(Continued from yesterday)

 China and Sri Lanka discovered that their interests were closely aligned in the evolving post-war strategic landscape. China served as a vital diplomatic shield for Sri Lanka, particularly in countering UN resolutions amid international scrutiny over its actions. For China, Sri Lanka was a crucial link in the Belt and Road Initiative, serving as a strategic hub for infrastructure investment in the Indian Ocean region.

Since 2009, Sino-Sri Lanka relations have expanded rapidly across multiple sectors. China has emerged as Sri Lanka’s leading source of foreign direct investment (FDI), funding large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Hambantota Port, Mattala Airport, the Southern Expressway, the Norochcholai coal power plant, and a $500 million expansion of Colombo’s South Harbour. In May 2013, the two countries signed a Strategic Cooperative Partnership (SCP), encompassing trade, investment, financial assistance, and strategic cooperation. The geopolitical implications of these developments are evident in projects like the Trincomalee-based Sri Lankan Air Force maintenance workshop awarded to a Chinese firm.

These initiatives triggered reactions from regional powers, particularly India and Japan, which view them as components of China’s expanding “Maritime Silk Road” and “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean. India and the United States have formally conveyed concerns to Sri Lankan authorities about the strategic implications of China’s involvement in the Hambantota Harbour and Colombo Port City projects. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has shown little strategic foresight and diplomatic acumen in managing this delicate situation.

Foreign policy Dilemmas of Yahapalanaya:  Breakthroughs and Vacillations

The domestic context of foreign policy shifted once again when the National Unity Government (NUG), commonly known as Yahapalana government, came to power following the Presidential election on January 8, 2015. The blatant democracy backsliding since 2009, coupled with misuse of power, widespread corruption and state extravagance, gust a political wind—originating within civil society—that ultimately unseated the seemingly invincible Mahinda Rajapaksa regime. A new discourse on democracy and good governance emerged, shaping the narrative in guiding political development. Soon after coming to power, the Yahapalana government introduced the 19th Amendment to the Constitution on April 28, 2015, as an initial step toward broad democratic reforms. The amendment imposed checks on the President’s executive powers and included certain provisions to promote good governance.  The country’s political atmosphere changed markedly after the unseating of the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, the Yahapalana government signaled its willingness to engage more constructively with the international community, particularly the United Nations, departing from the confrontational approach of its predecessor. This shift was evident in several key developments. In March 2015, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) visited Sri Lanka, followed by the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) in November—the latter marking its first visit in 16 years. The government’s changed approach was most notably demonstrated at the 30th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, where Sri Lanka collaborated with other Council members to co-sponsor the resolution Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability, and Human Rights in Sri Lanka, which was adopted by consensus.

The initial steps taken by the Yahapalana

government in democracy building and good governance helped restore democratic credibility of Sri Lanka before the international community. The focus on good governance, accountability, and anti-corruption resonated with Western countries that champion these principles in the international arena.  In addition to the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, there were other initiatives in that direction. The right to information was incorporated into the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution, making it a judicially enforceable right. A key milestone in this regard was the enactment of the Right to Information Act, which, after a prolonged gestation period, was finally implemented in February 2017. Meanwhile, the process of drafting a new constitution began with the transformation of Parliament into a Constituent Assembly. A Steering Committee was established, which submitted its interim report on September 26, 2017.

The international pressure that was mounting on Sri Lanka before 2015 was eased significantly due to the Yahapalana government’s approach to national reconciliation. This approach was built on four key main pillars: truth-seeking, the right to justice, reparation, and non-recurrence. As an initial step, the government appointed the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms (CTFRM) on January 26, 2016.

Amid changing domestic dynamics, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy priorities were redefined, particularly in relation to its three geopolitical spheres. The Indian Ocean once again became a priority in foreign policy, reflected in the establishment of the Indian Ocean Secretariat under the Prime Minister’s purview. Recognising shifts in the regional and global balance of power—across South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and beyond—the Yahapalana government sought to restore balance in its foreign policy. India, an emerging blue-water naval power, is Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour. China, a rising superpower with an expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean, remains Sri Lanka’s principal source of foreign direct investment. Meanwhile, the United States, the dominant naval power in the region, continues to play a crucial role.  Sri Lanka’s economic ties also shaped its foreign policy calculus. While India is its second-largest trading partner, China remains a major investor. At the same time, Western markets continue to be vital for Sri Lanka’s exports, with 27% of total exports going to the United States, 27% to the EU, and 10% to Britain. India is Sri Lanka’s second largest trading partner.

Sri Lanka has preferred to be in the Indian Ocean framework rather than the broader Indo-Pacific construct. Recognising the strategic volatility of the region, the Yahapalanaya government maintained that the dominance of the Indian Ocean by any single power would be detrimental to Sri Lanka’s national interests. At this critical juncture, a small island state like Sri Lanka cannot afford to be a passive observer. Sri Lanka has consistently championed a peaceful and stable maritime environment. Ensuring freedom of navigation and securing sea lanes of communication remain central to this vision.

The Yahapalana Government prioritized economic diplomacy. Recognising the global shift in economic and financial power toward ‘emerging Asia’, the government understood that the Indian Ocean was becoming a focal point of global economic influence. In this context, a key policy challenge was determining how best to leverage Sri Lanka’s strategic location and human capital to integrate into Asia’s economic growth.

Sri Lanka’s deepening economic crisis, particularly its mounting debt repayment challenges, had profound implications for its foreign policy under the Yahapalana government. In an effort to mitigate its balance of payment problem, the government signed a controversial agreement in August 2017 with China Merchants Port Holdings (CM Port), leasing a 70% stake in the Hambantota Port for 99 years in exchange for $1.12 billion. This deal not only underscored Sri Lanka’s growing dependence on Chinese investment to manage its financial distress but also highlighted the complex interplay between economic crisis and strategic foreign policy decisions. While the agreement carried significant political and geopolitical ramifications, Sri Lanka’s options at the time appeared severely limited.

Although the Yahapalana government prioritised economic diplomacy, its track record in this area was not impressive. Efforts to revive the economy through foreign investment yielded underwhelming results. The government worked hard to secure Sri Lanka’s qualification for the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact grant. Ultimately, in April 2019—toward the end of its tenure—MCC offered Sri Lanka a $480 million outright grant to upgrade urban transport, modernise the land registration system, and build rural roads connecting highways. Similarly, the Yahapalana government entered into an agreement with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for a Light Rail Transit (LRT) project under highly concessional terms. However, the project failed to take off before the 2019 presidential election.

The Yahapalana government’s indecision and delays were evident in the development of the East Container Terminal (ECT). After prolonged uncertainty, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) finally signed a tripartite agreement with the governments of Japan and India in May 2019 to develop the terminal. However, before finalising the restructuring of the India-Japan joint venture and the capital infusion plan, the Yahapalana government collapsed.  The government’s hesitation in making critical policy decisions, even after initiating processes with major international partners, has eroded Sri Lanka’s credibility on the global stage.

Given the significance of the Tamil Diaspora in the international public sphere, engaging with them remained a key challenge in Sri Lanka’s post-war foreign policy. Successive Sri Lankan governments, both during and after the war, struggled to establish a constructive dialogue with the Tamil Diaspora, largely due to their failure to recognise its diversity. As Foreign Minister of the Yahapalana Government (2015–2017), Mangala Samaraweera made a concerted effort to engage with the Diaspora, particularly the Global Tamil Forum (GTF), aiming to integrate them into Sri Lanka’s national reconciliation process. However, his initiative remained largely personal and lacked broader government support. Following his departure from the Foreign Ministry in mid-2017, the effort lost momentum.

The Yahapalana government struggled to sustain its initial momentum in promoting democracy and good governance, ultimately failing to maintain a consistent policy direction. Indecision and frequent policy reversals came to define its domestic governance. A key example was its approach to transitional justice. While the government initially demonstrated enthusiasm for establishing the Office on Missing Persons (OMP), this commitment soon waned. By the time the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms (CTFRM) submitted its final report in November 2016, the initial drive had significantly diminished. Notably, neither the President nor the Prime Minister attended the report’s handover, signaling a lack of political will. After prolonged delays, the OMP was finally established in March 2018—almost two years after its initial proposal, highlighting the government’s slow and inconsistent approach to key reforms.

Divisions within the government emerged before its second year in office, preventing a unified stance on key policies, including foreign affairs. On critical issues, the President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister often voiced conflicting positions, creating confusion. This persistent inconsistency left the international community uncertain and bewildered.

The rift between the President and the Prime Minister of the Yahapalana Government reached a crisis point on October 26, 2018, when the President dismissed the Prime Minister and appointed Mahinda Rajapaksa in his place. The Supreme Court later ruled the President’s actions unconstitutional and reversed his decisions. However, this exposed the underlying tensions within the Yahapalana Government, turning a hidden cold war into an open conflict that paralysed the country’s public administration. Meanwhile, the Central Bank bond scam inflicted irreparable damage on the government’s anti-corruption credibility. The faltering pace of democratic reforms, economic stagnation, and infighting within the political leadership created a bleak political atmosphere. In this context, the carefully coordinated suicide bombings on April 21, 2019, carried out by a little-known Islamic terrorist group, shifted the national discourse from democracy and good governance to security and strong leadership.

by Gamini Keerawella

(To be continued)