackfruit exporters. India exported over 26 million kg (26,000 tons) of jackfruit valued at approximately US$40 million during the 2023-2024 fiscal year. The annual exports from Bangladesh fluctuated between 1000 to 2000 metric tons during the recent years. In contrast, jackfruit exports from Sri Lanka are estimated to be around 20 to 30 metric tons per month, which are mainly in processed form.
Main markets for jackfruits are in North America, Europe, Gulf countries, China, and Australia. Key markets for fresh jackfruits are Gulf countries and China. The governments of the main exporting countries intervene proactively to develop these markets for their exporters. For example, during the visit of the Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rehaman to China in June 2026, one of the MoUs signed was on jackfruit. Based on this MoU, Bangladesh is targeting 500 to 1,000 tons of exports to China during the next year.
Gulf market for fresh jackfruits
As the global demand for jackfruit increases, the demand for fresh jackfruit has also risen in the Gulf countries. The Indian and Bangladeshi exporters have already successfully exploited this market. However, due to perishability and the limited shelf life of fresh jackfruits, exporters from India and Bangladesh rely on air shipments for quicker delivery. Yet, as whole jackfruits are heavy with a high waste-to-edible ratio (thick rind and core), air freighting whole fruit is economically inefficient. Hence, exports are mainly in semi-processed form.
A game changer – export of fresh jackfruits by sea
This brings me to another article published early this month in Bangladesh; it says a Dhaka-based export company shipped 3.5 tons of fresh jackfruits to Dubai by sea in May this year. Though the shipment took over 26 days to reach its destination, the quality of the jackfruit remained intact. If that is so, then it is a game changer. Sea freight from Colombo to Dubai, I believe, takes only 4 to 8 days for a direct port-to-port journey, compared to 26 days from Bangladesh. Hence, exporting jackfruits and other fruits and vegetables by sea to GCC markets from Sri Lanka would be much more efficient and cost-effective.
With its plentiful supply and a lucrative market in close proximity in the Gulf countries, it is difficult to understand how Sri Lanka has not managed to capture a significant share of the market in the GCC, given that Sri Lanka began to export fruits and vegetables into that market long before Bangladesh, Thailand, or Vietnam.
(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)
Features
Insights from Chieftains of Uva: Genealogy of two Kandyan Families – Part II
Reflections on Kandyan Genealogical Studies:
by Sena Thoradeniya
(Part I of this article appeared in The Island of 19 August 2026)
In the Kandyan territories, genealogical studies have been largely caste based on only those who belong to the so-called upper stratum – the highest echelon of the Govigama caste. Even within this group, attention is reserved for ancient office holders, illustrious figures, and socially prominent members, while non-office holders, side branches, and ordinary kin are omitted. Sub divisions of the Govigama caste, as well as families belonging to the so-called depressed castes, are almost entirely omitted. One reason for this stigmatisation lies in the absence of competition for caste supremacy within the Kandyan regions, unlike in the “low country” areas. This silences the presence of non-elite Kandyans. However, oral genealogies, folk traditions, palm-leaf manuscripts, and colonial records preserve the names of less prominent members.
On the other hand, the descendants of clan leaders, such as the Vidana Maha Durayas, Maha Balitiyannas, Maha Hulawaliyas, Mulacharis, and chiefs of Halu Apullana Henayas, do not seek to record their genealogies as all their ancestral roots have been uprooted and obliterated. In such a context, they have acquired new names, new identities, and fashion a new genealogy as their point of departure. The erasure of older identities forces these families to reconstruct a new lineage.
The only exception within my private collection is “Great Royal Artificer of the Kandyan Kingdom: Devendra Mulachari” by D. D. M. Waidyasekera (2017), which records the architectural works of the master craftsman, chiefly responsible for the design of the Paththirippuwa, Walakulu Bemma, and Mangul Maduwa.
The names of hundreds of master craftsmen and other artificers have been carefully recorded, yet their works remain largely obscure, without their corresponding works save the creations of a few celebrated Sittaras. This creates an inconsistency in cultural memory as in pre-Kandyan days.
In theory, elders are often the custodians of memory, transmitting genealogies across generations, providing names, relationships, anecdotes, and related details that written records are not available, although the memory may be selective and biased influenced by various factors. Today such elders are rare, even within our traditional villages. With the passing of elders, the cultural and historical memory tied to ancient villages was obliterated. I can illustrate this with numerous examples taken from my village.
More often genealogical records, especially those produced by descendants of noble families, are not impartial records. They conceal historical truths such as collaboration with colonial expeditions, capture of the last King, betrayal during 1818 and 1848 uprisings as some Kandyan chiefs sided with the British during the 1818 and 1848 uprisings, and their servility to British colonial rulers as junior partners in the administration. Their descendants too later held high office under colonial rule, but genealogical records often present only illustrious service. But modern historians, colonial records, and oral traditions unravel these tainted facts. Some descendants of freedom fighters who were executed or transported to the Isle of France, sometimes rose to prominence under the British.
Although genealogical writers are not historians, they can and do omit vital information if they tarnish family prestige. They can consult archival records, oral traditions, and colonial documents to augment their studies. This writer suggests a combination of all sources as explained at the beginning of this essay.
It is true that the line between genealogical study and historical research is less rigid or open. Both genealogists and researchers may use the same sources, but the distinction lies in the purpose and the method. The primary aim of genealogy is to trace lineage, kinship ties and family continuity. It is basically descriptive and compilatory, but it needs critical assessments. Genealogy becomes research when the genealogist moves beyond compiling sources, and analyzing and interpreting them, situating family history in a wider historical process.
In Kandyan genealogical studies, clashes and serious discrepancies between family records, oral traditions, colonial writings, and modern historical scholarship are common. The problem is how to weigh them against one another looking for convergences. Discrepancies arise when genealogical writers adhere to their own records for family pride or myth making, without consulting other sources, without following a more balanced approach, and allowing the reader to formulate independent perspectives. Failure to engage multiple sources perpetuates partial inquiry rather than historical inquiry.
Wanniachy faithfully traces the ancestry of the Taldena family from the era of King Devanam Piyatissa, drawing upon family history, oral tradition, and two folk poems. Yet his account remains narrowly confined, for he pays little attention to other archival sources, colonial writings, and modern historical scholarship. Works such as Paul E. Pieris’s “Sinhale and the Patriots, 1815–1818” (1950/1995), Tennakone Wimalananda’s “The Great Rebellion of 1818” (1963), are conspicuously absent from his study. Although colonial records remain largely inaccessible to the general public, the writings of modern historians reach a wider audience.
Wimalananda records that Taldena Mohottala, a chieftain of Viyaluwa, saw his house ransacked and destroyed by the British troops during the uprising of 1818. In ancient times, a Mohottala, was a scribe, a secretary, whose main function was collecting and sending the King’s and Dissave’s revenue. Mohottalas of Uva also assumed far greater powers by reason of the distance from the capital, Kandy.
The English dismembered the ancient Uva Maha Disawa, under the almost independent authority of a Maha Disava and created six Disavas, of which one was Oya Palatha.
Paul E. Pieris says that Taldena in recognition of his good work for the British, demanded the post of Disava of Oya Palatha. Owing to his collaboration with the colonial administration, he was appointed Acting Dissava of Oya Palatha. Taldena however, again fell under suspicion, was kept under detention at the Barrier Guard and the British administration thought advisable to remove him from Badulla. As he was ill under detention he could not be removed to Colombo as ordered. He was removed from his position of Oya Palata Disava and was called upon to deposit his valuables at the Badulla Kachcheri, as security for his good behaviuor. On depositing his valuables with the Agent, he was released from detention.
Wimalananda further notes that the Taldena family established marital ties with families in the Batticaloa District. A native of Pottuvil, Mutu Banda’s relative, Sama Kumarihamy alias Ramath, married G. B. Taldena; her second husband was Mutukumaru Murugesu Pillai, and their daughter was Madduma Kumarihamy.
The ancient Maha Disava of Uva was further divided. In my series of articles on the Kandyan chieftains under British rule, I have noted that in 1908 Charles Taldena was appointed Gravets Muhandiram of Kandy by J. P. Lewis, Government Agent of the Central Province. In his report, Lewis observed that this office, as had always been the case, was once again entrusted to a Kandyan, whereas previously it had been conferred upon a “lowcountry” official.
In Chapter Four of his booklet, Wanniachy turns to the history and genealogy of the Mullegama family. Though Mullegama does not belong to Uva, the family is linked to the Taldenas through intermarriage, as he explains. Mullegama itself is a village in Harispattuwa, situated about two kilometers off from the Ambatenna junction along the Kandy–Matale road. In tracing the lineage of the Mullegamas, Wanniachy relies closely on A. C. Lawrie’s Gazetteer of the Central Province of Ceylon (1898).
Mullegama, once Dissava of Wellassa and Dissava of Navayodun Korale supported the British expedition. Yet in 1818, British troops plundered his residence at Wellassa, seizing his most treasured possessions, among them gifts from Sri Vickrema, an elephant, and two horses, which were later sold in Badulla, says Paul E. Peiris. During the Uva uprising, he provided the British with valuable intelligence, and in recognition of his services he was subsequently appointed as Siyapattuwe Adhikaram, a post created by Sri Vickrema, an ironic reward for loyalty despite the plundering.
Lawrie records that the estate of the Mullegama Maha Nilame was divided, and that one grandson sold his share to Moormen of Akurana. He further notes that all the walawwa lands were eventually sold, with a Moorman of Akurana purchasing part of the walawwa, repairing it, and residing there. The pathetic decline of the Mullegama estates is poignantly reflected in Asoka M. Herath’s Sinhala novel Nindagama (2002), a symbolic resonance of the literary echo of dispossession.
I am acutely aware that independent researchers and genealogists of Kandyan families often incur the displeasure of presentday descendants, for the facts they uncover are seldom palatable. Their inquiries reveal that certain ancestors occupied the lower rungs of the royal administration yet later attained high office under the British through collaboration with the colonial regime. Such revelations, though historically significant, provoke resentment among descendants who prefer to sustain more exalted narratives of lineage. This genealogical selectivity perpetuates sanitised family histories and conceals the complexities of colonial collaboration.
In Kandyan genealogical studies compiled by kinsmen, attention is almost exclusively bestowed upon the illustrious figures who once served the king. Their descendants, even those living today, are relegated to mere entries in family trees, noted with their matrimonial alliances. Wanniachy’s book is no exception.
Why does this occur? By highlighting only those ancestors who held office or enjoyed distinction, families reinforced their claims to nobility and social standing. Descendants, unless they themselves attained prominence, were recorded routinely since their presence served only continuity but not prestige.
I thought it necessary to highlight certain technical shortcomings of the book. In the present publishing climate, design has become a matter of considerable importance. Proper book design requires attention to margins, chapter titles, and other elements of presentation. Moreover, the volume carries no ISBN, indicating that it has not been registered with the National Library. This omission prevents the work from being catalogued in the Sri Lanka National Archives, the Museum Library, the National Library, and the University of Peradeniya Library and diminishes its archival value. Another notable deficiency is the absence of the author’s address and contact information. (Concluded)
Features
22nd Amendment: Proof of the pudding will be in the eating
by Jehan Perera
It appears that the die has been cast on the 22nd Amendment. The government appears unshaken in its determination to ensure its passage into law. From the government’s perspective, the 22nd Amendment and associated legislation, by increasing the tenure of all judges by two years, will give them the extra time to complete their existing cases. This will do away with the need to change judges midstream and have complex legal cases go back to the beginning, which has too often been the case. The completion of these cases will be to the benefit of the victims who have waited for decades for justice in some cases. It will also be to the government’s benefit as many of the wrongdoers are those in the political opposition. In the past, human rights and democracy activists, not to mention lawyers in the field, have bemoaned the manner in which court cases have got delayed for a variety of reasons, including judges being promoted or transferred midstream or reaching the age of retirement.
Principled opposition to 22nd Amendment is articulated in terms of the ad hoc and sudden emergence of the amendment. Those who advance this argument have expressed concern that extending judges’ tenure could create a sense of indebtedness to the government and weaken judicial independence. They would prefer the extension of judges’ tenure to be part of a comprehensive package of constitutional reforms that would apply across the board to other sectors of the public service and, ideally, find its place in the new constitution that the NPP promised in its election manifesto. The question is one of timing. Public opinion surveys carried out regularly have shown that the vast majority of people consider that corruption and criminality at high levels need to be brought to an end as soon as possible. They want accountability to become real rather than remain an unfulfilled promise. The public mood today is that the era of impunity must finally end.
Investigations by law enforcement agencies into the misdeeds of politicians in the past have too often come to naught due to the lack of political will on the part of successive governments. But on this occasion there is a manifest expression of such political will, as witnessed in the seemingly endless series of corruption and criminality cases being uncovered and exposed week by week and month by month. It is equally predictable that those under investigation will seek to challenge the legitimacy of this process. Some will perceive the prosecutions as essentially being in the nature of political revenge rather than lawful accountability and argue along those lines. Others will seek to rally public opinion by questioning the independence of the institutions involved. These reactions should surprise no one. But they make it all the more important that the credibility of the institutions through which accountability is pursued be safeguarded.
Safeguard Change
There is an old saying that society is a mule, not a horse. A horse may respond to repeated use of the spurs, but a mule, if driven too hard, may throw its rider off altogether. The proverb captures an important truth about governing societies. History offers many examples of societies that succeeded in exposing wrongdoing but failed to build reconciliation afterwards. The greatest danger is not merely that the guilty will protest their innocence. That is to be expected. The greater danger is that punishment itself becomes the principal language of politics. When that happens, each change of government carries with it the expectation that today’s judgments will tomorrow be revisited, reversed or avenged.
The electoral verdicts of 2024 that swept the NPP into power brought an entirely new group of political leaders to the fore. This transition needs to take place with care to ensure that polarisation and civil conflict are contained rather than intensified. The post-22nd Amendment period will therefore require something more than legal correctness. It will require political sagacity. Accountability needs to be seen in the light of strengthening the legitimacy of institutions rather than becoming sidetracked into another arena of political contestation. If justice comes to be seen as merely the continuation of politics by legal means, even deserving convictions of wrongdoers may lose public confidence on which long lasting justice depends.
Troubling in this context has been the conduct of some opponents of the amendment. They have not only attacked the government leadership for taking forward the 22nd Amendment. They have also launched personal attacks on judges and cast sweeping aspersions on the judiciary itself. Ironically, in seeking to discredit the courts before they deliver their judgments, they risk undermining the very institution they claim to defend. The lawyers who have united against the 22nd Amendment have every right and duty to raise constitutional concerns. Opposition politicians have every right to criticise legislation. But both also carry a responsibility not to erode public confidence in the judiciary through speculative accusations that prejudge the integrity of judges before they have acted. Such argumentation weakens an institution that belongs to the entire country, not to any government or opposition.
Real Test
Sri Lanka is emerging from decades of violent conflict and deep political polarization. Too often in our history, one government’s triumph has become the next government’s point of demonization as in the once widely used phrase of the “17 year curse” by the successor government. Institutions rebuilt today must therefore survive tomorrow’s transfer of power. They must earn the confidence not only of those who celebrate today’s victories, but also of those who will one day sit in opposition. Institutions that command confidence across political divides need to become stronger and not weaker than the governments that created them.
The national challenge is no longer simply whether accountability will be pursued. It is whether accountability will restore faith in the law by ending a culture of impunity that for too long protected the powerful while denying justice to victims. The country has waited too long for that moment. It must not now be compromised by unnecessary political confrontation or irresponsible attacks on the courts. Ultimately, the strongest answer to the critics of the 22nd Amendment will not come from government ministers or parliamentary speeches. It will need to come from the judges themselves.
The extension of the tenure of members of the judiciary will place an even greater obligation upon them to demonstrate, through every judgment they deliver, that they are truly independent, impartial and beholden to no political authority. If they uphold the law without fear or favour, they will expose the predictions of the doomsayers as unfounded. Those in the legal profession, media, civil society and politics should likewise recognise that criticism of judicial decisions must not become an assault on the institution of the judiciary itself. The greatest service that all sides can render Sri Lanka at this moment is to strengthen the people’s faith that justice belongs equally to every citizen and that no one, however powerful, stands above the law.
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