Midweek Review

Our Common Heritage – one country – one land – one people

Published

6 years ago

2020/08/5

by Ashley de Vos

Reconciliation is a strange word with multiple meanings when applied in different situations and understandings, but mostly gravitating towards a willingness, a compromise to get together again. As such, it is a process that cannot be forced; it will always and should be a natural process. Four hundred years of colonialism introduced a need to move vertically and not on a horizontal plane only to satisfy false definitions of democracy, based on the divide-and-rule policy of the coloniser.

“Prior to colonialism, the Jathi-varna system in India had little, if anything, to do with race, ethnicity, or genetics. It is better understood as a set of distinctions based on traditional or inherited social status derived from work roles. Jathi is a highly localised and intricately organised social structure. One of the important aspects of Jathi, which was conspicuously overlooked by western Indologists, is its dynamic nature – allowing social mobility as well as occupational diversification” (Malhotra & Neelakandan, 2011, Schwab, 1984). Sri Lanka would have shared a similar vision.

This draconian political need based on ex-colonial recommendations to follow the African, the South African model as a methodology for reconciliation in Sri Lanka, is strange, as in the case of South Africa, reconciliation is between two distinctly different people. The Afrikaners who are predominantly White and of Dutch extraction, have been totally racist in their approach to living in South Africa. They saw the Black African as an inferior being to be used as a slave and treated them as such. The Dutch have a long history of slavery throughout their colonial occupation. Hence the Africans for decades were treated as the lowest of the low, and were beginning to believe what was been instigated. That was to be their lot.

Today, the traditional African tribes, living in South Africa, are forced to sacrifice their human dignity, to dress in colourful beads and dance semi-nude before the camera, for the titillated gratification of some frustrated foreign tourist. This is also a form of cultural slavery that has its roots in the very concept of Cultural Tourism promoted by the Bretton Wood twins, as a new economic break through theory, believed and unfortunately adopted copycat as a way forward, by “Experts” in many countries, including in Sri Lanka.

The Indian community in South Africa, arrogant and believing in their false superiority over the Africans, even though they themselves may have been taken across during the colonial occupation of the African lands, some even as slaves to work the sugar cane fields and as labour in the construction of infrastructure, looked down on the Africans as belonging to the lowest of the untouchable classes. An applied ruling based on a derogative concept judged firstly by the skin colour of the Africans. These Indians aided and abetted the British and white Afrikaner against the Black Africans.

Depicting Indians as “infinitely superior” to black Africans and using the racist pejorative “kaffirs” to describe them, is common throughout Gandhi’s early writings. He routinely expressed “disdain for Africans,” Gandhi described black Africans as “savage,” “raw” and living a life of “indolence and nakedness,” and he campaigned relentlessly to prove to the British rulers that the Indian community in South Africa was “superior” to native black Africans. This is spelt out clearly in “The South African Gandhi: Stretcher- Bearer of Empire” by S. Anand.

In an open letter to the Natal Parliament, in 1893, Gandhi wrote: “I venture to point out that both the English and the Indians spring from a common stock, called the Indo-Aryan. A general belief seems to prevail in the Colony that the Indians are a little better, if at all, than savages or the Natives of Africa. Even the children are taught to believe in that manner, with the result that the Indian is being dragged down to the position of a raw Kaffir.”(Gandhi – S. Anand). Over time some of Ghandi’s views may have changed, but he remained caste conscious to the end.

Offended and very rightly so, the students at the University of Ghana, Accra, actioned the removal of the Gandhi statue, installed on the campus by the government of India. Law student Nana Adoma Asare Adei told the BBC: “Having Gandhi’s statue means that we stand for everything he stands for and if he stands for these things (his alleged racism), I don’t think we should have his statue on campus.”

Can there ever be reconciliation? Whatever anyone says, we personally don’t think it ever possible. The final black uprising is looming on the horizon; it will arrive within a decade, nay earlier. This will see all white South Africans wiped out. Whether it constitutes a step back is for the Africans to decide. The Indian community will suffer the same fate. The South African experiment with reconciliation is not something that should be copied by anyone, it cannot last. It is but a short-term kite in the sky. It will fly only as long as the wind remains favourable and white, so to speak.

Many White South Africans have realised that the writing is on the wall and are migrating to create a new life for themselves in New Zealand, Australia, and the UK and even to Georgia in the previous Soviet Union. However, the open invitation from New Zealand, Australia and the UK seems to be running into problems, due to the migrant’s dissimilar and non-adoptable behavioural patterns, inconvenience to integrate and the willing creation of close knit ghetto communities built around their inter dependency. It will not be easy for the Afrikaner in any of the new countries as they will miss the African slave to help in whatever they hope to do. As for the experiment in Georgia, it is hoped that it would be successful.

The American exercise of integration, based on reconciliation, even after two centuries has still not worked, as there is no truth or sincerity in the process. They had a President who claimed to be black in colour. So what? That has not improved the general level of the African American people compared to the rest. A few have benefitted while being the routinely discriminated against, poverty stricken; the black community, driven into ghettos, still waits. It is a very long wait for the Martin Luther King’s dream, immobile, a stillbirth; will it ever come to fruition? Chris Hedges in his recent book, “America, The final tour”, referred to “the country being of a mindset that stems from a violent disposition, a war mentality based on promoting a brand of unsustainable ultra-consumerism”. Will the poor continue to be exploited and remain poor? Of course, they certainly will, and according to the grand (sic) scheme they have to.

The mass migration out of the disgusting slums in the eastern cities in the US around 1870s prompted and encouraged the new American migrants to go west to today’s mid-west and further to California. In the process, they decimated the first nation tribes and robbed them of their lands with the help of treaties that were not worth the paper they were written on. These tribes were eventually forced into enclosures called reservations and to ominous drunkenness. The “change-the-(native)Indian- and-save-the-man” policy has robbed them of not only their rich culture based on a deep respect for nature but also their traditional lands, their burial grounds and their rightful place in history. Today, they have been relegated to a subordinate tier in the American society lower than that of the African American.

Unfortunately, the African American who is of greater use to American society will continue to be used with a carrot of false promises dangling in front? While the globalisation experiment referred to by Henry Kissinger, “globalisation is the Americanisation of the world” will continue to spiral. This mass global consumerisation is being further encouraged by the corporate banks with their issue of credit cards, luring those unfamiliar with handling bank credit into a spiral of debt. These innocents carry on merrily paying the minimum, often forgetting that there is a heavy penalty accumulation taking place.

This spiralling debt will eventually engulf the poor in the world, leading to their suffocation and death and an eventual crippling of the traditional banking system. In the past decade, instead of making savings, big business greedily allocated all profits earned, amongst themselves and their shareholders, or in the purchasing of new projects, with little concern for a rainy day. The rainy day has arrived. This will eventually lead to their self-destruction, even begging their governments to prop them up.

The countries whose economies depend on the continuous development of endlessly superior and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, will continue to do so. Driven by an insatiabile hunger, a prerequisite would be to frighten the more peaceful countries on the looming of an eminent imaginary enemy or to promote and generate a tyranny, all to ferment and create markets for this merchandise. Even if it entails the starting of wars in specially selected oil rich or strategically located parts of the world, usually far from their own, destroying all normalcy, on a false concept of democracy.

The Western hegemony has a different definition for democracy. A definition that is blinkered on what they as countries do, but at the drop of a hat would be willing to point their fingers in a predetermined direction. Always finding fault with and bullying the smaller more vulnerable and weaker nations, in the process promoting their own idealistic belief of a totally insincere concept, of what democracy is.

After the forced disruption, once they install their puppets and move in, the motive is to install their contractors, to gain free access to exploiting valuable resources that rightfully belong to the people and the nation in the countries under siege, and not to the leadership in these countries.

They will even encourage the leadership to partake in this robbery. This will be the biggest war that will eventually be deposited on the doorstep of the manufacturers of these weapons. A trajectory works in mysterious ways; it has a homing instinct and eventually returns.

While we cannot accept the South African or the US model, both favourites of the Internationally funded NGO community, which sit at the base of the table eagerly waiting for the scraps that may fall their way. Both foreign-based models will surely not work for Sri Lanka. In both examples, one side with presumed superiority is vehemently disinterested in compromise, especially, in their despised disinterest in the other. They expect the other side to accept all their demands and meet requirements.

The world encompassing predominant media hype on the corona virus has thrown a blanket over the more serious issues. The ex-colonial British, especially as they still live in an illusionary superiority even after the loss of empire and believe they are still a lead colonial in charge, will go a step further. They will use promises and rhetoric as a tool to trap a disoriented and obligated refugee society to vote for them at the next elections. They are playing a dangerous short-term game in displaying an acute desperation, in choosing whom to support, when and where.

Singapore is also facing a fraying or the downside effects of the original experiment into secular living. Will it lead to success or to the destruction of the original vision, is to be seen. Canada instead of protecting and supporting the preservation of the first nations in their own countries, spend time in an inferiority based, superior pontificating in the affairs of other nations, in an attempt to entice those living in cultural ghettoes in Canada to win votes in their own district elections.

Considering the above, is there a Sri Lankan model? Yes! There is, but the success in implementation of such a model is hampered by a myriad of self-centred individuals who call themselves, “politicians”, who aspire to use the people they allegedly represent and are expected to serve, for their personal ends. Many see the neo-colonial use of this human asset and its virtue as a lucrative building block for their own survival in this quagmire of sick politics. These politicians need to keep a constant flow of rhetoric, for without the statements they make and the tension they create they will have no role to play to sustain their ego. Without this rhetoric, the ‘generous’ funding by International NGO’s will also come to an end.

As an alternative, we should be looking at a Sri Lankan model that keeps out false prophets and gives people the freedom to interact across the board and learn to live together again. As categorically stated by Dr Abdul Kalm, an eminent past President of India, “A nation is greater than its politics “. In Sri Lanka misplaced arrogance blocks a clear vision.

All who have been displaced due to forced ethnic cleansing should be returned to their original homes; this should not be limited to one group only. The Sinhalese and Muslims displaced in the north should be resettled in their original environments. As in the past, we still hope to see Matara Bakers in the forefront of breadmaking in the North. Those displaced in other parts of the island should also be encouraged to return. Those who have gone abroad will never return, as they and their families now enjoy the economic benefits of their new life. However, they will be routinely enticed to continue to fund and drum beat in their chosen foreign lands, to maintain their status, and to keep the original investment that never produced the promised and envisaged dividend, continuously afloat.

The work of Prof. Kamani Thennakoon, University of Colombo is significant. Her DNA studies, “Comparing both the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils, show no large genetic difference, suggesting that both populations have a common ancestry native to the island”. These data have led the team to conclude that contemporary Sri Lankans share very close maternal ancestors.

Race is usually seen as biological, referring to the physical characteristics of a person, while ethnicity is viewed as a social science construct that describes a person’s cultural identity. Ethnicity is created by linguistic, religious and cultural differences rather than by genetic differences. The study indicates no genetic difference between the Sinhala and Tamil speaking community living on this island.

However, there is a difference in the DNA of South India. Even the Tamil spoken in Tamil Nadu is different, it has evolved over time. The Tamil presently spoken in Jaffna has remained static and has its roots in an early form that stems from the 7th – 9th Century. Does this have another interpretation? A well-known scholar’s original thesis, may hold a clue.

In Sri Lanka, the DNA studies show that, we are all one people divided by two languages, forcibly kept apart by location and ego-seeking neo-colonial politicians. A recent statement by Daya Gamage showed that 58% of Tamil speaking people drawn from the north and east are living amongst the Sinhala speaking community in the rest of the island, amongst a very tolerant community. A narrow fragmented false domestic wall, that divided a single people like the bifurcation of Germany after World War ll has been created, nurtured and kept alive by the egotistical neo-colonial politician.

The new condescension of the Islamic population has a short memory; it is a recent foreign influenced input that has blinkered thought. They have forgotten that it was a benevolent Sinhala king that in the 16th C, who invited the Moors to live amongst the Sinhala in the hill country to save them from the persecution by the Portuguese, and even permitted them to marry Sinhala women, giving them access to a broader understanding of a cultural matrix, when they partook in the temple rituals and even offered dana to the Sangha. Robert Knox, during his exile in the Sinhala village, spent his time and earned an income from crocheting skull caps for sale to the Islamic population living in the vicinity of his village. (To be concluded)

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Midweek Review

22A: Competing Opposition parties in dilemma

Published

3 days ago

2026/09/2

Sahan Weerasooriya

Ranil Wickremesinghe arrives at the Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa's Office on 23 July, 2026. Talks centred on ways and means to oppose the 22nd Amendment

Silent petty backbiting among Opposition may result in it grabbing defeat from victory over NPP

There is no likelihood of the SJB and the UNP reaching consensus on a tangible arrangement in the near future though some asserted that they may agree on a united front against the ruling National People’s Power (NPP). Referring to

former President and UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’s visit to Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa’s Office on 23 July, a source familiar with the developments said that in spite of such gestures, underlying problems remain. Another source explained that a combined front may be useful in a campaign against a particular issue but the two parties needed a genuine arrangement ahead of the next countrywide election.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

United Republican Front (URF) leader Patali Champika Ranawaka recently thanked Health and Media Minister Dr. Nalinda Jayathissa for recognising the Janathawadi Joint Opposition as a real challenge to the National People’s Power (NPP) government. The NPP enjoys an unassailable 159 parliamentary seats.

The former Minister noted that Dr. Jayathissa, who is also the Cabinet spokesman, realised the political threat posed by them, though the main parliamentary Opposition party Samagi Jana Balawegaya consisted of 40 lawmakers.

Ranawaka refrained from naming the SJB as the main Opposition party he was referring to.

Addressing the media at the Flower Road Office of UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ranawaka pointed out that the ruling party felt their challenge, though there were a plethora of Opposition parties in the Parliament.

Referring to Dr. Jayathissa’s recent accusation that they conspired at the Kirula Place, Colombo 5, residence of former External Affairs Minister Prof. G. L Peiris, Ranawaka appreciated the Minister’s declaration made at the expense of the SJB.

While the 40-member SJB group is the second largest group in Parliament, the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) holds third position with eight seats whereas New Democratic Front (NDF) consists of five MPs. The NDF, that received the backing of Wickremesinghe at the 2024 parliamentary polls, is in fourth position, whereas the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) parliamentary group consists of just three members. The SLPP suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the NPP at the last parliamentary polls, held in November 2024. An angry electorate at the first parliamentary polls after the 2022 regime change project reduced the SLPP, from a commanding 145-seat group, to just three MPs. Defeated 2024 presidential election candidate Namal Rajapaksa was so fearful of the impending rout at the November 2024 polls, he took refuge in the SLPP National List.

The political grouping, based at the Flower Road office of Wickremesinghe, has gradually broadened its operation. The stepping up of the Flower Road operation must be examined taking into consideration the NPP targeting Wickremesinghe over his 2023 September visit to the UK. The NPP has alleged that Wickremesinghe squandered public funds at a time the country was undergoing extreme economic difficulties. The crux of the matter is whether Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as the President, spent Rs 16.2 man on a private visit.

In spite of the Flower Road project receiving the NPP’s attention, Wickremesinghe does not really command the NDF that contested under the ‘Gas Cylinder’ symbol. The NDF group in Parliament consists of former Badulla District SLPP lawmaker Chamara Sampath Dassanayake, former Kalutara District SLPP MP Rohitha Abeygunawardena, ex-SLPP Kandy District MP Andrada Jayaratne, ex-UNP Minister Ravi Karunanayake (National List) and former SLFP Minister Fizer Mustapha (National List).

It would be pertinent to mention that a major problem erupted within the NDF at the time of filling the two National List slots. Wickremesinghe is the undisputed leader of the NDF, though he lacked any formal recognition as such, fielded candidates for selected electoral districts outside the Northern and Eastern regions at the 2024 November polls. The NDL comprised the UNP, the SLFP and the SLPP breakaway faction ‘Podujana Eksath Nidahas Peramuna (PENP).’ All three elected members Dissanayake, Abeygunawardena and Jayaratne represented the PENP.

The SLFP received one National List slot whereas the General Secretary of the NDF, Sharmila Perera, regardless of strong objections by Wickremesinghe, accommodated Karunanayake as the other NDF National List nominee. Perera informed the Election Commission, in writing, while the coalition debated Karunanayake’s appointment. An influential section of the coalition favoured the appointment of Kanchana Wijesekera, of the PENP, as the other National List member.

Perera, in her capacity as the NDF’s General Secretary, chose Karunanayake whose involvement with the NDF is in the public domain. The Election Commission gazetted a notification on 18 November, 2024, naming Karunanayake to Parliament. Will discuss the NDF’s emergence as a significant political factor in the wake of the 2010 presidential election, the first national poll after the eradication of the separatist Tamil terrorist movement.

SJB strategy

Whether the SJB likes it or not, former Yahapalana Minister Ranawaka’s reaction to Dr. Jayathissa’s conspiracy claim highlighted the ongoing controversy surrounding the main Opposition party’s overall response to the NPP’s pet project, the enactment of the 22nd Amendment.

Some political commentators have harshly criticised SJB Chief, who is also the Opposition Leader, Sajith Premadasa, for failing to mount a large-scale counter offensive. Some of them have taken offence that Premadasa sort of played it safe in spite of the NPP seeking to bulldoze the Opposition, both in and outside Parliament. Various interested parties have asserted that Premadasa’s inaction has been influenced by his fear of the government hounding him with corruption investigations, targeting him and his wife Jalani.

In spite of much publicised gathering of recognised Opposition parties/groups at the Opposition Leader’s Office at No 30, Sir Marcus Fernando Mawatha, Colombo 07, on 23 July, 2026, also attended by Wickremesinghe, the SJB appeared to have failed to take the lead in the overall campaign against the 22nd Amendment. Had the government managed to neutralise the determined efforts of the Sri Lanka Bar Association (BASL) and the unexpected United Nations intervention, the Opposition campaign may have collapsed already.

The undeniable truth is the SJB never succeeded in taking command of the overall political strategy. Dr. Jayathissa’s claim and Ranawaka’s reaction clearly suggested the deterioration of the SJB’s status. But those who approve of the SJB’s handling of political developments seem confident the party is on the right track. They feel criticism directed at the SJB and Sajith Premadasa, in particular, unfair and utterly politically motivated. Social media criticism appeared to have troubled the SJB. Recently, the SJB contradicted and challenged the opinion expressed by Priyanjith Vitharana who posted political commentaries under the pseudonym ‘Rate Rala.’ The former General Secretary of the breakaway JVP group, the National Freedom Front (NFF), has emerged as one of the strongest critics of Premadasa’s style of Opposition politics. ‘Rate Rala’ relentlessly attacked the SJB leader and vigorously questioned what he called the Opposition Leader’s lukewarm reaction to the NPP’s challenge.

The SJB and the Wickremesinghe-led political grouping cannot turn a blind eye to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s impending high profile political campaign, countrywide. The NPP has declared that the campaign would be launched on 5 September. The NPP enjoys absolute political power to move large groups of people for their intended meetings as previous ruling parties did. But, in the absence of a cohesive political strategy, those in the Opposition are still unable to work out a strategy to counter the NPP campaign. The Cabinet spokesman has dared Wickremesinghe’s group to bring in people onto the streets instead of having clandestine meetings at the residence of Prof. Peiris, the convenor of the Janathawadi Joint Opposition.

Wickremesinghe’s five-member NDF group in Parliament is obviously divided over political strategy. It seems the members of the group are pulling in different directions. The SLFP’s Faizer Mustapha is somewhat silent on the 22nd Amendment and the remaining members haven’t been seen playing a role against the 22nd Amendment worth mentioning. Cobbling up alliances to overcome short-term political challenges is the bane of the Sri Lankan political setup. The NDF is no exception. Having suffered an expected defeat at the 2024 September presidential poll, Wickremesinghe utilised the NDF to bring together those at the mercy of the NPP. Wickremesinghe’s move dealt a devastating blow to the SLPP, struggling to cope up with the developing situation. The consequences of Wickremesinghe post-presidential actions caused irreparable damage. The fielding of SLPP candidates on the NDF ticket and also accommodating them on its National List, at the expense of the SLPP, undermined that party. Among those who betrayed the SLPP were former Prime Minister Dinesh Gunawardena and ex-Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena. But, Wickremesinghe didn’t care. By then, the SLPP had forgotten how in its capacity as the ruling party it elected Wickremesinghe as Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s successor at the expense of their own Dullas Alahapperuma who teamed up with the SJB to fight it out in Parliament.

The SLPP fell out with Wickremesinghe when the latter sought the ruling party’s backing at the 2024 presidential polls, the first post-Aragalaya (read regime change project) national election. At the end, Sajith Premadasa, Ranil Wickremesinghe and Namal Rajapaksa contested at the expense of a unified front. That enabled Anura Kumara Dissanayake to secure victory at the 2024 presidential race.

Unrealistic SJB-UNP partnership

In the run-up to the 2024 parliamentary polls, the writer, at a Flower Road Office briefing by UNP Deputy Leader Ruwan Wijewardena, raised the failure on the part of the UNP and the SJB to reach a consensus after Dissanayake won the presidency due to their dithering.

The former Deputy Defence Minister, struggled to explain the status on the SJB-UNP talks when the writer pointed out that Dissanayake polled 5,634,915 votes whereas Sajith Premadasa (4,363,035 votes) and Ranil Wickremesinghe (2,299,767) together polled 6,662,802- a staggering 1,027,887 votes more than the winner. Unfortunately, both camps remained adamant regarding the modalities of consensus/unification. Had the two parties realised the gravity of the situation and the extraordinary challenge the NPP posed, they could have shed whatever their differences to contest under one symbol. But the petty-minded SJB and UNP leaders squandered an opportunity that resulted in the NPP securing an unbeatable 159 seats at the presidential election.

The SJB and the UNP continue to move in different directions. Those who remain with the UNP appeared to be more comfortable having Dissanayake as the President than Premadasa. Wickremesinghe’s visit to the Opposition Leader’s Office seemed to have failed to achieve a genuine reconciliation between the two leaders. Soon after the 2019 presidential election that brought newcomer Gotabaya Rajapaksa to power, the internal crisis, within the UNP, intensified.

Defeated UNP contestant Deputy Leader Sajith Premadasa quit the party in early February 2020, to form the SJB. The SJB-led alliance was officially launched in March 2020 ahead of the parliamentary polls in August 2020. The UNP split in the aftermath of the 2019 presidential poll created an extremely unfavourable environment for Wickremesinghe who suffered a crushing defeat at the August parliamentary polls. The UNP was reduced to one National List slot whereas the SJB secured 54 seats, including seven National List slots. Wickremesinghe failed to retain his Colombo District parliamentary seat.

Wickremesinghe refrained from filling that solitary National List slot till June 2021. By then, the economic crisis had set in. Wickremesinghe entered Parliament on 23 June, 2021. Rapid economic deterioration led to sovereign default the following year. Political stability created an environment for Wickremnesinghe to exploit. Wickremesinghe didn’t hesitate to accept the premiership on 12 May, 2022, soon after SJB leader Sajith Premadasa turned down President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s invitation. The beleaguered UNPer couldn’t have asked for more. The SLPP ended up electing Wickremesinghe as Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s successor 10 weeks later, a decision that the party now rued. In hindsight, the consensus between the Rajapaksas and Wickremesinghe, in the short term, benefited both parties but undermined efforts to iron out differences between the SJB and the UNP.

The UNP felt that it should have the final say in the issue at hand. However, the SJB quite rightly asserted that securing 54 seats at the 2020 parliamentary election should be taken into consideration. The UNP was down to one National List slot and in the wake of the SLPP accommodating Wickremesinghe in the Executive Office, Wajira Abeywardena filled that vacancy.

In fact, the UNP never relished consensus with the SJB. Instead, Wickremesinghe felt that it could extend his partnership with the SLPP, to his advantage, by securing its approval as the party’s 2024 presidential poll. Had that happened, the SLPP would have further deteriorated though Wickremesinghe could have polled a far larger share of votes at the presidential poll. Contesting as an independent, Wickremesinghe polled over 2.2 million votes at the presidential election. That defeat compelled Wickremesinghe, who turned 75 in the run-up to the presidential poll, not to join the parliamentary polls fray.

Wickremesinghe knew the signs. He knew the game was over and the UNP no longer appealed, even to die-hard supporters. The UNP leader quietly brought together the remnants of the UNP with the SLFP and SLPP and fielded them under the NDF’s symbol. As mentioned at the onset of this piece, the NDF, under Wickremesinghe’s leadership, obtained five seats. But, he never managed to retain control of the parliamentary group. Against the backdrop of an unprecedented deterioration of the UNP, the 22nd Amendment, in a way, has helped Wickremesinghe to work out a strategy to somewhat consolidate his position. The Flower Road operation has given Wickremesinghe some leverage as the NPP battled the high profile Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL)-led campaign against the 22nd Amendment.

NPP strategy

The NPP seems confident that the SJB and the UNP, under any circumstances, will not amalgamate or contest under one symbol. The NPP’s political strategy is based on the presumption that the two parties lacked the will to do so, though they realised their costly failure to reach consensus at the last presidential and parliamentary polls in 2024. Both parties suffered at the 2025 May Local Government polls as well. In a last-ditch attempt UNP leader Wickremesinghe proposed that the UNP and SJB contest the Colombo Municipal Council under one symbol. That proposal never materialised.

As a result, the UNP lost the CMC after more than 50 years. The UNP won the CMC in 2011 when the rival UPFA, led by the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa, won all other local government bodies outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces, two years after the eradication of the LTTE.

Opposition sources acknowledged that nothing short of an arrangement to contest the next election, under one symbol, wouldn’t help them. “We are unable to fully exploit the deterioration of public confidence in the NPP due to the appalling failure to bring talks between the two parties to a successful conclusion,” a source familiar with the developments said.

The 22nd Amendment gave an opportunity for the SJB, with 40 MPs in Parliament, and the UNP, sans any parliamentary representation, to finalise an arrangement. Unfortunately, they failed to do so, thereby allowed the government to proceed with the strategy. A major campaign, led by President Dissanayake himself, scheduled to be launched on 5 September, underscored their strategy, whereas the Opposition remained still unsure of its own counter-strategy. Had they at least managed to organise a few mega rallies with the participation of the entire Opposition, the NPP may have come under real pressure. Unfortunately, even after the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) and Tamil Progressive Front (TPA) representing upcountry political parties declared strong opposition to 22nd Amendment, the SJB couldn’t take the lead in organising a large-scale counter campaign. Instead, the Janathawadi Joint Opposition, operating out of the Flower Road Office, has exploited the situation to its advantage.

Despite both the SJB and the UNP (Janathawadi Joint Opposition) moving the Supreme Court against the 22nd Amendment, they conveniently failed to appear together at regular media briefings, held at Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office, where Prof. Peiris, in his capacity as the convenor of the grouping, meticulously dealt with the developing story.

Regardless of the failure on the part of the SJB and the UNP to finalise an arrangement with eyes on the next election, the BASL-led campaign against the 22nd Amendment caused significant damage to the NPP’s reputation. The BASL’s shocking revelation that two deserving justices, namely senior justice of the Court of Appeal, Dhammika Ganepola, and senior-most justice of the Court of Appeal, justice R. Gurusinghe, were deprived of promotion to the Supreme Court by the incumbent administration, was received by the public with disappointment. The BASL released 17 August, 2026, dated, hitherto unpublished letter, addressed to President Dissanayake, that dealt with unfilled vacancies in the superior courts, while the government preached the public of its determination to deal with a mountain of case backlog.

Unfortunately, the Opposition campaign lacked direction though some former and present lawmakers targeted the 22nd Amendment. With almost all who moved the Supreme Court against the 22nd Amendment seeking all remaining judges of the Supreme Court to hear the petitions with the BASL suggesting that Chief Justice recuse himself of hearing the cases over conflict of interests and all agreeing on a referendum to approve of the controversial constitutional amendment, the apex court constitutionally is authorised to take three weeks to decide on the issue at hand.

The decision is expected to be communicated to Speaker Dr. Jagath Wickremaratne around the time President Dissanayake completed his second turbulent year in Office on 21 September.

Midweek Review

The local and global dynamics of Sri Lanka’s 22nd Amendment

Published

3 days ago

2026/09/2

Sahan Weerasooriya

Beyond noise and acrimony:

by Sasanka Perera
(The writer is on X as @sasmester)
Background

The Sri Lankan government has proposed to introduce the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution focused on increasing the retirement age for Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judges. Coupled with parallel legislative adjustments to the Judicature Act of 1978 governing the functioning of lower-tier courts, the initiative has drawn sharp criticism from domestic legal bodies, opposition political parties, human rights activists and scrutiny from international organisations, most notably the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers.

Locally however, much of the debate is lost in the noise of acrimony, name-calling and what can only be called ‘social media violence’ rather than becoming a sensible discourse of rational and courteous debate. A week ago, a simple tweet from me on my wariness over getting the UN involved in this matter and the UN’s general bias towards countries like ours literally went viral, castigating me as a supporter of the government. My public writing in support and often in opposition to government positions — as demanded by different cases and situations — had no impact whatsoever. This virulent noise has no place in democratic practice, which all these noisemakers nevertheless claim to protect. This essay, however, finds its genesis in that noise as a means of making sense of the politics of the 22nd Amendment for myself and for any sensible people who might want to ponder over its implications.

As far as my understanding goes as a citizen without a legal background, the present controversy touches on the core tension amongst practical administrative necessity as seen by the government, constitutional integrity as argued by many in the legal profession, human rights advocates and opposition politicians and the geopolitics of international human rights oversight exercised by entities such as the UN.

Under Article 107 of Sri Lanka’s 1978 Constitution, the mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court judges is 65 years, while Court of Appeal judges must retire at 63 years. The proposed 22nd constitutional amendment seeks to raise these limits by two years. That is, extending Supreme Court tenure to 67 years and Court of Appeal tenure to 65 years. It also proposes that the number of judges in the Court of Appeal be increased from 19 to 24. Further, in the case of the Chief Justice, it is specified that the retirement date would be 67 years or after completing six years in office, subject to whichever comes first. In parallel, the government has also proposed to amend the Judicature Act of 1978 with the aim of raising the retirement age of High Court judges to 63 years and for District Court judges and Magistrates to 62 years. In other words, the overall proposal is to increase the retirement age of judges throughout the judicial hierarchy by two years.

Government’s Rationale

The government’s justifications for the proposed amendment rests on two general parameters. One is efficiency in judicial administration. The other is the retention of experienced judges for an additional period of two years. In this context, the government and its supporters in civil society do not perceive the proposal as a political maneouvre, but rather as an urgent administrative intervention that is essential to clear the backlog of cases throughout the judicial system. There is no doubt that the system is clearly overworked, understaffed and inefficient, and as a result, burdened with a serious backlog of cases.

Sri Lankan courts face an acute backlog exceeding 1.1 million pending cases according to some estimates. In this context, the government’s argument is that retaining seasoned judges is vital to maintain case disposal rates and prevent systemic paralysis. Extending judicial service is presented as a pragmatic mechanism to preserve institutional memory and combat capacity shortages.

Objections and Opposition

Despite official justifications, most of which seem legitimate based on actual experience and existing data, some legal analysts, opposition figures, and civil society groups suspect unstated political objectives behind the timing and structure of the reform. For them, a primary concern is that the amendment is structured to apply retroactively or immediately to sitting judges rather than prospective future appointees. Critics suggest this directly benefits specific high-ranking figures ranging from the incumbent Chief Justice to senior appellate judges, who are nearing the mandatory retirement age while overseeing politically sensitive cases. On the other hand, one can argue it is precisely because some of them are presiding over politically sensitive cases, that they need to complete the relevant cases for which experience, familiarity as well as institutional memory are essential.

However, there is no doubt that extending the tenure during an active term creates the impression of a government benefit granted to sitting judges. Whether this is the intention or whether it becomes reality, appearances do matter. The main point opponents bring out is, this specific intervention risks compromising the perception of judicial neutrality in a situation where sitting judges might be perceived as indebted to political authority for extending their service. While this is indeed a possibility, it is nevertheless not a necessary outcome.

Formal and vocal opposition at the moment is led by the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, local political parties, and some constitutional experts. But this has not become a bread-and-butter issue yet in the country. That is, there is no way this issue will capture the public imagination in the manner more pressing bread and butter issues did in the aragalaya of 2022. Also, Sri Lanka’s fractured and delegitimised opposition sharing the same argumentative plain with an entity like the Bar Association of Sri Lanka does not help the latter when it comes to generating public sympathy for its cause however legitimate it might be.

To my understanding and reading between the lines amidst the deafening noise in the vocal opposition, the above concerns are based on several core arguments.

One has to do with the perceived erosion of the separation of powers. That is, changing the retirement age of sitting judges mid-tenure can compromise constitutional predictability and impartiality. Theoretically, fixed retirement ages exist in judicial systems globally to specifically protect judges from executive interference or influence. The second concern I can see but not clearly articulated by sceptics has to do with the possibilities of career stagnation. In other words, delaying emergent vacancies at the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal will create a bottleneck across the entire judicial hierarchy for some time, potentially demoralising junior judges in the High Courts and District Courts awaiting elevation. Finally, there is a concern over the long-term government failure to effectively utilise cadre expansion that has already been made possible which precedes the present government’s access to office. Prior constitutional changes (such as the 20th Amendment) already had expanded the numerical capacity of the superior courts. In this context, the argument is that the government should focus on filling existing vacancies with new appointees rather than altering the tenure of current judges. Purely as matters of principle, theory and potential impact on democratic governance, none of these concerns are spurious.

The UN Special Rapporteur’s Intervention

The 22nd Amendment is no longer merely a local political issue. On 7 August 2026, Margaret Satterthwaite, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, addressed a five-page official communication to the Sri Lankan government based on ‘information’ her office had received and issued 7 requests for further information. Internationalisation of the politics surrounding the 22nd Amendment is also an integral part of Sri Lanka’s oppositional politics. While acknowledging that raising retirement ages can preserve expertise, her mandate emphasised that alterations to judicial tenure must adhere strictly to international standards. The Special Rapporteur highlights a number of primary concerns, which include the following: 1) She is concerned with the application of the proposed changes to sitting judges. That is, extending terms for sitting judges without clear, objective, and transparent transitional safeguards creates the risk or perception of political favor. 2) Second, she has raised concerns over the lack of broad consultations in introducing the proposal. In other words, the rapid introduction of the amendment without inclusive public and professional stakeholder consultation can threaten public trust in the rule of law. 3) Finally, she has also referred to a potential conflict of interest. That is sitting judges benefiting from the extension could face a structural conflict of interest if called upon to adjudicate constitutional challenges against the very amendment that extended their careers.

In a sense, these concerns are very similar to the concerns raised by the local opposition. But in real terms, is the 22nd Amendment unusual or inherently anti-democratic that it warrants a UN body to be this concerned when in general it is often not concerned beyond rhetoric in far worse situations? Increasing judicial retirement ages is a common trend globally, driven by demographic shifts and longer life expectancy. However, the mechanisms and contexts of various cases differ considerably. Through the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Act 2022, the United Kingdom raised the mandatory retirement age for judicial office holders from 70 to 75. This included judges, magistrates, and coroners. The rationale for this provided by the UK government at the time cited improvements in life expectancy, the need to address post-pandemic court backlogs, and recruitment gaps across courts. Crucially, the change followed a comprehensive public consultation involving over 1,000 responses from legal professionals, the magistracy, and civic bodies.

An Australian state and a self-governing territory, namely, New South Wales and Northern Territory offer other recent examples. Australia does not have a single uniform retirement age for all state and federal judges. Under Section 72 of the Australian Constitution, federal judges have a fixed retirement age of 70. However, individual states have raised state-level judicial retirement ages at different times. In 2018, New South Wales enacted the Justice Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2) 2018, raising the mandatory retirement age for state judges and magistrates from 72 to 75. Similarly, in 2019, the Northern Territory also raised the retirement age for Supreme Court judges from 70 to 72 years under the Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2019.

But the UN Special Rapporteur did not issue formal communications or allegations to either the United Kingdom or the Australian state and territory regarding these specific tenure increases — with reason. For one thing, both the UK and Australian state and territorial governments conducted long-term, transparent public consultations with legal professional bodies prior to enacting legislation. That is, there was an appearance of reasonability. On the other hand, in these cases, the reforms were introduced as broad, systemic statutory updates rather than ad-hoc constitutional amendments enacted amid heightened domestic political tension or ongoing sensitive litigation involving sitting judges as is the case in Sri Lanka. Finally, in these cases, the policy changes were implemented via general legislative consensus rather than executive-driven constitutional maneuvers that directly benefited individual judges in real-time in the short term.

Further, in these cases, as far as I can see, there were no formal complaints to the UN from any entity in these countries given that there were adequate consultations. On the other hand, unlike the UK or Australia, bodies like the UN generally assume countries like Sri Lanka are inherently anti-democratic and therefore need oversight. It is in such a context that the UN Special Rapporteurs have routinely issued communications to other countries that have altered judicial terms. For example, Poland, Hungary, and Bolivia have received such communications when changes to judicial retirement ages or tenure were perceived as attempts by the governments concerned to alter the composition of courts or erode judicial independence. The Sri Lankan case too must be understood in such a situation. The government, on its part, has submitted a six-page response accompanied by two annexures to the Special Rapporteur’s communication on 21 August 2026. It responds fully to the queries raised by the Special Rapporteur rationally. However, if it closes the matter remains to be seen.

The problem in this context is that Sri Lanka has the added complication of having a resolution on its human rights situation in the United Nations Human Rights Council since 2012. The next formal update on this resolution is scheduled for the 63rd session of the UN Human Rights Council taking place from 7 September to 9 October 2026. My concern in internationalising a domestic issue such as the opposition to the 22nd Amendment is that it could feed into the longstanding resolution giving further ammunition to Sri Lanka sceptics and detractors both in and outside the country. This is an unnecessary burden for a country like Sri Lanka lacking the power wielded by mass human rights violators such as Israel and its sponsor the United States. It is also a needless distraction for a country that is trying to reinvent itself. In such a situation, dealing with the sins of the predecessors does not help, more so, when UN impartiality is known to be selective.

The Future of the 22nd

Amendment

The controversy surrounding Sri Lanka’s proposed 22nd Amendment illustrates the delicate equilibrium required in constitutional governance and democratic practice. On a practical level, the government’s argument addresses an undeniable operational crisis. That is, as a means to deal with an overburdened legal system requiring the retention of experienced judicial personnel to deliver timely justice. Yet, on a principled level, constitutional safeguards exist precisely to ensure that procedural mechanisms are insulated from perceived political manipulation. In my mind, the government’s cardinal mistake was not to have wide-ranging consultations and information sharing programmes before the proposal became a contentious issue. This is simply good PR and common sense. Consultations and information sharing do not mean wholesale adherence to opposition positions. It simply means transparency, accepting what is reasonable, not accepting what makes no sense and offering at least a semblance of fair play. This would have also ensured that the government did not need to be overly defensive as it is now. In any case, given its overwhelming majority in parliament, the government does not need any support from the opposition to pass legislation. But it can certainly afford to be politically intelligent, sophisticated and mature in its public demeanor.

When a government alters the terms of service for sitting judges, the primary challenge is rarely the increased age limit. Rather, it is the need to preserve public trust in judicial neutrality. As comparative examples demonstrate, nations can adjust judicial tenure legally and successfully when changes are accompanied by broad professional consensus, prospective application, and transparent legislative processes.

Sri Lanka’s challenge lies in balancing the immediate demands of judicial efficiency against the enduring requirement that constitutional reforms must satisfy both domestic legitimacy and established international standards of judicial independence, particularly in a situation the latter is inherently oppositional to nations who do not have a veto or global political wherewithal to withstand pressure.