Features
Post-election Dimensions of Governance—Revival, Reconstruction and Reconciliation
by C. Narayanasuwami
(A member of the former Ceylon Civil Service and Retired Senior Professional of the Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines)
There has been substantial discussion in recent weeks on what follows next after a convincing victory by the JVP/NPP. Informed and analytical articles have appeared in the country’s main media outlets outlining the varied tasks at hand for the new government to fulfil its mandate to the people. This Paper is intended to highlight a few priority areas for initiating development guided by the principles of good governance.
Components of Good Governance
Good Governance has been singled out as the most important criterion for sound development management. A World Bank Report on Governance and Development (1992), states that “good governance is central to creating and sustaining an environment which fosters strong and equitable development”. This concept has been reiterated several times subsequently in recent years.
The components of good governance are identified as follows; (i) an effective policy framework that incorporates both growth and equity-oriented policies, (ii) a corruption free management system that rewards good performance, (iii) a well-founded institutional framework, including a good public administrative structure with sound recruitment and retention policies for civil servants, (iv) a qualified, competent and skilled workforce at different implementation levels and (v) overall politico-legal framework that supports non-discriminatory policies, and promotes initiative and dynamism in project and program execution.
Sri Lanka has suffered substantially in upholding many of these requirements/values in the last few decades largely due to the adoption of ill-conceived policies and implementation structures, which combined with entrenched corruption in the entire body politic, seriously undermined effective execution of planned development interventions. Today we are at the crossroads because of the rampant misuse of public funds, flagrant violations of the rule of law and inefficient delivery of public services.
Prioritising and formulating developmental interventions
The tasks that lie ahead are formidable – the government must start working on areas requiring immediate intervention. The writer offers his views based on his own personal experience as a senior public servant in Sri Lanka and as an international civil servant who offered his services to 24 countries in the Asia- Pacific Region as a senior professional of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The suggestions that follow may evoke controversy but every citizen has the right to offer his/her thoughts on subjects of national importance.
In his first policy speech in the Parliament, the President identified key areas that require intervention, specifically drawing attention to agriculture, rural development, poverty reduction, fisheries, tourism and elimination of corruption, among others. The state of the country warrants simultaneous action on many of these areas. The question that arises is whether the country’s current implementation framework and public service orientation will be conducive to support initiatives in this regard without system change.
System change
was strongly endorsed during the elections and remains the key issue for the government today. Changing highly entrenched practices and procedures require commitment, accountability and a high sense of integrity. As the President himself noted in a recent public speech, corruption has seriously undermined the effectiveness of even the Anti-Corruption Watchdog. Several interrelated issues must be addressed on an urgent basis if system change is to become a reality.
Reforming Public Service
Reforms cannot be instituted unless systems inimical to change management and development are drastically modified or changed. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, former Singapore Prime Minister is credited with the statement that a “little bit of totalitarianism is essential to develop countries which have remained lethargic for years”. This is undeniably an apt statement in the context of Sri Lanka which needs to adopt strong policies to make the public service deliver.
There was a recent statement that the public service is overstaffed with around 750, 000 of the 1.3 million staff considered redundant. A ‘needs review’ should be undertaken as soon as possible to carefully evaluate the scope for reduction and possible retirement and redundancy payments. This should be done in consultation and coordination with staff unions to ensure that the overall scope for redundancies is mitigated by re-employment in new ventures, transfers or changes in roles.
The issues relevant to this phenomenon have been addressed in several documents in the recent past – the writer addressed this problem in a Paper published by the Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo in April 2016 entitled, “Public Administration in Sri Lanka and the 19th Amendment to the Constitution: Prospects for the Future”. This was further elaborated in his book, ‘Managing Development: People, Policies and Institutions’ published in 2019. Several strategies were identified to redeploy and retrain superfluous staff, merge staff functions and retire unproductive staff through ‘Golden Handshakes’ or similar incentive filled approaches. Unfortunately, very little has been done up to date.
It may be prudent to look at the historical context and learn from lessons to determine changes required to deepen developmental thrusts.
Phases in Sri Lanka’s Development Trajectory
The history of Sri Lanka’s development is characterised by several phases closely following the thoughts and actions of leaders who controlled its destiny since independence. The immediate post-independence period, 1948-1956, much of it under the first Prime Minister, Mr. D.S. Senanayake was the first development phase. This phase arguably was the period of agricultural reawakening with priority accorded to the renewal of the tank civilization. Several initiatives were taken to build, renovate and revive ancient tanks for agricultural development. Simultaneously, colonization schemes or tank-based settlements were established in hitherto underdeveloped areas such as Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa. Epoch-making changes in the social sphere such as the establishment of the free education system and an equally accessible health system greatly beneficial to the citizens of Sri Lanka, created new opportunities for revitalising the tradition-bound social structure.
The second phase from 1956-1965,
turned out to be a period of mixed development in agriculture and industry with a substantial loss in the tempo of development due to the 1958 racial riots, the Sinhala Only Bill, and poor political leadership which undermined social cohesion and economic stability.
The third phase -1965-1970-
saw some progress in accelerating agricultural production with emphasis given to both plantation and domestic agriculture. No concerted efforts were made however, to address some of the fundamental problems affecting the industrial sector.
The next phase-1970-1977
-witnessed some success in enhancing agricultural productivity with equal emphasis given to paddy and subsidiary food production. This period saw the country moving toward self-sufficiency in subsidiary food production but unfortunately it did not last long because of rebel activity – JVP insurrection and LTTE activism- resulting in increased suppression and damage to life and property island wide.
The 1977-1989
phase was a turning point for private sector involvement in development activities which embraced garment industries, telecom and tourist-oriented ventures, in addition to development of small and medium scale enterprises. The private sector emerged as an engine of growth for the first time. Despite these positive developments, the country had to encounter significant downturn in agricultural productivity and social mobility, again due to civil conflicts and insurgencies, both in the north and south. The burning of the Jaffna Public Library, an insensitive and abhorrent event in Sri Lanka’s history, added to increased ethnic tensions.
The ensuing phase-1989-1993
witnessed continued civil conflicts leading to subdued development activities. The major thrust in development during this period was in state sponsored housing and urban development.
The next phase 1993-2004 and thereafter from 2005- 2020
could be categorised as the infrastructure era with roads, railways and airports given considerable investment support along with substantial private sector investment in export-intensive garment industries and agricultural products. Despite these efforts, the country’s growth remained stagnant because of corruption and mismanagement particularly after 2005, altering the pace, direction and durability of investment operations. This led to significant decline in valuable international goodwill and support. Variations in governance, including diminished trust and accountability in government operations, and the establishment of less impact projects such as airports created widespread dissatisfaction among the general populace.
Lessons of Development Learned during the past seven decades.
The foregoing analysis suggests that during the past seven decades Sri Lanka witnessed uneven, isolated and disjointed development efforts and substantial break up of social cohesion
that led to significant exodus of the population to western countries in search of greener pastures. The level of dissatisfaction and disenchantment was convincingly proven in the overwhelming support given by the people to JVP/NPP and Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) in particular, at the recent elections.
The major lessons of development could be summarised as follows:
· Development operations were centred on programs and projects that reflected the ideals, political philosophies and the entrenched thought processes of the ruling elite and was not assessed in a holistic manner taking into consideration the diverse needs of a multi-ethnic nation. There was no long-term vision although several 10 year and five-year plans, and a ‘Regaining Sri Lanka’ planning document were prepared. The tragedy of planning in Sri Lanka was that at no time did any of the development plans enlist all-party support and were not viewed as development visions representing overall national perspectives.
·Planning and executing development projects require mature skills in project development and consistency and continuity in implementation. Malaysia adopted a singularly successful monitoring system in the sixties and seventies. Relevant operations came under the direct purview of the then Prime Minister of Malaysia. The establishment of an ‘Operations Room’ in the Planning Secretariat of Sri Lanka in the late 1960s to monitor implementation, including identification of shortfalls with a view to taking remedial action, was an innovation that was adapted from the Malaysian model. This worked well initially but the momentum declined in subsequent years when enthusiasm waned with the change of governments. The concept was revived in 2022 but its operational performance has not yet been evaluated. It is widely recognised that development requires continuity, enlightened monitoring strategies and thoughtful mid-term interventions for achieving good outcomes.
· The three-decade civil war led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) severely damaged development operations, and the impact of this was noted in destroyed infrastructure, dilapidated irrigation systems, neglected agricultural activities, and destruction of small-scale industries, all of which resulted in increased poverty and distress among the affected population.
· Social cohesion was destroyed, and ethnic tensions had a pernicious effect on communal activities destroying peace, trust and happiness among well-bonded village communities.
· Unbridled corruption was pervasive from the level of the grass-roots level institutions to heads of institutions/departments making investments costly, unattractive and less profitable. This has had serious repercussions making investors run away from future investments. This was epitomised by a recent statement made by the departing Japanese Ambassador. The result unfortunately was less development and more social dislocation and suffering.
The above analysis confirms how governance approaches, including contradictory socio-economic policies, and lack of a long-term vision contributed to less effective and disjointed development over seven decades. The country continues to remain a developing nation while some of its neighbours have graduated to a first world status. Singapore followed by Malaysia are two examples of countries which had similar beginnings like Sri Lanka but developed fast to overcome their developing country status. Times have changed and a new mandate has been given to revive, review and reconstruct a nation bedevilled by past policies of mismanagement. Past mistakes should serve as solid lessons to promulgate a revitalised approach to development.
Delivering development amidst challenges and opportunities
Policy and Implementation Framework
While policies are framed at the political level the support mechanism for policy planning and implementation are orchestrated through administrative structures. It is axiomatic that an overarching super ministry is given the responsibility for planning and implementing development projects and programs. This has generally been the case in Sri Lanka and many other countries in the region. The President of Sri Lanka has taken over the responsibility for overall management of the ministry of finance, planning and economic development. Plan implementation should be considered central to planning and development and accorded high priority.
The ministry is expected to have overall supervision and oversight in the following areas;
· Support for Policy formulation,
· Designing implementation strategies, including setting of targets, establishing monitoring mechanisms and coordinating delivery of outputs,
· On-going monitoring and post-evaluation of projects and programs.
The current implementation strategies follow a centralised pattern utilising existing decentralized administrative structures at the provincial, district, divisional and grama sevaka levels. The adequacy of the existing administrative structure for planning and implementation needs to be reviewed, restructured and adapted to focus on project/program results/outcomes.
While individual ministries are responsible for implementation of sector-specific programs, it is important that there is proper oversight and coordination at the level of the ministry of plan implementation to ensure that implementation proceeds as originally proposed and that there are no impediments to achieving the intended outcomes. As the functions of monitoring and evaluation are key aspects of project management, it is essential that a highly professional team is set up at the planning ministry level with responsibilities for designing an implementation strategy that accords high priority to achieving targeted results. At the same time, it is important that the ministry also establishes sectoral oversight units or committees consisting of two or three senior staff to oversee implementation at sectoral ministry level by closely monitoring, interacting, and coordinating delivery of anticipated results.
Evaluation of projects/programs
periodically is another management exercise that goes hand in hand with regular monitoring to assess impact and ascertain the level of achievement of anticipated and actual outputs and outcomes. Countries which succeeded in maintaining a rigid, well-coordinated and supervised monitoring and evaluation system such as Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Peoples’ Republic of China and currently Vietnam have lessons to offer in this regard. Although Sri Lanka had received considerable multilateral assistance, including from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), to set up good monitoring and evaluation systems since the nineties, and staff were trained, the results achieved fluctuated over the years due largely to management shortcomings and limited enthusiasm displayed by sectoral ministries and departments.
Agriculture, rural development and poverty alleviation
Over 75 percent of Sri Lanka’s total population resides in rural areas and agriculture remains the backbone of the economy. Domestic agriculture has for decades remained traditional with a few innovations here and there. Though considerable success was achieved in providing improved seeds, better extension services, including advanced fertilizer and agro-chemicals (except during the period of President. Gotabaya Rajapaksa who was misguided to change over to the use of organic fertilizer), further technological improvements are necessary to help modernise agriculture.
Procurement, sale and marketing strategies have not progressed adequately to ensure timeliness, efficiency and improved prices to the farming community. Milling continues to remain an oligopoly constricting the emergence of small and medium scale millers. Rice prices are manipulated by the millers to the detriment of both producers and consumers. Reorganisation of agricultural marketing, including activation of modern tools, methods and practices, require more sophisticated government support.
Agricultural and rural development activities complement each other
and provide scope for advanced initiatives in other areas such as construction of rural roads and bridges and setting up of small-scale agro-industries. Improving the scope and content of rural development activities with focus on employment and income generation would constitute important transformative activities in line with the JVP/NPP manifesto and its public announcements during the election. The success of endeavours will depend on the commitment, direction and leadership provided by the different ministries and departments tasked with varied sectoral activities such as agriculture, industry, irrigation, rural development and transport.
Poverty cuts across sectors and territorial boundaries and affects about 26 percent of the population in Sri Lanka.
There is therefore a critical need to address poverty on a holistic basis. Both agricultural and rural development initiatives should be targeted to address extreme poverty in the first instance followed by other vulnerable groups. Infrastructure and industry related projects should also seek to improve the livelihood of rural people whose income levels are below the poverty line.
A separate unit in the ministry of plan implementation should ideally be responsible to initiate, monitor, evaluate and document poverty alleviation efforts undertaken by all ministries.
While sectoral ministries will target special programs for poverty alleviation, the role of the special unit in the ministry of planning should be to ensure that there is no overlap and duplication of efforts and that the final outcomes match originally proposed results. Success stories of other countries such as South Korea and Malaysia clearly suggest that direct interventions and targeted approaches brought about convincing improvement in the livelihood of the rural people.
Reconciliation
One of the hallmarks of the last election was the unity achieved among all communities to elect a new government to work towards equality and fairness in delivering the fruits of development. Having set out openly to achieve development for all, the President has a Herculean task now to complete it. He is aware that missed opportunities, lost ethnic harmony and resultant civil war, and rising corruption levels eroded the benefits of development and made people to wish for change. The nation is now looking for redemption and resolution of the ethnic conflict once and for all.
The question of whether the solution lies in implementing the 13th amendment to the Constitution in full or adopt a new variation ultimately lies in the hands of the government. The President has reiterated that he is for devolution of power and functions to the periphery. The writer considers that substantial devolution of power and functions to the periphery without prejudice to the powers and integrity of the central government would go a long way to satisfy ethnic aspirations.
Question arises as to what kind of structure is viable and justifiable. Looking at the countries around us and beyond, substantial devolution should involve decentralized power to manage education, health, land, police and revenue operations. While the aim of the government should be to ensure equality, justice and fairness for all, a structure is warranted to give legal status to this commitment. Whether this should be achieved through improved delegation to the existing provincial councils or through a new structure could only be settled at the political level with the participation of the concerned ethnic communities. Lack of progress in achieving a consensus can further delay development and hamper efforts to reaching economic stability and social transformation.
Review and revision of existing regulatory provisions for attracting foreign investment and promoting tourism.
Restrictive regulatory policies and practices have hindered the development process considerably in the recent past. Sri Lanka must set up a special overarching institution that will cut red tape, ease restrictions inimical to investment, and provide easy access to investment opportunities. Our embassies, and consulates should be instructed to raise the image of the new Sri Lanka that is willing to engage in fair and reasonable international trade cutting across red tape and corruption.
Tourism has great potential in Sri Lanka because the country is endowed with significant natural resources, including scenic landscapes with beautiful mountains and valleys, moderate climate, and pristine beaches. Tourism cannot be promoted merely through advertising and related promotional activities. Thailand attracts millions of tourists (32 million in 2024), and Vietnam 12.5 million in 2023, because of the exclusive tourist-oriented policies and well-coordinated institutional framework servicing the tourist industry. Improved administrative structure for tourism should facilitate easy entry and exit formalities for tourists. For example, easing of visa restrictions, reduction of cumbersome immigration procedures, improved airport and aviation facilities, and strengthened hotel services serve as important packages for attracting tourists and making them feel welcome to the country. The country has the resources – intellectual and financial – to formulate a new image that will promote tourism and expand trade potential that would help enlarge its foreign reserves.
Conclusions
This paper serves to provide a synopsis of developmental interventions over the last seven decades and identifies issues that constrained development over this period. It also highlights some of the pervasive impediments to development such as ineffective governance, mismanagement, public service inefficiencies and corruption. Some of the more pressing developmental areas that require intervention in line with the proclaimed policy statements of the current government are outlined and discussed with the objective of drawing the attention of the government to move forward decisively.
There is commitment and leadership to steer the country toward the path of development. Priorities therefore need to be accorded to (a) reforming the public service, (b) mitigating if not altogether eradicating corruption in the short term, (iii) moving forward to restructure agricultural and rural development policies to alleviate poverty, improve productivity and generate better employment and income, (iv) promoting international trade and investment, (v) attracting more tourists and (vi) resolving the ethnic conflict by promoting reconciliation and making structural changes through constitutional arrangements.
(To be continued next week)
Features
After Iranian frigate sinks near Sri Lanka, a call for a Colombo-based framework to prevent regional spiral
The US Navy’s sinking of an Iranian frigate IRIS Dena just off Sri Lanka’s southern coast has done more than disturb the waters of the Indian Ocean. It has jolted a small island nation into the gravitational pull of a geopolitical drama that is no longer confined to Tehran’s crumbling political architecture. Sri Lanka did not seek this moment. Yet history has a habit of choosing its bystanders, and the detonation beneath the waves has now placed Colombo at the fault line of Iran’s post regime turmoil. What had been a fractured and uncertain transition has suddenly acquired a maritime focal point, one that carries the potential for escalation, misjudgment, and the opportunistic meddling of regional powers eager to shape the emerging order.
In response, Sri Lanka has moved with a discipline that belies its size. Naval vessels were dispatched within hours to secure the wreck site. A formal inquiry was announced even before public speculation could harden into rumor. Senior officials established discreet channels with the International Maritime Organization to ensure that the investigation proceeds within an internationally recognized framework. Throughout these actions, the government has maintained a posture of strict neutrality. Yet the neutrality itself is a message. It signals that Sri Lanka intends to steady the situation without becoming entangled in the rivalries now radiating outward from Iran’s internal collapse.
For weeks, analysts have warned that Iran’s unfolding transition was approaching a dangerous tipping point. That warning has now come to pass. The crisis is no longer political alone. It is no longer a matter of rival factions disputing legitimacy in distant capitals. It has become a security crisis with consequences that wash onto the shores of states that never imagined they would be pulled into the vortex.
It is into this unpredictable moment that I have advanced the proposal known as the Colombo Accord. It is presented not as a government blueprint, but as a scholarly intervention grounded in the mechanics of negotiated transitions and the realities of regional security. The Accord outlines a multi-phase framework for structured dialogue among Iran’s four principal factions and relevant international stakeholders. In any week, the initiative would have been timely. In this week, with Sri Lanka thrust into the story by the accident of geography and the violence of the sea, its logic has become unavoidable. The stakes have risen. So has the urgency.
A Maritime Tragedy Highlights a Political Vacuum
The sinking of the Iranian frigate, still the subject of an evolving investigation, has unleashed a torrent of speculation that mirrors the broader uncertainty consuming Iran’s post regime landscape. Tehran’s provisional authorities have already gestured toward sabotage. Within Iran’s rival factions, whispers circulate that the incident may be a settling of scores disguised as misfortune. Regional analysts, quick to see the hidden hand of intelligence services, suggest the possibility of covert action by states with long standing grievances against Tehran. No version of events has been substantiated, yet each interpretation reveals the same unsettling truth. A nation struggling to define its political future is now projecting its instability outward, and the tremor has been felt far beyond its territorial waters.
In the aftermath, Iran’s political factions have turned upon one another with renewed ferocity. The sinking has become a canvas on which competing narratives of legitimacy are being hastily painted, each faction scrambling to depict itself as the victim of a conspiracy and its rivals as the likely authors of national humiliation. As Tehran’s internal quarrels intensify, regional powers have begun repositioning their naval assets nearer to the Indian Ocean’s key transit routes. The maritime movements speak more loudly than the official communiqués. They betray a quiet preparation for whatever comes next, whether escalation, opportunity, or a larger realignment triggered by the vacuum in Iran.
For Sri Lanka, the event has created a delicate and unfamiliar burden. The country now finds itself attempting to preserve its neutrality while managing the political sensitivities of hosting the wreckage of a foreign military vessel barely beyond its shoreline. Every statement must be calibrated, every operational decision measured. An island that has long viewed geopolitical turbulence as something observed from afar must now contend with the fact that great power politics can arrive not by choice or invitation, but as debris drifting toward its beaches.
The tragedy at sea has made unmistakably clear what distant observers sometimes forget. Geography offers no immunity when instability expands beyond its point of origin. In a world where maritime space is both the arena of commerce and the stage of strategic rivalry, even a nation seemingly far from the epicenter of conflict can find itself drawn into its orbit.
Why Colombo Now Matters More Than Ever
My proposal for the Colombo Accord predates the sinking of the Iranian frigate, yet the incident has given the framework a sharper edge and a sense of immediacy that no academic theorizing could have supplied. Iran’s transition has long been fractured among four principal blocs. Monarchists cling to the memory of a political order that once anchored Iran in a very different world. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (a coalition of Iranian dissident groups) and the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK)—an exiled Iranian opposition group advocating for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic to establish a secular, democratic state—operate with a disciplined organizational machinery that inspires both loyalty and unease. The technocrats and remnants of the Artesh, the conventional Islamic Republic of Iran Army, represent the continuity of a state apparatus that refuses to vanish with the fall of its governing ideology. The democratic coalitions, particularly those rooted in Iran’s ethnic peripheries, carry their own visions of a future that balances autonomy with nationhood. Their rivalry has always posed a significant risk to Iran’s internal stability, but until now it remained largely contained within the fractured political landscape of a country struggling to reinvent itself.
The loss of the frigate near Sri Lanka’s waters has altered the nature of the crisis. What had been an internal contest for legitimacy has tipped outward. It has become transnational, touching actors and geographies that never sought to be involved. The sinking is not merely a maritime accident. It is an early signal that Iran’s instability possesses a centrifugal force capable of drawing in distant states through the mechanisms of happenstance, miscalculation, or opportunistic interference. When a nation in turmoil radiates uncertainty into the sea lanes of the Indo Pacific, it is no longer possible to treat its troubles as an isolated matter.
The Colombo Accord argues that Sri Lanka, or any similarly neutral Indo Pacific venue, provides both psychological distance and geopolitical safety essential for meaningful dialogue. This distance is not a luxury. It is a structural requirement for factions that have spent decades regarding one another as existential threats. Colombo’s neutrality was once a diplomatic asset, useful but not indispensable. After the frigate incident, that neutrality has acquired a different kind of weight. It has become a stabilizing counterpoint to the suspicion that now permeates the region. When the waters grow crowded with vessels watching one another, calculating advantages, and anticipating the next provocation, a neutral shoreline becomes more than a symbolic refuge. It becomes a strategic terrain upon which the first steps toward de-escalation can plausibly be taken.
Sri Lanka did not ask for this role, yet circumstances have placed the island in a position where neutrality is no longer simply a posture. It is a form of strategic relevance. The calm that Colombo projects in the face of a foreign frigate resting near its coast demonstrates a kind of quiet capability that the region increasingly needs. The Accord seeks to build upon this moment, not to entangle Sri Lanka in the ambitions of others, but to offer a platform on which Iran’s fractured actors might finally find a way out of their zero sum contest.
A Scholar’s Framework for a Global Crisis
The Colombo Accord remains, at its core, an intellectual construct rather than an instrument of statecraft. It was conceived not in the corridors of a foreign ministry, but in the analytical space where theory, history, and strategic necessity intersect. Yet the fact that it is an academic design does not diminish its relevance. On the contrary, scholarly frameworks often precede political action, especially when governments find themselves reacting to crises they did not anticipate and do not fully understand. The Accord offers a disciplined structure for a transition that has so far unfolded as a series of disconnected improvisations by actors who distrust one another far more than they fear the consequences of inaction.
The framework proceeds in three distinct movements that reflect the logic of negotiated transitions. The first is a period of stabilisation talks that addresses the most immediate sources of danger. These include the custodial control of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, the architecture of sanctions relief, and the assurance of safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The frigate incident has now broadened this agenda. Maritime stability is no longer separable from the wider Indo Pacific environment, and any discussion of navigational security must take into account the possibility that Iran’s turmoil can spill outward into seas once considered peripheral to its internal struggles.
The second movement concerns the formation of a Transitional National Council. This requires closed negotiations in which the factions confront the difficult questions of representation, authority, and temporal limits. It demands that monarchists, technocrats, armed political organizations, and democratic regional coalitions attempt to imagine a shared political future after decades of mutual suspicion. A council of this nature cannot be imposed from outside. It must be assembled by the factions themselves yet guided within a structured environment that prevents the stronger parties from overwhelming the weaker and the weaker from derailing the process through fear of exclusion.
The third movement culminates in the drafting of two foundational texts. A Stabilisation Communiqué formalizes the immediate agreements necessary to prevent a descent into chaos. A Transitional National Council Framework sets the rules of the interim governance period and outlines the path toward elections or constitutional ratification. These documents, once completed, would not require Sri Lanka to act as guarantor. They would instead be presented to the United Nations by states willing to sponsor a viable path forward without seeking to dominate its content.
The sinking of the frigate does not alter the design of these phases. What it alters is the timeline. Crises at sea have a way of compressing political space. Maritime insecurity forces actors to confront the possibility that the next miscalculation could ignite a conflict far larger than anyone intends. The Colombo Accord, once a conceptual blueprint, now functions as an urgent scaffolding for de-escalation. It offers a disciplined alternative to the drift that currently characterizes the regional response. The longer the vacuum persists, the more likely it becomes that events will unfold according to the logic of accident rather than the logic of strategy. The Accord exists to prevent that outcome.
Sri Lanka’s Dilemma: Neutrality in the Eye of a Storm
Colombo’s response in the days since the sinking has been marked by a quiet discipline that reflects both prudence and an awareness of the moment’s gravity. Naval patrols have been extended across the affected waters in an effort to ensure that no foreign actor exploits the wreck or attempts to manipulate the scene for strategic advantage. The government has initiated a joint maritime safety review aimed at reassuring international observers that Sri Lanka intends to handle the incident with full transparency and in accordance with international maritime norms. Diplomats have opened discreet channels with Tehran, New Delhi, Washington, and several Gulf capitals, not as an act of alignment, but to prevent premature narratives from hardening into geopolitical assumptions that could force Sri Lanka into positions it has no desire to occupy.
Neutrality, however, becomes most fragile precisely when events press hardest against its boundaries. The sight of foreign debris washing ashore has created a symbolic intrusion that no government can simply cordon off with patrols or press releases. The island now occupies a liminal space between spectator and participant, and this is a position familiar to many small states navigating the undertow of great power rivalry. Their neutrality becomes most prized by the international community at the exact moment it becomes most difficult for them to preserve. It is a paradox that is neither new nor avoidable. It is the structural reality of a world where crises migrate unpredictably across borders and through seas.
Sri Lanka now confronts a moment in which the temptation to withdraw into studied silence must be balanced against the need to shape the narrative before larger powers do so on its behalf. This is where the logic of the Colombo Accord becomes most compelling. The framework is not only a mechanism for easing Iran’s internal fragmentation. It is also a means for Sri Lanka to assert a form of agency that does not compromise its neutrality. By offering a venue for structured dialogue, the island positions itself not as a partisan actor, but as a stabilizing presence in a region increasingly defined by uncertainty at sea and volatility on land. In doing so, Sri Lanka shapes events before events shape Sri Lanka, which is the essential choice required of any state forced, however reluctantly, into the center of a crisis not of its own making.
The Narrowing Window
The sinking of the frigate has emerged as a stark emblem of a deeper reality. Iran’s transition is no longer a distant abstraction that can be managed at diplomatic arm’s length. It has shed the illusion of containment. The crisis now lives simultaneously in contested territorial waters, in competing claims of political legitimacy, and in the widening space between what factions assert and what realities unfold. Its center of gravity remains in Tehran, but its shockwaves have reached Colombo with an insistence that can no longer be ignored.
This moment reveals a simple but unforgiving truth. Statements will not steady the situation, and sanctions will not guide a fractured nation toward coherence. The forces now in motion are too varied, too suspicious of one another, and too willing to interpret every event as either an opportunity or an existential threat. The wrecked frigate near Sri Lanka’s shores is a reminder that crises born of political collapse do not respect geography. They travel outward until they encounter resistance or structure, and at present there is no structure worthy of the name.
The Colombo Accord does not pretend to offer a miracle. It offers something far more modest and far more necessary. It creates a disciplined mechanism within which Iran’s competing actors can confront one another without turning the region into their arena. It provides a framework for de-escalation at a moment when the absence of structure risks inviting a cascade of increasingly dangerous misunderstandings. The Accord is not a promise of peace. It is an attempt to slow the march toward catastrophe long enough for reason to reenter the conversation.
As investigations proceed and diplomats circle carefully around the wreckage, this one fact will not change. Without a neutral venue that can host structured dialogue, the next Iranian crisis will not limit itself to a sinking offshore. It will break outward in ways that no state in the region, and few beyond it, are prepared to manage. History rarely gives much warning before the window for action closes. Sri Lanka now finds itself standing at that window, and the world would be unwise to ignore the view from its shore.
Dr. Achala GunasekaraRockwell is a Sri Lankan–born scholar of international security affairs whose work focuses on political transitions, regional security architectures, and defence strategy. She holds advanced degrees from the University of Wisconsin and has published widely on geopolitical dynamics across the IndoPacific, South Asia, and the Middle East. Her research emphasizes negotiated transitions, smallstate diplomacy, and the intersection of security with political instability. Dr. GunasekaraRockwell writes in her personal capacity, and her views represent her own scholarly analysis.
Disclaimer
The views, interpretations, and analyses presented in this article are solely those of the author. They do not represent, reflect, or imply any official position of the US Government, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, Air University, or any other federal entity. This work was produced entirely in the author’s personal capacity, outside the scope of her official duties, and is completely unrelated to her employment or responsibilities within the US Government.
By Dr. Achala Gunasekara Rockwell
Features
Cuba and the end of an era
Cuba’s deepening crisis represents more than the failure of an economic model-it signals a turning point in Global South politics. While attention remains fixed on the Middle East, consequential shifts are unfolding across Latin America, shaped in significant part by a more assertive U.S. policy posture that has intensified long-standing pressures on the region.
The island is facing a severe economic and energy crisis, driven by structural weaknesses and the cumulative weight of external constraints. Decades of U.S. economic embargoes-tightened in recent years-have pushed an already fragile system toward breaking point. Fuel shortages, power outages, and rising social strain reveal a system under acute stress, reflecting a wider shift in hemispheric dynamics. Cuba, long seen as an emblem of resistance to Western dominance, now confronts the practical limits of that posture.
For decades, countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia were romanticized across the Global South as symbols of sovereignty and defiance. Figures like Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and Hugo Chávez occupied an outsized place in this imagination. Yet ideology and symbolism often obscured more complex realities. Cuba became a Soviet outpost during the Cold War, culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis-the closest the world came to nuclear confrontation in that era.
Economically, Cuba and Venezuela might have achieved more sustained development had they pursued more pragmatic engagement with the United States, as many in the region did.
Today, that question is no longer theoretical. The collapse of Venezuelan support, particularly in the energy sector, combined with sustained U.S. pressure, has left Cuba increasingly isolated. Early signs suggest Havana may now explore limited accommodation with Washington. Even tentative steps would mark a profound departure from decades of entrenched positioning.
If this trajectory continues, it may signal the decline of an older form of Global South politics-once anchored in ideological defiance, now yielding to the imperatives of realism. The Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, once central to the moral and rhetorical architecture of the post-colonial world, are likely to see their influence further diluted in this evolving environment. An earlier era of ideological posturing is giving way to more pragmatic navigation of power and opportunity.
Yet realism does not eliminate the need for dignity. States must recognize their limitations, but major powers must also understand that humiliation can seed future instability. The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya illustrate how coercive or poorly managed transitions often create new crises. Similarly, the post-Cold War order-widely perceived in Moscow as dismissive of its security and status-helped shape grievances that continue to influence global geopolitics.
An instructive counterpoint is the evolution of relations between the United States and Vietnam. Despite a deeply traumatic war, the two countries today engage as pragmatic partners. This transformation underscores that even the most adversarial histories can give way to stable and mutually beneficial relationships-provided transitions are managed with foresight and respect
How transitions are managed can be as important as the transitions themselves.
Amid this evolving landscape, India has a distinct opportunity. It is one of the few countries with credibility across the Global South and sustained engagement with the United States. This positions it to act as a bridge-engaging countries like Cuba while supporting gradual, dignified economic and political adjustment.
India’s own experience-balancing strategic autonomy with pragmatic partnerships-offers a relevant template. Platforms such as the Non-Aligned Movement and BRICS will need to adapt, or be complemented by more flexible coalitions aligned with contemporary realities.
Diasporas also shape outcomes. In the United States, Cuban, Venezuelan, and Iranian communities influence domestic debates and, at times, foreign policy. India, too, must navigate the growing influence of its diaspora in key Western capitals-an asset if managed carefully, but a potential complication if not.
The manner of transition remains critical. Cuba and Venezuela must adapt with legitimacy intact. An emerging order perceived as purely coercive or dismissive will generate resistance, undermining both regional stability and broader strategic objectives. Successful transitions require early, careful engagement, guided by respect and strategic foresight.
The stakes are significant. Cuba, Venezuela, and others remain symbols of a historical narrative, but the world is moving toward a multipolar order shaped by realism, strategy, and negotiated respect. India has both the credibility and the opportunity to help guide this transition-toward a Global South that is pragmatic, resilient, and capable of asserting itself without confrontation.
The Global South is not disappearing; it is being redefined. The question is whether India and its partners will move early enough to shape that process-ensuring the emerging order reflects inclusion, pragmatism, and respect, rather than humiliation.
(Milinda Moragoda is a former cabinet minister and diplomat and Founder of the Pathfinder Foundation, a strategic affairs think tank, can be contacted via via milinda@email.com, was published 2026.03.26 NDTV Opinion section https://shorturl.ad/wZVvt)
By Milinda Moragoda
Features
LESSONS FROM MY CAREER: SYNTHESISING MANAGEMENT THEORY WITH PRACTICE – PART 34
My Stint at Dankotuwa Porcelain – Episode 2
The last episode described some of the interesting experiences during my first stint as non-executive Chairman of Dankotuwa Porcelain, including the privatisation. However, there was one incident I forgot to describe at that time, and I will relate it in this article.
Political interference continues
Political interference at the local level continued unabated. A particular senior minister would walk into the factory without warning at any hour of the day. The security guards were too frightened to stop him. He would speak on behalf of the workers and demand salary increases.
The company was doing well at the time, and our employees’ salaries and benefits were already well above the ceramic industry average. The management felt there was nothing more that could reasonably be given, and we stood firm. No more special increases. The union at the time was the Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya, which was affiliated with the UNP.
One day, the General Secretary of the parent union requested an urgent meeting, which we arranged immediately in Colombo. Since the factory union arrived late, our HR Manager used the opportunity to explain to the parent union official the full details of salaries, the monthly cost-of-living allowance, which increased regularly, and the other benefits provided by the company.
We were operating 26 buses to transport workers from different areas in two districts. Breakfast and lunch were subsidised, and the meals were of good quality. When the union official heard all this, he was shocked. When the factory union leaders finally arrived, he scolded them severely and told them their demands were unreasonable. They left the meeting very embarrassed.
Briefing the minister while pirith was being chanted
Despite this, the agitation continued. I realised that some militant elements had entered the union committee and were determined to create trouble and unsettle the company. Their agenda was different.
I decided I needed political support to resolve the situation and arranged to brief the Minister of Industries. He said he was very busy but suggested that I meet him at an all-night pirith ceremony which had been organised to bless the new building the Ministry was moving into.
When the Minister, Hon. Ranil Wickremesinghe, arrived, he sat on a mat in the middle of the hall, with everyone else seated along the walls. I made myself visible to him, and when he saw me, he signalled me to come forward and sit beside him. I was quite embarrassed, because even senior officials were not seated near him.
I explained the entire situation to him, which took nearly 45 minutes while the pirith chanting was underway. The monks did not look very pleased because the Minister was listening to me rather than the chanting.
When I finished, I quietly asked him whether I could leave. He smiled and said,
“It depends on you. If you want to gain more merit, you may stay. If not, you may leave.”
I took the opportunity and slipped away quietly.
The Politician-inspired Work Stoppage
The demands for salary increases continued, even though the workers already received annual increments, a monthly cost-of-living allowance, a monthly incentive, and an annual bonus. Meals and transport were subsidised.
The senior minister of the area, who was also the President of the Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya, asked the Dankotuwa Porcelain branch union to go on strike. The workers stopped work and left the factory, but remained within the administrative perimeter. They were confident that the Government would intervene and force the management to give in.
At that time, I was also the Executive Chairman of the Employees’ Trust Fund Board, and therefore had access to both the Prime Minister and the President. I met the Prime Minister and showed him the faxes we had received from concerned customers, as well as the details of the salaries and benefits our workers were receiving. He was surprised and told me firmly not to give in.
One night, the Board was invited to the Minister’s house for discussions to settle the issue. I took the other directors with me. The Managing Director joined us halfway. We were slightly nervous about travelling at night, but the journey passed without incident.
We arrived around 8 p.m., but we were called in only at midnight. I felt this delay was deliberate, as the Minister had arranged several political meetings before ours. The discussions were tough. Even when the Minister suggested a small increase of Rs. 50, my fellow directors did not agree. ‘Not one rupee, ’ one Director said. We left without reaching a settlement. As we walked out, the Minister made a veiled threat, but we ignored it.
Keeping the factory running during the work stoppage
Meanwhile, the factory had to continue operating. The main glost kiln could not be stopped suddenly. It had to be cooled gradually over about 14 days. If not, the sudden temperature change would permanently damage the kiln, resulting in a significant loss.
Managers and supervisors themselves had to do manual work to load and unload the kiln. There was also a threat that the strikers would cut off water and electricity to the managers’ quarters within the administrative area. We were also worried that the lorries parked there might be set on fire. Our Managing Director, Mr Jagath Pieris, had to drive the lorries himself into a safer area inside the factory perimeter. He later told me that it was the first time in his life he had driven a lorry.
We then briefed the President, who instructed the Prime Minister to refer the matter for compulsory arbitration immediately. I also requested that the Prime Minister send police from outside the area, as the local police appeared to be under political pressure.
At six o’clock the next morning, I was informed that three busloads of police from other stations had arrived, cleared the premises, and taken control of the factory. Our managers continued to run the operations.
This changed the situation completely. The strikers realised that their political support had weakened. At the same time, the compulsory arbitration order was issued. The newspapers reported that the strike had to be called off, and that those who refused to return to work would be considered to have vacated their posts. The SLBC morning news also carried the same announcement.
The union had no choice. They decided to march to the Minister’s house. The Minister then advised them to return to work.
He later came to the factory and told the union leaders to ask the workers to resume duty because the compulsory arbitration order had to be honoured. They refused, saying it was he who had asked them to strike, and that he himself should address the workers. He did so and then left quickly.
Before leaving, he shouted at the Managing Director,
“Tell your Directors that if my people are harassed, I will not hesitate to bomb the place.”
Discipline restored
Even after the Minister left, the union leaders continued speaking to the workers using the factory microphone. Our HR Manager courageously went forward, took the microphone, and said that they had no right to use it.
He also announced that the workers would not be allowed back until all the placards, caricatures, and effigies placed along the Dankotuwa–Pannala road were removed. Apparently, there were some very well-made effigies of me, along with placards containing language that was not fit to print. I asked for photographs, but my staff refused to show them to me.
That incident effectively ended the union’s power. Management power and discipline were restored, but we continued to treat the employees fairly and provide benefits whenever possible. The union leaders themselves were later reprimanded by their parent union, which had not approved the strike. They even had to bear the cost of the arbitration proceedings personally.
The union leader later came to see me privately. He showed me the loans he had taken to cover the expenses and asked for my help. He promised never to start a strike again. More than 30 years have passed, and he still keeps in touch with me.
After this incident, the company enjoyed industrial peace for many years.
The surprising arbitration award
When the arbitration decision finally came, we were surprised. The award stated that the management’s generosity had actually backfired. Because the company had given regular salary increases and good benefits year after year, the workers had developed higher expectations. Therefore, those expectations had to be recognised.
The arbitrator’s award was much smaller than the union demanded, and we decided not to appeal. It was a small price to pay for the stability we achieved.
The lesson – generosity can create expectations
The lesson from this experience is very clear. Many managers feel happy to give higher wages and better benefits when the company is doing well. However, the happiness level comes down to normal soon. Psychologists call it the ‘Hedonic Treadmill’. Satisfaction with a new benefit soon becomes a norm, and expectations increase. Business conditions do not remain the same forever. When difficult times come, and the company can no longer be generous, workers feel something has been taken away from them and blame management.
When Dankotuwa later faced strong international competition, some workers blamed the management for not getting enough orders. We explained the global situation, and although the younger union members understood and realised that they were on the same side as management in reducing waste and improving productivity, the older leaders still believed they had to fight management to win demands, irrespective of the international situation.
Interestingly, towards the end of my tenure, some young union leaders were even monitoring the Saudi Aramco contract price, because our energy cost formula depended on it. That showed a new level of maturity with the new generation.
A lesson I should have learned earlier
I must admit that I had seen this situation before, but I had not fully understood or internalised the lesson.
Many years earlier, I visited a tea estate owned by a very generous man. He provided his workers with facilities far better than those given in neighbouring estates, and he was very proud of his benevolent management style.
I was there with a retired Deputy Commissioner of a Government Department, a much wiser man. After listening to the owner and his boasts of how well he treats his labour, he quietly said to me,
“Giving much more than the basics will one day boomerang on him.”
Sometime later, I returned to the same estate and saw many vehicles parked there. Officials from a regional union office had come to form a union. One speaker addressing the workers said loudly,
“It is true that the owner gives many benefits, but he makes a big profit too. Therefore, we must demand more, because he can afford it.”
I was shocked by that attitude. Soon afterwards, the union presented a list of demands, and the owner was deeply disappointed. His generous style gradually disappeared. He learned his lesson.
A warning to another company
After the Dankotuwa arbitration award, I was invited to speak to the managers of a factory in the Pannala area. I learned that they were about to introduce several new benefits to workers. I told them our story and advised them to be careful.
The moral is simple. Generosity is good, but it must be balanced with long-term thinking. Several management and motivation theories also warn that once higher pay and benefits become the norm, people quickly adjust their lifestyles to that level. When the benefits stop increasing, dissatisfaction begins.
The next episode will also describe further experiences at Dankotuwa Porcelain, including my return.
Sunil G. Wijesinha, Consultant on Productivity and Japanese Management Techniques, Former Chairman / Director of several listed and unlisted companies
Recipient of the APO Regional Award for Promoting Productivity in the Asia-Pacific Region, Recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun, Gold and Silver Rays – Government of Japan
Email: bizex.seminarsandconsulting@gmail.com
by Sunil G. Wijesinha
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