Features

China without Blinkers

Published

1 year ago

2025/08/31

I was while in Europe last month to spend a couple of days in Sete by the Mediterranean, with Tamara Kunanayagam and her partner Jean Pierre Page. He was a leading light of the French Communist party and though, as with so many left wing movements in the last century it had split, he was trying to redevelop connections. He was also strongly supportive of Jean-Luc Melenchon, the radical former Socialist who put together the coalition that emerged as the largest group in Parliament after the last French election.

Jean-Pierre is highly respected internationally, and in recent years he and Tamara have often been in China at conferences which mark the increasing influence of that country. So, I was delighted when he gave me, when I was leaving, a volume entitled China without Blinkers, which he had edited together with the radical journalist Maxime Vivas.

The basic aim of the book is to correct what it characterizes as deliberate disinformation about China. But in the process it also expounds some of the principles on the basis of which China is increasing its footprint in the world. This is done most effectively in the opening essay in the book, by Tamara, entitled ‘New Cold War or “the Unthinkable War”?’ She examines there the increasing hostility to China’s international advances, beginning with the pivoting towards the Asia-Pacific as he put it by President Obama way back in 2011.

Tamara says that that made clear that America’s principal enemy was no longer the ‘unknown unknown’ terrorist as identified by Donald Rumsfeld, but was rather China, which had not only been getting richer during this century but had also increased its influence in other countries. So we have now seen the development of what is termed the Quad, where traditional American allies such as Australia and Japan were joined with India, and the attempt to entrench the concept of an Indo-Pacific Ocean, where America would increase its primacy with its allies.

But all this is accompanied by a demonizing of China, with propaganda designed to prove that it is exploiting the countries with which it has enhanced dealings. It was such propaganda, swallowed or perhaps regurgitated without conviction, by stooge politicians in this country, that precipitated the economic crisis from which we are now suffering. For the perfectly manageable loans from China were excoriated by the Yahapalanaya government, to be replaced by loans on the international market from private agents on which we are now paying colossal interest.

Tamara’s primary concern however is foreign policy, and she shows how Washington, arguing in terms of freedom of the seas, ignores UN resolutions on territorial waters, and the provision that access should be for peaceful purposes. She also notes how the United States heightens tensions between China and nations in South East Asia with regard to territorial waters, claiming that negotiations between China and the Philippines foundered when the latter was persuaded to demand international arbitration – counter she says to a China ASEAN agreement to work through bilateral discussions without third party involvement. Of course, it could be argued that the Philippines required strengthening in any dispute with China, but underlying this is the American assumption that its hegemony is essential for holding China at bay.

The article following Tamara’s was on a very different topic, ‘On trade and foreign policy: China and some untruths’. But as the title makes clear, this too dealt with disinformation. Much of what is said is well known, but it takes an article like this to put it all together, and make clear the double standards that are involved.

Tony Andreani, emeritus professor at the University of Paris, starts with the criticism in the French mainstream press of the Chinese peril, since it has bought up vineyards and land and companies. European leaders are also worried about Chinese investments in Eastern Europe, which they see as an effort to divide the Union. But as Andreani notes with regard to the sale of Greek and Portuguese public companies, they went to the highest bidder.

The opportunities China offers, whereas the rich Western countries only offer continuing dependence, has led to 17 European countries, including 11 EU members, joining the Silk Road initiative. And there is further evidence of China working on development when it engages in economic relations, as with the infrastructure it has developed in Africa. I still recall an Ethiopian driver telling me how China had developed roads, which the West had not done. This reinforced what a British friend in Cambodia said about why Chinese assistance was highly regarded, whereas the West concentrated on what they called capacity building, ie funding their supporters in mechanisms to ensure perpetuation of their own control.

Jean Pierre Page is categorical about this when he shows what Western meddling seeks to achieve in Hong Kong. But only in passing does he note that the claim that the West is concerned with preserving democracy seems nonsensical in that Hong Kong was only given its own Legislative Council just before it was handed over to China. Until then, for one and a half centuries, it had been ruled by a British governor, with no regard for the wishes of the natives – and indeed harsh measures when workers seemed to be getting out of control, which might have limited the massive profits British companies were repatriating. These of course went back more than a century, dating back to the days of supply of opium to the natives, a commitment to free trade that crippled China and led to its virtual enslavement for a century.

I used to think that the Americans acted to promote freedom when after the Second World War they took the lead in giving independence to the Philippines, and expected the European powers to follow suit. But I had not registered then that American imperialism worked through economic domination, facilitated by their pet rulers, whom they would protect at any cost. This involved relentless support to dictators, as we have seen in Latin America. And when the natives got out of hand, support for the overthrow of a recalcitrant leader, as in the case of Indonesia, was immediate.

China too has dealt with dictators, but it has not engaged in regime change to promote its own interests. And as we have found out to our cost, following the relentless propaganda about the Rajapaksas selling the country to the Chinese, the loans they provided, far from holding us in a debt trap, were much better for us than the private loans we took under the guidance of Western oriented policy makers.

China without blinkers is most illuminating about the manner in which the Chinese economy has grown, while at the same time China has done its best to avoid the worst elements in unbridled capitalism whereby the rich get richer and richer whilst the worst off go to the wall. As John Rawls argued half a century back, making the cake grow does not mean that the slices of all who share in it get larger.

He also argued that socialism as generally practiced led to the cake not growing. But China in embracing individual enterprise, has made sure that opportunities for the worst off are expanded, and so the poverty levels in China have diminished in the last couple of decades. This is quite unlike what happens in some Western countries, where safety nets have been reduced, or indeed never really existed.

Apart from the article on Hong Kong, there are two more that deal with areas in which the West has shown particular interest, claiming that the Chinese government is exploiting minorities and destroying their identity. These are Tibet and Xinjiang. In the case of the former, whatever respect and affection the Dalai Lama commands, there is little doubt that the regime he presided over was authoritarian with little done to develop the lot of the peasantry. Those of us who have visited Tibet have seen its development, and also the continuation of the monastic life including within the Potala.

Albert Ettinger, a retired professor from Luxembourg, writes incisively about violence in Tibet before the Chinese took over, when it had an army ‘equipped and trained by the British. Its officers wore colonial pith helmets, its military band played “God Save the King” and “It’s a Long Way to Tipperary”.’ And the violence he records gives the lie to the myth of a land full of ‘innate goodness and love of neighbour’.

We have heard repeatedly of the colonization of Tibet by Han Chinese, but Ettinger claims that, at the last census, in 2010, the population was 91% Tibetan. Whether this is correct I do not know, but he seems on surer ground when he notes that a city claimed to be now 97% Chinese was part of the first Chinese empire and protected by the Great Wall.

If the charm of the Dalai Lama seems to strengthen the case against the Chinese in Tibet, far otherwise is the alternative the west promotes in Xinjiang, namely fundamentalist Islam. As Maxime Vivas, the co-editor of the book puts it in his article on this phenomenon, ‘Here in France, under the pretext that democracy can be perfected in China, the muddle-headed are championing the victory of Sharia law. They are like Gribouille, the folk tale character, who throws himself into a pond so that the rain does not spoil his fine suit’.

One example of disinformation should suffice to make clear the general picture. China was accused of using a World Bank loan to establish vocational training centres to build concentration camps, but when the Bank looked into this, it reported that its ‘review did not substantiate the allegations’.

That project, which the Bank itself cleared of the allegations against it, indicates what China has done to develop the area and thus reduce the appeal of fundamentalism. Sadly Pakistan, which slithered towards fundamentalism when it was a close ally of the United States, never thought of such a simple remedy, and it is clear that in Africa too the economic development that would limit the spread of fundamentalism is not foremost on the agenda.

Vivas has a wonderful time giving examples of the sort of misinformation the West propagated to justify its aggression towards leaders it loathed, and claims that Mike Pompeo, later Secretary of State, confessed in a talk in 2019 that as Director of the CIA in the preceding year ‘We lied, we cheated, we stole’. And later he notes that the canard about 500,000 slaves in the cotton fields of Xinjiang must be absurd, ‘when harvesting has been highly mechanised’.

The case of Xinjiang, and other allegations against China in the popular media of the West, are dispassionately analysed in the preface to the book by Mobo Gao, Professor of Chinese at Adelaide University and Director of the Confucius Institute there. He rubbishes the allegations about control of the non-Han population by pointing out, what I did not know previously, that the one-child policy was confined to the Han Chinese and minorities were exempt.

However when the policy, having succeeded in reducing population growth, was changed to allow two children, the exemptions were abolished. This has contributed to claims that minorities are now being unfairly restricted. Yet, as the article makes clear, if anyone suffered – and in the long run China seems to have benefited by the restriction on population growth – it was the Han Chinese, with as he points out the current President having just one daughter, the Prime Minister at the time he wrote only one child.

He also rubbishes the canard about forced labour, though he does grant that the conditions of migrant labour are sad. But this is true with regard to most migrant labour and he notes that, when China began its massive industrialization programme, the Han Chinese also suffered when they moved to factories in urban areas. But they moved, as our migrant labour does, because conditions were better than the rural poverty they had lived in previously.

Gao does not make pointed comparisons, with for instance the continuing poverty of workers in banana plantations in countries the West controls, though he does mention that things are now improving, which has not been the case in banana republics. But he does gently note why these tales of woe rouse anger – ‘Given the colonial slave labour, whether African labourers or aboriginal Australians and Western colonial genocides of the indigenous, and given the Holocaust in Europe itself, the narrative of slave labour and genocide, understandably rouses indignation and sentiment of horror.’

In acknowledging poor labour conditions when China industrialized, Gao notes how this was music to the ears of the West, until that is China ceased to be ‘a junior partner, or more accurately, an apprentice of capitalism’. Anger started when the West realized how hollow its victory in the Cold War had been, since the outsourcing of ‘manufacturing industries and decades of neoliberal marketiism has resulted in increasing inequality in Western affluent societies’.

Gao notes also how the way in which the Western media reports on China makes nonsense of the claim that its press is free. The way the Voice of America functioned is too well known to require repetition, though now Trump seems to have virtually abolished it, with the decision that ‘One America News (OAN), a far-right, pro-Trump network known for promoting conspiracy theories, will provide news coverage for VOA.’

More insidious than the Americans are the British, for the BBC was long thought to be independent. The recent petition by several staff opposing the manner in which the BBC had projected the Israeli perspective in covering the crisis in that region makes clear the restrictions that admittedly often idealistic journalists suffer. Gao simply notes that ‘The influential BBC is supposed to be regulated by Ofcom in its domestic reporting, but Ofcom does not regulate the BBC for its external reporting’.

And of course the private media is much worse, with unrelenting abuse of countries not to the taste of the devotees of Western monopoly capitalism who control it. Extreme instances of this occurred with regard to coronavirus, with even the Washington Post insinuating that the virus may have leaked from the Wuhan laboratory.

At a different level was the criticism of China for being repressive in its measures of control, though these led to the outbreak being contained and fatalities low, as opposed to in the libertarian United States, where the poor suffered disproportionately. Interestingly, one of those who got into the act was Francis Boyle, someone whom I remembered for his extreme allegations against Sri Lanka. Condescendingly, the article ends with the suggestion, without any allegations, that the ‘claim that the virus was created can be turned against the Western transmitter’, noting that the US is the only country to ‘have a bacteriological laboratory for military use’.

This wide ranging volume had a lot of information new to me. But while most of it could have been anticipated, from wider reading and the current international situation, I was surprised by an article on China’s Economic Growth which claimed the foundations for this were built in Mao’s time. Received wisdom, as the article puts it, is that the Chinese economy really began to develop only thanks to its ‘reorientation’ and its opening up to the world capitalist system’.

But the article claims that its GDP grew substantially in the earlier period, and China had put in place in those years the physical capital stock necessary for the economy to take off. The third argument, that China was a major civilization for thousands of years, producing a third of the world’s GNP at the beginning of the 19th century, may not seem so strong. But it is perhaps strong enough in that he claims that the century of Western aggression and exploitation, beginning with the British Opium War of 1942, decimated the country, but its rebuilding began then with the Communist Revolution of 1949.

I was glad that Mao’s commitment to social equity, even if it got out of hand at times, has been recognized, and also the development of education and health services, so that the social capital as necessary for development as physical capital was also in place.

One can understand then the hysteria of the West, which had crushed China so easily in the 19th century, when it began to realize that this giant could no longer be patronized. Given the evidence the book provides about its support for development of poorer countries, even while it pursues its own development goals through better access to raw materials, we can only be thankful that the end of history the West so complacently predicted has given way to a world of different mansions.

‘China without Blinkers’ Edited by Maxime Vivas and Jean-Pierre Page

Reviewed by prof. rajiva wijesinha

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Features

The quiet habits behind wealth: Without chasing appearances

Published

13 hours ago

2026/10/21

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Prof. C. A. Saliya

When people picture wealth, they often imagine luxury cars, large homes and expensive holidays. But financial advisers who work with wealthy clients describe a different picture: people who spend carefully, keep cash aside, invest patiently and understand the risks they take.

A recent Research NZ report, based on interviews with financial advisers, found that many wealthy people are discreet about money. They tend to live within their means, maintain emergency savings, take calculated investment risks and pay close attention to tax and financial structures.

For Sri Lankan families facing high living costs, loan repayments and uncertainty about the future, the lesson is not that everyone must become rich overnight. It is that better financial habits can create greater security over time.

Wealth is often quiet

One of the strongest habits associated with long-term financial stability is controlled spending. Many people with high incomes do not automatically increase their lifestyle every time they earn more. Instead, they decide in advance what they can afford, save consistently and avoid treating every salary increase as permission to spend more.

This does not mean denying life’s small pleasures. It means knowing the difference between a need, a want and a purchase made only to impress others.

In Sri Lanka, where social pressure can sometimes encourage visible spending on weddings, vehicles, clothing or celebrations, this is a difficult but useful principle. A household that earns well but spends everything may look prosperous while remaining financially fragile. By contrast, a family that saves even a modest amount regularly can build options: education for children, a medical reserve, a home deposit or capital for a small business.

The Central Bank of Sri Lanka’s financial-literacy survey found that bank-account ownership is high, but financial behaviour remains a concern. Its later roadmap notes that Sri Lankans show satisfactory financial knowledge compared with other countries, while positive everyday financial behaviour still lags behind.

Knowledge, in other words, is not enough. People also need routines.

Keep an emergency fund before taking bigger risks

The wealthy people described in the RNZ article often kept readily available savings for genuine emergencies and avoided using these funds for ordinary spending.

This is perhaps the most practical lesson for an average family. An emergency fund is not money that “does nothing.” It is money that protects a household from making a desperate decision when illness, job loss, vehicle repairs or an unexpected school expense arrives.

For some, the first target may be one month of essential expenses. Over time, it can be increased. The point is not perfection; it is having a buffer.

Without one, families may turn to costly borrowing, informal lenders or repeated credit-card debt. Research on household finance shows that weak credit knowledge, cross-borrowing and reliance on informal debt can increase the risk of over-indebtedness.

Saving alone may not be enough—but investing requires care

Saving is the starting point, not always the final destination. Money kept entirely in cash or low-return accounts can lose purchasing power over time, especially when prices rise. This is why financially secure people often invest—not recklessly, but with an understanding that long-term returns usually require some level of risk.

The key phrase is calculated risk. That means asking basic questions before investing: What is the business model? Is the institution regulated? How easily can I access my money? What happens if the investment falls in value? Am I being promised unusually high returns? Do I understand where my money is going?

A proper investment plan should not depend on rumours, social-media tips or promises of “guaranteed” profits. It should be diversified where possible—spread across suitable assets rather than placed in a single company, property deal or scheme.

For a young worker, investing may begin with a small, regular contribution. For a business owner, it may mean reinvesting carefully in a viable enterprise. For a family nearing retirement, capital protection and predictable income may matter more than aggressive growth. There is no single plan for everyone.

Debt can build wealth or destroy it

The RNZ article also makes a more controversial point: wealthy people sometimes use other people’s money, through debt or outside equity, to build businesses or buy assets. When investment returns exceed borrowing costs, borrowing can magnify gains. But the reverse is equally true: when returns fall or income is interrupted, debt magnifies losses.

This distinction is crucial in Sri Lanka.

Debt used for a productive purpose—such as a well-researched business, equipment that generates income, or an asset with manageable repayments—can be different from debt used for consumption. Borrowing for status purchases, repeated expenses or a lifestyle beyond one’s income can quickly become a burden.

Before taking a loan, families should calculate the monthly repayment under difficult conditions, not only favourable ones. Could the instalment still be paid if income falls? Is the interest rate fixed or variable? Is there enough emergency savings left after the initial payment? These questions may feel cautious, but caution is often what keeps a financial setback from becoming a crisis.

Pay attention to taxes and paperwork

Another quiet habit of financially successful people is paying attention to tax. They understand that the amount earned is not the same as the amount kept. They keep records, claim lawful deductions where applicable and structure businesses or investments properly.

The quiet habits

For self-employed people and small-business owners, this can be especially important. Clear records of income, expenses, invoices and taxes are not merely administrative chores. They help owners understand whether a business is truly profitable and make it easier to obtain formal finance when needed.

This is not an argument for avoiding tax. It is an argument for understanding the rules, meeting obligations and using legitimate options available under the law. When in doubt, taxpayers should seek advice from a qualified professional.

The human side of money

The most important lesson is that wealth is rarely created by one dramatic decision. It is usually built through repeated small choices: saving before spending, avoiding unnecessary debt, learning before investing, and staying patient when others are chasing quick gains.

A literature review of household finance supports this practical view. Studies consistently associate financial literacy, planning, self-control and budgeting with better saving and investment decisions. At the same time, the research warns that financial outcomes are shaped by income, access to formal financial services and economic conditions—not simply by individual discipline.

That matters in Sri Lanka, where many households are working hard simply to meet daily needs. Advice about wealth should never become blame. Not everyone starts with the same income, family support or opportunity.

But the habits that strengthen financial resilience are available in some form to most people: keep records, build a buffer, question easy-money promises, borrow carefully and make decisions based on long-term goals rather than short-term appearances. (See table)

Wealth may not always look glamorous. Often, it looks like an emergency fund nobody sees, an investment made patiently, a loan avoided, and a family that sleeps more peacefully because it has planned ahead.

(Prof. C. A. Saliya, is a charted accountant, academic, researcher and former banker. He is the author of SAMAJA GAVESHAKAYA and Springer Publication DOING SOCIAL RESEARCH. He can be contacted at saliya.ca@gmail.com. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the organisations with which he is affiliated.)

Features

Tusker Kavantissa’s death exposes Sri Lanka’s wildlife conservation crisis

Published

2 days ago

2026/10/20

Sahan Weerasooriya

Kavantissa

by Prof. Ranjith Bandara,
Emeritus Professor, University of Colombo

This article examines why community exclusion, excessive bureaucratic control, unequal distribution of conservation benefits, weak institutional accountability, and short-sighted political leadership continue to undermine wildlife conservation in Sri Lanka.

The death of Tusker Kavantissa is more than the loss of one of Sri Lanka’s most remarkable wild elephants. It exposes uncomfortable questions about how we protect our natural heritage, how conservation decisions are made, and why repeated warnings have failed to produce meaningful reforms. His death should compel us to examine not only what happened to one extraordinary animal, but also the deeper weaknesses in our wildlife conservation system.

Tusker Kavantissa, one of Sri Lanka’s most prominent wild tuskers, died on 16 October, 2026, after receiving veterinary treatment for an injury, reportedly caused by gunfire. Although the wound had shown some improvement, his health subsequently deteriorated. The precise cause of death requires confirmation through a proper post-mortem examination. Nevertheless, the circumstances raise serious questions about preventive protection, wildlife management, and institutional preparedness.

The wider picture is equally disturbing. According to recently reported figures, Sri Lanka has lost an average of approximately 402 elephants and 138 people annually, since 2019, due to human–elephant conflict. These figures reflect a continuing national tragedy affecting both wildlife and rural communities.

What Sri Lanka faces today is not merely a wildlife conservation problem. It is also a crisis of environmental governance, shaped by institutional weaknesses, political decisions, and the failure to recognise the economic and social realities of conservation.

Conservation without communities

One of the fundamental weaknesses of our conservation approach is that local communities are often treated as subjects of regulation rather than partners in conservation. They are expected to bear the risks, respect restrictions, and cooperate with government programmes, yet their influence over decisions affecting their lives remains limited.

For rural families living alongside wild elephants, conservation is not an abstract environmental objective. It directly affects their safety, agricultural income, property, and everyday lives.

Farmers frequently possess valuable knowledge about elephant movements, vulnerable locations, seasonal changes, and practical protection measures. Yet conservation interventions are sometimes designed without adequately considering this experience.

When decisions are imposed from above, communities may feel excluded from programmes they are expected to support. This weakens trust, reduces cooperation, and ultimately undermines conservation outcomes.

We must recognise that protecting elephants and protecting farmers are not conflicting objectives. Both are essential. A conservation policy that safeguards wildlife while neglecting human security cannot be considered successful.

The real challenge is to replace conservation imposed on communities with conservation undertaken alongside them. Meaningful participation requires more than consultation meetings. Communities must have a genuine role in planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating conservation activities.

Bureaucratic authority versus public accountability

Wildlife conservation requires strong institutions, professional expertise, and effective regulations. However, excessive bureaucratic control can become an obstacle when administrative authority takes precedence over practical outcomes.

Decision-making in Sri Lanka’s conservation system remains heavily dependent on central institutions. Administrative procedures, overlapping responsibilities, and limited coordination can delay responses to urgent problems.

More importantly, excessive centralisation can discourage local innovation and prevent communities from contributing practical solutions.

When administrative authority becomes more important than results, conservation risks becoming an exercise in controlling people rather than protecting nature.

This criticism should not be confused with questioning the dedication of frontline wildlife officers and veterinarians. Many work under difficult conditions with limited resources. The efforts undertaken to save Tusker Kavantissa deserve recognition.

However, individual commitment cannot compensate indefinitely for institutional weaknesses.

We must ask whether our conservation institutions have the capacity to identify risks early, protect vulnerable animals, coordinate emergency responses, and evaluate the effectiveness of their interventions.

Public accountability should, therefore, extend beyond compliance with administrative procedures to measurable conservation outcomes.

Who bears costs, and who receives benefits?

Perhaps the most neglected dimension of wildlife conservation in Sri Lanka is the unequal distribution of its economic costs and benefits.

Wild elephants contribute substantially to tourism, biodiversity, cultural heritage, and the country’s international image. Their conservation generates benefits enjoyed by society as a whole.

Yet the financial and personal costs are concentrated among rural communities living within elephant habitats.

A study published in 2023, involving 300 farming households in southern Sri Lanka, revealed a striking imbalance. Although these households lived near two national parks, none received economic benefits from tourism. Meanwhile, 57 percent had experienced elephant-related crop damage.

The findings raise a fundamental economic question: if the entire country benefits from elephant conservation, why should a relatively small and vulnerable section of society bear a disproportionate share of its costs?

Conservation cannot remain economically sustainable when its benefits are widely enjoyed but its costs are concentrated among those least able to bear them.

A separate study, published in 2024, involving 439 affected farming households, examined the possibility of financing compensation through tourism revenue. It demonstrated the potential for tourism-based financial mechanisms to support human–elephant coexistence.

The policy implications are significant

A proportion of wildlife tourism revenue could be directed towards affected communities through transparent benefit-sharing arrangements. Such measures could support compensation, village protection, local employment, community enterprises, and agricultural improvements.

However, financial compensation alone is insufficient. The 2023 study also indicated that fear of elephants and concerns about crop damage strongly influenced community attitudes. People must feel safe in their homes and farms, not merely receive payment after suffering losses.

Equitable benefit-sharing is, therefore, more than an act of generosity. It is an economic and social requirement for sustainable conservation.

Political decisions and absence of long-term vision

The weaknesses in wildlife conservation cannot be attributed solely to public officials. Political leadership must accept its share of responsibility.

Poor land-use planning, habitat fragmentation, obstruction of elephant movement corridors, and development decisions that inadequately consider environmental consequences have contributed to human–elephant conflict.

Political decisions made for immediate gains can create environmental and economic costs lasting for decades.

Another weakness is the preference for visible, short-term interventions.

Constructing electric fences, relocating elephants, and launching emergency operations can attract considerable publicity. However, such interventions should be evaluated according to their effectiveness, not their visibility.

Political leadership should be judged not by the number of conservation programmes announced, but by the lives protected, conflicts prevented, and long-term improvements achieved.

There is also a serious problem of policy continuity. Conservation cannot be governed according to electoral cycles or changing political priorities.

Elephant habitats, migration patterns, and ecological processes do not change with governments. Successful conservation, therefore, requires consistent national commitments extending beyond individual political administrations.

Without such continuity, public investment may be wasted while the underlying problems remain unresolved.

Problem is not always a lack of policy

Sri Lanka’s conservation crisis cannot be explained simply by a shortage of scientific knowledge or policy recommendations.

In many instances, the greater challenge lies in translating available knowledge into coordinated, adequately funded, and politically supported action.

The National Action Plan for the Mitigation of Human–Elephant Conflict, prepared in 2020, proposed a science-based approach that emphasised community participation, protection of villages and agricultural land, and more effective conflict-management strategies.

Yet an important question remains: how much of this plan has been implemented successfully?

Have implementation difficulties arisen from inadequate resources, weak institutional coordination, administrative resistance, or insufficient political commitment?

An independent assessment of the plan’s implementation would help identify these obstacles and establish clear responsibilities.

We must also recognise that a substantial proportion of Sri Lanka’s wild elephants live outside protected areas. Attempting to confine all elephants within national parks and forest reserves is, therefore, neither realistic nor sustainable.

Effective conservation requires land-use policies informed by elephant ecology, settlement patterns, agricultural needs, and the practical realities of human–wildlife coexistence.

A sound policy that remains largely unimplemented offers little protection to either elephants or people.

Towards more responsible conservation system

Sri Lanka needs a fundamental change in how wildlife conservation is governed.

Four priorities deserve immediate attention.

First, local communities must become genuine partners in conservation management, with meaningful responsibilities and decision-making opportunities.

Second, conservation benefits must be distributed more fairly. Wildlife tourism should contribute directly to protecting the livelihoods and safety of communities that bear conservation costs.

Third, existing national conservation plans should be independently reviewed to identify implementation gaps and establish a realistic timetable for corrective action.

Fourth, conservation institutions must become more accountable for measurable outcomes, including reductions in human deaths, elephant mortality, crop losses, and property damage.

These reforms require cooperation among wildlife, forestry, agriculture, land, irrigation, and local government institutions.

They also demand political leadership willing to prioritise long-term results over short-term publicity.

For exceptional animals, such as Tusker Kavantissa, improved risk monitoring, preventive protection, and timely veterinary responses are particularly important. However, conservation should not be limited to protecting a few well-known animals.

Every wild elephant has ecological value, just as every person living alongside elephants has an equal right to safety.

The objective must be a system that protects both.

Lesson tusker Kavantissa leaves behind

The death of Tusker Kavantissa should not become another moment of national sorrow that gradually fades from public memory. It should mark a turning point in how Sri Lanka approaches wildlife conservation.

A proper investigation into his death is essential. Equally important is an honest examination of the conservation system within which such tragedies continue to occur.

The real challenge is not choosing between people and elephants. It is creating a system in which both can coexist safely, and where the responsibilities, costs, and benefits of conservation are shared fairly.

This requires more than scientific expertise and stronger regulations. It demands accountable institutions, meaningful community participation, economic fairness, and political leadership guided by a clear long-term vision.

Our greatest failure would not be the loss of Tusker Kavantissa alone. It would be allowing the same weaknesses in our conservation system to claim more lives while we continue to avoid the reforms that could prevent them.

Features

Equality before the Law as foundation of Sri Lanka’s recovery

Published

2 days ago

2026/10/20

Sahan Weerasooriya

Gnanasara Thera brought to court, dressed in lay attire

by Jehan Perera

The government appears set to overcome the first major challenge to one of its foundational principles. It has faced down demands from sections of the Buddhist clergy and opposition parties to release Ven. Galagodaatte Gnanasara from his prison sentence for contempt of court.

Ven Gnanasara is best known as the general secretary of the Bodu Bala Sena, a nationalist Sinhala grouping. The government seemed unfazed by a protest march organised by Buddhist monks and the opposition parties and its supporters organised an even bigger march to support the government’s position. It is notable that the general population did not get involved in either march in any substantial number. The issue has now become a test of whether the government will uphold its commitment to apply the law equally, irrespective of a person’s position or status, even when doing so brings it into conflict with a powerful constituency.

The case has a specific legal history. Ven. Gnanasara was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment by the Court of Appeal in 2018 for contempt of court in a case involving former military personnel where he disrupted the proceedings. The Supreme Court rejected his appeal in 2018. Former President Maithripala Sirisena subsequently granted him a presidential pardon in 2019. Last month, the Supreme Court invalidated that pardon. The initial demand by Buddhist monks and their lay supporters was that Ven. Gnanasara should be permitted to wear his Buddhist robes when appearing in public before the courts. The government has indicated its willingness to examine the procedures governing the treatment of Buddhist monks in prison, in consultation with the relevant religious authorities. However, the initial demand has now been escalated into a demand for a presidential pardon.

One of the central promises of the National People’s Power (NPP) during its election campaign two years ago was to apply the law equally to all. This commitment has shaped the government’s approach to allegations of corruption and criminality involving individuals who previously wielded political power. The NPP government was swept into power on a wave of antipathy towards those in previous governments who were perceived to have abused their positions for private gain. The economic collapse Sri Lanka experienced in 2022, and the hardships endured across society, remain vivid in the public memory. The past two years have seen the government pursuing those accused of corruption and other offences. Several high-ranking members of previous governments have faced arrest and legal proceedings and been sentenced to jail.

Religious Concerns

The ability of opposition parties to mobilise widespread resistance against proceedings involving their leaders has been limited, as much of the general population continues to favour accountability for past financial crimes. However, the case of Ven. Gnanasara is different. It does not concern allegations of financial corruption, but the relationship between religious authority, the courts and the law of the land. This is where the distinction between respecting religious traditions and upholding the law becomes crucial. There is a sense among sections of the general population that Buddhist monks should not be treated on a par with others and that requiring Ven. Gnanasara to appear in court without his robes was unjust and contrary to the national ethos. Such sentiments reflect the special place Buddhism occupies in Sri Lanka’s history and society. Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has been a potent political force throughout the country’s history, drawing on a heritage that extends back more than two millennia. The question is whether respect for Buddhism needs to also entail the exemption of individual monks from the ordinary requirements of the law and thereby treat them differently.

The challenge would be to accommodate legitimate religious concerns through rational and lawful procedures without allowing religious status to become a source of legal privilege. The government has been amenable to addressing the issue of monastic robes, but has so far resisted the demand to release Ven. Gnanasara through a new pardon. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and government members have made it clear that the government would not bend the law to accommodate any individual. They have taken the position that any shortcomings in existing rules should be addressed by changing the rules through proper procedures, rather than by making an exception for a particular individual. If the government holds its position, it will demonstrate that its commitment to the rule of law extends even to constituencies that have historically enjoyed considerable political influence.

This is important not only for the country’s democratic institutions but also for its economic future. Sri Lanka is seeking to recover from its economic collapse and establish the foundations for sustained growth. The International Monetary Fund’s analysis of Sri Lanka’s governance weaknesses has repeatedly emphasised the economic costs of corruption and institutional deficiencies. Its 2024 analysis of governance and growth concluded that comprehensive and coherent reforms could bring significant macroeconomic benefits. The IMF’s 2025 assessment also highlighted the importance of sustained governance reforms in unlocking the country’s growth potential. Investors, both domestic and foreign, need confidence that public institutions function according to predictable rules, that contracts and property rights are protected, and that political connections or social status will not determine how the law is applied.

Sensitive Issue

Sri Lanka has long sought the leap towards prosperity that has proved elusive under successive governments. Economic reform alone will not achieve it. The connection between the rule of law and economic prosperity is direct. Businesses are more likely to invest when they can expect disputes to be resolved fairly, public resources to be managed transparently and regulatory decisions to be made on rational grounds. No country can achieve a durable economic take-off if its institutions are perceived to operate according to political favour, inherited privilege or communal pressure. Sri Lanka cannot afford to return to a political culture in which powerful interests are shielded from accountability while ordinary citizens bear the costs.

Changing a political culture that has evolved over the decades if not centuries is a difficult undertaking, particularly in a country where political leaders have long relied on religious and communal identities to consolidate their support. It requires not only firmness but also sensitivity, dialogue and a willingness to reform laws and institutions where genuine deficiencies exist. The present controversy offers an opportunity to demonstrate that these objectives need not be in conflict. The government can respect the Buddhist clergy’s concerns about the treatment of monks in prison while refusing to grant an individual an exemption from a judicial sentence. It can recognise the importance of Buddhism to the country while maintaining that no religious or political authority stands above the law.

The question is whether national traditions and ethos are interpreted in ways that strengthen justice, responsibility and social harmony, or invoked to defend privileges that undermine them. The country needs a transformation in public expectations from privilege to accountability, from communal claims to equal citizenship, and from personal discretion to institutions governed by law.

The government’s handling of the case involving Ven. Gnanasara is therefore about more than one monk or one sentence. This particular case will determine whether the government can build a system in which no government, religious authority or politically influential individuals can place themselves beyond the law. A just society must be able to honour both its traditions and its commitment to equality before the law.