Features
Electoral reform and abolishing the executive presidency
by Dr Jayampathy Wickramaratne,
President’s Counsel
The Sri Lankan Left spearheaded the campaign against introducing the executive presidency and consistently agitated for its abolition. Abolition was a central plank of the platform of the National People’s Power (NPP) at the 2024 presidential elections and of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) at all previous elections.
Issues under FPP or a mixed system
President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, participating in the ‘Satana’ programme on Sirasa TV, recently reiterated the NPP’s commitment to abolition and raised four issues related to accompanying electoral reform.
The first is that proportional representation (PR) did not, except in a few instances, give the ruling party a clear majority, resulting in a ‘weak parliament’. Therefore, electoral reform is essential when changing to a parliamentary form of government.
Secondly, ensuring that different shades of opinion and communities are proportionally represented may be challenging under the first-past-the-post system (FPP). For example, as the Muslim community in the Kurunegala district is dispersed, a Muslim-majority electorate will be impossible. Under PR, such representation is possible, as happened in 2024, with many Muslims voting for the NPP and its Muslim candidate.
The third issue is a difficulty that might arise under a mixed (FPP-PR) system. For example, the Trincomalee district returned Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim candidates at successive elections. In a mixed system, territorial constituencies would be fewer and ensuring representation would be difficult. For the unversed, there were 160 electorates that returned 168 members under FPP at the 1977 Parliamentary elections.
The fourth is that certain castes may not be represented under a new system. He cited the Galle district where some of the ‘old’ electorates had been created to facilitate such representation.
It might straightaway be said that all four issues raised by President Dissanayake have substantial validity. However, as the writer will endeavour to show, they do not present unsurmountable obstacles.
Proposals for reform, Constitutional Assembly 2016-18
Proposals made by the Steering Committee of the Constitutional Assembly of the 2015 Parliament and views of parties may be referred to.
The Committee proposed a 233-member First Chamber of Parliament elected under a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) system that seeks to ensure proportionality in the final allocation of seats. 140 seats (60%) will be filled by FPP. The Delimitation Commission may create dual-member constituencies and smaller constituencies to render possible the representation of communities of interest, whether racial, religious or otherwise. 93 compensatory seats (40%) will be filled to ensure proportionality. Of these, 76 will be filled by PR at the provincial level and 12 by PR at the national level, while the remaining 5 seats will go to the party that secures the highest number of votes nationally.
The Sri Lanka Freedom Party agreed with the proposals in principle, while the Joint Opposition (the precursor of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna) did not make any specific proposals. The Tamil Nationalist Alliance was willing to consider any agreement between the two main parties on the main principles in the interest of reaching an acceptable consensus.
The Jathika Hela Urumaya’s position was interesting. If the presidential powers are to be reduced, the party obtaining the highest number of votes should have a majority of seats. Still, the representation of minor political parties should be assured. Therefore, the number of seats added to the winning party should be at the expense of the party placed second.
The All Ceylon Makkal Congress, Eelam People’s Democratic Party, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the Tamil Progressive Alliance jointly proposed that the principles of the existing PR system be retained but with elections being held for 40 to 50 electoral zones and a 2% cut-off point. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna was for the abolition of the executive presidency and, interestingly, suggested a mixed electoral system that ensures that the final outcome is proportional.
CDRL proposals
The Collective for Democracy and Rule of Law (CDRL), a group of professionals and academics that included the writer, made detailed proposals on constitutional reform in 2024. It proposed returning to parliamentary government. The legislature would be bicameral, with a House of Representatives of 200 members elected as follows: 130 members will be elected from territorial constituencies, including multi-member and smaller constituencies carved out to facilitate the representation of social groups of shared interest; Sixty members will be elected based on PR at a national or provincial level; Ten seats would be filled through national-level PR from among parties that failed to secure a seat through territorial constituencies or the sixty seats mentioned above, enabling small parties with significant national presence without local concentration to secure representation. Appropriate provisions shall be made to ensure adequate representation of women, youth and underrepresented interest groups.
The writer’s proposal
The people have elected the NPP leader as President and given the party a two-thirds majority in Parliament. It is, therefore, prudent to propose a system that addresses the concerns expressed by the President. Otherwise, we will be going around in circles. The writer believes that the CDRL proposals, suitably modified, present a suitable basis for further discussion.
While the people vehemently oppose any increase in the number of MPs, it would be challenging to address the President’s concerns in a smaller parliament. The writer’s proposal is, therefore, to work within a 225-member Parliament.
The writer proposes that 150 MPs be elected through FPP and 65 through national PR. 10 seats would be filled through national-level PR from among parties that have not secured a seat either through territorial constituencies or the 65 seats mentioned above. The Delimitation Commission shall apportion 150 members among the various provinces proportionally according to the number of registered voters in each province. The Commission will then divide each province into territorial constituencies that will return the number of MPs apportioned. The Commission may create smaller constituencies or multi-member constituencies to render possible the representation of social groups of shared interest.
The 65 PR seats will be proportionally distributed according to the votes received by parties nationally, without a cut-off point. The number of ‘PR MPs’ that a party gets will be apportioned among the various provinces in proportion to the votes received in the provinces. For example, if Party A is entitled to 10 PR seats and has obtained 20% of its total vote from the Central Province, it will fill 2 PR seats from candidates from that Province, and so on. Each party shall submit names of potential ‘PR MPs’ from each of the provinces where the party contests at least one constituency in the order of its preference, and seats allotted to that party in a given province are filled accordingly. The remaining 10 seats will be filled by small parties as proposed by the CDRL.
How does the proposed system address President Dissanayake’s concerns?
The President’s concern that PR will result in a weak parliament is sufficiently addressed when a majority of MPs are elected under FPP.
Before dealing with the other three issues, it must be said that voters do not always vote for candidates from their communities. A classic example is the 1965 election result in Balapitiya, a Left-oriented constituency dominated by a particular caste. The Lanka Sama Samaja Party boldly nominated L.C. de Silva, from a different caste, to contest Lakshman de Silva, a long-standing MP who crossed over to bring down the SLFP-LSSP coalition. Balapitiya voters punished Lakshman and elected L.C.
Multi-member constituencies have generally served their purpose but not always. The Batticaloa dual-member constituency had been created to ‘render possible’ the election of a Tamil and a Muslim. At the 1970 elections, the four leading candidates were Rajadurai of the Federal Party, Makan Markar of the UNP, Rahuman of the SLFP and the independent Selvanayagam. The Muslim vote was closely split between Macan Markar and Rahuman, resulting in both losing. Muslim voters surely knew that a split might deny Muslim representation but preferred to vote according to their political convictions.
The President’s second concern that a dispersed community may not get representation under FPP will also be addressed better under the proposed system. Taking the same Kurunegala district as an example, a party could attract Muslim voters by placing a Muslim high up on the PR list. Similarly, a Tamil party could place a candidate from a depressed community high up in its Northern Province PR list to attract voters of depressed communities and ensure their representation.
The third concern was that the number of electorates would be less under a mixed system, making it challenging to carve out electorates to facilitate the representation of communities, the Trincomalee district being an example. Empowering the Delimitation Commission to create smaller electorates assuages this concern. It will not be Trincomalee District but the whole Eastern Province to which a certain number of FPP MPs will be allotted, giving the Commission broad discretion to carve out electorates. The Commission could also create multimember constituencies to render possible the representation of communities of interest. The fourth concern about caste representation would also be addressed similarly.
It may be noted that the difference between the number of FPP MPs (150) under the proposed system is only 10% less than that under the delimitation of 1975 (168). Also, there will be no cut-off point for PR as against the present cut-off of 5%. This will help small as well as not-so-small parties. Reserving 10 seats for small parties also helps address the concerns of the President.
No spoilers, please. Don’t let electoral reform be an excuse for a Nokerena Wedakama
The writer submits the above proposals as a basis for discussion. While a stable government and the representation of various interests are essential, abolishing the dreaded Executive Presidency is equally important. These are not mutually exclusive.
President Dissanayake also said on Sirasa TV that once the local elections are over, the NPP would first discuss the issue internally. This is welcome as there would be a government position, which can be the basis for further discussion.
This is the first time a single political party committed to abolition has won a two-thirds majority. Another such opportunity will almost certainly not come. Let there be no spoilers from either side. Let electoral reform not be an excuse for retaining the Executive Presidency. Let the Sinhala saying ‘nokerena veda kamata konduru thel hath pattayakuth thava tikakuth onalu’ not apply to this exercise (‘for the doctoring that will never come off, seven measures and a little more, of the oil of eye-flies are required’—translation by John M. Senaveratne, Dictionary of Proverbs of the Sinhalese, 1936).
According to recent determinations of the Supreme Court, a change to a parliamentary form of government requires the People’s approval at a referendum. While the NPP has a two-thirds majority, it should not take for granted a victory at a referendum held late in the term of Parliament for, then, there is the danger of a referendum becoming a referendum on the government’s performance rather than one on the constitutional bill, with opposition parties playing spoilers. If the government wishes to have the present form of government for, say, four years, it could now move a bill for abolition with a sunset clause that provides for abolition on a specified date. Delay will undoubtedly frustrate the process and open the government to the accusation that it indulged in a ‘nokerena vedakama’.
Features
Australia’s social media ban: A sledgehammer approach to a scalpel problem
When governments panic, they legislate. When they legislate in panic, they create monsters. Australia’s world-first ban on social media for under-16s, which came into force on 10 December, 2025, is precisely such a monster, a clumsy, authoritarian response to a legitimate problem that threatens to do more harm than good.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hailed it as a “proud day” for Australian families. One wonders what there is to be proud about when a liberal democracy resorts to blanket censorship, violates children’s fundamental rights, and outsources enforcement to the very tech giants it claims to be taming. This is not protection; it is political theatre masquerading as policy.
The Seduction of Simplicity
The ban’s appeal is obvious. Social media platforms have become toxic playgrounds where children are subjected to cyberbullying, addictive algorithms, and content that can genuinely harm their mental health. The statistics are damning: 40% of Australian teens have experienced cyberbullying, youth self-harm hospital admissions rose 47% between 2012 and 2022, and depression rates have skyrocketed in tandem with smartphone adoption. These are real problems demanding real solutions.
But here’s where Australia has gone catastrophically wrong: it has conflated correlation with causation and chosen punishment over education, restriction over reform, and authoritarian control over empowerment. The ban assumes that removing children from social media will magically solve mental health crises, as if these platforms emerged in a vacuum rather than as symptoms of deeper societal failures, inadequate mental health services, overworked parents, underfunded schools, and a culture that has outsourced child-rearing to screens.
Dr. Naomi Lott of the University of Reading hit the nail on the head when she argued that the ban unfairly burdens youth for tech firms’ failures in content moderation and algorithm design. Why should children pay the price for corporate malfeasance? This is akin to banning teenagers from roads because car manufacturers built unsafe vehicles, rather than holding those manufacturers accountable.
The Enforcement Farce
The practical implementation of this ban reads like dystopian satire. Platforms must take “reasonable steps” to prevent access, a phrase so vague it could mean anything or nothing. The age verification methods being deployed include AI-driven facial recognition, behavioural analysis, government ID scans, and something called “AgeKeys.” Each comes with its own Pandora’s box of problems.
Facial recognition technology has well-documented biases against ethnic minorities. Behavioural analysis can be easily gamed by tech-savvy teenagers. ID scans create massive privacy risks in a country that has suffered repeated data breaches. And zero-knowledge proof, while theoretically elegant, require a level of technical sophistication that makes them impractical for mass adoption.
Already, teenagers are bragging online about circumventing the restrictions, prompting Albanese’s impotent rebuke. What did he expect? That Australian youth would simply accept digital exile? The history of prohibition, from alcohol to file-sharing, teaches us that determined users will always find workarounds. The ban doesn’t eliminate risk; it merely drives it underground where it becomes harder to monitor and address.
Even more absurdly, platforms like YouTube have expressed doubts about enforcement, and Opposition Leader Sussan Ley has declared she has “no confidence” in the ban’s efficacy. When your own political opposition and the companies tasked with implementing your policy both say it won’t work, perhaps that’s a sign you should reconsider.

The Rights We’re Trading Away
The legal challenges now percolating through Australia’s High Court get to the heart of what’s really at stake here. The Digital Freedom Project, led by teenagers Noah Jones and Macy Neyland, argues that the ban violates the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. They’re right. Social media platforms, for all their flaws, have become essential venues for democratic discourse. By age 16, many young Australians are politically aware, engaged in climate activism, and participating in public debates. This ban silences them.
The government’s response, that child welfare trumps absolute freedom, sounds reasonable until you examine it closely. Child welfare is being invoked as a rhetorical trump card to justify what is essentially state paternalism. The government isn’t protecting children from objective harm; it’s making a value judgment about what information they should be allowed to access and what communities they should be permitted to join. That’s thought control, not child protection.
Moreover, the ban creates a two-tiered system of rights. Those over 16 can access platforms; those under cannot, regardless of maturity, need, or circumstance. A 15-year-old seeking LGBTQ+ support groups, mental health resources, or information about escaping domestic abuse is now cut off from potentially life-saving communities. A 15-year-old living in rural Australia, isolated from peers, loses a vital social lifeline. The ban is blunt force trauma applied to a problem requiring surgical precision.
The Privacy Nightmare
Let’s talk about the elephant in the digital room: data security. Australia’s track record here is abysmal. The country has experienced multiple high-profile data breaches, and now it’s mandating that platforms collect biometric data, government IDs, and behavioural information from millions of users, including adults who will need to verify their age to distinguish themselves from banned minors.
The legislation claims to mandate “data minimisation” and promises that information collected solely for age verification will be destroyed post-verification. These promises are worth less than the pixels they’re displayed on. Once data is collected, it exists. It can be hacked. It can be subpoenaed. It can be repurposed. The fine for violations, up to AUD 9.5 million, sounds impressive until you realise that’s pocket change for tech giants making billions annually.
We’re creating a massive honeypot of sensitive information about children and families, and we’re trusting companies with questionable data stewardship records to protect it. What could possibly go wrong?
The Global Domino Delusion
Proponents like US Senator Josh Hawley and author Jonathan Haidt praise Australia’s ban as a “bold precedent” that will trigger global reform. This is wishful thinking bordering on delusion. What Australia has actually created is a case study in how not to regulate technology.
France, Denmark, and Malaysia are watching, but with notable differences. France’s model includes parental consent options. Denmark proposes exemptions for 13-14-year-olds with parental approval. These approaches recognise what Australia refuses to acknowledge: that blanket prohibitions fail to account for individual circumstances and family autonomy.
The comparison table in the document reveals the stark rigidity of Australia’s approach. It’s the only country attempting outright prohibition without parental consent. This isn’t leadership; it’s extremism. Other nations may cherry-pick elements of Australia’s approach while avoiding its most draconian features. (See Table)

The Real Solutions We’re Ignoring
Here’s what actual child protection would look like: holding platforms legally accountable for algorithmic harm, mandating transparent content moderation, requiring platforms to offer chronological feeds instead of engagement-maximising algorithms, funding digital literacy programmes in schools, properly resourcing mental health services for young people, and empowering parents with better tools to guide their children’s online experiences.
Instead, Australia has chosen the path of least intellectual effort: ban it and hope for the best. This is governance by bumper sticker, policy by panic.
Mia Bannister, whose son’s suicide has been invoked repeatedly to justify the ban, called parental enforcement “short-term pain, long-term gain” and urged families to remove devices entirely. But her tragedy, however heart-wrenching, doesn’t justify bad policy. Individual cases, no matter how emotionally compelling, are poor foundations for sweeping legislation affecting millions.
Conclusion: The Tyranny of Good Intentions
Australia’s social media ban is built on good intentions, genuine concerns about child welfare, and understandable frustration with unaccountable tech giants. But good intentions pave a very particular road, and this road leads to a place where governments dictate what information citizens can access based on age, where privacy becomes a quaint relic, and where young people are infantilised rather than educated.
The ban will fail on its own terms, teenagers will circumvent it, platforms will struggle with enforcement, and the mental health crisis will continue because it was never primarily about social media. But it will succeed in normalising digital authoritarianism, expanding surveillance infrastructure, and teaching young Australians that their rights are negotiable commodities.
When this ban inevitably fails, when the promised mental health improvements don’t materialize, when data breaches expose the verification systems, and when teenagers continue to access prohibited platforms through VPNs and workarounds, Australia will face a choice: double down on enforcement, creating an even more invasive surveillance state, or admit that the entire exercise was a costly mistake.
Smart money says they’ll choose the former. After all, once governments acquire new powers, they rarely relinquish them willingly. And that’s the real danger here, not that Australia will fail to protect children from social media, but that it will succeed in building the infrastructure for a far more intrusive state. The platforms may be the proximate target, but the ultimate casualties will be freedom, privacy, and trust.
Australia didn’t need a world-first ban. It needed world-class thinking. Instead, it settled for a world of trouble.
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Sustaining good governance requires good systems
A prominent feature of the first year of the NPP government is that it has not engaged in the institutional reforms which was expected of it. This observation comes in the context of the extraordinary mandate with which the government was elected and the high expectations that accompanied its rise to power. When in opposition and in its election manifesto, the JVP and NPP took a prominent role in advocating good governance systems for the country. They insisted on constitutional reform that included the abolition of the executive presidency and the concentration of power it epitomises, the strengthening of independent institutions that overlook key state institutions such as the judiciary, public service and police, and the reform or repeal of repressive laws such as the PTA and the Online Safety Act.
The transformation of a political party that averaged between three to five percent of the popular vote into one that currently forms the government with a two thirds majority in parliament is a testament to the faith that the general population placed in the JVP/ NPP combine. This faith was the outcome of more than three decades of disciplined conduct in the aftermath of the bitter experience of the 1988 to 1990 period of JVP insurrection. The manner in which the handful of JVP parliamentarians engaged in debate with well researched critiques of government policy and actions, and their service in times of disaster such as the tsunami of 2004 won them the trust of the people. This faith was bolstered by the Aragalaya movement which galvanized the citizens against the ruling elites of the past.
In this context, the long delay to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act which has earned notoriety for its abuse especially against ethnic and religious minorities, has been a disappointment to those who value human rights. So has been the delay in appointing an Auditor General, so important in ensuring accountability for the money expended by the state. The PTA has a long history of being used without restraint against those deemed to be anti-state which, ironically enough, included the JVP in the period 1988 to 1990. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), published in December 2025, is the latest attempt to repeal and replace the PTA. Unfortunately, the PSTA largely replicates the structure, logic and dangers of previous failed counter terrorism bills, including the Counter Terrorism Act of 2018 and the Anti Terrorism Act proposed in 2023.
Misguided Assumption
Despite its stated commitment to rule of law and fundamental rights, the draft PTSA reproduces many of the core defects of the PTA. In a preliminary statement, the Centre for Policy Alternatives has observed among other things that “if there is a Detention Order made against the person, then in combination, the period of remand and detention can extend up to two years. This means that a person can languish in detention for up to two years without being charged with a crime. Such a long period again raises questions of the power of the State to target individuals, exacerbated by Sri Lanka’s history of long periods of remand and detention, which has contributed to abuse and violence.” Human Rights lawyer Ermiza Tegal has warned against the broad definition of terrorism under the proposed law: “The definition empowers state officials to term acts of dissent and civil disobedience as ‘terrorism’ and will lawfully permit disproportionate and excessive responses.” The legitimate and peaceful protests against abuse of power by the authorities cannot be classified as acts of terror.
The willingness to retain such powers reflects the surmise that the government feels that keeping in place the structures that come from the past is to their benefit, as they can utilise those powers in a crisis. Due to the strict discipline that exists within the JVP/NPP at this time there may be an assumption that those the party appoints will not abuse their trust. However, the country’s experience with draconian laws designed for exceptional circumstances demonstrates that they tend to become tools of routine governance. On the plus side, the government has given two months for public comment which will become meaningful if the inputs from civil society actors are taken into consideration.
Worldwide experience has repeatedly demonstrated that integrity at the level of individual leaders, while necessary, is not sufficient to guarantee good governance over time. This is where the absence of institutional reform becomes significant. The aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah in particular has necessitated massive procurements of emergency relief which have to be disbursed at maximum speed. There are also significant amounts of foreign aid flowing into the country to help it deal with the relief and recovery phase. There are protocols in place that need to be followed and monitored so that a fiasco like the disappearance of tsunami aid in 2004 does not recur. To the government’s credit there are no such allegations at the present time. But precautions need to be in place, and those precautions depend less on trust in individuals than on the strength and independence of oversight institutions.
Inappropriate Appointments
It is in this context that the government’s efforts to appoint its own preferred nominees to the Auditor General’s Department has also come as a disappointment to civil society groups. The unsuitability of the latest presidential nominee has given rise to the surmise that this nomination was a time buying exercise to make an acting appointment. For the fourth time, the Constitutional Council refused to accept the president’s nominee. The term of the three independent civil society members of the Constitutional Council ends in January which would give the government the opportunity to appoint three new members of its choice and get its way in the future.
The failure to appoint a permanent Auditor General has created an institutional vacuum at a critical moment. The Auditor General acts as a watchdog, ensuring effective service delivery promoting integrity in public administration and providing an independent review of the performance and accountability. Transparency International has observed “The sequence of events following the retirement of the previous Auditor General points to a broader political inertia and a governance failure. Despite the clear constitutional importance of the role, the appointment process has remained protracted and opaque, raising serious questions about political will and commitment to accountability.”
It would appear that the government leadership takes the position they have been given the mandate to govern the country which requires implementation by those they have confidence in. This may explain their approach to the appointment (or non-appointment) at this time of the Auditor General. Yet this approach carries risks. Institutions are designed to function beyond the lifespan of any one government and to protect the public interest even when those in power are tempted to act otherwise. The challenge and opportunity for the NPP government is to safeguard independent institutions and enact just laws, so that the promise of system change endures beyond personalities and political cycles.
by Jehan Perera
Features
General education reforms: What about language and ethnicity?
A new batch arrived at our Faculty again. Students representing almost all districts of the country remind me once again of the wonderful opportunity we have for promoting social and ethnic cohesion at our universities. Sadly, however, many students do not interact with each other during the first few semesters, not only because they do not speak each other’s language(s), but also because of the fear and distrust that still prevails among communities in our society.
General education reform presents an opportunity to explore ways to promote social and ethnic cohesion. A school curriculum could foster shared values, empathy, and critical thinking, through social studies and civics education, implement inclusive language policies, and raise critical awareness about our collective histories. Yet, the government’s new policy document, Transforming General Education in Sri Lanka 2025, leaves us little to look forward to in this regard.
The policy document points to several “salient” features within it, including: 1) a school credit system to quantify learning; 2) module-based formative and summative assessments to replace end-of-term tests; 3) skills assessment in Grade 9 consisting of a ‘literacy and numeracy test’ and a ‘career interest test’; 4) a comprehensive GPA-based reporting system spanning the various phases of education; 5) blended learning that combines online with classroom teaching; 6) learning units to guide students to select their preferred career pathways; 7) technology modules; 8) innovation labs; and 9) Early Childhood Education (ECE). Notably, social and ethnic cohesion does not appear in this list. Here, I explore how the proposed curriculum reforms align (or do not align) with the NPP’s pledge to inculcate “[s]afety, mutual understanding, trust and rights of all ethnicities and religious groups” (p.127), in their 2024 Election Manifesto.
Language/ethnicity in the present curriculum
The civil war ended over 15 years ago, but our general education system has done little to bring ethnic communities together. In fact, most students still cannot speak in the “second national language” (SNL) and textbooks continue to reinforce negative stereotyping of ethnic minorities, while leaving out crucial elements of our post-independence history.
Although SNL has been a compulsory subject since the 1990s, the hours dedicated to SNL are few, curricula poorly developed, and trained teachers few (Perera, 2025). Perhaps due to unconscious bias and for ideological reasons, SNL is not valued by parents and school communities more broadly. Most students, who enter our Faculty, only have basic reading/writing skills in SNL, apart from the few Muslim and Tamil students who schooled outside the North and the East; they pick up SNL by virtue of their environment, not the school curriculum.
Regardless of ethnic background, most undergraduates seem to be ignorant about crucial aspects of our country’s history of ethnic conflict. The Grade 11 history textbook, which contains the only chapter on the post-independence period, does not mention the civil war or the events that led up to it. While the textbook valourises ‘Sinhala Only’ as an anti-colonial policy (p.11), the material covering the period thereafter fails to mention the anti-Tamil riots, rise of rebel groups, escalation of civil war, and JVP insurrections. The words “Tamil” and “Muslim” appear most frequently in the chapter, ‘National Renaissance,’ which cursorily mentions “Sinhalese-Muslim riots” vis-à-vis the Temperance Movement (p.57). The disenfranchisement of the Malaiyaha Tamils and their history are completely left out.
Given the horrifying experiences of war and exclusion experienced by many of our peoples since independence, and because most students still learn in mono-ethnic schools having little interaction with the ‘Other’, it is not surprising that our undergraduates find it difficult to mix across language and ethnic communities. This environment also creates fertile ground for polarizing discourses that further divide and segregate students once they enter university.
More of the same?
How does Transforming General Education seek to address these problems? The introduction begins on a positive note: “The proposed reforms will create citizens with a critical consciousness who will respect and appreciate the diversity they see around them, along the lines of ethnicity, religion, gender, disability, and other areas of difference” (p.1). Although National Education Goal no. 8 somewhat problematically aims to “Develop a patriotic Sri Lankan citizen fostering national cohesion, national integrity, and national unity while respecting cultural diversity (p. 2), the curriculum reforms aim to embed values of “equity, inclusivity, and social justice” (p. 9) through education. Such buzzwords appear through the introduction, but are not reflected in the reforms.
Learning SNL is promoted under Language and Literacy (Learning Area no. 1) as “a critical means of reconciliation and co-existence”, but the number of hours assigned to SNL are minimal. For instance, at primary level (Grades 1 to 5), only 0.3 to 1 hour is allocated to SNL per week. Meanwhile, at junior secondary level (Grades 6 to 9), out of 35 credits (30 credits across 15 essential subjects that include SNL, history and civics; 3 credits of further learning modules; and 2 credits of transversal skills modules (p. 13, pp.18-19), SNL receives 1 credit (10 hours) per term. Like other essential subjects, SNL is to be assessed through formative and summative assessments within modules. As details of the Grade 9 skills assessment are not provided in the document, it is unclear whether SNL assessments will be included in the ‘Literacy and numeracy test’. At senior secondary level – phase 1 (Grades 10-11 – O/L equivalent), SNL is listed as an elective.
Refreshingly, the policy document does acknowledge the detrimental effects of funding cuts in the humanities and social sciences, and highlights their importance for creating knowledge that could help to “eradicate socioeconomic divisions and inequalities” (p.5-6). It goes on to point to the salience of the Humanities and Social Sciences Education under Learning Area no. 6 (p.12):
“Humanities and Social Sciences education is vital for students to develop as well as critique various forms of identities so that they have an awareness of their role in their immediate communities and nation. Such awareness will allow them to contribute towards the strengthening of democracy and intercommunal dialogue, which is necessary for peace and reconciliation. Furthermore, a strong grounding in the Humanities and Social Sciences will lead to equity and social justice concerning caste, disability, gender, and other features of social stratification.”
Sadly, the seemingly progressive philosophy guiding has not moulded the new curriculum. Subjects that could potentially address social/ethnic cohesion, such as environmental studies, history and civics, are not listed as learning areas at the primary level. History is allocated 20 hours (2 credits) across four years at junior secondary level (Grades 6 to 9), while only 10 hours (1 credit) are allocated to civics. Meanwhile, at the O/L, students will learn 5 compulsory subjects (Mother Tongue, English, Mathematics, Science, and Religion and Value Education), and 2 electives—SNL, history and civics are bunched together with the likes of entrepreneurship here. Unlike the compulsory subjects, which are allocated 140 hours (14 credits or 70 hours each) across two years, those who opt for history or civics as electives would only have 20 hours (2 credits) of learning in each. A further 14 credits per term are for further learning modules, which will allow students to explore their interests before committing to a A/L stream or career path.
With the distribution of credits across a large number of subjects, and the few credits available for SNL, history and civics, social/ethnic cohesion will likely remain on the back burner. It appears to be neglected at primary level, is dealt sparingly at junior secondary level, and relegated to electives in senior years. This means that students will be able to progress through their entire school years, like we did, with very basic competencies in SNL and little understanding of history.
Going forward
Whether the students who experience this curriculum will be able to “resist and respond to hegemonic, divisive forces that pose a threat to social harmony and multicultural coexistence” (p.9) as anticipated in the policy, is questionable. Education policymakers and others must call for more attention to social and ethnic cohesion in the curriculum. However, changes to the curriculum would only be meaningful if accompanied by constitutional reform, abolition of policies, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (and its proxies), and other political changes.
For now, our school system remains divided by ethnicity and religion. Research from conflict-ridden societies suggests that lack of intercultural exposure in mono-ethnic schools leads to ignorance, prejudice, and polarized positions on politics and national identity. While such problems must be addressed in broader education reform efforts that also safeguard minority identities, the new curriculum revision presents an opportune moment to move this agenda forward.
(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna).
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
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News7 days agoOfficials of NMRA, SPC, and Health Minister under pressure to resign as drug safety concerns mount
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News7 days agoExpert: Lanka destroying its own food security by depending on imported seeds, chemical-intensive agriculture
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Editorial7 days agoFlawed drug regulation endangers lives
