Features
Directionless government, clueless opposition
“There’s something called conviction in politics… Lives of Iranian people matter, the lives of people in Gaza matter, the lives of people in Cuba matter. When Donald Trump is echoing Gallant (Israeli politician) and calling people in Iran animals, we should be a Democratic Party who says that would be morally wrong. When we don’t do that…what we are telling most Americans is that we are not willing to fight for our vision of America.”
US Congressman Ro Khanna (MS Now – 8.4.2026)
Victor Orbán was Hungary’s Mahinda Rajapaksa. He loved to describe himself as a ‘freedom fighter’, a valiant defender of national sovereignty (vis-à-vis the EU of which Hungary is a member), and a patriot dedicated to the promotion of Christian values and Hungarian traditions. He intertwined politics with religion and nationalism with Xenophobia. He undermined and co-opted institutions, from the judiciary to the Catholic and Reformed Churches. As Hungarian Roman Catholic theologian Rita Perintfalvi said, “The church’s entire financing is in the hands of the government, it is in a straitjacketed, completely dependent position.” (https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/how-viktor-orbans-hungary-eroded-rule-law-free-markets#citation).
Mr Orbán began his marathon run as prime minister in 2010, the same year Mahinda Rajapaksa won his second presidential term. Over the next several years, both leaders moved relentlessly and systematically to disembowel democracy from within. Elections were preserved but the electoral playing field was made as uneven as possible. Non-compliant media was driven to closure or bought by proxies. Targeted repression silenced critics. The economy was turned into a source of wealth for family, friends, and supporters. A pro-regime oligarchy was fostered. The opposition was rendered toothless and ineffective, a mere showpiece rather than a counter to the overweening power of the leader.
Sri Lanka escaped Rajapaksa rule in 2015 but Hungary would remain under Mr Orbán’s thumb for another 10+ years. Cracks in the previously monolithic ruling parties played a critical role in the downfall of both leaders. In Sri Lanka, it was the emergence of Maithripala Sirisena as the joint opposition candidate in 2014. In Hungary, it was the departure of Orbán protégé Péter Magyar from the ruling Fidesz party in 2024. While Mr Sirisena’s presidential candidacy was engineered by the then Opposition, Mr Magyar, a member of Mr Orbán’s inner-circle, left of his own volition, in protest against a presidential pardon to a felon convicted of covering up child abuses in state-run orphanages. Instead of joining the traditional opposition, he assumed the leadership of a little-known political party (Tisza), positioning himself as a centrist, an alternative to not just a tyrannical and corrupt government but also a lacklustre opposition.
Victor Orbán’s popularity had been declining for years, but the weakness of the opposition as much as his retooling of the electoral system in his favour kept him winning massively. Hungarians who detested the government and were scornful of the opposition found non-political ways of expressing their dissatisfaction. Mr Orbán promoted large families, encouraging women to have more children. But the country’s birth-rate, after a slight increase during his first term, declined. As his use of Christianity increased, more and more Hungarians moved away from traditional religion. In a 2022 national survey, 40.1% refused to answer the question about their religious adherence while 16.1% identified themselves as non-religious.
Mr Magyar was able to change this collective despondency into hope. He travelled widely, including to faraway villages seen as traditional Orbán strongholds, talking about the affordability crisis, the degeneration of public services, corruption, and nepotism. His new-found resistance to the government was matched by his refusal to have any truck with the traditional opposition. At the 2024 European Parliamentary Election, his party came second to Fidesz, winning almost 30% of the vote. In 2026, he won a stunning victory over Europe’s longest serving leader cresting a wave of record-high voter turnout, especially amongst young people (turnout among those under 30 more than doubled).
The Hungarian outcome reinforces a familiar lesson. Opposing for the sake of opposing does not work. Instead of speechifying and posturing, there has to be a positive vision for the country based on the real needs of the people. If an opposition lacks that, elections are likely to go the way of the government, not because the government is popular but because the opposition is even less popular. Sri Lanka has been in that quagmire in the past and may get bogged down there in the future.
Government vs Government
The US-Iran enmity is almost 47 years old, but the US carefully restrained from involving itself in a war with Iran. Donald Trump broke that golden rule. According to an expose in The New York Times, he took that fateful step because he was persuaded to do so by Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu.
On 11 February 2026, Mr Netanyahu made a one-hour presentation to Donald Trump, and other American political, military and intelligence leaders, arguing that a decapitation strike against top Iranian leaders will lead to regime-change in a couple of weeks. In an analysis of this presentation, US intelligence experts agreed that killing Ayatollah Khamenei and crippling Iran’s capacity to threaten its Gulf neighbours were doable but dismissed predictions of a popular uprising and regime-change as ‘detached from reality’. CIA director John Ratcliffe called the regime-change scenario ‘farcical’ while State Secretary Marco Rubio ridiculed it as ‘bullshit’. Asked by President Trump for his opinion, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Caine said, “Sir, this is, in my experience, standard operating procedure for the Israelis. They oversell… They know they need us, and that’s why they are hard-selling” (Regime Change: Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald Trump – The New York Times – 7.4.2026). He also warned that a war would ‘drastically deplete stockpiles of American weaponry including missile interceptors and lead to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Not becoming embroiled in ‘forever wars’ especially in the Middle East was a key Trump campaign promise. He violated that promise, thereby alienating key swathes of his support base and some of his most avid defenders. His popularity has hit record-lows while the US and the world are heading towards a recession (or worse). Had he not trusted Bibi Netanyahu blindly, he, the country he leads would be in a better place today.
There is reason to believe that the NPP/JVP government is heading towards a similar slippery slope, to its own and the country’s detriment.
Take the jailing of two young Muslim Lankans for the ‘crime’ of opposing Israel. On 24 October 2024, 21-year-old Mohamed Suhail was arrested for having an anti-Israeli post on his phone. He was held under the PTA for close to nine months. In March 2025, 22-year-old Mohamed Rushdi was arrested for pasting an anti-Israeli sticker.
President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, whose electoral pledges included the abolishing of the PTA, probably signed the two detention orders of Mr. Suhail. He certainly signed the detention order of Mr. Rushdi. Its contents indicate what President Dissanayake was made to believe about this young man who was propelled into an act of peaceful protest by the wanton murder of children in Gaza by Israel. In the DO signed by President Dissanayake, Mr. Rushdi was accused of “associating with members of extremist or terrorist organisations, motivated by extremist ideologies and acting in a manner detrimental peace and harmony among communities and knowingly concealing such information from security forces” (https://x.com/amnestysasia/status/1908439933687115872?s=52&t=hpsMr4AN7vbPbLFNTtk7yA). Not a word about that F*$k Israel sticker, the real reason Mr Rushdi was arrested.
Someone managed to persuade President Dissanayake to break a campaign promise by depicting Mr Rushdi as an extremist and a terrorist, without an iota of proof. That someone had to have been a person President Dissanayake trusted implicitly. The country doesn’t know the identity of that false-friend who misled the president so badly. AKD does. Would he, at least now, understand the danger of coming to conclusions without adequate proof? Because, had he asked for proof and studied them before signing those detention orders, he could have saved himself from a reputation-tarnishing mistake.
The story of hackers breaching Finance and Planning Ministry’s computer system and stealing $2.5million (which was to be paid to an Australian creditor) indicates that crippling inefficiencies are becoming a hallmark of the NPP/JVP government. The government has admitted that the theft did take place, but belatedly, only after it was exposed by the opposition. When did the government discover this theft? Was it after the opposition’s expose? If the discovery was made before that, why didn’t the government inform the parliament (and the nation) about this incident, as it was duty bound to do?
The government says disciplinary action has been taken against some officials. Who are these officials? What is the reason for the said action? What does this action entail? What is being done to prevent such incidents in the future? Incidentally, had the government immediately informed the parliament about the theft, it could have saved itself a political and public backlash. It was the government’s silence on the matter which enabled the opposition to raise the issue and gave rise to wild speculation. This silence-denial-admission response is becoming a familiar pattern. For instance, the government followed the same playbook about the coal issue.
Contrary to the opposition’s hyperbolic allegations, this is not the most corrupt government in history. That credit belongs to the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime. This is not the most inefficient government in history. The Gotabaya Rajapaksa regime grabs that prize. This is not the most tyrannical regime; there are many contenders to that distinction. But the government’s days on the pedestal of perfection are gone. Its inefficiency seems to be growing with time. Its anti-corruption image has been tarnished not so much by the coal issue but by the ‘defend-our-man-at-all-costs’ approach to it. Had a commission been appointed the moment the consignments failed the quality test and the minister been persuaded to resign, the government’s anti-corruption image would have improved. Similarly, had the government not abused the PTA so egregiously, its pro-rights reputation would have been in better shape.
On 23 March, the police officer who arrested Mr Suhail settled the fundamental rights case against him by admitting to wrongful arrest and apologising for it in open court and before a three-judge bench headed by the Chief Justice. The government could have used the opportunity to issue a public apology about the two arrests. Its unwillingness to do so casts doubts on its democratic credentials. The government does a better job undermining itself than the opposition does or can.
Opposition vs Opposition
In September 2025, the UNP held its convention. Not only was the SLPP invited to it. The party’s slavishly pro-Rajapaksa general secretary was actually given a speaking slot. Sagara Kariyawasam used that platform to deliver a speech of unrivalled toxicity and shamelessness. “Our two camps made the same major mistake,” he informed the audience which included the general secretary of the SJB. “Both of us, in order to gain power, ignored the services rendered by our opponents to the country…pointed our finger at the opposite side and called them Thief, Thief, Thief, with no proof, with no reason. That error was committed by us and by you” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u02YkZdqdEw). His audience, seeing nothing the matter in those words, applauded.
The speech and the enthusiastic reaction to it symbolise what is wrong with today’s opposition. It has no vision, no convictions. It doesn’t know nor care about public concerns. It wants power but lacks the intelligence to understand how its blatant opportunism and lack of principles would keep it from power for a long time. We know what the Rajapaksas stand for – familial power and dynastic succession. But what do the UNP and the SJB stand for? Do they have any agenda above and beyond Ranil Wickremesinghe/Sajith Premadasa becoming the next president?
Chandrika Bandaranaike and Mahinda Rajapaksa kept on winning because the opposition could not convince enough voters to support it. The same is true today. The government is bleeding support, but those voters are not thronging to the opposition but staying at home. And the government will win in 2029, because it is more able to get its voters out.
“The vision of a rosy future shorn of complexity has enabled different sections of Nepali society to imagine a different and more hopeful future under his leadership, each reading into him the hopes and aspirations of their own cohort,” wrote Indian journalist Aunohita Mojumdar about the winner of the recent Nepali elections, Balendra Shah (Can Nepal’s new leaders escape the old traps of power? – Frontline – 14.3.2026). That in a sense was how the NPP/JVP won elections in 2024. Voters are disenchanted with the government not because they have ceased to care about corruption or democratic rights but because they feel that the government is not doing enough to keep its promises. If the non-SLPP opposition doesn’t understand this basic fact, if they embrace the kind of cynicism so obscenely expressed by Sagara Kariyawasam at the UNP convention, where can the people disenchanted with the government go?
by Tisaranee Gunasekara
Features
‘Lord Edgware Dies’
It has been some time since I read an Agatha Christie, the plot of which I cannot remember. So, I was delighted to find on the shelves of a friend Lord Edgware Dies, which I had a vague memory of, but no certainty about who had done it.
When I read it, I found that my memory of who was probably the killer was correct, but I could not be certain and the red herrings Christie threw in were so diverting that until almost the very end I wondered if I had been wrong.
The plot is very simple. Jane Wilkinson, who is married to Lord Edgware, tells him that she is desperate for a divorce since she is in love with a very proper Anglo-Catholic peer, Lord Melton, but Edgware refuses to divorce her. She asks Poirot to talk to him, which he does, and is surprised to find that Edgware has told Jane he is prepared to give her a divorce. This was, after he had categorically refused, through a letter, which Jane said she had not received.
That night Edgware is murdered, after Jane had been to see him, or so the butler said, and also Edgware’s secretary. But Jane had been that evening at a grand dinner many miles away, where a dozen fellow guests could swear to her presence.
There was a solution however to the mystery of two Jane Wilkinsons, namely a skilful impersonator called Carlotta Adams who, in the opening chapter had impersonated Jane Wilkinson, who had also been at the performance. But when Poirot goes to see her, he finds that she had been found dead on the morning after Edgware had been killed, of an overdose. And in her bag was a gold case, with a strange inscription, that contained the drug, along with a pair of pince-nez.
Her maid said she had written a letter to her sister in America and posted it the previous night. Poirot asks Inspector Japp to get the letter, and a transcript is received from America, and in it the name of Edgware’s nephew Ronald Marsh is mentioned; he had taken Carlotta to dinner after her performance, with which the book opens, and had then set her a challenge. Japp arrests Marsh, but Poirot is not happy and asks for the original of the letter, which the sister sends him. That shows that a page is missing, and the tear is obvious, though that raises the question as to why it had not simply been cut.
Matters are further complicated by the fact that Marsh had gone in a taxi to the Edgware house, along with Edgware’s daughter Geraldine, in the interval of an opera which had previously seemed to provide them with cast iron alibis. Geraldine had gone in to fetch her pearls so that Marsh could raise money he needed, and thus had an opportunity to kill Edgware, as did Marsh, for the driver said he had got out of the taxi while waiting and gone into the house.
Marsh explained why he had gone to the house on the night of the murder as having followed Bryan Martin, an American actor, who had been in love with Jane, whom he saw go into the house with a key. But there was no one visible when he entered, and Geraldine almost immediately came down and they left together. And Martin too has become an object of suspicion to Poirot, for he had been to see him before the murders were discovered with a story of being followed by a man with a gold tooth – a story Poirot immediately realized was false when he was asked how old the man was, and was told he was young, for young people did not have gold teeth.
A heap of French money Edgware had got for a trip to Paris was missing, but since Marsh had no need for it after his cousin’s offer of help, Poirot deduces that it must have been taken by the butler, who has disappeared. Christie has stressed that he is astonishingly handsome, unusual in a butler, and Poirot notes a resemblance to Martin, so he thinks the mysterious man going into the house must have been him.
Incidentally, later Poirot assumes that Edgware’s change of mind was because he was involved in some scandal, and I believe Christie intends us to see the cause of this in his handsome butler, though this is not specified.
Meanwhile, Poirot has asked Japp to find out the provenance of the case found in Carlotta’s handbag, and it turns out to have been made in Paris, specially commissioned, and collected by a woman with pince-nez.
But then another murder occurs—that of another guest at the grand dinner, which provided Jane with her alibi. The victim is an actor who had been bemused when Jane, at a lunch, thought the Judgment of Paris referred to the city. He told Hastings he wanted to see Poirot, but was killed before he could get to the appointment. Poirot had rushed there when told about his request, but it was too late.
Meanwhile, Poirot has tried out the pince-nez on Edgware’s secretary, but she could not see through these. It was only a chance remark heard outside the theatre that led him to try them out on Wilkinson’s maid Ellis, a spare pair that had been appropriated for the night of the murders.
Poirot then lays things out, having summoned Martin and told him that he probably suppressed Edgware’s letter, as he had been dropped by then and he did not want Jane to marry another. But after teasing Martin, Poirot says that Jane was in fact the murderer, and she got Carlotta to impersonate her at the dinner while she went to the house and killed her husband. After meeting Carlotta later and checking with her through a call that she had
not been rumbled, Jane had gone ahead with the murder – she put veronal into her drink and the case with veronal into the handbag. She forgot to take out the pince-nez she had used earlier to imitate an American. Carlotta had registered as the American in a hotel and Jane had gone to see her, and there they exchanged identities. After seen the letter, she made use of it by tearing off the page that referred to her, and the S of She, so that the person who had challenged Carlotta to impersonate her seemed to be a man.
There is a coda in which Jane, condemned to death, writes to Hastings, still full of pride at her ingenuity hoping she will be remembered.
Features
Desilt reservoirs, learn from our ancient irrigation systems
by Prof. O. A. Ileperuma
Silting of reservoirs is a major problem today affecting our hydropower production and irrigation systems. The main Mahaweli reservoirs are silted to a considerable extent reducing the water holding capacity of them. Due to poor soil management practices, floodwaters deposit large amounts of silt in these reservoirs. When the Polgolla reservoir was fully drained about two years back, one could see mountains of silt in the lower reaches of the reservoir. A rough estimate is that 50% of the total capacity of these reservoirs has been lost to siltation. This is a serious issue which affects not only power and agriculture but also flood control.
Our ancient irrigation systems ensured that desilting of reservoirs took place under royal decree where all users of the reservoirs were ordered to carry out desilting of reservoirs during the dry season. The clay thus collected was used in making bricks for the construction of great stupas which dot the landscape of our ancient kingdoms. This ensured that the reservoirs had their full capacity filled with water for the next cultivating season. Our ancient kings were clever enough not to construct reservoirs by blocking main rivers such as the Mahaweli. A classic example is the Minipe left canal where they tapped only the surface water of Mahaweli. Even the bigger tanks such as Nuwara Wewa and Parakrama Samudraya were fed with minor rivulets. There were also other ingenious features in the cascade irrigation systems built by the ancient kings, such as mud sluice canals and forest reservations between the reservoirs in the cascade system. These reservations helped trap silt and remove excess nutrients, which could otherwise contribute to increasing salinity as water flowed from one reservoir to another.
- Parakrama Samudraya
- Kalawewa
- Kotmale
A classic engineering marvel is the former Yoda Ela, which carries water from Kalawewa to Nuwara Wewa and Tissa Wewa. It is 87 km long although the straight distance between these points is only about 40 km. The gradient of this canal is about 10 cm per km or 6 inches per mile. Yodha Ela functions as a moving reservoir and feeds about 4,600 hectares of paddy lands. It is a winding canal with about 120 smaller reservoirs on its way. It was constructed during the reign of King Dhatusena around 459 AD and later expanded by King Parakramabahu by connecting more reservoirs to the network. Unfortunately, during the Mahaweli project our modern-day engineers constructed a concrete canal replacing the winding path of this Yoda Ela also called Jaya Ganga. This effectively removed the ability of the old Yoda Ela to remove silt and nutrients. The bank of this Ela has wet zone trees such as jak and areca nut growing well. They take up the nutrients from the flowing stream making the water suitable for irrigation later.
Ancient Mesopotamian civilisations depended on dams constructed along the two main rivers, Euphrates and Tigris. After continuous irrigation of their fields over several thousand years, salinity of the irrigated lands increased making them unsuitable for agriculture. People died due to famine and this clearly illustrates the danger of blocking main rivers for agriculture. There is scientific evidence that the salinity of paddy soils in the Mahaweli C area is increasing.
We saw the devastation caused by Cyclone Ditwah. The sluice gates of the Kotmale Reservoir were opened, and Kandy and Peradeniya were flooded. If the reservoir had had greater storage capacity, couldn’t the opening of the gates have been delayed? This may not be an argument that modern-day engineers would readily accept, and I am not an irrigation expert. These ideas may well be naïve. But most of us tend to think of reservoirs mainly in terms of hydropower generation and irrigation, while their role in flood control receives much less attention. The question therefore deserves serious consideration. Could restoring lost reservoir capacity through desilting help improve our ability to manage extreme rainfall and reduce flood risks?
Desilting our reservoirs should be considered a national priority.
Features
Losing out to Ethiopia
Export diversification – Missing the wood for the trees – Part III
by Gomi Senadhira
In Sri Lanka, the word “Ethiopia” is often used as disparaging slang to describe individuals or areas experiencing extreme poverty, starvation, or severe economic hardship. This linguistic habit originated in the 1980s with the Western media coverage of the devastating Ethiopian famine of 1983-85. That media coverage shocked the world but also left an outdated and offensive global stereotype that the country is permanently starving. Much has changed since then. By now, with an annual growth rate of around 9%, it is the fastest-growing economy in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia has also emerged as a highly competitive exporter and is challenging not only its competitors in the region but also countries like Sri Lanka. This article is on how Sri Lanka has lost ground to Ethiopia (and a few other countries) in the GCC markets for agricultural and floricultural products.
Sri Lanka – A Pioneer in the Agriculture and Floricultural Market in the GCC
As discussed in Part II of this article, by the mid-1980s Sri Lanka had established a strong foothold in the GCC’s fruit, vegetable, and floricultural market. Geographical proximity and well-established shipping and air links gave Sri Lanka a strong comparative advantage over Southeast Asian and African nations. Thailand, Vietnam, and Kenya were not even in the market. At that time, Ethiopia was experiencing (as BBC news reports described) “a biblical famine”.
The market was not very large, but it was lucrative and growing. Trade Minister Lalith Athulathmudali as well as the Chairman of the Export Development Board, Victor Santiapillai, who visited Kuwait (and the GCC countries), recognised the market potential for these products and encouraged us to continue with our work. The minister was particularly keen to further develop links between the market for these products, exporters, and his Export Production Villages (EPVs). So, it was becoming a successful case not only for export diversification but also for transferring gains from exports directly to rural households.
From Trailblazer to Tailender
As a result, even by the beginning of this century Sri Lanka had a larger market share than most of its competitors from Asia or Africa. But since then, our competitiveness has weakened significantly. The tables below provide a comparative snapshot of Sri Lanka’s performance vis-à-vis Thailand, Vietnam, Kenya and Ethiopia in the GCC market for vegetables, fruits and floricultural products. As illustrated therein, in 2001 Sri Lanka was ahead of Thailand, Kenya and Ethiopia in this small but rapidly growing market. Since then, we have fallen behind Thailand, Kenya and many other countries in that lucrative market. If this trend continues, Sri Lanka will fall behind Ethiopia within the next few years. (See Table 1)
In the GCC market for vegetables (covered in HS chapter 07), Sri Lanka was ahead of most other competitors in 2001. As illustrated in Table 1 , Sri Lanka had failed to develop this market, while Thailand, Kenya, and even Ethiopia had very efficiently increased their market shares. The GCC is a market to which Sri Lanka can supply some vegetables, like cabbages, by sea. It appears Sri Lanka had also failed to exploit this mode of supply.
We can see a similar trend in the market for fruits. Vietnam, Kenya, and Thailand have emerged as major players, while exports from Sri Lanka have staggered on slowly. In this segment, Vietnam has emerged as a leading player during the last twenty years and the GCC imports from Viet Nam have shot up from US$44 thousand in 2001 to US$346 million by 2024. In part one of these articles, I discussed the remarkable increase of jackfruit exports from Vietnam “…just $3 million in 2015 to an impressive $236.8 million in 2023” while most of our jackfruit production rots under the trees. This explains how countries develop their markets, geographically and product-wise. (See Table 2)
Sri Lanka’s performance has been weakest in the market for floricultural products (HS Chapter 06), which groups live trees, cut flowers, and ornamental foliage. When we first entered the market in the 1980s, the market was dominated by the Netherlands, and Kenya and Ethiopia were not even in the market. At that time, we identified the Gulf states as a market where Sri Lanka could have a dominant presence due to geographical proximity. Even in 2001, Sri Lanka was ahead of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Thailand. But by now, Kenya has emerged as the dominant supplier. Ethiopia is also expanding its market share and is the third-largest exporter. (See Table 3)
Missing the Wood for the Trees
In the mid-1980s, Sri Lanka first established its foothold in the GCC market. Since then, Thailand, Vietnam, Kenya, and even Ethiopia have moved well ahead of us and have become leading players. Why did we lag behind in our export diversification efforts in general and, more particularly, in the GCC market?
The reasons are very clear. After the initial attempts in the 1980s and early 1990s, Sri Lanka has not been proactively involved in identifying, developing, and promoting new products and markets, or protecting and further developing new markets already established. The focus has simply been on traditional exports: tea, coconut, cinnamon, and garments, while other products were almost ignored. In essence, we have been and continue to focus intensely on a narrow group of products and markets, and we have lost sight of the bigger picture.
(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)
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